Mission With Mountbatten

MISSION WITH
MOUNTBATTEN

by

ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON

CLE., O.B.E.

AICO PUBLISHING HOUSE
K

tpMBAY — NEW DELHI CALCUTTA MADRAS

1951

Specially revised and abridged by
the author for Indian readers

Printed ii
Rusi
RM.D.C. Prei
Worli Estate]
Boml

Pttttfishcd in
Jaman
JmQO f ublishirj
MahMwa Gam

CONTENTS

Page

PREFACE vii

PROLOGUF 1

PART I
THE LAST VICEROY

VICEROY DESIGNATE

DEBASES AND BRIEFINGS

THE FIRST WEEK

GANDHI AND J1NNAH

1HE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN ..

FRONTIER VISH

CRISIS AT SIMLA

THE PLAN RL DRATTED

THE GREAT A( CEPrANCE
ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

INDEPENDENT E DAYS

PART II

THE FIRST GOVERNOR-GENERAL

WAR OF SUCCESSION 1<>7

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY 206

SHAD0W OF JUNAGADH 220

25
39
54
72
83
l >7
\%
114
131
148
160
179

vi

CONTENTS

Page

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES 232

REPORT FROM LONDON 250

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO 260

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE 286

C ALL TO REPENTANCE 303

MA HAT MA'S MARTYRDOM 311

CONFLICTS CONTINUED 327

BURMA REVISITED 343

DEFINITION AND DETECTION 348

STALEMATE ^ 363

MISSION TO THE NIZAM 374

FAREWELL PHASE 387

PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES 4S5

PREFACE

The transfer of power in India is widely, recognised as
perhaps the greatest single development in world affairs
since the Second World War; it is an irony of history,
however, that the larger the scale of the event the greater
the danger of it being lost in legend or blurred by contro-
versy. Already the fogs of propaganda and political in-
vective are helping to obscure the view of Lord Mount-
batten's momentous mission to India.

, Some five months after my return from service on the
personal staff of the last Viceroy and first constitutional
Governor-General of India, I delivered an address on the
transfer of power to the Royal Institute of International
Affairs. It is reproduced in full by kind permission of
the Council of the Institute as an Epilogue to this book,
but if the reader prefers to start with a bird's-eye view
of the period covered by my diary narrative it will serve
equally well as an introduction. It was the interest shown
in this attempt to provide a general appreciation of Lord
Mountbatten's term of office that first encouraged me to
recall the story in more vivid detail for a wider public.

How did I come to be in this position of privileged
eye-witness? My previous excursions into contemporary
history were biographies of Anthony Eden and Lord
Halifax, but whereas, in both these books T was obliged
to dig for my source-material from papers and impres-
sions largely at second-hand, here was the rare opportu-
nity to write not just from the documents and experiences
of others, but of events in which I was taking part.

In July 1942 I found myself, by the chances of Royal
Air Force service, suddenly assigned as Air Public Re-
lations Officer on Lord Mountbatten's staff at* Combined
Operations Headquarters. When, fifteen months later,

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

he was nominated to the position of Supreme Allied Com-
mander South-east Asia, he asked for me to take charge
of his inter-command and inter-allied Records Section.
In this post he did not leave me simply to obtain inform-
ation from official documents, but used to call me in
lo high level meetings and weekly interviews to provide
personal background for the records. By the time he
was invited to go to India as Viceroy I was sufficiently
a part of the Mountbatten machine to be asked to rejoin
him now in civilian capacity as Press Attache— a post,
incidentally, unknown to his predecessors

The primary purpose oi this book is simply to tell the
story from daily notes, letters and memoranda J wrote
at the lime. *

For the most part 1 provide source-mnterial for history
rather than the history itself: evidence rather than an-
other verdict on India. The events and personalities are
still too near for me to attempt any final analysis of
them. From my particular vantage point 1 feel the cause
of analysis is best served if the atmosphere in which we
lived is first recaptured and the opinions we lormed on the
spot are duly appreciated. If this is a hurried, breathless
narrative, that is because we all worked at the highest pres-
sure and with an acute sense of urgency. If it appears
disjointed, that is because ad hoc problems demanding
immediate solution cut across continuity to become our
daily routine.

Lord Mountbatten's methods of using a large high-
powered staff under these conditions of stress and strain
were original and ingenious. For every hour of discus-
sion with the Inflian leaders he allowed a quarter of an
hour for dictation before seeing the next visitor. Copies
ot his interview notes were distributed to all the key
members of his Staff. He obtained our advice and did
his thinking aloud at the daily Stall Meetings, which we
all attended already knowing every word that had pass-
ed at his private and informal interviews the day* before.
This is how it will be found that on occasion I have no

PREFACE

ix

difficulty in quoting what Lord Mounlbatlcn said and
thought at any given time when 1 was not necessariN
there myself.

fn spite of the pace, the setbacks and distractions, the
transfer of power by Partition was steadily evolved ac-
cording to schedule. Within seventy-three days of our
arrival the Partition Plan had been announced; a further
seventy-two days after that, and the Viceroyalty itself was
at an end. Throughout Mounlbattcn's ten months as
Governor-General the tempo never substantially slacked.
All this immense and self-sustaining concentration of effort
is, 1 believe, better brought out by maintaining as far as
possible the chronological sequence, rather than in the se-
lection and separation of special themes. I have therefore
simply divided the book into its two natural parts: the
periods before and after the 15th August- Independence
Day. Within that framework the narrative is, as I have
already said, in efTect a daily progress.

J am indebted to Mr. V. P. Menon and Captain R. V.
Brockman, R.N., both former colleagues on Lord Mount-
batten's staff in Jndia, and to Mr. A. H. Joyce, Officer
in Charge of Information at the Commonwealth Relations
Office, for reading through my dairy narrative
in typescript, also to Mr. K. St, Pavlowitch for checking
references, and last but not least in my wife * for her
accuracy during the long and often Idle hours of dicta-
tion, typing and proof-reading.

My acknowledgements for permission to reproduce the
illustrations are due to: Press Information Bureau,
Government of India (Nos. 2, (), II, 12, 17 and
26): Associated Press (No. 1): Kinsey , Brothers,
New Delhi (No. 3); Lord Mounlbatten; Comman-
der Peter Howes, R.N. (No. 5); Mr. David Walker
(No. 9); Life (No. 15); Lalit Gopal, New Delhi (No.
18): P. N. Sharma, New Delhi (No. 19); International

x MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

News Agency; Press Association-Reuters (No. 27).

ALAN CAMPBELL-JOHNSON

Westminster
July 1951

PROLOGUE

"It may be said of the British Raj, as Shakespeare said
of the Thane of Cawdor, 'Nothing in his life became him
like the leaving it*. . . . This, Bill is a moral to all future
generations; it is a Treaty of Peace without a War."

Such was Lord Samuel's considered tribute, paid during
the House of Lords debate on the Indian Independence
Act, to the creation by compromise and consent of two
new nations involving one-fifth of the entire human race.

It was certainly the privilege of a life-lime to be given
the chance, as a member of Lord Mountbatten's staff, of
playing some personal part in this unique transfer of
power.

In announcing to Parliament on 20th February, 1947,
Lord Mountbatten's appointment as Viceroy, Mr. Attlee
stated that he would be "entrusted with the task of trans-
ferring to Indian hands the responsibility for the govern-
ment of British India in a manner that will best ensure
the future happiness and prosperity of India". But
Mr. Attlee then added that there was to be a time limit
for achieving agreement if possible and for transferring
power in any case by June 1948 -the principle no doubt
being that a time limit would induce the necessary margin
of agreement between the two great Indian political parties,
the Congress and Moslem League, as nothing else had so
far succeeded in doing.

In spite of the immediate controversy it provoked, this
time limit was in effect the logical conclusion of the policy
decision of the British Government early in the war to
cease recruitment for the Indian Civil Service. .The nor-
mal complement of that Service was never much more
than eleven hundred; by November 1946 it had fallen to
five hundred and twenty British officers in senior positions,

1

2

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

with the remainder Indians. In 1039 the Central Govern-
ment Secretariat was run on the basia of, approximately,
thirty senior administtative olhcers, but by the end of the
war the number oi ofliceis oi equivalent grade had risen
to three hundred

'I he same situation was developing in the Provinces.
This tremendous buicaucrulic growth of work coinciding
with the decline in the number of British senior officials
made it cleat, quite apart from other considerations, that
it was going to be vntujlly impossible to hold on to India
administratively beyond 1949. It is doubtful whether the
police establishment was strong enough by 1947 to en-
force any policy opposed by both major parties, and it
is fair to say that any large military commitments in India
to maintain the Raj would have been wholly unacceptable
to the British Government or people.

The original schedule Lord Mountbatten set himself was
to produce a plan by October 1947, discuss it with the
British Government and put it to the Indian Leaders by
about January 1948. While he was still at home this ap-
proach was considered much loo hurried, but he had hard-
ly set foot in India when he reached the firm conclusion
that it was, in fact, much too leisurely to meet the situa-
tion then confronting us. We were faced by rapidly rising
Hindu-Moslem tensions; "Direct Action" had been
launched by the Moslem League in August 1946; there
were riots and reprisals for riots. This set off the spark,
and disturbances of great intensity took place in Bengal
and Bihar. The trouble spicad to Lahore and the North-
west Frontier Province. In his first talks with Lord Mount-
batten the Moslem* I eague leader, Mr. Jinnah, gave a
frank warning that unless an acceptable political solution
was reached very quickly he could not guarantee to con-
trol the situation from his side. A similar warning was
given by Congress leaders.

Although it was still officially in being, the sg-called
Cabinet Mission Plan, negotiated throughout 1946, had
already broken down. This was the last attempt to

PROLOGUE

3

achieve a unitary system for India, and it was based on
an elaborate three-tiered structure of Provinces and groups
of Provinces. Group A comprised the present Dominion
of India, while Groups B and C conceded the substance
of West and hast Pakistan respectively; but all three
Groups were to support a weak central authority. This
"Grand Design" broke down, as many had done before,
on detail — vital detail, certainly — but a significant warning
for Lord Mountbattcn about the nature of the Indian
deadlock and how to handle it. Lt seemed that the Indian
approach was to start with an overall agreement and work
steadily away from it; while the British approach was to
tackle, the difficulties first and hope to be left with some
common ground al the end.

Unity had been our greatest legislative and administra-
tive achievement in India, but by March 1947 the only
alternatives were Pakistan or chaos. Lord Ismay likened
the position to "taking charge of a ship in mid-ocean with
a fire on the deck and ammunition in the hold". Lord
Mountbatten discovered from personal discussions with
the Leaders of the Moslem League that they would insist
on partition at all costs and fight a civil war rather than
accept transfer of power to a Hindu majority union, while
Congress showed themselves as champions of unity, but
not at the price of coercion. By the same token they in-
sisted that no non-Moslem majority community should
go against its will into Pakistan. Provided that was not
done, they would raise no fundamental objection to parti-
tion. After seventy-three days of diplomacy by discussion
involving unparalleled concentration of will and intensity
of effort on the part of Lord Mountbatlen, the 3rd June
Plan was in principle accepted.

The Plan had three main features. First, it was partition
within partition. The Punjab and Bengal, the communal
composition of which were almost equal, were given the
right \p decide on their own partition prior to option for
India or Pakistan. Mr. Jinnah, while stressing the tragedy
of this step, was also unable to resist its logic. For some

4

MISSION Wim MOUNT BATTEN

time there was possibility of Bengal separatism expressing
itself, but this died away as the transfer of power drew
near. As a result of this partition, West and East Pakistan
were divided by some eight hundred miles. Secondly, it
involved the partition ot the Sikhs; this, was the outcome
of the partition or the Punjab, upon which the Sikh leaders
insisted. Lord Mountbatten vvus surprised at the vehem-
ence of their altitude, in view oi the price they would have
to pay for it, but v\as given no practicable alternative by
them.

The third main feature was Dominion Status. This was
a master-stroke on many grounds, but in particular be-
cause it made possible the maximum administrative and
constitutional continuity, on the basis of the great India
Act of 1935. As 1 ord Mountbatten himself said shortly
after his return to Fngland, *'l know ot no other country
in the world to-day in the fortunate position of having a
constitution that is already a working constitution, but
which can be amended by a stroke of the pen day by day
to be made to work more agreeably to themselves.*'

So much for the Plan; let us turn now to some of the
majoi consequences of the partition of British India.

First of all it meant in erlect an administrative within a
political transfer of power Action was at once taken to
meet the demand for the partition ot the magnificent
Indian Army. A Supreme Command gave higher direc-
tion until its disbandment in November to this complex
and delicate task. A Joint Defence Council meeting alter-
nately in India and Pakistan, with Lord Mountbatten act-
ing as chairman on behalf of both Governments, enabled
steady contact on major military problems to be main-
tained right up to 1 ord Mount hatten\s departure. It also
provided a safety-valve at more than one moment of crisis
for private consideration of all outstanding inter-Dominion
disputes. A Partition Council was formed to deal with
all civil issues, including transfer of assets and endless
technicalities involved in partition. Finally an Arbitration
Tribunal was appointed to give awards when agreement

PROLOGUE

5

by other means had failed. Considering the range of the
controversy involved, these instruments of partition work-
ed with remarkable speed and administrative smoothness.

Provision was made in the Act, on Mr. Jinnah's sug-
gestion, for Lord Mountbatten to be Governor-General of
both Dominions, and for some time it seemed as if this
might be acceptable, but at the last moment Mr. Jinnah
decided otherwise. No doubt he was in the best position
to judge, but in so far as India held the majority of phy-
sical assets, it was arguable that an interim joint Governor-
Generalship might have been in the best interests of
Pakistan.

The second major consequence was, of course, the
violent communal reaction in the Punjab, tn terms of
the geography and population of Jndia as a whole, the
troubles were concentrated into a limited but vital area
for both countries. The people rose up against their
leaders' acceptance of partition. In this communal irrup-
tion twelve million Hindus, Sikhs and Moslems were in-
volved, and migration of some nine million people began
overnight in an area the sire of Wales. A far greater
catastrophe was avoided only by an almost miraculous
absence of large-scale famine and disease. J flew over
columns of refugees stretching for more than sixty miles,
creeping along narrow roads, the families carrying all their
worldly goods in bullock-carts. There had been many
communal migrations before, but never of this magnitude.
Moreover, this time there would be no return.

For Pakistan the immediate danger was to the key Pro-
vince of the West Punjab. They were receiving impo-
verished Moslems in place of wealthy Sikhs, for India
the decisive threat was to Delhi, which was right in the
epicentre of this earthquake. Before long some four
hundred thousand refugees were moving on the capital,
bringing in their wake suffering and bitterness. It was by
her heroic efforts in organising relief for the refugees that
Lady* Mountbatten made her name immortal in India.
Her dynamic but human personality, combined with her

6

MISSION WITH MOUJNTBATTEN

unique Red Cross and St. John experience, helped greatly
to build up the morale and improve the conditions of
thousands in the crowded refugee camps.

Within three weeks of Independence Day the Prime
Minister. Pandit Nehru, and Deputy Prime Minister Patel,
with great political courage, invited Lord Mountbatten,
now constitutional Governor-General, to come down from
£imla and take over the chairmanship ot the Emergency
Committee of the Cabinet, ft assumed full war powers,
and Government House itself became an operational head-
quarters. The Cabinet would meet there each morning
and go into a Map Room, where the movements of the
refugees and outbreaks of disturbances were pin-pointed
on wall charts. As the days went by, it became evident
that the situation was being held along the boundary of
the Fast Punjab and United Provinces through the firm
action taken both by the Provincial and Central Govern-
ments to halt refugee movement there. If the Govern-
ment had shown weakness at that point, the trouble might
well have spread across the whole of Northern India.

It may be asked whether all possible precautions were
taken to meet this crisis, or whether something was left
undone. In trying to answer this question J would suggest
that the followina considerations should be borne in mind.

Once the Leaders had accepted Partition it became im-
possible to maintain tor vei> long the Interim Congress-
Moslem League Coalition Government in Delhi. It was
only with the utmost dilhculty that this Government had
been set up in lsH6 and held together subsequently. Ever
since March the Punjab had been administered on an
emergency basis under Section 93 of the Government of
India Act; but it was quiie out of the question for the
Central Government to function under that regulation as
well. Alter ^rd June the Interim Government fell apart;
each side wanted to take control of their respective so-
vereign Stales, and they could have been deflected only
at the cost of the overthrow of the Partition Plan. Transfer
of power, in the last analysis, was an unconditional act.

PROl OOUE

7

As a precaution against tiouble following upon the
Award of Sir Cyril Radclilfe, who, with the agreement
of both Governments, had been invited to draw the actual
boundary lines for the Punjab. Bengal and Sylhct, there
was the largest concentration of troops ever known in the
Punjab In fact, a special Boundary force was set up in
the area directly alTected. The task was found, however,
to be quite beyond its resources, and by October command
had to be handed back to thi two new Governments.

In *he (iispersal of forces before 15th August, Independ-
ence Day, provision had to be made to meet the hardly
less tense situation in Bengal and Calcutta. But here a
completely ditlerent "Third force" was to succeed in
keeping the peace. Jt would have been impossible to have
foreseen the miracle oi Gandhi's moral influence, and
wanton to have relied upon it in advance of the event.
I have heard an expert estimate that the situation in the
Punjab could have been restored only with double the
amount of troops in fact employed (which would have
meant some eight divisions), and even then only on the
assumption that they were all communally reliable.

Then there was the form taken by the Sikh rising. The
operations were mostly earned out by small groups with
cleverly planned mobile attacks on trains and villages. It
was, in iact, a rank-and-file jcvolt, and any action to
arrest the wilder Sikh leaders -sciiously considered at the
time, but rejected would have been more likely to have
touched on" or intensified the disorder than to have brought
it under control. The Punjab troubles must be regaided
as a cataclysm, but in the context of India as a whole
they were, in fact, limited to three per cent of the popula-
tion, and were hardly comparable as a human tragedy to
the Bengal iaminc ot 1943. finally it should be remem-
bered that Partition did not cause the communal crisis,
but that the communal-crisis was the cause oi Partition.

One of the major consequences of Partition was its
clfect on the position of the Indian Princely States. Hve
hundred and sixty -five of them in all, ranging from Princes

8

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

of States as large as European nations to landlords con-
trolling a few thousand acres, they ruled over a third of
the Indian sub-continent in area, and a quarter of it in
population. They stood outside British India being in
treaty relationship with Britain the Paramount Power.
Thus the term Viceroy was a composite term covering the
dual status and function of Governor-General of British
India and Crown Representative of the Indian States.
United, they might well have been a formidable factor in
the situation, but when we arrived in India in March 1947
we found the Princes distracted and fatally weakened by
great internal dissensions. On 25th July, after prolonged
efforts to achieve some unity of purpose among them.
Lord Mountbatten spoke to them in the Chamber of
Princes for the last time in his capacity as Crown Repre-
sentative. He took the initiative in advising them all to
accede to one or other of the two new Dominions as the
effective successor Powers to the British Raj.

The basic principle of Accession was that it was vested
in the personal discretion of the Ruler, since he was an
autocrat. But it was recognised that this discretion should
be qualified by the geographical contiguity of the State
to the successor Dominion, the communal composition of
the State, and a plebiscite if necessary to ascertain the will
of the people. Lord Mountbatten met with a remarkable
measure of success, and all but three of the five hundred
and sixty-five Stales had acceded by 14th August. They
had recognised the force of his argument that voluntary
mediatisation was their greatest chance of survival in a
rapidly changing world; that the protection of British para-
mountcy was no longer a practicable source of authority,
but that, as constitutional rulers, they could make a vital
contribution lo the political and social solidarity of the
two new nations.

The constructive statesmanship of Congress, and in
particular of Sardar Patel, the Deputy Prime Minister, who
became the first Minister in charge of relations with the
States, must be acknowledged. For acceptance of the sur-

PROLOGUE

9

vival of the Princes at all meant on the part of Congress
a major reversal of long-established policy and avoidance
of the temptation provided by an easy target.

Accession was to be followed closely by the Merger
policy. Several great Princely blocs were formed. Of
special importance were the Unions of the States of Orissa,
Malwa (which includes Gwalior and Jndore), Gujerat (in-
volving a mosaic of some two hundred Princelings under
the leadership of the Jam Sahib of Nawanagar), and the
Phulkian Union of the leading Sikh Princes. One con-
sequence of the settlement with the States was an approach
suggested strongly by Mountbatten by the new Indian
Government to individual Princes to undertake political
and diplomatic duties outside their State boundaries. A
ruling Prince was appointed Governor of Madras, and
another became one of India's delegates to the United
Nations. It has been a bloodless revolution and a political
achievement of the first magnitude, largely lost sight of
abroad on account of more lurid and dramatic news,
among which must be counted events in those three States
who failed to accede by 15th August.

There was first of all the case of Junagadh. This was
not of primary importance in itself, but significant for the
precedents it set. Junagadh was a small Stale of some
five thousand square miles, whh a Moslem ruler who
finally acceded to Pakistan. By his action the twin princi-
ples of geographical contiguity and communal majority
inherent in Accession were both violated. After various
complicated negotiations, India took over the State, and a
plebiscite confirmed popular acceptance of this action,

Junagadh was a mere curtain-raiser to the complex pro-
blem posed by the delayed accession of Kashmir. Lord
Mountbatten himself had visited Kashmir in June, and
armed with an assurance from Sardar Pat el on the Indian
side, strongly advised that any decision taken prior to
15th August would be acceptable to both successor Stales.
The Maharaja, however, chose to ignore this opportunity,
and only acceded to India on 26th October, when con-

10

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

fronted by large-scale tribal invasion coming largely from
the North-west Frontier Province of Pakistan. Here was
a Hindu ruler with a Stale geographically continguous to
both Dominions and the majority of his subjects Moslem.
Kashmir's accession was rendered more complicated still
by further special factors.

There was a powerful Kashmir States Congress move-
ment led by Sheikh Abdullah, a Moslem Congressman of
forceful personality and national status in India. More-
over, Nehru, himself descended from Kashmiri Brahmins,
and Sheikh Abdullah are not only political colleagues,
but also close personal friends.

But from the military viewpoint Kashmir is an atea of
great strategic importance to both countries. Pakistan has
inherited the burden of the North-west Frontier, and a
major conflict of interest between the two Governments
along this line could gravely undermine the security — al-
ready strained by the partition of the Indian Army — of
the entire sub-continent. It was soon clear that the Kash-
mir commitment would involve a dangerous drain of man-
power and money and a distraction of effort going beyond
the margin of safety or the dictates of prudence. For
India in particular it means the deployment of her military
strength to the maximum disadvantage along tenuotis*
lines of communication and on a front where superiority
of numbers and armour can rarely be exploited.

Finally there was the appeal to the United Nations by
India at the peak of the crisis in December 1947, which
has given the dispute an international status. There is no
easy solution to Kashmir. In one sense it symbolises the
general clash of sentiment and interest which made Parti-
tion inevitable. It may well be that there was inherent in
any settlement of the general Congress- Moslem League
conflict one outstanding and insoluble dispute. When the
formula was the Cabinet Mission Plan, it was Assam; in
the spring of 1947, it seemed, from the emphasis placed
upon it by both Gandhi and Jinnah, that it would be the
North-west Frontier Province. A turn of the wheel, and

PROLOGUE

11

the clash might well have centred round Bengal or Cal-
cutta. Moreover, both sides arc sustained by fervent and
not unfounded belief in the strength of their cause —
Pakistan relying more on natural justice and economic
necessity, and India more on legal right and political
moralitv.

The third and perhaps most important State of all to
stand outside Accession was Hyderabad. This, too, was
p. special case, with a Moslem Prince (direct descendant
of the Moghul Emperor's Viceroy) and a small Moslem
oligarchy as the governing caste; the Slate geographically
in the heart of India, and the subjects eighty-six per cent
Hindu. In view of the Nizam's special status. Lord
Mountbatten, although now a constitutional Governor-
General, was empowered to carry on negotiations for a
Standstill Agreement with him beyond 14th August. But
perhaps because of developments in Junagadh and Kash-
mir, or of expectations of support from opinion abroad,
or from some inner compulsion, the Ni/am tried to stall
and play for time.

At the end of October a duly accredited delegation,
including his Prime Minister and his constitutional ad-
viser, Sir Walter Monckton, accepted the substance of a
Standstill Agreement and returned to Hyderabad to re-
commend the Nizam's signature. His Legislative Council
formally approved. The Nizam then excused himself from
signing for a few hours, during which lime members of
the delegation, due to return to Delhi, were surrounded
at their homes and subjected to physical intimidation by
the Moslem extremist party, the Jttehad-ul-Muslimeen.
When they saw the Nizam in the morning, they found that
he had changed his mind, and they duly resigned. The
Nizam, in the knowledge that he had already secured the
maximum concessions from the Government of Jfidia, then
blandly appointed a new delegation consisting entirely of
ltteha.d members.

After this bizarre episode it argues much for Lord
Mountbatten's diplomatic resource that he was able to

12

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

keep the negotiations alive at all. But he prevailed upon
the Government of India to receive the new delegation,
making it clear that he would not support the change of
a single comma, and in November it reported back to the
Nizam with precisely the same terms as before. This time
he signed. He had gained a month's respite, but lost much
of the Government ot India's essential confidence in the
process.

There followed moral and physical violations of the
Standstill Agreement, which was valid for a year pending
a final settlement. Hyderabad sponsored various acts to
display her status as an independent nation. A loan was
offered to Pakistan, and State Congress leaders wejfe im-
prisoned without trial. But most provocative was the
activity of Kasim Ra/vi, head of the Ittehad-ul-Muslimcen
Party and of the Ra/akars, embryo storm-troopers. 1 met
Ra/vi when I visited the Ni/am on Lord Mountbatten\
behalf in May 1948. I can only describe him as expressing
the most violent race hatred 1 had encountered in anyone
since a meeting \ had with Forster, the Dan/ig Na/i, just
before the war.

On the Indian side there was an undoubted blockade
of the State, which included the stopping even of medical
supplies. Most of this obstruction seemed to be organised
at Provincial levels; but while the Central Government did
not authorise it, neither did they succeed in bringing it
ettectivelv to an end. 1 hen there was Communist inter-
vention, which was designed to embarrass and confuse
both sides.

Britain never recognised Hyderabad's title to independ-
ence, and in a faniotis letter to the present Ni/am in 1926,
Lord Reading laid down that Britain's relationship was
one ot undoubted Paramountcy. It was unreasonable to
expect that the successor Power, consisting of Hyderabad's
kith and kin, should now concede what the British Raj
had so consistently refused. Right up to the eve of his
departure »t seemed that Lord Mountbatten might find a
tormula to cover Hydciabad's final relations with India,

PROLOGUE

13

but unhappily it was not to be. Three months after he
left, a military demonstration and occupation was provided
to clinch the argument.

Some of the Indian diplomacy on the spot was un-
doubtedly clumsy, and the presentation of their case
throughout was generally deplorable. India has been
severely criticised for forcing the pace, but it has to be
remembered that in giving the Nizam more time they
would also have been allowing Razvi and his fanatical
movement fresh scope. Indian intervention effectively
checked the spread of communal violence and has insured
political consolidation throughout South India.

The Nizam, with his love of diplomatic finesse, left him-
self just enough margin to save his dynasty. As the leading
Prince in India, his great mistake had been retirement
into his State as a result of the clash with Lord Reading
in 1926, and complete withdrawal from central affairs
thereafter. From his isolation he failed in 1947 to recog-
nise the meaning of Partition, which inevitably involved
the setting up of two strong Central Governments instead
of one weak one.

The transfer of power was an unique response essential-
ly to a revolutionary situation. It is usual for revolutions
to get out of control and defy the calculations of those
who lead them. Perhaps Lord Mountbatlen's greatest
achievement lay in producing a solution which had about
it sufficient substance and support to survive the storm
of the immediate revolutionary crisis and to maintain in
spite of Partition the vital links between the past and the
future.

The shock of change was intensified by the deaths, so
soon after the transfer of power, of the two great national
leaders, Gandhi and Jinnah. I cannot presume to assess
the full measure of Gandhi's moral and spiritual stature,
but his political power and personal magnetism, judging
by the devotion he aroused in millions from one end of
the sub-continent to the other, can have had few preced-
ents in history. He had an amazing instinct for the mass

14

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

propagation of ideas, reinforced by the direct contacts
which he assiduously encouraged through his Prayer Meet-
ings and vast correspondence with people in all walks
of life.

Jinnah, on the other hand, derived his authority from
remote control. He made no concessions to the masses
and had no contact with them. He combined tactical sup-
pleness and capacity to profit from his opponents* mistakes
with an iron will and the maintenance of the single ob-
jective. He was a unique phenomenon, in that he con-
ceived of Pakistan at the age of sixty and realised it at
seventy. Like Gandhi, he was steeped in the idiom and
outlook of British law, but had virtually no interest in
or understanding of the administration of government.

Fortunately for both countries, Jawaharlal Nehru in
India and Liaquat Ali Khan in Pakistan are statesmen
of the first rank by any standards of comparison, whether
in the Lastern or Western world. They lead middle-of-
the-road and middle-aged Governments, which are called
upon to undertake i airly late in life a major reorientation
ol ideas now that the two ba^ic opponents of the Congress
and the Moslem League have disappeared from the arena
For the British helped to keep the Congress together, and
the Congress the Moslem League.

Inside India the Congress is assailed both from the right
and left. During Lord Mountbattcifs lime the Maha-
sabha~-the Hindu communal counterpart of the Moslem
League, with aspirations to emulate and counteract tlv
Moslem 1 eague's political success -wa^ always active, but
was unable it's canalise Hindu resentment at Partition sulli-
ciently to thwait llje 3rd June Plan. Subsequently the
Mahasabha suffered a serious setback as the result of its
suspected complicity in Gandhi's assassination; but. foi
all that, it remained a formidable force.

The Socialists, under the leadership of Jai Prakash
Narain, lost valuable time and opportunity in making up
their minds whether to bid for office as a ginger group
within the Congress or to reinvigorate the Legislative As-

PROLOGUE

15

sembly by constructive Parliamentary Opposition. By
wavering they simply provided fresh openings for the Com-
munists, who under the war-time "Grand Alliance" had
been left free to co-operate with the British Raj, while
the Congress High Command languished in gaol. The
Partition decision, however, and in particular the force
of communal sentiment in Bengal, came as a blow to the
Communists, who had concentrated most of their efTort
in the industrial slums of Calcutta, and had directed their
propaganda strongly against the division of India.

Alter the transfer of power, Communist effort seemed
to move from Bengal to the South. There was a big con-
ference of Communists from South-east Asia under Indian
leadership early in 1948, in which there were signs of the
usual deviationist troubles. Communism is likely to pro-
vide a dangerous threat to the Congress just so long as
there is extensive misery to exploit.

While Pakistan has derived its inspiration from provid-
ing a Moslem homeland, the Indian Union has aimed at
creating loyalty to a secular democracy. With some forty
million Moslems left after Partition on the Indian side of
the border, not to mention eight million Christians, six
million Sikhs and other smaller communities, India is cer-
tainly something more than a Hindu State. Gandhi him-
self was to become a martyr in the cause of Hindu-Moslem
solidarity.

The Indian constitution, which was under active pre-
paration and discussion during Lord Mountbatten's term
of office, is a synthesis of the great Western charters of
liberty. The obvious hiatus between the vision of this
document and the realities of Indian life does not destroy
the validity of the vision. It represents a great tribute to
the liberalising influence of British thought, and is a funda-
mental attack upon the aims and aspirations , of com-
munalism. The [ndian constitution offers fresh hope for
the eighty million Untouchables, who under purely Hindu
dogma were pariahs polluting food with their shadow,
but* are now Indian citi/ens with equal rights before the

16 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

law. It is significant that one of the principal personalities
in Nehru's Government, and as such a prominent person-
ality in the preparation and sponsorship of the Constitu-
tion, is Dr. Ambedkar, the well-known leader of the
Untouchables.

Economically, Pakistan, in spite of the initial disasters,
quickly showed herself to be a viable State with the sup-
reme asset of a solvent agricultural economy. There was
a surplus both of food and jute in the first Pakistan budget.
India, however, was soon suffering from inflation, and,
in response to the Gandhian ethic, rather than on grounds
of strict economic justification, from the altogether too
rapid removal of controls over basic commodities. The
controls had to be clamped on again, but the operation
was difficult and the damage had been done.

It is perhaps in the psychological field that the greatest
revolution of all has occurred. Jn advance of any final
definitions of Commonwealth membership, Indo-British
relations under Lord Mountbatten's imaginative leadership
had already improved beyond all expectations. Those of
us who took part in the Independence celebrations were
eye-witnesses of what must surely be one of the greatest
reconciliations of history. Subordinate status had become
as hateful to bear as to impose.

Both Britain and India, as Nehru pointed out, are es-
sentially Mother civilisations. We are now friends and
equals, and we would be worse than fools if we ever allow-
ed estrangement to creep in again. For the implications
of this upsurge of good-will reach out beyond the reckon-
ings of our own day and age. It is a transformation that
augurs well for the future progress and solidarity of the
world.

Part I

THE LAST VICEROY

niAPriR ONr

VICEROY DESIGNATE

i on don, Thursday, 19th December, 1946
I CALLin fariy on Mountbatteii at his home in Chester
Street, and arrived in time for the customary Mountbatten
breakfast last-minute dictation, toast and tea all com-
peting for the services of his mouth. As usual, the meal
came nfT second best. He had asked ine to go round and
see him about his South-east Asia Command Despatches.
As erstwhile Recorder and keeper of his War Diaries
throughout his lour of duty as Supreme Commander, I
retain an almost e\ officio, now no more than honorary,
interest in these Despatches. There are many teething
troubles in theii production, not the least of which is to
fit them into his crowded agenda. As our business was
not finished and time pressed, thcic was, as usual, no
alternative but to accompany him to his next appointment
—a sitting for an official portrait Oswald Birley is paint-
ing of him.

When we got into (he car he pulled up all the windows,
swore me to the utmost secrecy and whispered that what
he was about to tell me was known to no one outside his
own family. Mr Attlee, he said, had called for him the
picvious evening and invited him to succeed Lord Wavcll
as Viceroy of India Although 1 had become accustomed
to associate him with surprises, i was wholly unprepared
for this denouement All was fairly set tor him to lulfil
his long-thwarted personal ambition of resuming his career
in the Navy. His refresher course was in lull swing. He
was to be Rear-Admiral commanding the First Cruiser
Squadron with effect from April 1947. Moreover, the re-
cent conference in London between the Indian Leaders,
Lord Wavell and the British Government, while giving
no grounds for any easy optimism, seemed to intply that
the Cabinet Mission Plan was still in being.

19

20 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

From what I now heard, the Prime Minister had put
a very different complexion both on India's and Mount-
batten's future. Mr. Attlee had begun the interview by
asking Mountbattcn whether his heart was really set on
going to sea. He replied that it certainly was. By being
put back into circulation with his own Service, his whole
Naval career was being saved. He added that he had
been both surprised and touched at the number of letters
he had received from his friends in the Navy expressing
their pleasure that he was going back to sea again.

Attlee then switched the conversation to the Indian
crisis. Wavcll, he said, had come back with nothing more
constructive than a military evacuation plan. The Govern-
ment was most unfavourably impressed with the political
trends affecting both the Congress and the Moslem League.
If we were not very careful, we might well find ourselves
handing India over not simply to civil war, but to political
movements of a definitely totalitarian character. Urgent
action was needed to break the deadlock, and the principal
members of the Cabinet had reached the conclusion that
a new personal approach was perhaps the only hope. They
had looked round in every direction for a suitable man
to make it, and had unanimously agreed that it was Mount-
batten alone who had the personality and qualifications
required.

At this point Mountbatten intervened to say he must at
once make it clear, from what he had seen of the Indian
situation when he was Supreme Commander and from his
many talks with Wavell, that he had entirely agreed with
WavelFs policy up to his last talk in Delhi in June. There
was nothing that V^avell had done throughout that time
which he would not have done himself. Attlee agreed
that fundamentally it was not WaveH's general policy in
the past that was in question, but its implementation to-
day. The hard fact was that in spite of his unremitting
efforts it had largely broken down, and Attlee reiterated

VICEROY DESIGNATE

21

that in this new situation the problem was now more one
of personality. The need for closer personal contacts with
the Indian Leaders was paramount.

Mountbatten told me that he put up a stiff fight against
the Prime Minister's pressure and blandishments, stressing
his extreme tiredness, and the folly of wearing him out
too young and of diverting him from his Service career,
where perhaps his most likely usefulness to the State lay.
Were there no other names? What about Auchinlcck,
who was immensely popular in India? The interview end-
ed, it seems, on a note of indecision. Mountbatten wished
to know just what Government policy he would be requir-
ed to implement, and he told me that before making any
answec he must in any case consult the King, since a
Viceroy was not only theoretically his servant and nomi-
nee, but, as far as the Indian Princes were concerned, his
Representative.

He asked what my reaction was to this bombshell. I
could only reply that the Prime Minister, for his part,
had shown considerable psychological insight and made
a sound appraisal of his personal qualifications; but that
he on his side could not reasonably be asked to take on
such an explosive commitment without the clearest direc-
tive. Mountbatten then said it was quite clear to him
that there would have to be the earliest time limit for the
transfer of power if his mission \\as not to be hopelessly
compromised with Indian opinion irom the outset. As
for the British reaction, he felt that if he agreed to go there
would be considerable public sympathy for him in taking
on the job at all, and popular support would probably
back him up in whatever measures he saw fit to take. He
was ready to run any risk, but did not in fact think that
the traditional risk of his being made the scapegoat was
excessive.

I am afraid that when we got to Birley's studio, and
the time came to study the forceful but unfinished portrait,
my mind was on other things.

22

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

London, Friday, 20th December, J 946
My wife and T attended the British Government's Re-
ception at Lancaster House in honour of Pridi Panom-
yong, the Senior Statesman of Siam, who had combined
the roles of Regent and resistance leader during the war.

Mountbatten arrived at the party rather late. On seeing
mc there he signalled me into a quiet corner and showed
me his reply to the Prime Minister's offer. It was quite
brief; hut, while appreciating the honour, he had begged
to be excused unless he was able to go at the express in-
vitation of the Indian Leaders. 1 must say I think it is
extremely unlikely that Altlee will be able or willing to
comply with this condition, so this may well be the last
we shall hear ol the whole proposal. He said he was
going straight from the party to Downing Street.

I on don, Wednesday, 1 5th January, J 947
Mountbattcn's acceptance of the Viceroyalty is at last
firm. His early talks with the Prime Minister were in-
conclusive. Government policy accepted the principle of
a time limit, but havered over the exact date. The second
half of 1948 was suggested, but Mountbattcn's conviction
haidcned that political success was bound up with the
Government's readiness lo accept the earliest possible dale
of British departure from India, and he at once bid for
"second half" to mean June rather than December. With
the Christmas week at hand, final decisions were held
over, and Mountbatten took himself and his family away
for a brief holiday at Davos. He had not been there
forty-eight hours when he was urgently summoned to Lon-
don, and a special aircraft sent to bring him back. This
move was calculated to arouse considerable Press specula-
lion, but its meaning was missed.

Mountbatten was recalled because ihe news from India
was increasingly serious. The communal deadlock and
violence persisted. The Government wished to announce
a new policy and a new Viceroy as quickly as possible.
After close consideration of the terms of this draft an-

VICEROY DESIGNATE

23

nouncement, and in particular the incorporation of a phrase
to indicate that his Naval career will not be prejudiced,
Mountbatlen has finally agreed in principle to take on the
job. He wenfr so far, he told me, as to insist that the First
Lord and First Sea Lord should associate themselves with
the Prime Minister in guaranteeing his return to the Navy.
The knowledge that the King was strongly in favour of
his undertaking the task helped to confirm his decision.
In his discussions with the Government he warned them
of the danger of giving any impression that his appoint-
ment was designed to perpetuate the Viceregal system or
to impose British arbitration. This was his reason for
making his acceptance in the first instance conditional upon
his receiving an open invitation from the Indian parties to
go in a capacity defined by themselves. Mr. Attlee ex-
plained in detail, however, that this last condition was
not feasible, but he fully accepted the principle of termi-
nating the British Raj by a specific date regardless of
agreement or earlier than the time limit if the Indian
parties were able beforehand to agree on a constitution
and form a Government.

His Majesty's Government has shown itself prepared
to go to very great lengths to secure Mountbatten's ac-
ceptance. Sir Stafford Cripps offered to provide the neces-
sary liaison in advance between the Indian I caders and
the new Viceroy, and to do his utmost to ensure that the
appointment was in fact acceptable to them before it was
officially announced. Cripps went so far as to offer to
serve in any capacity, even to the point of accompanying
Mountbatten to India. This ofTer was not unnaturally
shelved, as Cripps' status and experience in Indian affairs
would have prejudiced Mountbatten's position and made
it virtually impossible ior a new Viceroy to carry on nego-
tiations with the necessary authority or prestige,

London, Ihurschix, 2()th lehtuary, 1947
1 once more called on Mountbatten at Chester Street,
this time to see him about India and give a firm and final
M.M— 2

24

MISSION WITH MOUN1 BATTEN

"yes" to his invitation to join his staff as Press attache.

We have heard that Attlee's statement in the House of
Commons has been the occasion of a lively scene and
that Churchill seemed bent on making po^ieal capital
out of Mount batten's appointment and the policy under-
lying it.

The new Viceroy was given a very wide mandate. If
there was no likelihood of a unitary constitution emerging
from a fully representative Constituent Assembly by June
l l M8, then, said Mr. Attlee, tht British Government would
"have to consider to whom the powers of the central
Government in British India should he handed over, on
the due date, whether as a whole to some form ot central
Government for British India, or in some areas to the
existing Provincial Governments, or in such other way
as may seem most reasonable and in the best interests ol
the Indian people" As for the Princely States, the Prime
Minister made it clear that the Government did not intend
to hand over their powers and obligations under Para-
mountcy to any successor Government of British India
While Paramountcy was to be retained until power was
actually transferred, 4 it is contemplated that lor the in-
tervening period the relations of the Crown with individual
States may be adjusted by agreement."

Churchill at once jumped up to ask a number of barbed
questions about the reasons for WavelPs removal. It must
be confessed that Attlee's reference to Wavell had been
sufficiently cold and perfunctory to provide Churchill with
this particular opening. The time limit also came as a
considerable emotional jolt to the Conservative Opposi-
tion. What threatened to be a major show-down, how-
ever, petered out tfirough the House of Commons' time-
honoured technique of passing on to other business.

C HM'TLR TWO

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

lonixw, Wednesday, 26th February, 1947
The-: grkai two-day Debate in the House of Lords has
ended with Lord Templewood withdrawing his motion of
virtual censure on the Government for its announcement
of 20th February. This was one of the occasions when
the opinions of the House of Lords were not unjustifiably
regarded by many as carrying greater political weight than
thost of the Commons. In the first place, in as far as the
Lords were discussing the new situation in advance of
the forthcoming Commons Debate, it was appreciated that
the final attitude of the Conservative Opposition might
well depend upon the tone set by their Lordships. More-
over, they were debating not so much in their hereditary
capacity, as in the role of elder statesmen, specialists and
experts.

A galaxy of names famous in the annals of Indian ad-
ministration for over a quarter of a century addressed
themselves to Lord Templewood \s stern declaration that
the time limit was a breach of faith imperilling the peace
and prosperity of India. Coming from Lord Temple-
wood, who, as Secretary of State while still known as
Sir Samuel Hoare, had spent the better part of seven
years in steering through the great Government of India
Act of 1935 against the most violent and sustained op-
position of Mr. Churchill and the Conservative right wing,
this motion was indeed a formidable challenge to the
Government, and if widely supported calculated to render
a united national approach to Indian Independence im-
possible. By the time Lord Lislowel had wound up the

25

26

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

first day's Debate for the Government there seemed very
little prospect of avoiding a division and a defeat.

This danger loomed larger to-day, when Lord Simon,
of Simon Commission fame, resumed for the Opposition.
He spoke for just over an hour. It was an essay in closely
reasoned negation and foreboding. The accumulated
burden of the Government's problems was enough to break
down the deliberate considerations of any man or body
of men. "However, I am bound to siy,'" he concluded,
,fc thal I sadly fear that the end of this business is not going
to be the establishment ol peace in India, but rather that
it is going to degrade the British name."

After yet another highly critical speech, this time by
Lord Trenchard, 1 ord Halifax- the only ex-Viceroy tak-
ing part in the Debate rose to make his last great decisive
intervention in Indian airairs. Reaching out far beyond
the confines of parly faith or discipline, he declared :-

"With such knowledge as I have, I am not prepared to
say that whatever else may be light or wrong, this step
must on all counts certainly be judged to be wrong . . .
for the truth is that for India to-day there is no solution
that is not fraught with the gravest objection, with the
gravest danger. And the conclusion that I reach - with
all that can be said against it is that J am not prepared
to condemn what His Majesty's Government are doing
unless 1 can honestly and confidently recommend a better
solution. ... I should be sorry if the only message from
the House to India at this moment was one of condemna-
tion, based on what I must fully recognise are very natural
feelings of failure, frustration and foreboding."

Lord Samuel told me afterwards that it was the most
persuasive speech he had ever heard delivered in the House
of Lords, and that its impact was such that many Con-
servative Peers who, belore he rose, had firmly decided
to vote against the Government, changed their minds while
he was speaking and fell in with his appeal to Temple-

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

27

wood "to spare the House the necessity of going to a
Division". The rest of the Debate was an anti-climax.
The tide of opinion had turned, and Templewood, while
maintaining his criticisms, duly withdrew his motion.

K)NIX)N, Wednesday, 5//; March, J947
Although the opening of the two-day Debate in ihe
House of Commons was obviously a great Parliamentary
occasion, I could not help feeling, when I saw Cripps rise
to expound the Government's case with his accustomed
poise and lucidity, that the key battle tor the new policy
had already been won in the Lords. Cripps* speeches are
always so closely reasoned and beautifully arranged that
the emotional temperature almost immediately drops when
he speaks. He would never dream of appealing to your
heart without first trying to persuade your mind. But on
this occasion J detected a deeper note ol passionate con-
viction than usual.

Already Cripps' contribution to India's forthcoming In-
dependence was assured of its place in history. As Lord
Halifax had pointed out, the Cripps' Mission of 1942 was
the decisive act from which there could be no turning
back. In 1946 he was the dominating figure of the Cabinet
Mission In both negotiations he had been on the verge
of complete agreement and unqualified success, only to
sec his efforts thwarted at the last minute. In proposing
the Government's new approach, he must have known
that he was in fact confirming the effective eclipse of his
own elaborate master plan to translcr power to a united
India.

He was at pains 10 stress that it was administratively and
militarily out ol the question to stay on beyond 1948.
Otherwise he laid no special emphasis on the time limit,
and he made no relerence whatever to Lord Wavell. This
last omission was undoubtedly a pity, as it tended to con-
firm the ill-disposed gossip about serious differences of
opinion between the Government and the returning Vice-
roy. Cripps throughout did his utmost to leave the door

28

MISSION WITH M OU NTB ATTEN

open for a revised Cabinet Mission Plan. "Now is tfte
time," he said in his final peroration, "when the wider
good of all India, throughout which both communities are
widely dispersed, must take precedence over the narrower
claims of single communities or single parts of that great
continental area."

Sir John Anderson moved a detailed amendment on
behalf of the Conservative Opposition, which he support-
ed with a ponderous oration. The formula was in effect
an elaborate attempt on Sir John's part to reconcile what
Lord Halifax had said last week with what Mr. Churchill
was likely to say to-morrow. But this was a formidable
task even for one of Anderson's drafting calibre. As was
perhaps to be expected, he largely confined himself to an
exhaustive condemnation of the Government's time-limit
proposal. Under cover of a dense dialectical smoke-screen
he worked his way towards a position of proposing a final
date for an agreed central authority, failing which the
Government should resume freedom of action to transfer
power to convenient separate authorities "as speedily as
possible". Anderson is a disappointing Parliamentarian.
This aspect of his career has been superimposed upon too
many other distinctions too late in life. The result is a
pomposity of manner and a heaviness of expression which
weaken both his arguments and influence in the House.

The more persuasive performances to-day came from
back-benchers speaking from their uwn experience, some-
times against the party line. Perhaps the most original
suggestion under this heading was put forward by the
Socialist "rebel" Zilliacus, who saw India as the classic
problem of natiorfal minorities who are distrustful at being
left to the tender mercies of the majority. Jn this instance,
however, the Moslem community was more than a national
minority, but somewhat less than an independent nation.
He cited the example of the U.S.S.R, to suggest that India
should enjoy multi-national membership of the United
Nations, which would enable the Moslems to have the

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

20

same status as the Ukraine and become a separate
member.

London, Thursday, 6th March, 1947

When Churchill resumed the Debate to-day we were
regaled with the Jong-awaited firework display. Over the
years Churchill has remained very loyal to his pei aver-
sions, and what may perhaps best be termed his Indian
invective proclaims probably the most rigid and unbend-
ing of all his opinions upon the public issues of our time.

He started oil" by taking his stand on ihe Cripps' Mission
of 1942. Although the oiler had not been accepted at
the time, both sides of the House were still bound by it.
He denounced the present plan as involving grave depar-
tures from the "scope and integrity" of its principles.
There was at last a reference in this debate to Wavcll, but
it was far from cordial. " The Viceroy, Lord Wavell, has
been dismissed. I hold no brief for Lord Wavell. He
has been the willing or unwilling agent of the Government
in all the errors and mistakes into which they have been
led." But he continued to assert that he did not know
why Wavell had been cast aside at this juncture, and to
press for a personal statement from him on his return.

As for the new Viceroy, "Is he to make a new effort
to restore the situation, or is it merely Operation Scuttle
on which he and other distinguished officers have been
despatched?. . . I am bound to say the whole thing wears
the aspect of an attempt by the Government to make use
of brilliant war figures in order to cover up a melancholy
and disastrous transaction."

He then entered the field of prophecy. "India is to be
subjected not merely to partition, but to fragmentation
and to haphazard fragmentation." The time limit, far
from bringing the Indian parties to their senses,' was cal-
culated to make them step up their demands. These
parlies' claims to represent the Indian masses were fictiti-
ous: "In handing over the Government of India to these
so-called political classes, we are handing over to men of

30

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

straw of whom in a few years no trace will remain. This
Government by their latest action, this fifteen months*
limitation, cripple the new Viceroy and destroy the pros-
pect of even going through the business on the agenda
which has to be settled."

He found wholly incomprehensible the time limit for
India but the lack of it for Palestine. Could the House
believe that there were three or four times as many British
troops in little petty Palestine as in mighty India at the
present time? He could find no sense in this distribution
of our forces. His only positive proposals were that this
ratio should be reversed and — a typical Churchillian sur-
prise — that Zilliacus' suggestion should be taken up and
the problem of the Moslem minority submitted to the
United Nations. And so to the funereal conclusion. "Many
have defended Britain against her foes, none can defend
her against herself. . . . But, at least, let us not add-
by shameful flight, by a premature hurried scuttle — at
least, let us not add to the pangs of sorrow so many of us
feel, the taint and smear of shame."

When Attlee rose at last from the Treasury Bench there
was an air of expectancy which had somehow been mis-
sing before. Indeed, one of the things which surprised me
while Cripps was speaking yesterday was the thinness of
the Labour ranks. After Question Time they had troop-
ed out, not to return again en bloc until the Prime Minister
brought the Debate to a close the following evening. He
certainly did nol disappoint them. Although I have often
listened to Attlee on various themes, I his. is the first time
1 have heard him on India, which is undoubtedly his spe-
cial subject. His fwo years service as a member of the
Simon Commission was clearly one of the most formative
experiences of his life, and historically speaking probably
the most important thing about the Simon Commission.
Those who are interested in working out the contrast be-
tween Churchill and Attlee should not overlook the Indian
motif.

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

3!

On this occasion Attlee brought to bear on his famous
adversary a debating armament of a calibre which 1 for
one had no idea he possessed. He put aside his notes,
spoke straight from the heart, and the result was a genuine
eloquence. His style did not change, but he simply ceased
to be commonplace. This man burns with a hidden fire
and is sustained by a certain spiritual integrity which en-
ables him to scale the heights when the great occasion
demands. Churchill was raked with delicate irony. Jt
was close in-fighting, which is sometimes lost upon the
general public, but which scores points with the judges
and wins bouts in the Parliamentary ring.

Attlee firmly rebutted the doctrine that Wavell was
under* some necessity to make a personal statement on
his return; "to put it colloquially, if a change of bowling
is desire\l it is not always necessary that there should be
an elaborate explanation". As for the attack on the ad-
mission of the Indian politicians into the Government and
the desire to continue with the caretaker administration
"the essence of the Indian problem is to get Indian states-
men to understand what aie the real problems they have
to face. ... A very grave fault ot the reforms that we-
have carried out over these years is that we have taught
irresponsibility instead of responsibility. All Indian poli-
ticians were permanently in opposition, and speaking with
long experience, it is not good to be always in opposition. ,v

He then turned to our responsibilities to the minorities.
Here he made the shrewd point that in so far as the ex-
istence of the scheduled castes (Untouchables) and their
position was part of the whole Hindu social system, the
British Raj had lacked not the will but the power to
raise these people. With one or two special exceptions,
our policy had been to accept the social and economic
system we had found. "Why are we told now,", he ask-
ed, "at the very end of our rule, that we must clear up
all these things before we go, otherwise we shall betray
our trust? If that trust is there, it ought to have been
fulfilled long ago." Essentially the dangers of delay, the

MISSION WITH VfOUNTBATTEN

dangers of hanging on, were as great as the dangers of
going forward. He concluded by saying he was sure the
whole House would wish "Godspeed" to the new Viceroy
in his great mission. "It is a mission, not, as has been
suggested, of betrayal on our part, it is a mission of ful-
filment."

The Prime Minister's speech, and in particular his per-
oration, roused his back-bench supporters, who normally
display a somewhat •parochial and passive attitude towards
India, to a high pitch of enthusiasm. When the House
divided, the vote was three hundred and thirty-seven in
favour of the Government's policy and our mission, and
one hundred and eighty-five against. Although Mr. Attlee's
appeal that there should be a united message of, good-
will from the House to the Indian Leaders and people
had failed to prevent a Division on strictly Party lines,
one could not help coming away from this historic Debate
with the sense that the gulf between Government and
Opposition was far narrower than some of Mr. Churchill's
more sombre polemics might suggest.

iondon. Monday, 10th March, 1947
in general, it can be said that Mountbalten, in briefing
himself lor the political tusk that lies ahead of him, is
starting from scratch. But he has, of course, visited India
before, first as an A D.C. to the Prince of Wales on his
tour in l l >21. Then, between October 1*M3 and Apul
1 Q 44, New Delhi was his headquarters as Supreme Allied
Commander, but this post had been formed for the ex-
press purpose ol separating the responsibilit\ lor the
prosecution of the war in South-east Asia from that ot
the internal defence and security of India and its admini-
stration as a base. Mof cover, although the scope of his
duties ranged beyond strictly military operations, his para-
political interests did not include India. He used to see
a lot of Lord Wavell, and officially the Viceroy's relation-
ship to him as Supreme Commander was that of Minister
of Stale appointed with a special directive to advise and

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

33

represent the Government, the exact equivalent post estab-
lished in the Middle Past theatre of war.

Towards the end of his time in South-east Asia Com-
mand, Mountbatlen had his first meeting with Jawaharlal
Nehru, on the occasion of Nehru's visit to Malaya, at
the suggestion of Lord Wavcll, to see the large Indian
minority there. It was a most successful and happy en-
counter. I was present on the occasion of it, and it was
quite clear that the two men made a deep personal im-
pression upon each other.

From the moment his appointment was announced,
Mountbatlen has been caught up in a hectic sequence of
meetings and interviews. He has seen the King, whose
constitutional position is vitally affected, and has been in
almost regular session with the India-Burma Committee
of the Cabinet, which includes Atllee, Cripps, Alexander
and Pethick-Lawrence and is concerned with the detailed
elaboration and control of the Government's Indian policy.
There have also been detailed discussions with the Chiefs
of Staff and India Office experts. They have ranged over
the whole field, from the terms of the Government's direc-
tive to the Viceroy, to compensation for the Indian Civil
Service, from the movement of British civilians from India,
with its effect on world shipping capacity, to the future
of the Gurkhas and the strategic defence of the Indian
Ocean.

First and foremost has been the consideration given to
the amendment of the so-called "Governor-General's In-
strument of Instructions", the official standing directive
which it is his duty to try it) implement. Mountbatlen has
had an important part to play in the issue of new instruc-
tions to himself. The existing Instrument is in effect the
execution and fulfilment of the intentions of Parliament
as embodied in the great Act of 1935, and although its
provisions do not directly conflict with His Majesty's Go-
vernment's new policy, they arc not by now fully con-
sistent with it. Strictly there should be a new Instrument,
but as there will be no direct inconsistency until new

34

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

legislation for the actual transfer of power is passed, the
Government agreed to let it slide. Mountbatten, however,
has insisted on a directive of some sort to amplify the
Instrument, feeling it is essential that the object of his
appointment should be clearly set out by the Prime
Minister. He has asked for it in the form of a letter to
himself from Mr. Attlee.

Once this was approved he had a lot to do in the draft-
ing of the text, which contains the following major points
of policy for his guidance: —

(1) The definite objective oi the British Government
is to obtain a unitary Government for British India and
the Jndian States, if possible within the British Com-
monwealth, through the medium of a Constituent As-
sembly set up and run in accordance with the Cabinet
Mission Plan. He was instructed to do the utmost in
his power to persuade all Parties to work together to-
wards this end. The insertion of the phrase "if possible
within the British Commonwealth" is at the special re-
quest of Mountbatten, who feels that he must strive for
a solution which leaves such good feeling that the Indian
Parties will want to remain within the Commonwealth.

(2) Since, however, the Cabinet Mission Plan can
become operative in respect of British India only by
agreement between the two major Parties, there can be
no question of compelling either Parly to accept it. If
by the 1st October Mountbatten considers there is no
prospect of reaching a settlement on the basis of unitary
Government, he is to report to the British Government
on the steps he considers should be taken for the hand-
over of power on the due date.

(3) For guidance in his relations with the States,
Mr. Attlee laid down that he was to do his best to
persuade Rulers of States in which political progress
had been slow to go forward rapidly towards the in-
troduction of some form of more democratic govern-

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

35

ment in their States, and towards the formulation of
fair and just arrangements with the leaders of British
India as to their future relationships.

(4) As far as his administration of British India was
concerned, the keynote of this was to be the closest co-
operation with Indians.

(5) Transfer of power was lo be in accordance with
Indian Defence requirements, and he was lo impress
upon the Indian leaders the importance of avoiding a
break in the continuity of the Indian Army and to point
out the need for continued collaboration in the security
of the Indian Ocean.

Attlee\s letter certainly embodies the most formidable
terms of reference ever given by a Government lo a
Vicerov.

London, Tuesday, Jlth March, 1947
In the welter of engagements Mountbatten has been
careful to include the Opposition leaders. Some of these
discussions have been quite private and informal. To-
night he came round lo my flat for the first meeting he
has ever had with Lord Samuel. Lord Samuel arrived a
few minutes early, and Mountbatten on time. It came
as quite a jolt to see the Admiral in plain clothes- teddy-
bear coat and bowler hat perched on the top of his head.
I understand the Admiralty Fleet Orders describe his
latest appointment as "Rear- Admiral etc., seconded tem-
porary duty Viceroy"!

He was at pains lo stress that as far as he was con-
cerned his appointment had the cordial approval of the
King, who had personally appealed lo him, on grounds of
national duty, lo accept it. Attlec had observed all the pro-
prieties, and the Opposition were quite wrong 'in saying
that it was simply the Prime Minister's appointment. He
could not sec what alternative there was to a time limit.
June 1948 might not be long enough, but Wavell himself
had advised this date on the grounds that the administra-

36

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

live services would have run down by then. Speaking from
the purely personal view-point, he said it was probably
better to take over when the situation was at its lowest
ebb. Bihar and Bengal had been in a sense inoculated after
their recent outbreaks, but he felt the present Punjab crisis
was inevitable. The situation in the Punjab had been very
tense for some time. The Moslem Coalition Prime Minister
had for the past five months been compelled to move from
house Lo house each night to avoid the threat of assassina-
lion at the hands of the Moslem League. Mounlbatten fell
there would probably also be trouble from the north in
the North-west Frontier Province.

He recalled the warning he had given to Sir Hubert
Ranee before Ranee left to become Governor of Bufma.
It was, that he should wail until the situation was at its
worst; but he had gone oul, from a sense of duty, a bit
loo quickly, and instead of arriving while the big Rangoon
strike was on, did so a few days before it began, thereby
incurring some of the blame for it. Mountbattcn felt that
in his own case it would not be possible for anyone to
hold him responsible for the present troubles in India, and
that this in itself would be a great advantage in the nego-
tiations ahead of him. He asked for advice on the lines
he should pursue. Answering his own question and think-
ing aloud, he said he favoured a week's private talk with
the key^ leaders in Simla. This should supply occasion
for a completely frank and uninhibited exchange of views.
Samuel was content to do most of the listening, but stress-
ed the need tor maintaining the constitutional link with
the Crown after the transfer of power, perhaps even
through the relenliorf of the Viceregal title.

I was very glad lo have been able to arrange this meet-
ing, as, in spite of obvious disparities of age and outlook,
the two men have much in common. Samuel's influence
in the Lords is very great, and his goodwill in the coming
months may be of value out of all proportion to the
Liberal voting strength.

DEBATES AND BRIEFINGS

37

London, Monday, 17th March, 1947
A crowded day. In the morning I saw Lady Mount-
batten who is extremely kind and cordial about my join-
ing the party. I mentioned that at dinner last night with
the Lay tons, Lady Lay ton had referred to the great in-
fluence in Sardar Patel's household of his daughter Mani-
ben, who was reported to be very suspicious of British in-
tentions. Lady Mountbatten agreed, adding that Jinnah's
sister, no less influential, was also reported to hold strong
views and to be a formidable factor in the situation.
Mountbatten, 1 know, has asked her to establish early
contact with the women who matter in India and who
have hitherto had no relations with Viceroy's House.

I went on to 10 Downing Street, where J had a most
helpful talk with Francis Williams, the Prime Minister's
Public Relations Officer. He has given me a number of
useful introductions and has shown himself keenly alive
to the scale of the Public Relations problems confronting
me. I leave fortified by the knowledge of his firm sup-
port. J have also received invaluable help from A. H.
Joyce, the able and experienced Officer in charge of In-
formation at the India Office, who is most co-operative
and full of sound doctrine.

In the evening to India House for a reception given by
ihc High Commissioner, Sir Samuel Runganadhan. From
the Press point of view it was a veritable bear-garden, and
a most useful commentary on the paper I have just put in
warning Mountbatten aeainst large-scale Press conferences
in India. We had no idea that the Press was uoine to be
let loose on him at this particular gathering. The whole
place was floodlit for a ncwsreel interview, and Mount-
batten was waylaid by about a do/en London correspond-
ents of Indian papers, who buzzed round him like a swarm
of bees working overtime. No attempt was made by the
host to rescue him. One 4 particularly persistent reporter
asked him if he had ever read Karl Marx, and a little later
assured him that he approved his appointment, as it would
no doubt be best for an Admiral to deal with the British

38

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

evacuation by sea! I left the party with Mountbatten, who
was, I think, much chastened by his experience. His only
comment was, "We live and learn.'*

malta, Wednesday, 19th March, 1947
It has been arranged for Mountbatten and his staff to
fly out to India in the two York aircraft MW101 and
MW102, which were allotted respectively to the King, and
to Mountbatten as Supreme Commander South-east Asia,
during the war. Mountbatten, Lady Mountbatten and
Pamela, with Ronnie Brockman and Peter Howes,* do
not leave until to-morrow. They will be flying rather more
ruthlessly than ourselves, and when we reach Delhi they
will be only two hours flying time behind us. Fortunately
I am in Ismay's plane, who made it clear that he proposes
to travel to a comfortable schedule, arriving at the various
staging points at civilised hours.

After being obliged to shed some of our luggage, we
took off at 11.30 a.m., about half an hour late. The first
leg of the journey was uneventful and the route difficult
to follow. We passed over Perpignan and Perigeux, and
then made a wide sweep, taking the course of a following
wind along the North African coast. We came finally to
Malta from the south by way of Cape Bon — dark purple
in the sunset. On arrival at Luqa, Ismay and Mieville
drove off to dine with the mighty, while the rest of us
were graded as V.I. P. 2, which, as Martin Gilliat, Mount-
batten's new Deputy Military Secretary, wryly observed,
meant that we were low life, mere parasites of the great;
it also meant bare beds in bare rooms.

After dinner one member of our party became very
learned on Maltese* culture, customs and history — their

* Lieutenant-Commander Peter Howes, D.S.C., R.N., previous-
ly nominated as Lord Mountbatten 's Flag Lieutenant in the
First Cruiser Squadron, and now to become his senior A.D.C.
in India. He included among his A D.C.'s three Indian serving
officers, one from each Service, appointed on a full-time basis
and the first to hold such posts.

THE FIRST WEEK

3S>

stone-masonry, their goat economy, etc. He explained
that some British official, in his wisdom, had laid down
a hundred years ago that all ships had to pay their harbour
dues by bringing in earth. This ruling, which would seem
sufficiently creative and unorthodox to have earned in-
stant dismissal for its perpetrator, has. in fact helped to
give an arable top dressing to an otherwise bare rock.
Ended the day with some good Naval rum to counteract
the frosty air.

CHAPTER THREE

THE FIRST WEEK

viceroy's house, new dlehi, Saturday, 22nd March, 1947
Left Karachi promptly at 9.15 a.m., afler some fitful
sleep on a very hard Indian bed, for the last eight hundred
miles of our journey over the deserts of Sind and Raj-
putana to Delhi. This was. my seventh flight between
England and India, and the abiding impression is desert,
four thousand miles of it, without an appreciable break
from the sands of Tunis to the foothills of the Himalayas.
We touched down at PaJam airfield exactly to schedule
at 12.30 p.m. We were met by the Commander-in-Chief,
Field-Marshal Auchinleck — a very nice gesture on his part,
as two hours later he was due back to join the much larger
party receiving Mounlbatten's aircraft. We were whisked
away without luggage worries in Viceregal cars, and the
year's high living had begun.

Immediately on arrival at Viceroy's House we were told
that we were due to lunch with the Wavells. It was to
be their last lunch-party as Viceroy and Vicereinej It was
served on the terrace of the Moghul gardens under the
shadow of the south-west wing of Lutyen\s vast imperial
palace. While waiting for Their Excellencies to arrive,
Ismay engaged in a friendly chat with some of the senior

40

MISSION WITH MOD NTBATTEN

kitmutgars who remembered him when he was here as
Willingdon's Military Secretary.

During the afternoon there was much preparation and
bustle in the main courtyard and up the steps leading to
the great Durbar Hall of Viceroy's House. At 3.45 p.m.
the Mountbattens duly arrived in the open landau with the
Governor-General's escort and outriders. They were con-
ducted up the long flight of steps- red-carpeted for the
occasion— by Colonel Douglas Currie, Ihe Military Secre-
tary, and an A.D.C. At the top they were received by
the Wavells. Lady Mountbatten curtsied and Mount-
batten bowed his head to the Viceroy for the first and last
lime on this mission. They stood talking for quite a while,
long enough for the ubiquitous camera-men to takg some
pleasant shots of them.

Vernon Frskine Crum tells me that European sentiment
here is definitely anti-Mountbalten on four grounds: —

( 1 ) that he knows nothing about India;

(2) that he is bringing a stalf who know nothing
about India and who are doing good men out of good
jobs;

(3) that he is a play-boy:

(4) that Wavell has been treated abominably and
there is no good reason for his removal.

Mountbatten can be trusted to deal by his presence and
actions with (1) and O) within a matter of days. (2)
clearly cannot refer to Ismay or Micville— so that leaves
the rest of us! We arc not, of course, doing anyone out
of jobs, but are merely additional to the normal Viceregal
set-up. But we shall have to tread carefully and avoid
tender corns. (4)*i s primarily the responsibility of Attlee,
who has failed to say the generous word.

All this may be the view of the British about us, but
on our side it all too easy to start off with the feeling
that Mountbatten has been called in after the situation
has become hopeless, and that the Government has pro-
pounded a transfer of power without knowing how it can

THE FIRST WEEK

41

be effected. We have inherited inter alia communal riot-
ing, which is spreading as though by chain reaction; the
key Province of the Punjab, with its threefold Hindu,
Moslem and Sikh Communal problem, governed by em-
ergency decree; a Viceregal plan which is nothing more
nor less than a phased military evacuation; a Congress
formula for an Independent Sovereign Republic with a
Direct Action campaign by the Moslem League to resist
it; Paramountcv which returns to the Indian Princes but
contains no machinery for direct negotiation to provide
a new relationship with our successors in British India or,
indeed, with anyone else.

So, in short, we have the people rioting, the Princes
falling fuit among themselves, the entire Indian Civil Ser-
vice and Police running down, and the British, who are
left sceptical and full of foreboding. I detect in Mount-
batten, however, just the same optimism that uplifted us
all when we arrived here in Delhi some three and a half
years ago on the then ''impossible" task of creating South-
cast Asia Command out ol the ashes of defeat and
depression.

Mountbatten has wasted no time whatever in sending
off two simple and straightforward letters to Gandhi and
Jinnah expressing the hope that it will be possible for
them to come and see him soon. In Gandhi's case he ap-
preciates his preoccupations in Bihar, where he is carrying
out his "repentance tours" through the areas of the worst
communal disturbance. Incidentally Gandhi is so pre-
occupied that it is still doubtful whether he will attend
the great Pan Asian Conference which is due to be held
undei the shadow of the Old Fort on Monday. Mount-
batten's immediate approach to Gandhi and Jinnah in
this way, even before Wavell has left, is typical of the
man and his methods.

vici roy's HOTisr, nlw dkltii, Sunday, 23rd March, 1947
The Wavells left promptly at 8.15 in the morning. It
has certainly been no day of rest for us. There has been

42

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

much administrative panic in connection with the publicity
for to-morrow's Swearing-in Ceremony. It has never be-
fore been photographed or filmed, and now is the last
chance. 1 went round to Mountbatlen's suite and had a
discussion with the Viceroy designate, clad in his under-
pants and vest, on the implications of letting in all the
local news-reel and camera-men, twenty-two altogether, or
leaving some out. He proposed that a large platform
should be built for them at triforium level near the circular
dome, which I am quite sure will not be acceptable to any
of the interested parties. He showed me this morning's
masterpiece on the front pace of Dawn. It is a photograph
of Ronnie Brockman and Elizabeth Ward, Lady Mount-
batten's private secretary, in which they are, described as
"Lord and Lady Louis arriving"!*

The reaction of the Indian Press to Mountbalten on his
arrival is satisfactory. He is pleased at the tributes paid
to Wavcll, and says he would have hated to be written
up at Wavell's expense. In any case, he prefers to start
off on a low note.

He has decided on another innovation —a brief address
as part of the Swearing-in Ceremony. He read out George
Abell's first draft to me. T think the speech is well con-
ceived and well timed, for he must sei/c the initiative
quickly, and this calls for imaginative and unusual action.
During dinner a draft revised by Mount batten himself was
handed to me. It contained one sentence which worried
me. After commenting on the British Government's re-
solve to effect the transfer of power by June 1948, he
proposes to add "in fact a solution must be reached within
the next six months if there is to be adequate time for it
to be implemented*. T felt this wording was likely to be
misinterpreted, and even taken to imply an escape clause
from the Government's hitherto unqualified time limit.
Mountbatlen's first reaction is that he has the Govern-

* As they were Lord and Lady Louis Mountbatten before he
received his Viscounty for war .services, (hey are still colloquial-
ly called 1 ord and Lady Louis.

THE FIRST WEEK

43

ment's authority to report progress by October, so why
not say so now? But this is his specially chosen first bow.
If he starts off by unwittingly throwing doubt on the Go-
vernment's time-limit pledge, 1 can imagine nothing more
disastrous.

It is just after 1 a.m., and an A.D.C. has come through
to say that His Excellency has revised his speech, and
what is he to do about giving it to the Press? The ambi-
guous sentence, J am relieved to say, u> out.

vktroy's iioijSf, niw w.uii, Monday. 24th March, 1947
Up betimes for the Swearing-in Ceremony. It was
similar in form to WavelFs first investiture, which I had
attended in the Durbar Hall in 1943: the same trumpets
from the roof acting as a shattering prelude: then the
A.D.CYs in stiif procession leading Their Excellencies to-
wards the thrones. In all this royal splendour the Mount-
battens indeed showed themselves to be to the manner
born. Mountbatten himself looked superb with the dark-
blue ribbon of Knight of the Garter and the overwhelming
array of orders and decorations across his chest. In addi-
tion to the Garter they were headed by no fewer than three
Grand Crosses, the K.C.B. and D.S*0.

Lad\ Mountbatten, for her part, was the epitome of
grace, with her new order of the Crown of India, besides
all her war medals and other decorations, on her dress of
ivory brocade. "The red-and-gold thrones were set in bold
relief by the lighting concealed in the rich red velvet hang-
ings. Arc lights played down upon the scene as Sir Patrick
Spons,, the Lord Chief Justice of India, administered the
oath and Mountbatten repeated it alter him.

The film cameras whirred and the flash-bulbs went off
for the first time in the confines of the Durbar Hall. I
remained on guard with the photographers to ensure that
there were no ugly rushes, but they all behaved admirably.
Mountbatten \s responses and his address, although de-

44

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

livered with great emphasis, were almost inaudible at the
back of the hall: the acoustics were abominable; even
quite near to him it was most difficult to catch what he
was saying.

The whole ceremony was completed in exactly a quarter
of an hour, the address taking four minutes. On each side
of the thrones were flanked the Leaders of the new India,
upon whom will rest such terrifying responsibility in the
coming weeks. I noticed both Nehru and Liaquat Ali
Khan listened with the utmost attention to the speech,
which of course came as a complete surprise to them.

There were two important, and as far as 1 know un-
explained, absentees - the Nawab of Bhopal and the fyfaha-
raja of Bikaner. George Abell darted up just before ten
past ten to see il Bhopal had taken his place, but he had
not, and the seal was removed. Considering that both
Bhopal and Bikaner are Mountbatten's two oldest personal
friends in India, and the importance attached by (he
Princes to ceremonial etiquette in general and the Vicere-
gal conned ion in particular, their failure to be present
to-day is a good indication of disunity and crisis in their
ranks.

Mounlbattcn had three hours with Nehru and two with
Liaquat this afternoon. They discussed Liaquafs Budget,
the immediate bone of contention between the two Parties.
Wavell has warned Mountbatlen that he will find this a
very awkward opening problem to tackle when he presides
over his first Lxecutive Council. Liaquat, as Finance
Minister in the Interim Government, by proposing heavy
taxes on all large incomes, has put the Congress into the
invidious position of* being called upon to protect its big
business supporters and of seeking relief for them ap-
parently at the expense oi its own progressive and equali-
tarian declarations. The feeling is thai some compromise
will be found, for there is a limit beyond which neither
the Moslem League nor the Congress can go in taxing
wealthy subscribers.

THE FIRST WEEK

45

viceroy's house, nlw deehi, Tuesday, 25th March, 1947

1 attended Mountbalten's first Staff Meeting, which took
place in his dark, air-cooled study, and consisted of lsmay,
Mieville, George Abell, Brockman, Hrskine Crum and my-
self. It is Mount batten's intention that these informal
round-table moots should be held on a day-to-day basis,
enabling him to think aloud without any mental reserva-
tions. They are to be a direct continuation, in a far more
intimate form, of the staff techniques he instituted at Com-
bined Operations and developed in South-east Asia Com-
mand. Mountbatten started off with a lively account of
yesterday's interviews with Nehru and Liaqual, as well
as with Bikancr and Bhopal, who both came round to
exphyn their absence from the Swearing-in Ceremony. At
the end of all these sessions, six hours in all, he confessed
that he felt like a "boiled egg".

The Bhopal and Bikaner interviews revealed the full
scale of the split among the Princes. This is a great grief
to Bhopal, who feels that Bikancr and the other "dissid-
ents", by allowing themselves to take part in the Constitu-
ent Assembly, are becoming the tools of Congress and
undermining the whole bargaining position of the States

hitherto they had succeeded in standing on their own
outside the communal fury. Bhopal thought the time
limit was quite impossible, and if enforced must involve
bloodshed and chaos. He asked Mountbatten earnestly
whether there was any possible escape from it. Mount-
batten said there was of course one, jnd only one, way
out, and that was an invitation from all the Indian parties
to us to remain- a most unlikely contingency. But Bhopal
was not so sure that as the time drew on such an offer
might not be made.

Bikaner, whom Mountbatten questioned on this point,
was not so sanguine. He argued for the so-called "dis-
sident" Princes, and while agreeing that the split was
most unfortunate, stressed that it was Bhopal who, by his
attitude to the Interim Government, had caused the com-
munal issue to be raised among them. The "dissidents".

46

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

by taking part in the Constituent Assembly, would im-
measurably strengthen the new central regime, and help
to ensure that it was not in fact a purely Congress set-up.

Mountbatten's firitf interview with Nehru was illuminat-
ing. In expansive mood Nehru ran through his inter-
pretation of the major developments from the period of
the Cabinet Mission onwards. Mountbatten considered
it was substantially accurate and tallied with information
he had gathered in London. Ln Nehru's view, Wavell had
made one serious blunder in inviting the Moslem League
to come into the Interim Government, instead of waiting
a little longer for them to ask to be brought in. He spoke
of a private Moslem League meeting at which Jinnah had
in fact already capitulated on this issue.

Mountbatten asked Nehru to give him his own estimate
of Jinnah. Nehru recalled that he had done so in his
recent book, but this did not prevent him from giving a
further penetrating impression. Nehru said the essential
thing to realise about Jinnah is that he is a man to whom
success has come very late in life — at over sixty. Before
that he had not been a major figure in Indian politics. He
was a successful lawyer, but not an especially good one,
and Nehru stressed the necessity of making this particular
distinction in Jinnah's case. The secret of his success —
and it had been tremendous, if only for its emotional in-
tensity — was in his capacity to take up a permanently ne-
gative attitude. This he had done with complete singleness
of purpose ever since 1935. He knew that Pakistan could
never stand up to constructive criticism, and he had en-
sured that it should^never be subjected to it.

Mountbatten next asked what Nehru thought was the
biggest single problem facing India to-day, and he replied
at once, the economic one. Thereupon Mountbatten asked
him whether he was satisfied with the way the Interim
Government was tackling it. Nehru said he was not, but
the position was made impossible by the League, who

THE FIRST WEEK

47

were determined to sabotage any economic planning from
the centre. Such planning, if it succeeded, would ipso
facto undermine the case for Pakistan with regard to the
Punjab. Nehru put forward a proposal he has made be-
fore of a tripartite administration of the Province divided
up on communal lines, with a central authority to deal
with certain major non-communal subjects. He was con-
vinced this was the only way to break the intolerable dead-
lock of Government under Section 93,* which Wavell had
had to impose at the beginning of this month.

The vexed question of compensation for the Jndian
Civil Service on the transfer of power was raised at this
interview. Nehru thought we were crazy to want to com-
pensate civil servants to whom the offer of remaining on
in their jobs was open. The new Government would
pledge itself to offer them the same conditions of contract
as they had previously enjoyed. Mountballen said there
could be no question of the British Government going back
on its word, and he could not think Nehru was suggesting
that it should. Nehru admitted that as far as the British
were concerned it was, of course, purely the British Go-
vernment's affair. But even so, why compensate them
on such a lavish scale? This could only encourage them
to leave their posts. And what about (he Indians? Here
it was a question of their continuing in the service of their
own countrymen. The proposals really were crazy as they
stood, Mountbatten, however, firmly asked for his sup-
port on them. He thought Nehru had misunderstood
British psychology. The more lavish and clear-cut the
compensation, the greater was the likelihood of the British
civil servants remaining on.

In Mountbatten's view, Nehru was extremely frank and
fair, and astounded him by actually suggesting *at one

* A reference to Section 93 of the Government of India Act
of 1935, which under conditions of ci\il disturbance enabled the
Viceroy and Governors of the Indian Provinces to invoke re-
serve powers and govern by decree.

48

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

point an Anglo-Indian union involving nothing less than
common citizenship — in effect, a far closer bond than
Commonwealth status, which Nehru felt was psychologi-
cally and emotionally unacceptable.

At the end of the interview, us Nehru was about to take
hi«; leave, Mountbutten said to him, "Mr. Nehru, I want
you to regard me not as the last Viceroy winding up the
British Raj, but as the first to lead the way to the new
India.** Nehru turned, looked intensely moved, smiled
and then said, "Now I know what they mean when they
speak of your charm being so dangerous."

During his talk Liaquat asked a leading question about
Mountbatten's Swearing-in speech. He wanted to -know
who was responsible for the idea. Mountbatlen said he
could answer that at once. It was entirely his own, and
produced at nobody's request. Indeed, some of his own
statf had been against it. "1 am pleased to hear that,"
said Liaquat, "for no fewer than three highly placed and
well-informed sources had assured me that you had made
the speech at the request of Congress." This little incid-
ent is a good example of the prevailing communal suspi-
cion, and no lime has been lost by either side in pressing
home all possible points it can against the other.

Perhaps the most signilicant commentary on Nehru's
Punjab proposals was a telegram from Sir Lvan Jenkins,
the Governor of the Punjab, to which Mieville drew at-
tention at the Staff Meeting. Jenkins reported that Giani
Kartar Singh, an influential Sikh leader, had stated that
in the absence of an agreement between Congress and the
League acceptable *o the Sikhs, the Sikhs must insist on
the partition of the Punjab and would resist with all their
resources any endeavour to set up a Moslem League Mini-
stry there in the meanwhile. This speech has additional
authority in that the Sikhs have already persuaded Con-
gress lo put up a resolution -accepted, incidentally, by
Wavell only a week before Mountbatten arrived — in fav-
our of partitioning the Punjab.

THE FIRST WEEK

49

VICl.ROY'S HOUSL, NFW Dl.LHI,

Wednesday, 26th March, 1947
Mountbatten began this morning's Staff Meeting with
another vivid resume of yesterday's interviews. Quite
apart from keeping notes, he has a photographic memory
and the journalist's perception of human detail. Yester-
day he saw Dr. John Matthai, Minister for Railways,, Sir
Conrad Corfield, Secretary to the Political Department,
and, last but not least, Vallabhbhai Patcl. Matthai, who
is a Christian and in no sense a Party man, gave, in
Mountbatten's estimate, a first-class appreciation, in every
way balanced and reasonable. Matthai stressed that a
horrifying feature of the situation was that all those who
were /trying to steer an honourable straight course were
gradually losing their influence and becoming increasingly
disliked and distrusted by both sides. Matthai said that
he had done his best, for instance, to back Liaquafs
Budget, only to find himself subjected to bitter attack by
Dawn.

Corfield. who is constitutionally adviser to the Viceroy
in his capacity as Crown Representative on all matters
affecting the Indian Slates, argued with some bitterness
that Bikaner, by taking his place in the Constituent As-
sembly, had seriously weakened the bargaining power of
the Princes. Corfield is clearly on BhopaTs side in this
controversy, and seems to see the Princes as a potential
"Third Force" in the transfer of power.

Mountbatten had been somewhat apprehensive about
his first meeting with Patcl, who has the reputation ot
being the strong man in the Congress High Command,
but he very quickly detected a twinkle in the Sardar's
eye. His approach to the whole problem was clear and
decisive. India must get rid of the Moslem League. The
League was actually boasting about the developments in
the Punjab. They must be mad. All was serene until
they touched on compensation. At this point Patel raised
his hand and vowed that if any Indian accepted compensa-
tion he would never be employed again.

50

MISSION WITH MOUNTBAT1 EN

In the evening 1 dined with Maurice Zinkin, a very
clever young Indian Civil Service man whom 1 first met
in Delhi in 1943. He is now working as an assistant secre-
tary in the Finance Department, and as an official has
been fairly closely involved in the framing of Liaquat's
controversial budget, which soaks the Hindu rich and is
calculated to widen the breach between the millionaire and
four-anna subscribers to Congress. Maurice had also in-
vilcd K. M. Panikkar, whom I was particularly anxious
to meet. Panikkar sports a small imperial beard. He is
an historian, politician and journalist, a man of prodigious
learning and profound judgement and no mean practi-
tioner in l he dying art of good conversation.

1 gave him a clear run by asking, "What would you do
if you were in Mountbatten's place?" He replied at once
thai Mountbatten, as a Naval strategist, must realise that
British interest was best served by the creation of a solid
centralised State based on India's seaboard, on more than
three hundred millions of the people and on geographical
and religious unity. Hindustan is the elephant, he said,
and Pakistan the two ears. The elephant can live without
the ears. He admitted frankly that Jinnah could make .
an essentially reasonable case. In a four-roomed house he
asks for only one room, but he wants that room to be his
own. He is unwilling to entrust local Moslem majorities
to a strong Hindu -control led central government. Panik-
kar s thesis was in effect that we should not try to impose
a larger unity than India was fundamentally seeking.
Nehru's tripartite proposals for the Punjab were the first
sign of Congress acceptance of the Hindustan-Pakistan
division. J innah's ^experience with the Sikhs must have
made him realise that the unity of the Punjab was physi-
cally impossible.

Historically speaking, Panikkar asserted, the Punjab is
a British myth, and no more the special home of a fighting
race than anywhere else in India. Over the centuries the
historical greatness of India was never identified with a
strong Punjab. The British should beware of the Punjab

THE FIRST WEEK

51

myth and of the larger "Central Asia" myth which had
dominated so much of their thought and policy in the
past. It was necessary to think in post-war terms.

He then turned to the problem of the Princes. As
Bikaner's Dewan, or Prime Minister, and principal ad-
viser, Panikkar* occupies a key position. He and Sir V.
T. Krishnamachari, Dewan to the Maharaja of Jaipur,
have seized the initiative on behalf of the Rajputana
Princes. Panikkar admits lhat Bhopal, the present Chan-
cellor of the Chamber of Princes, is in a difficult position
as a Moslem Prince of a Hindu Slate. Bui as Chancellor
he is really enunciating- although he may not fully realise
it — a new doctrine of Paramountcy, by asserting that no
action *should be taken by Stales individually, but only
collectively and by agreement with the Chancellor. Panik-
kar said that his concept of Paramountcy allowed it to be
no business of the Chancellor as to whether or no indivi-
dual Princes opted to have representation in the Consti-
tuent Assembly. This was a matter as between each in-
dividual State and Britain, and only a direct instruction
from the Crown Representative would affect his action.

Some ten of the sixteen big Stales had taken their places
in the Constituent Assembly. Post-war thinking in the
case of the Princes was also necessary on Britain's part.
As long as they were instruments in a British "Divide and
Rule" regime they were powerful factors in the mainten-
ance of the Raj, but once British rule is relaxed, the
Princes* power is automatically in decline, and they must
seek security within the framework of the dominant politi-
cal structure which is likely to take its place. The position
of the northern group of Princes— Jodhpur, Jaipur,
Baroda, Patiala and Bikaner— was particularly difficult.
Patiala was only a hundred and forty miles from Delhi.

Although Nehru during his seven days' negotiations with
the Princes in February had stressed no fewer than five

* Some of Panikkar' s most constructive and far-seeing ideas
are to be fonnd in his monograph "The Basis of an Jndo-Biitish
Treaty" (Oxford University Press, 1945).

52

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

limes the voluntary nature of any agreement with the
Congress, and Congress's refusal to coerce any unwilling
partner, the decision facing the Princes was none the less
to join in or perish. The Nizam of Hyderabad was a
special case, and while it was highly desirable to bring
him into the fold and to handle him firmly, Panikkar re-
commended no actual coercion. Hyderabad, the Premier
Indian State, with its Moslem ruler, was in the heart oi
Hindustan, and had eighty-six per cent of its total popu-
lation of seventeen million, Hindus. It would be impos-
sible for her to remain out. The largest State of all in
area, Kashmir, was in a difficult position, and the Maha-
raja would no doubt be tempted to throw in his lot with
Jinnah. Panikkar said that a key motive for the* Princes
to join the Constituent Assembly is to provide a reinforce-
ment of the right wing of Congress and a counter- weight
to Jai Prakash Narain and his Socialist group, who have
made considerable headway in Bengal.

Hnallv I asked Panikkar about the social structure of
the two Parties, and he confirmed the view, to which
Mountbatten subscribes, that the Congress was in due
course likely to split. The Moslem League, he felt, was
more closely integrated, lacking as it did the extremes of
industrial wealth and poverty. The few Moslem magnates
were mainly land-owners, and the exploitation of Moslem
poverty was mostly at the hands of Hindu capitalists.

vk t-roy's housi., nfw \)\ i hi, Friday, 28/ h March, 1947
During his first week as Viceroy, Mountbatten has set
the tempo he proposes to maintain. By the time March
is out he will have held comprehensive individual inter-
views with every member of the Cabinet, as the Viceroy's
Executive Council is now colloquially called, with Auchin-
leck and the other Service Commanders-in-Chief, with the
key Princes and Dcwans, and with the leaders of the British
community and Scheduled Castes. He approaches each
of these conversations with a completely open mind and
handles them without any formality. The objective is to

THE FIRST WEEK

53

establish personal relationships where none have existed
before. All this is extremely hard work. The interviews
are of rarely less than a half -hour's duration.

As he is seeing the Leaders in such close sequence, the
volume of opinion and information which he is absorbing
is very heavy. vSo he has established a procedure that as
soon as a Leader leaves the room there is a fifteen minutes'
interval before the next appointment while he dictates to
his stenographer a resume of his last conversation. These
interview notes are given reference numbers and are cir-
culated immediately to his start, enabling us to follow ever\
move he makes.

An opportunity to introduce himself to a wider circle
has been presented by the great Asian Relations Confer-
ence, which has been meeting near the Old f-'orl in Old
Delhi all this week. This evening the Mountbatlens gave
their first garden-parly for all the delegates, members of
the Legislative Assembly and senior officials in Delhi, num-
bering in all some seven hundred guests. The Moghul
gardens and the State rooms were crowded with a great
number of Congress and other leaders, who were seeing
the inside of Viceroy's House literally for the first time.
This was psychologically a very important party. In the
first place, it was a clear token of !he new Viceroy's good-
will towards Nehru's most ambitious move to assert
Indian status in Asian affairs. But, beyond that, it en-
abled tne Mountbattens to reveal from the outset their
splendid social sense and invoke the Indian gift for friend-
ship. As 1 mingled among the guests I gained no sense
of hostility, but only of reserve struggling to suppress
curiosity. The Mountbattens did much to-night to break
down that reserve.

Afterwards Lady Mountbatten and Pamela and a, party
from Viceroy's House went on to an "At Home" in the
garden of Nehru's house at 17, York Road, where we saw
an exquisite display by the famous Chhau or Masque
dancers of Seraikclla, a small State dedicated for centuries
to the service of the dance.

CHAPTER FOUR

GANDHI AND JINNAH

viceroy's iioush, new di-.lhi. Monday, 31st March, 1947
I li,m early for breakfast with the Nehru household.
There was* an informal atmosphere, and we sat down to
a European breakfast of eggs and tomatoes, tea and cof-
fee, toast and marmalade." Mrs. Pandit, Nehru's charm-
ing and brilliant sister, with one of her daughters, had
just arrived from the United Nations session in New York.
Krishna Menon, of India League fame, one of Nehru's
closest friends, to whom he has given a roving commis-
sion at this critical time, was there, aquiline and intense.
There was another friend present- -a Mr. Patel, a tractor
manufacturer, who was pleading with Nehru to open a
new factory of his in Bombay. Nehru was weighing in
his mind whether he could combine such a materialistic
ceremony with his principal duly during his next Bombay
visit — namely, the handing over of some Buddhist telics.
Nehru is very quiet-spoken, and all his reactions in his
own home seem to be pianissimo.

After breakfast 1 had an earnest talk with Krishna
Menon, who stressed: ---

(a) The Indian desire for common citizenship but
not Dominion Status. He wants what he calls reci-
procity. Such are the suspicions about Churchill that
if he is prepared to accept Dominion Status, it can-
not mean real freedom.

(/>) The limit of Nehru's patience with the pre-
sent situation in the Cabinet. The persistent refusal
of the Moslem League members to accept him as
leader was intolerable.

54

GANDHI AND JINNAH

55

(c) Prevalent criticism of the Viceroy's I.C.S. staff,
and in particular of George Abell. I spoke strongly
in favour of Abell's high calibre and patent objecti-
vity. Menon 4 admitted that the attacks against him
were probably unjustified, but must be recognised
by Mountbatten as a political reality.

He said Mountbatten started with an advantage vis-a-
vis Gandhi, who regarded him as an honest man, but he
gave warning that a conversation with the Mahatma was
always unpredictable. There was always the darjger that
it might be side-tracked through Gandhi involving him-
self in some special subject.

I arrived back just in time for the ten o'clock Staff
Meeting, where plans for Mounlbatten's first interview
with Gandhi this afternoon were fully discussed. Press
interest in the meeting is naturally immense. When the
Mahatma duly arrived at three o'clock I must have had
every accredited camera-man in the sub-continent wait-
ing with me in the Moghul gardens outside the Viceroy's
study.

After the initial greetings were over the Mountbattens
conducted him out to face this battery. He underwent
the ordeal with great good humour, joking with the
Mountbattens and generally doing his best to meet the
conflicting requests of the camera-men, all trying to secure
the perfect shot. As it happens, this was achieved by
Max Desfor, the brilliant Associated Press of America
photographer, who waited until the frenzied scramble for
the posed shots was over, and then, with the perception
of the artist, saw that Gandhi, on turning to go back into
the cool study, had placed his hand on Lady Mountbatten's
shoulder. The picture was his- Gandhi by his action
was doing no more and no Jess than treating Lady Mount-
batten in the same manner as his own grand -daughters on
his way to his Prayer Meetings. Every gesture he makes

M. M. — 3

56

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

has; consciously or otherwise symbolic meaning, and this
afternoon it was spontaneous friendship.

To-day's talk lasted for two and a quarter hours. At
the end of it Mountbatten called me in,' introduced me to
Gandhi, to discuss the immediate issue of a Press com-
munique. Gandhi, who spoke with a very soft voice and
a slight lisp, said he would be happy to leave the wording
to the Viceroy. As soon as he had left, Mountbatten
told me that the whole interview had been delibeiatelv
taken up with reminiscence, the first hour and a quarter
with Lady Mountbatten present to help produce the air
of friendliness, and the last hour on their own. He had
deliberately avoided all reference to the immediate, poli-
tical situation, to allow time for them to progress along
the path of understanding and friendship. Gandhi had
gone back to his early life in England and South Africa
and to his meetings with former Viceroy's. MountbaUcn
told me that the talks are likely to go on for the remainder
of Gandhi's week's slay in Delhi. He is quite determin-
ed not to hustle him. All this is admirable in itself, but
not so easy to explain to the Press, who will find it diffi-
cult to believe that momentous discussions have not in
fact taken place.

1 hammered out a text with all speed, secured Mount-
batten's approval, and then went out into the courtyard,
where a large crowd of correspondents were wailing to
take it down. I started to read, 'Their Excellencies met
Mr. Gandhi at Viceroy's House this evening, and they had
a most friendly talk with him lasting for seventy-five
minutes". Before I could take breath an eager corres-
pondent protested (hat this could not be true. He knew
that the Mahatma had been there for over two hours.
There was a murmur in the ranks. But when T continued
with, "Thereafter His Excellency and Mr. Gandhi had an
hour's talk alone in the same cordial vein", it was gener-
ally acknowledged that the statement might, after all, bear
some relation to the truth!

GANDHI AND JINNAH

57

viceroy's hou sr., nfw dklhi, Tuesday, 1st April, 1947

Mountbatten has had his second talk with Gandhi. It
lasted for two hours, only a quarter of an hour of which
was taken up with solid business. There was a further
long excursion into the Mahatma's life-story, and then
an astonishing proposal by him to solve the whole pro-
blem. It was nothing less than to dismiss the present
Cabinet and call on Jinnah to appoint an all-Moslem ad-
ministration. Mountbatten asked, "What will Jinnah s
reaction be?" Gandhi replied, "Jinnah will say, *Ah, it is
the wily Gandhi again*." Mountbatten asked with a
smile, "And won't he be right?" "No," Gandhi replied;
k 'l am being absolutely sincere." He told Mountbatten
that he had got to be firm and face the consequences of
the sins of his predecessors. The British system of
"Divide and Rule" had created a situation in which the
only alternatives were a continuation of British rule to
keep law and order or an Indian blood-bath. The blood-
bath must be faced and accepted.

Wavell had been irritated by the time consumed in these
interviews, but Mountbatten said he is ready to give ten
hours to him, if necessary. He is deeply impressed with
him, and thinks he is still of the first importance.

To-day Mountbatten called me in to act as an unofficial
rapporteur at a very tense and difficult meeting involving
the final liquidation of the vexed Indian National Army
question. A number of former I.N. A. men were still in
prison for war crimes- that is, tor specific brutalities, as
against purely political offences. The Government was
being subjected to considerable pressure to release them,
but Auchinleck, as Commander-in-Chief, was adamant
that these sentences were to be served if discipline was
to be maintained. In Bengal the I.N. A. were widely re-
garded as heroic liberators, largely because they had been
commanded by Subhas Chandra Bose, who had Once suc-
cessfully defied Gandhi's opposition to become President
of the Congress, and who carried his enmity of the British
Raj to the point of linking up with the Axis and provid-

58

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

ing the Japanese with the Indian National Army as an
auxiliary force for their offensive on India.

By the time Mountbatten arrived on the scene there
was a widespread feeling that this issue should be disposed
of; but in so far as it touched the Nationalist nerve, and
had not been too happily handled in the past, a reason-
able solution became more difficult to obtain as each day
passed. Wavell had actually used his Viceregal authority
to veto discussion of the matter, and had handed it over
as one of the outstanding conundrums.

Mountbatten decided to have it out in a completely
frank conference with Nehru, Liaquat, Baldev Singh and
Auchinleck. The meeting, my first direct experience of
the prevailing political climate at the highest level, is not
likely to be in character with most of the crises which
Mountbatten will have to face. Kor once Congress and
the Moslem League are on the same side of the fence.
One or two of the I.N. A. men in question were Moslems.
Although the Moslem League had been careful to avoid
identifying itself with the Congress Civil Disobedience
policy of 1942 or any direct challenge to the Allied war
effort, it was significant that as soon as there was any
suggestion that the issue was one involving national aspi-
rations, their differences with the Congress vanished at
once.

Nehru was clearly anxious to be rid of the whole pro-
blem, but was naturally worried at the possible strength
of the Legislative Assembly's reaction. Liaquat, on the
other hand, developed arguments which were, I felt, cal-
culated to draw heavily on Auchinleck's limited reserves
of temper and provoke a breach between the Government
and the Commander-in-Chief. None the less, underneath
the surface tension it was clear that there was a tremend-
ous respect for Auchinleck and genuine dismay at the
threat of his resignation, which had brought the actual
crisis to a head. After three hours of intense discussion,
a formula was found. Auchinleck was prevailed upon
to write it out himself. It invoked the Federal Court as

GANDHI AND JINNAH

59

an adviser on the merits of each particular outstanding
case.

vicfroy's noi'SE, nfw DE-iJii, Wednesday, 2nd April, 1947
At our morning Staff Meeting Mounlbatten was busy
hammering out the I.N. A. formula. The snag now
centres round the status of the Federal Court, which ap-
parently is not in a position to render reports to the Com-
mander-in-Chief.

On Mountbalten's instructions, I attended the Legisla-
tive Assembly, sitting discreetly in the Governor-General's
box to listen to the I.N. A. debate. A Moslem back-
bencher moved the resolution demanding the release of
the J«N.A. men and started breathing fire and slaughter.
His oration then suddenly tailed away. It looked as
though the Congress Whips had given him some friendly
advice half-way through his speech.

Then Nehru replied. His speech was a splendid effort.
He backed Auchinleck to the hill, as he promised he
would. The speech required great moral courage before
a potentially hostile House. The I.N. A., he argued, was
subjected to different pulls. There was the pull of loyalty
lo the Army, there was the pull of a larger loyally to
what one imagined was the good of the country; when
loyalty is in conflict the result is an inner conflict in the
individual. "When this happens, the best man suffers,
the lesser man is insensitive." Not all the J.N. A. men
were patriots; as with everyone else, there were some
good, some bad and some in the middle. The resolu-
tion was ultimately withdrawn. The outcome of this dan-
gerous incident is Mountbatteirs first success at mediation
and an encouraging example of Nehru's steadfaslness.

vioroy's housf. nfav dm hi, Friday, 4th April, 1947
The newspaper limelight continues lo be on the North-
west Frontier. Tsmay spoke at to-day's Meeting of what
he called "the bastard situation" there- ninety-seven per
cent Moslems with a Congress Ministry.

60

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

The question, arose of Travancore, which is in the far
South, and the only Indian State with a sizeable sea-board.
Uranium deposits have been found there, so the lapse of
Paramountcy now assumes new strategic significance.

There was a full and frank discussion of ways and
means of evacuating Europeans should this be necessary.
A register is to be prepared of those who wish to leave
by June 1048. Passenger-ship shortage is such that any
fleet of ships, however modest, will be out of the question.
MountbatleVs directive is that shipping losses as a result
of the war should be stressed to all concerned, and that
in all planning any impression of panic movement must
at all costs be avoided.

vici.roy's noi'SF. nf:w dixhi, Saturday, 5th April, 1947
Gandhi's master plan was discussed, and was describ-
ed as an old kite flown without disguise. Mountbatten,
however, had been the first person sufficiently intelligent
to pay attention to it. The vital point was that Mount-
batten should not allow himself to be drawn into nego-
tiation with the Mahatma, but should only listen to advice.

Now, at the end of the first fortnight, the main strategy
of Mountbalten's plan, together with its tactical applica-
tion, has already taken shape. He has had to start from
scratch, but no time has been lost. His primary aim is to
achieve a solution which inspires sufficient good feeling
to enable the Indian parties to remain within the Com-
monwealth structure from the outset. He is bending every
effort to keep the Cabinet Mission Plan alive, but on the
assumption that Jinnah's power and purpose are sustain-
ed, the facilities for partition will have to be allowed for.
He appreciates thijf the logic of partitioning the centre
involves similar treatment for those Provinces where the
two communities are evenly balanced.

Whatever shape the Plan takes, Mountbatten has been
convinced from the outset that the need for the political
solution is much more pressing than was apparent when
we were in London, and that the June 1948 time limit.

GANDHI AND J1NNAH

61

far from being not long enough, is already too remote
a deadline. He senses the danger of political collapse;
ihe various contending factions — Congress, Moslem Lea-
gue and Sikhs- heing strong enough to slake their res-
pective claims, but unable, unless an agreement is reach-
ed at once, to prevent the Chinese situation being repeat-
ed in Jndia. The quick political solution carries with it
the proviso 'hat its difficult administrative implications
should be met during an agreed interim period after-
wards.

In preparing the way for the acceptable plan, Mount-
batten is resolved to lake all the leaders along with him
step by step, but he proposes to do so separately on a
personal basis, and not by formal and forbidding con-
claves. Mountbalten hopes that the diplomacy of dis-
cussion will have the effect of playing down the com-
munal tension which the committee method, as can be
seen at the Cabinet meetings of the Interim Government,
undoubtedly stimulates. In the meanwhile at our Staff
Meetings all possible concepts are examined.

This morning the possibility of achieving a solution
which leaves something at the centre was considered.
Mountbalten mentioned as alternative concepts an alli-
ance on the lines of the League of Nations, autonomy
within the U.S.S.R., and the federal structure at Wash-
ington. The argument was thrown into the arena that
the only chance of a unitary solution would be for a de-
cision to be taken as soon as all data was available, if
possible within two months. It would have to be in the
form of a decision, and not an agreement —unilateral,
from which there was no appeal. The approval of His
Majesty's Government would be needed at once, together
with the earliest possible legislation and implementation,
so that the scheme could be completed before th« end of
1947. This would be the most honest approach, and
could be presented as the best means of getting out by
June 1948. If a scheme was required without a centre,
then clearly we could not go so quickly.

62

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

The whole of this discussion was a form of mental
exercise in preparation for Mountbatten's first vital en-
counter with Jinnah to-day.

The morning Meeting went on up to Jinnah's arrival.
There were not quite so many photographers as for the
first Gandhi interview, and Jinnah was obviously far more
formal and reserved in his attitude to the Press. Imme-
diately after the meeting was over L got in to see Mount-
batten to have my communique approved. There was
only one minor alteration.

Jinnah and his sister are dining at Viceroy's House to-
morrow evening, instead of to-night. The reason is sim-
ply that Mountbatten felt he could not sustain another
session with him to-day. Jinnah, as he left, said he would
put himself entirely at Mountbatten's disposal. Mount-
batten's first reaction was, "My God, he was cold. It
took most of the interview to unfreeze him."

I went straight in to lunch, where the guests were Nehru
and his daughter Indira, and Sjahrir, the Indonesian Pre-
mier, with his buxom, blonde Dutch wife. Sjahrir must
be the smallest statesman since Dollfuss, the Austrian
pocket Premier. Mr. and Mrs. Winkelmann, the Dutch
Attache mid his wife, were there also. I sat next to Indira.
She told me she was in some of the worst blitzes in Lon-
don and still has an air-raid warden's hat which was lent
her one evening while she was trying to put out incendia-
ries in Piccadilly. She has kept the helmet ever since as
a trophy.

After lunch Krishna Menon and Ismay, at Mount-
batten's request, had a prolonged talk about Gandhi's
proposals. It was agreed to-day that it was essential to
make it clear to Nehru, before Gandhi got to work too
hard on the Congress, that Mountbatten was far from
committed to the Gandhi plan, and that it would need
careful scrutiny. As Mountbatten said at the morning
Meeting, Gandhi has come out definitely for inviting
Jinnah to form an administration and pledged himself to
get Congress support for it. Mountbatten thinks Gandhi's

GANDHI AND JINNAH

63

proposals and outlook similar to those of the phenomenal
Mr. Pyke, once a scientist at Combined Operations, and
author of Habakkuk, the floating self-propelled airfield
made of ice — far-fetched but potentially feasible.

At a Tea-party to-day at Western Court 1 was entertain-
ed by Sir Usha Nath Sen, President of the Jndian Cor-
respondents' Association, Associated Press of India's
special correspondent and a more than usually well-in*
formed source. He introduced me to some twenty lead-
ing Indian correspondents, who for about an hour and a
half gave me a fairly intensive grilling. I got oft* to a
good start by introducing myself as a member of the
Liberal Party on temporary leave from party politics and
as oee who therefore understood the meaning of minority
problems. Considerable interest was shown in Mount-
batten's personal hobbies. There was a happy, almost
child-like, belief among them all that a solution will be
found within the next fortnight, and it was difficult to
divert them from that.

In the evening I dined with the Mountbattens alone,
and heard details of the remarkable interview with Jinnah,
who started off the conversation quite blankly — "I will
enter into discussion on one condition only." Mount-
batten said, "J interrupted him before he could finish his
sentence: 'Mr. Jinnah, I am not prepared lo discuss con-
ditions or, indeed, the present snualinn until I have had
the chance of making your acquaintance and knowing
more about you yourself." Jinnah was completely taken
aback by Mountbatten's altitude, and for some while did
not respond, remaining reserved., haughty and aloof. But
in the end his mood softened and he duly succumbed to
Mountbatten's desire to hear him recount the story of the
Moslem League's rise to power in terms of his own career.

viceroy's house, new delht, Monday, 7th April, J947
The Jinnahs dined with the Mountbattens last night.
Jinnah harped on Moslem massacres and described the
horrors at length. A quick decision was called for — 'it

64

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

would have to be a surgical operation." Mountbatten
replied, "'An anesthetic is required before the operation."
Mountbatten emerged from this second encounter reason-
ably confident. "Jinnah can negotiate with me, but my
decision goes." Jinnah stressed that Gandhi's position
was mischievous because it entailed authority without res-
ponsibility. To prove this point he went through the
history of negotiations with Gandhi, ending with the re-
jection of the Cripps' Plan and the launching of civil dis-
obedience in 1942, which he described as the Mahatma's
"Himalayan blunder". "The Coneress want to inherit
everything, they would even accept Dominion Status to
deprive me of Pakistan."

Mountbatten is using his Staff Meetings to exercisejialf-
considered ideas. He hammers out his thoughts on the
anvil of discussion. It is most exciting to be a part of
this creative process. Ismay read out Gandhi's latest letter,
which contains the germs of a "Gandhi -Mountbatten Pact"
conjured up out of nothing more than Mountbatten's sym-
pathetic interest in Gandhi's proposal to let Jinnah form
a Government. Mountbatten feels that Jinnah must be
brought into the Government, but is not clear how it is to
be dime.

Apparently while the Mountballcns and Jinnah were
being photographed before the first interview, Jinnah, in
an elfort to be gallant to Lady Mountbatten, spoke of "a
rose between two thorns". Unfortunately, it turned out
that he was in the middle himself! Walt Mason, of As-
sociated Press of America, came round to see me, and
wanfe me to be quotable as "an official source", which
frightens me a bit in this whispering gallery.

This evening, at tfie end of their latest meeting, Mount-
batten called me in to meet Jinnah, who stared at me
with eyes like gimlets and said nothing. However, at
Mountbatten's prompting he told me he would be very
pleased for me to call on him and discuss Press problems.
After he had gone Mountbatten indicated that they would
be having a difficult talk to-morrow.

GANDHI AND JINNAH

65

viceroy's house, new Delhi, Tuesday, 8th April, 1947
At to-day's Staff Meeting a letter from Liaquat was
read which alleged the inadequate representation of Mos-
lems in the Armed Forces. He wanted these reorganised
forthwith so that they could be more readily split up be-
tween Pakistan and Hindustan at the proper time. Jsmay
stressed that to take any action on Liaquat's letter would
be to prejudice the political issue. Until and unless the
Viceroy reported otherwise to His Majesty's Government,
the Cabinet Mission Plan held the field, and that Plan
envisaged one National Army.

Mountbatten agreed that there could be no splitting of
the Indian Army before the withdrawal of the British, for
two "reasons. 'The mechanics won't permit it, and f
won't." He said he was resolved to tell Jinnah that he
must maintain law and order, and would not help the
Parlies at the expense of either. Kven if it was decided
to demit power to individual Provinces, it would still be
essential to keep central control of Defence. Jsmay said
the British Army slays until Command passes. The 1935
Constitution remains in force. Mountbatten spoke on
Nehru's view of Gandhi's plan— they should not let go a
strong Centre until there was something to hand over to.
Abell said the key question was: Is the Cabinet Mission
Plan dead? Tell Jinnah what he will get if he refuses iU
He won't be reasonable until this has been clarified.

VK FROY'S HOUSI , NtW Dl.UJI.

Wednesday, 9th April, 1947
At to-day's Meeting Mountbatten said that he raised
yesterday with Jinnah the question of an appeal by both
of the major Parties for a truce in the communal disturb-
ances, and had Jriuntly asked Jinnah whether he really
wanted these disturbances to be slopped, or whether the
issue of such an appeal would put the Moslem League at
a political disadvantage. Jinnah had ultimately agreed
to join in.

66 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

I was asked to give the Press a background warning
that, since the Viceroy was examining a large number of
different plans for the future of India, the Press should
be on their guard against assuming that the plan known
and believed to be under discussion on any day was the
one most likely to be decided on. The plan which was
receiving most careful examination was, of course, the
Cabinet Mission Plan.

We had another policy discussion. Jsmay spoke of a
talk he had had with Jinnah. He shows himself wholly
unaware of the administrative implications of his policy.
The British were liquidators. All would be well if Paki-
stan was conceded, but Jinnah spoke of his fear th^t all
he would get would be a "moth-eaten Pakistan".

After the Staff Meeting I went round and saw Jinnah at
his home. His house at 10 Aurangzeb Road looks rather
like a mosque, and is full of red and black inlay. On his
mantelpiece was a silver map of India on an oak plaque.
Pakistan was marked in green. He was much more cor-
dial than on the first encounter. We discussed the Press
situation. The All-Jndia Kdilors" Conference, he said,
was entirely Hindu. Of the Moslem papers there was
only Dawn, which was under his proprietorship. "Al-
though you may not believe it, 1 have never exercised
direct influence over its policy, and have always regarded
'that as the Editor's job and within his competence. " "The
Editor," he added, without a smile, "has always been in
agreement with my views/' He spoke at length on the
completely false reports of the Noakhali killings of Hindus
by Moslems. These were first described as a massacre of
many thousands, bflt he claimed they turned out to be
iitlle more than a hundred killed and a hundred wound-
ed. Background talks with the Press in Jndia were almost
impossible. He spoke of his experience in London, where
his off-the-record remarks were completely respected.

In a note of the interview for Mountbatten I wrote as
follows: —

GANDHI AND JINN AH

67

"In view of the inaccurate and inflammatory nature of
some recent Press comment, 1 said that I had in mind to
recommend that you should send a message to the All-
India Editors* Conference urging the need for restraint,
etc. 1 wanted to see what his reaction would be: It was
not particularly favourable. If J may presume to advise,'
he said, 'His Excellency should press on with his work,
reach a decision quickly, and avoid exhortations. It is
above all his sacred duty to uphold law and order.' The
interview was helpful in so far as it will enable me to
make contact with the Moslem Press under favourable
auspices, but discouraging as indicating that the chances
of any working arrangement between the Hindu and the
Moslem Press are very small indeed,' *

J had tea this afternoon with the Nehru household.
Indira and Krishna Menon recalled the origins of the
Moslem League and its leadership — pointing out that
Jinnah himself was a Hindu by birth. The league,
Krishna said, only began to mean something when Con-
gress became a Direct Action movement. It grew, he
alleged, under British encouragement. Krishna wants me
to go to the States Conference at Gwalior, where Nehru
is handing over the Presidency to Sheikh Abdullah, the
Moslem Congress leader in Kashmir, who is at present in
gaol there. It is not only the political temperature that
is rising. 7*he thermometer reached over 10p°F. yester-
day. As Nehru aptly remarked to me T 'The trouble is
we get hot by thinking about the heat."

In the evening we had a big State dinner for the British
Residents in the Indian States, who have been called to
Delhi for consultation with Mountbatten in his capacity
as Crown Representative. The Stale rooms were opened
up and the cobwebs dusted olT Lady Willingdonls Persian
ceiling. Eighty-four guests sat down to dinner, and the
silver plate was brought out, which somehow did not im-
prove the flavour of the food. Portraits of former Vice-
roys — Minto, Mayo, Halifax and Reading — look down

68

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

upon the swelling scene. The string band plays a strange
blend of Gilbert and Sullivan and Indian rhythms.

viceroy's house, new dflhi, Saturday, 12th April, 1947
Mountbatten reported on his latest meeting with Jinnah,
who was apparently much shaken when Mountbatten
failed to react in any way to his otfer, dramatically pre-
sented, to bring Pakistan into the Commonwealth. In
our general discussion to-day the alternatives of "Plan
Balkan" versus "Plan Union" were frankly and fully dis-
cussed. Mountbatten went to the root of the dilemma,
and put the proposition that he should try to get Congress
to accept the Cabinet Mission Plan in full, and then con-
front Jinnah with coming in or accepting a truncated Paki-
stan. George Abcll was sceptical of Congress changing
its policy. It had already forced the Mosfem League to
retreat by the pressure it had exerted on the northern
Groups.

Gandhi has written to Mountbatten that his own plan
is not acceptable to Congress, and that he is personally
handing over all future negotiations to the Working Com-
mittee. Mountbatten says he will try to get Gandhi to
slay on and exert his influence in favour of full Congress
acceptance of the Cabinet Mission Plan. He feels that,
deep down, desire for union still exerts a powerful pull
on Comrress.

Incidentally there was a charming postscript to Gandhi's
proposal that Mrs. Asaf Ali should meet Lady Mount-
batten. Lady Mountbatten at once wrote off an invita-
tion, which Mrs. Asaf Ali duly declined. The next day
when Gandhi came for a meeting with the Viceroy Mrs.
Asaf Ali was with him. "I hear she refused," he said,
"so I have brought her with me."

viceroy's house, new delhi, Monday, 14th April, 1947
The Press speculators have been busy. An article in
the Hindustan Times this morning has forecast the issue
of the "Peace Appeal" on which Mountbatten has been

GANDHI AND JINNAH

69

working. It indicates that it will shortly be issued over
the signatures of Gandhi, Jinnah and Kripalani, as the
President of Congress. One of the big points at issue
is Congress's insistence on including Kripalani, and
Jinnah's unwillingness to do so. Ismay and Mieville con-
sider that the Hindustan Times article may well have
wrecked the chances of persuading Jinnah to sign the
document which has been prepared. Mountbatten gave
strict instructions to me to point out that the article had
of course been published without his knowledge and had
caused him great annoyance, as indeed it has. He is also
writing to Nehru to find out how the leak occurred.

After many spasms of uncertainty Mountbalten's pa-
tience and will-power have prevailed, and this afternoon i
havc*been able to take round to the Ministry of Inform-
ation the original document over Gandhi's and Jinnah's
joint signatures. Jinnah has gained his point over Kripa-
lani, who has not been invited to sign. Actually Gandhi
wrote his name twice, once in English and once in Urdu.

The tone and liming of this Appeal are a great personal
triumph for Mountbatten and give impetus to his whole
effort to produce an acceptable political plan. It enhances
his prestige and it exploits to the maximum the initial
^ood-will surrounding him. It is designed to create a
detente without which no political solution will be worth
a pin\s fee. It is the first victory for his open diplomacy.

The message is couched in stern and forceful terms,
which are urgently needed. The call tor avoidance, both
in speech and wiiting, of any incitement to acts of vio-
lence and disorder is particularly timely. As each day
passes certain of the more communally minded Press com-
mentators become increasingly provocative in their langu-
age, stirring up hatreds they cannot control and heroics
they are never likely to perform. At Mounlbatlen\s re-
quest I have gone very carefully into the Ministry of In-
formation's proposals for disseminating the Appeal. The
engine of All India Radio will be at full throttle, and
at my suggestion to-night's release will include a photo-

70

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

stat copy. Ambitious; plans are in hand to show it at
cinemas and to distribute it by leaflet from the air over
the disturbed areas.

The planned pattern of events now centres round a
Simla house-party early in May — the probable guests to
be Nehru, Jinnah, Palel, Liaquat, Kripalani, Baldev Singh,
and the possibles Gandhi, Bhopal and Bikaner.

To-morrow the Governor's Conference is due to take
place, following closely upon a useful session with the
Residents. Mountbatlen is not likely to put his Plan into
final shape until he has heard the Governors' full and
frank views on the draft which he has already sent for
their consideration. On the eve of the Conference the
broad principles of Mountbalten's Plan arc:

(1) that the responsibility for Partition, if it comes,
is to rest fairly upon the Indians themselves;

(2) the Provinces, generally speaking, shall have the
riizht to determine their own future.

(3) Bengal and the Punjab arc to be nolionally parti-
tioned for voting purposes;

(4) the predominantly Moslem Sylhet district in
Assam is to be given the option of joining the Moslem
Province created by a partitioned Bengal;

(5) General I- lections are to be held in the North-
west F rontier Province.

Some of the Governors have arrived at Viceroy's House,
and Mountbatlen has already had talks with Sir Frederick
Bourne (Central Provinces), Sir John Colville (Bombay),
and Sir Archibald Nye (Madras). By the time they are
all here the Mounth^iUcns will be entertaining under one
roof eleven Governors, their wives, private secretaries and

A.D.CYs a formidable gathering even for Viceroy's

House, with its three hundred and forty rooms and one
and a half miles of corridors, to hold.

Sir Mirza Ismail, the Prime Minister of Hyderabad,
was called in for the talk with Bourne when they dis-

GANDHI AND J1NNAH

71

cussed the very tricky question of the status of Berar. This
is part of the Nizam of Hyderabad's hereditary domains —
indeed, his heir is entitled the Prince of Berar- but is ad-
ministered by the Central Provinces. Congress, will cer-
tainly lay claim to Berar as part of the Central Provinces,
while the Nizam will certainly want Berar back. Mirza
Ismail intimated that the Nizam may shortly be seeing
Jinnah. As for himself, he says that he is rapidly losing
the Nizam's confidence and does not expect to be in
office much longer.

L sat next to Ismail at the Mountbattens' lunch-party.
He is a Moslem of moderate opinion, sober judgement and
high intellect, who is therefore in a somewhat isolated
position. He spoke quite freely to me about the uneasy
role of Premier to the N'zam. The maximum period of
power one could hope for was about four years. The only
exception to this had been old Sir Akbar Hydari, who had
clung on for nearly fourteen years. The Ni/am\s state-
craft consisted largely of weaving complex conspiracies
against his own Prime Ministers and ultimately depriving
them of the power he had wrested for them. It was, by
Ismail's account, a depressing cycle of self-defeating in-
trigue. Also at the lunch was Compton Mackenzie, who
vj covering the world's bal tie-fronts to produce an official
account of the Indian Army's contribution to the war.

Colville, it seems, began by ollcring to resign, but has
been prevailed upon lo slay on a little longer. Mount-
batten said that Colville was likely lo be both wrong and
right ir his objections to the present policy. Wrong, be-
cause only short notice and a time limit could make the
Indian leaders face up to reality and right because there
was not enough time to launch a new constitution,

CHAPTER FIVL

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN

vichroy's housk Ni-w dllhi, Tuesday, 15th April, 1947
Tin 7 Governor's Conhrfnct opened lo-day with the
boost of encouragement provided by the banner headlines
announcing the Gandhi-Jinnah AppeaJ. I attended the first
session, which took place in the sombre, panelled Council
Chamber. It was an impressive spectacle, with the eJeven
Governors seated in anti -clockwise order of precedence
round the large oval table. Mountbatten's opening speech
was a very fluent and persuasive appeal for loyalty both
to the letter and spirit of the British Government's deci-
sion. He stressed, just in case there was any doubting
Thomas in his midst, that June 1948 was a firm departure
date.

There was full and frank discussion on the evacuation
of Europeans. Colville and Nyc, Governors of the two
Senior Presidencies, were both robust on this issue, but
Sir f:van Jenkins, the very brilliant Governor of the Punjab

George Abcll's predecessor as P.S.V. to Wavcll — said
he felt bound to draw attention to the seriousness of the
situation in the Punjab. Sir Hugh Dow, Governor of
Bihar, said there were only fifty European officials in his
State, covering a population of forty million. So it was
not surprising, perhaps, that there was little law or order
in his part of the world. Sir Andrew Clow, the retiring
Governor of Assam, spoke about the planters, and said
there were more JV>ung wives than ever before enjoying
the sunshine, food and servants.

J. D. T\son, Secretary to the Governor of Bengal, Sir
Frederick Burrows (who was ill and unable to be at the
Conference), reported that there were twenty thousand

12

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN

73

Europeans in Bengal and that he was seriously worried
about the five thousand in the outlying districts. He fell
that the chances of maintaining law and order in the Pro-
vince were very slim. Communist agitation -stronger here
than anywhere else— was definitely anti-European, and he
believed that the Europeans were not looking ahead.

Mountbatten stressed that there was little chance of any
support from the British Cabinet for any legislation to
prevent people coming to India. The final vote on this
delicate subject was in favour of using persuasion with
regard to the movement of Europeans, with the Punjab
asking for enforcement powers later.

There followed detailed consideration of the vexed ques-
tion of compensation. Mountbatten gave the history of
the negotiations to date. Colville — "George, the auto-
matic pilot", as he called himself, to cover the various
occasions he has served as acting Viceroy -confirmed what
Mountbatten had to say about the difficulty of getting
compensation tor Indians past the Interim Government.
Trivcdi and Hydari both felt Indians would, on purely
patriotic grounds, wish to remain on and let compensation
go" Mountbatten had some interesting things to say about
the ambiguities and uncertainties of the Commonwealth
link, referring in particular to Fire. Sir John Maffey had
told him that the Letter of Credence of the Irish repre-
sentative to Hitler during the war was actually signed
"George R.I.".

In the afternoon session discussion was broken down
to allow for reports by Governors on their individual
Provinces. Sir Olaf Caroe, speaking about the North-
west Frontier, which at the moment seems to be the point
of most acute political crisis, wants an election. Dr. Khan
Sahib, the Premier who, with his more famous brother
Abdul Ghaffar Khan, "the Frontier Gandhi", leads the
pro-Congress Red Shirt group, does not. All the pro-
Moslem League Moslems who would stand to gain most
from an election are in gaol. Mountbatten's advice is
"hold your hand, if possible", but Caroe looks tense and

74

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

tired, and is clearly weighed down by his heavy
responsibilities.

Jenkins gave a lucid analysis of the implications of
Punjab partition, showing just how the Moslem versus
non-Moslem issue was complicated by Sikh and Hindu
Jat claims. Tyson similarly examined the prospects for
Bengal, if under partition. East Bengal, he felt, would
become a rural slum. There were some twenty-five mil-
lion Hindus in Bengal forty-five per cent of the popula-
tion and they all wanted to be absorbed into Hindustan.
The concept of East Bengal was unacceptable to many
local Moslems. The relationship between Jinnah and the
present Moslem Premier of Bengal, Suhrawardy, was far
from cordial. Suhrawardy is frightened of partition and
is ready to play with the Hindus. Jenkins, too, spoke of
the possible growth of anti -Pakistan opinion in the Punjab
and Bengal. The local Moslems would be satisfied to run
Bengal as a Moslem-controlled Province.

The Governor of Bihar drew attention lo the concentra-
tion" of wealth, mineral and iron. The industrial develop-
ment of Chota Nagpur was part of Suhrawardy's concept
for the building up of an independent Bengal. Provincial
devolution would, he felt, in the case of Bihar have wide
repercussions. In the general discussion it was felt that
a Sind-Punjab Pakistan was economically feasible. Mount-
batten considered, however, that Fast Bengal might con-
tract out and that also the North-west Frontier was a
liabilitv.

vktroy's norsi, niav dm. hi.
Wednesday, 16th April, 1947
At the resumed Governors' Conference to-day Jenkins
spoke about the need for an "Operation Solomon" for
the Punjab and put forward the possibility of a statistical
boundary commission. There was a big discussion on
the whole draft Partition Plan, which Mountbatten had
put together in time for the Conference. Tt is clear, from
what The Governors have lo say, that by far the greater

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN

75

part of the sub-continent is calm and quiet and ready to
accept any reasonable solution.

I had lunch at the Imperial with Panikkar, who stressed
that the Constitution of the Moslem League had been
weighted heavily in favour of Moslems living in minority
areas. This simple fact, he claimed, had enabled Jinnah
to bring extra pressure on Moslem members living in majo-
rity areas. Bengali loyalties, he said, were increasingly
cutting across those of Hindustan, and would require care-
ful handling. He also argued strongly the need for an
Indian equivalent to the British Privy Council to which
unpredictable political and judicial problems could be
referred .

Mountbatten has had a talk with Baldev Singh, the De-
fence Minister, who, in the presence of Jenkins, the
Governor of the Punjab, denied being the treasurer of
the Sikhs* appeal fund, which is undoubtedly being sub-
scribed for warlike and unconstitutional purposes.

Baldev sought advice on the Army nationalisation
scheme. What chance was there of British Services re-
maining on after June 1948? Mountbatten replied that
it all depended on whether India wants to be in the Com-
monwealth. A face-saving formula is needed to cover
the Congress resolution passed prior to 20th February to
set up a sovereign independent Republic. Baldev's general
attitude goes to confirm that partition is new the only
solution acceptable to all parties.

vio.roy's not si., nlw ui-uii, Iriday, ISih April, 1947
Mountbatten was in buoyant mood at to-day's Staff
Meeting. He had an interesting talk with Krishna Menon,
who look upon himself part of the original responsibility
for the Independent Sovereign Republic formula. The
search., however, for another formula which wilt ensure
a close link with Britain is being actively pursued by him
and some of the Congress leaders. Menon has explained
how initiative on Congress's part is impossible; even the
semblance of it would lose them their position; it must

76

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

come in some way from us. Jn the course of the discus-
sion 1 said I felt that, at the military level, the analogy
aud advantages of the Combined Chiefs of Staff procedure
in the war should not be overlooked, and Mountbatten
agrees that this should certainly be kept in mind.

viceroy's housk, nlw dllhi, Saturday, 19th April, 1947
Mountbatten gave us an alarming but none the less
amusing account of his interview with the Sikh leaders,.
He found himself confronted by some very scruffy old
gentlemen with long beards and large kirpans who put on
their glasses, looking just like benign professors full of
peaceful intentions, but telling a few fibs in the process.
They all insisted that he must partition the Punjafi, and
said the Sikhs were the principal victims in the Rawalpindi
riots.

Mountbatten mentioned the interview he had yesterday '
with Dr. Matthai, who had stressed that although res-
ponsible Indian leaders were now generally making dis-
passionate and temperate speeches, the Press was causing
much trouble and was in his view an irresponsible and
inflammatory element in the situation. Matthai suggested
that the Viceroy should call together all editors and appeal
to them to lone down their comment and implement in
their own way the Gandhi-Jinnah Appeal, Dr. Matthai
thought that this would have a tremendous effect. Mount-
batten asked for mv comment. I said that 1 doubted
whether this approach was either feasible or even desirable.
It would be physically very difficult to bring in all the
editors concerned from distant parts, and when they had
arrived at Viceregal request they would expect to be told
news of some firm decision. They would, to say the least,
be deflated at receiving only an exhortation. Moreover,
I suggested the desirability of taking the matter up with
Patel in the first instance in his capacity as Minister of
Information.

At his meeting yesterday with Dr. Khan Sahib the sug-
gestion was mooted that Mountbatten should pay an early

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN

77

visit to the North-west Frontier Province. The idea hither-
to had been to postpone tours until the major Plan had been
completed and approved, but the Frontier situation seems
to call for special treatment beforehand. In our general
policy discussion the Dominion Status issue was further
thrashed out. Mountbatten pointed out that Nazimuddin,
the Moslem League leader in Fast Bengal, was jusl as
adamant as Jinnah about Pakistan. Ismay stressed that
we were engaged in creating two Pakistans, which drew
from Mountbatten the comment that whatever its impli-
cations he was beginning to think Pakistan was inevitable.

In the evening the Mountbattens gave a small dance in
the walled garden by the swimming-pool for Pamela's
eighteenth birthday. The fall of fountains and the glim-
mer (if fairy-lights, the air soft and fresh, ihe dark -green
cypress trees, red roses climbing on white walls, and the
red and gold of the Viceregal servants- here was all one
could ask of an enchanted garden.

viciroy's nousr, ni:w oh hi, Monday, 2ht April, W47
Mountbatten rehearsed his afternoon meeting with
Liaqual, indicating that his final decision as to whether
there should be a fresh election in the North-west Frontier
Province would depend upon his estimate of the Moslem
League's ability to form a responsible Ministry. He said
he would make it abundantly clear that in spite of ap-
pearances he would not in fact yield to force or to the
threat of force.

1 have been asked to prepare a Press note announcing
the forthcoming Frontier tour.

The Mountbatiens eave a small dinner <-it the House for
the Brockmans, Nicholls and ourselves, which was
directly preceded by a garden-party to the Viceregal
establishment. Mountbaftcn told us that he hajd been
much shaken to learn that the three hundred and seventy-
five guests were all of the officer cadre, and that there
were in all some seven thousand persons on the Viceregal
estate. He said he had told some of them that they ought

78

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

to have a Mayor and had then added that he supposed
he was their Mayor! This seemed to go down well with
the guests, and showed, he felt, that the Indian had a sense
of humour, or at least the good manners to laugh at the
right time.

While we were in the drawing-room before dinner Lady
Mounlbatten confessed that she found herself continually
trying to move the heavy teak-framed chairs and sofas,
only to be no less continually discovered by the servants
in this undignified attempt! In this connection she quoted
the experience of Lady Linlithgow, whose dog had had
an unfortunate accident on the Viceregal carpet shortly
before the guests were due to arrive. It took so long to
find a servant of sufficiently low caslc to clear up th^ mess
that she was finally obliged to deal with it herself, and
was caught by her guests and servants in the act!

Durinu dinner an officer's name was mentioned, and
Lady Mount batten exclaimed, "Let us see him by all
means, but don't let him arrange any more tours for us."
She then told a story of a trip in the Arakan when the
said hapless officer forgot that the river was tidal and she
and Lli/abeth Ward had to leave their jeep and swim for
it to keep their engagement!

Mounlbatten told me that the interview with Liaquat
had been very interesting. Liaquat had spoken with much
frankness about Wave! I, saying they all knew that he was
a very great soldier, but he had undoubtedly made his
political position impossible for himself with the Indian
leaders when they all went to London last December. On
that occasion he had apparently taken an apologetic line,
by asserting that he was merely a soldier and that he had
made mistakes. After such a confession it became obvi-
ous, Liaquat said, that he could no longer carry on. and
it was immediately after this that the idea of a successor
began to come into the picture.

Mountbatten told us he felt it was a very great pity that,
if he had to have this job, he could not have taken it on
eighteen months ago. He might then have been able to

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN 79

influence events, but now with the time at our disposal
this was almost impossible. There had been a catastrophic
deterioration in the situation during the past few months,
and political solutions must be found within the time limit,
and therefore before one could really hope to influence
events.

Jn a general talk about the Press 1 used the occasion
to stress the importance of hard news ahead of time which
enabled us to control speculation, and mentioned in this
connection our success with the Governors* Conference.
I also underlined my conviction of the importance of
Patel in the situation. Altogether Mountbatten was in
very good form throughout the evening.

vkhroy's house, nt.w dm. in, Tuesday, 22nd April, 1947
Mountbatten said to-day that representatives of ap-
proximately half of the inhabitants of India had already
asked to be allowed to remain within the Commonwealth.
They included the Moslem League, the Scheduled Castes
and the Indian States — although all the States' subjects
might not be of the same opinion as their Rulers. All
these applicants, he added, seemed to think they were
doing Great Britain a favour by asking to stay in. Mount-
batten went on to inquire whether it was considered that
there was any possibility of graining some form of Do-
minion Status to India as a whole, or more probably to
the separate parts of India, in the near future He en-
visaged the setting up of a Defence Council and a Gover-
nor-General as chairman with a casting vote. Jsmay
thought we should not rule out unilateral application by
Pakistan for Commonwealth membership. Mountbatten
directed that planning for the grant of Dominion Status
to India, whether united or divided, before June, and
possibly by January 1948, should continue concurrently
with the Plan for ihe main decision.

He has come round to the view to-day that the Cabinet
Mission Plan can somehow be resurrected in a new form
and name. As originally presented, it was psychologically

80

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

wrong. If the, principle of iwo sovereign States could be
accepted, union might be achieved through sovereignty.
We had to recognise that the Moslem League were pre-
pared to give up the B and C Groups (full Pakistan area)
and to accept a truncated Pakistan if a real free centre
went with it.

VICI.ROY'S 1HUIS1, NI.W DL1 II J,

Wednesday, 23rd April, 1947
This morning Moumbattcn has had a three-hour session
with Jinnah.

He seemed lo be resigned to the partition of the Punjab
and Bengal. He did not ask what the boundaries would
be, and Mountbatten did not tell him. He is putting out
k ':m appeal to reason"' on the North-west Frontier Pro-
vince and is clearly relieved at not being asked to call off
Direct Action. He told Mountbatten, "Frankly, Your
Fxccllency, the Hindus are impossible. They always want
seventeen annas for the rupee/''

Maulana Azad, the leading Congress Moslem, has put
forward a new formula. It is that Mountbatlcn's personal
interpretation of the British Government's statement fol-
lowing the London meeting with the Indian Leaders and
Wavell last December on the right of Provinces lo opt out
of Groups, would be acceptable. He bases this on a dic-
tum of Gandhi's, "The sole referee of what is or is not
in the interests of India as a whole will be Mountbatten
in his personal capacity/'

vktroy's housi, nl;w diijii, Friday, 25th April, 1947
At to-day's Staff ^Meeting the first draft of the Plan was
considered, but no clear concept for its final projection on
the Parties and the public emerged, ian Scott raised an
important debating point, favouring the widest publicity
for it prior to its submission lo the Working Committees
of the two Parties, who would then have the searchlight
of world attention focused upon them. This technique
might have the effect of drawing the more moderate ele-

THE GOVERNORS AND THE PLAN

81

ments in both Congress and Moslem League together again
to preserve the bare essentials of unity.

Mountbatten agreed that it was most important that
with the issue of the announcement the impression should
not be created thai partition was a foregone conclusion,
but that the question had been referred for decision to
the will of the people. To improve the chances of a return
to a united India, he felt that an escape clause should be
included in the announcement, and he would consider as
counting as a form of union any plan in which the centre
dealt with the same subjects as in the Cabinet Mission
Plan— namely, External Affairs, Defence and Communi-
cations. The crux of the matter seemed to him to be that
in the. Cabinet Mission Plan the Hindu majority at the
centre would be able permanently to outvote the Moslem
minority and use the reserved subjects to subdue them.
The alternative was that the representatives of Pakistan
and Hindustan should come together on the basis of parity.
If this form of a united India could be obtained it might
be possible for the Punjab, Bengal and Assam to remain
united. Abcll pointed out that it would not be real parity,
which depended on the relative strength of the two so-
vereign Stales. Mountbatten replied that he realised this
point. "My object is to create the effect of two sovereign
States (ir separate blocks negotiating at the centre rather
than having a system of majority voting."

Among the various points raised by Mountbatten, whose
mind ranged over the whole problem with much vigour
and originality, were forebodings about the future of Cal-
cutta. He felt that the Moslems would be bound to de-
mand a plebiscite for it and that its fate would become
a major issue. It would, however, be most undesirable
to lay down the procedure of self-determination here,
which might well give the wrong answer.

He reports that Patel has been complaining* "You
won't govern yourself and you won't let us govern." But
in fact we are aiming at a date as early as 19th May for
the decisive meeting with the Leaders.

82

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

vickroy's house, new delhi, Saturday, 26th April, 1947
Mount batten has decided to send Ismay and George
Abell back to London with the first draft of the Plan, to
hammer it out clause by clause with the Government and
officials concerned. In giving background guidance about
this trip, 1 am to explain that one of Mountbatten's princi-
pal objects in having Ismay and Jvlieville on his staff is in
order to improve liaison with Whitehall and to enable
them to visit London alternately at approximately two-
monthly intervals. It is understood that the first to return
will be Lord Ismay.

The Commonwealth issue is looming large. There has
been a fair indication of Patcl's policy on this subject in
the leading article of to-day's Hindustan Times. Ismay
drew attention to the relevant extract, which runs as
follows: —

"If there is a settlement between the Congress and the
League as a result of which the Muslim majority areas
arc allowed to constitute themselves into separate so-
vereign States, we have no doubt that the Union will not
stand in the way of Britain establishing contacts with those
States, it must be clearly understood, however, that the
Indian Union will consider it a hostile act if there is any
attempt by Britain to conclude any treaty or alliance in-
volving military or political clauses."

Mountbat ten's, line on this is that he has received no
instructions as to the attitude he should adopt in the event
of one or more parts of India expressing a desire to remain
within xhe Commonwealth. But His Majesty's Govern-
ment had clearly enjoined him not to enter into any dis-
cussions on this matter which might imperil the chances
of Indian unity; 4o attain which had always been and
would remain his first ambition and determination.

Bob Slimson, the B.B.C.'s special correspondent in
India, has shown me his latest script relayed throughout
the day on all the B.B.C. news bulletins. '"'One most im-
portant fact." he said, "in the Indian situation, which
tends to be overlooked in the rush of day-to-day news, is

FRONTIER VISIT

83

that India's; attitude towards Britain has undergone a fun-
damental change in the last two months. The good-will
established by Britain's 'Quit India' statement has been
consolidated by the new Viceroy in five industrious
weeks."

viceroy's housl, NLW Dixi it, Sunday, 27 th April, 1947
George Abell is back from his trip to Lahore, where he
reports a serious situation. Jenkins, probably the ablest
administrator in India, considers there is a grave danger
of civil war. When asked by George whether there was
anything else we could do but leave in June 1948, Jenkins
admitted that there was no alternative, but there was a
real peril that we would be handing over to chaos.

Prom Calcutta comes the news that John Christie, Joint
Private Secretary to the Viceroy, has failed to sell the
Bengal section of the Plan to Burrows, who was standing
out for the doctrine of a free city of Calcutta. He describes
its installation after June 1948 as mandatory. This seems
to be a strange word to apply to a situation over which
we shall have no control whatever at that time.

CHAP11 r six
FRONTIER VISIT

GOVFRNMLNT JIOUSL, IM.SIIAWAK.

Monday, 28th April, 1947
Early this morning 1 set off by air with the Viceregal
party for Peshawar. It was a bumpy journey, and Pamela
and myself in particular were both feeling somewhat green
on arrival. The most impressive spectacle on the way up
was the mighty Nanga Parbat. which we could see from
the air over a hundred miles away to the north, rising in
perfect symmetry to some twenty-five thousand feet, over-

84

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

topping by at least ten thousand feet the surrounding
peaks. We touched down just after midday.

On arrival at Government House, where we were anti-
cipating a nice quiet Junch prior to an afternoon of steady
conference, we found ourselves confronting a situation of
crisis bordering on panic. Sir Olaf Caroe, the Governor,
in a stale of some agitation, advised us that there was an
immense Moslem League demonstration less than a mile
away, which was to place its grievance before the Viceroy
and was ready to risk breaking the law by forming a pro-
cession and marching on Government House. The only
alternative, according to Caroe, was for the Viceroy to
forestall this plan by marching on them and showing him-
self to the multitude. The demonstrators were estimated
at well over seventy thousand, and had been gathering
from the most remote parts of the Province, many of them
having been on the march for several days. Mountbatten
had a brief "council of war'* with Caroe and the Premier,
Dr. Khan Sahib, and it was agreed that the Viceroy should
show himself without delay.

Mountbatten thereupon drove olT to the demonstration,
Lady Mountbatten, with great courage, insisting on going
with him. The crowd confronting us was certainly for-
midable. We climbed up the railway embankment close
to the historic Lorl Bala Hissar. and looked down upon
a vast concourse gathered at Cunningham Park and
stretching away into distant fields. There was much gesti-
culation and the waving of innumerable but illegal green
flags with the white crescent of Pakistan, accompanied by
a steady chant of "Pakistan Zindabad".

Within a few minutes of our arrival, however, the brood-
ing tension lifted# The slogan changed; ' Mountbatten
Zindabad", could be heard and cheers were raised. Sullen
faces smiled. Lor nearly half an hour Mountbatten, in
his khaki bush shirt, and Lady Mountbatten, also in a
bush shirt, stood waving to the crowd, which had a sur-
prisingly large number of women and children in its midst.
Any sort of speech was out of the question. But the im-

FRONTIER VISIT

85

pact of iheir friendly, confident personalities on that fana-
tical assembly had to be seen to be believed.

As we swarmed down the embankment and drove back
to a well-earned lunch, the relief of the Governor and
local officials could not be concealed. They told us that
it would have been quite beyond the resources of the
local police and military to have deflected the crowd peace-
ably if they had made up their collective mind to invade
Government House. As it was, after seeing the Mount-
battens they struck camp and returned to their homes.

After lunch Mountbaltcn began a series of exacting in-
terviews, f was present for two of them, one with Khan
Sahib and his Cabinet of four Ministers, and the other with
a deputation of local Hindu residents. He also met the
local Moslem League leaders, for whom a special dis-
pensation was made to leave gaol in order to see him.
Superimposed upon this conflict, which was in itself suffi-
ciently serious to become the focal point of the wider
struggle between Congress and the Moslem League, was
the very difficult relationship between the Governor and
his Congress Prime Minister. This friction also had wider
implications at the national level.

Mountballen's diplomatic resilience was shown to good
advantage in his encounter with Khan Sahib and his col-
leagues, at which the Governor was also present. He be-
gan by saying how grateful he was for the opportunity ol
meeting them in person. He would ask them and they
could ask him questions. He appreciated Khan Sahib's
public-spirited advice that he should go to meet the de-
monstrators. He had in fact done nothing but stand on
the embankment. He had previously refused Jinnah per-
mission to organise a procession to Government House.
Khan Sahib, on his side, was at pains to confirm that he
had called off a procession of Red Shirts — the Congress
mass movement in the Province and counterpart of the
Moslem League's Green Shirt organisation.

Mountbalten added that he had come to turn over India
to Indians: to transfer power in accordance with the will

86

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

of the people. He was already devising machinery for
dealing with the Punjab and Bengal, but, he added, "The
Frontier position involves particular difficulty for me. I
shall be telling the Moslem League that I will not yield
to violence. I tell you privately that I think elections are
necessary, but J can make no firm guarantee to the Mos-
lems that there will be any. Jinnah's promise is that if
there is any election there will be no violence. You must
trust my integrity. Jinnah accepts the position, and is
asking his followers to call oft civil disobedience." Mount-
batten asked about the general control exercised by the
Moslem League High Command. The reply was that the
local Moslem League had run riot and taken charge. At
the last election the Moslem League had definitely been
defeated on the Pakistan issue, and even Rab Nishtar,
a Moslem Lcaeue leader of the first rank at the national
level, was not returned. Then the Congress policy of
"Quit India" had won, but that cry no longer held the
people together, and many who had originally supported
Congress were now looking ahead and wondering whether
they would come under Hindu control.

When Khan Sahib turned to the question of Pathanistan
the discussion became somewhat disjointed and explosive.
Gandhi has for some time been actively inlercsted in this
concept, and has lately been stressing its virtues with re-
newed vigour. If it were to prevail it would create a
new frontier nationalism cutting across the Province's com-
munal and political solidarity with Pakistan. "If you
destroy the Palhan nation," warned Khan Sahib, "terrible
things will happen."

Mountbalten went on to ask why there was no coalition
government in the North-west Frontier Province. Khan
Sahib replied heatedly, "If Congress want a coalition, I
shall not remain in." Mountbalten hastened to add, "i
was asking for information only." "Our people are very
poor." Khan Sahib continued. 'The Moslem League
here represent only self-interest and a very privileged class

FRONTIER VISIT

87

of Khans." Caroe pointed out, "There are some very
wealthy Congress supporters as well/'

Mountbatten inquired about the state of communal feel-
ing in the Province. Caroe replied, "The Moslem masses
are protecting Hindus and Sikhs, except, of course, in
Hazara. The hearts and minds of the Moslems are
sound." Khan Sahib alleged that Moslems had been al-
lowed by officials to break the law. Caroe replied firmly
that he knew of no single instance where officials were not
trying to do their duty, but they were always blamed.

Following a discussion on constitutional procedure, with
complaints from the Governor of unjustifiable executive
pressure on the part of the Prime Minister, and from the
Primfc Minister of interference in the Government on the
part of the Governor, Mountbatten intervened to say, "I
am out here to do a job with no axe to grind. I want to
transfer power in terms of the will of the people. Ideally
I would have a plebiscite here, but there is no time." He
then discussed the implications of demission to the Pro-
vinces, partition generally and in relation to the North-
west Frontier Province and the solemn duty placed upon
him. "My problem", he added, "is whether to hold an
election before we go, or whether law and order are suffi-
cient for the Government to hold on." He suggested a
joint committee of the two High Commands to advise on
elections. The British, he said, always carried the rap,
but he reiterated that his mandate was impartiality. Al-
together it was a tense and taut session, which tested
Mountbatten's resources to the full.

No sooner was this meeting with the Ministers over than
we entered into a session with local Hindu representatives.
They explained that their deputation was more communal
than political or anti-Moslem League, and they made it
clear that they were not concerned with the fate of the
Ministry, but with the life and security of innocent Hindus
and Sikhs. Mountbatten: "f am trying to get at the
facts. Do you support the Government?" The Hindus:
"We are prepared to live at peace under any Government."
M. M.-4

88

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

IVf ountbatten : "I am glad of this sensible attitude. 1 am
trying to act constitutionally." There were complaints
about the lack of police, who were stretched to the utmost.
Four Brigades were at hand, but there were murders in
Peshawar and lack of any effective police action. Mount-
batten stressed the danger of using soldiers in place of
police. The two had different functions. He added that
there were at this moment more troops in the North-west
Frontier Province than anywhere else in India, and Caroe
added that more use was being made of them than at any
time in his twenty-five years" experience, even including
1930-31. Mountbalten said that he was out to get the
larger solution and end the uncertainly, but it would have
to be a solution acceptable to all.

1 was not able to slay on for the third meeting, this
time wiih the Moslem League leaders specially released
from gaol for the occasion. Among ihe delegation were
the young and fanatical Pir of Manki Sharif and Khan
Abdul Ouayyum Khan. I understand from Ian Scott that
they spoke at great length and with the utmost vehemence.
Mountbatten has wisely given instructions that they should
all be lodged in one gaol, so lhat they can meet and con-
sult each other. He also agreed with their proposal that
they should be allowed to go to Delhi on parole for con-
sultation with Jinnah.

I was for some time heavily engaged in drafting and
securing approval for Press notes covering the day's ex-
citing but exacting activities, and was only able to come
in at the tail end of a reception given by Dr. Khan Sahib.
Later in the evening there was a dinner-party at Govern-
ment House attended by all members of the Government
and leading civil and military officials. Paying his tribute
as one of the guests at this last bout of Viceregal splendour
that Peshawar will see, was Brigadier Sir Hissamuddin
Khan, a famous local landowner and personality almost
more Anglophile than the British. Mustering all his
medals, and dressed in archaic regimental uniform, he
made a brave showing, and recalled past glories. He told

FRONTIER VISIT

89

me that the first Viceroy he had served was Curzon, and
that his first assignment was as a very junior officer of the
guard outside the great man's bedroom. It was not an
easy job, for Curzon was such a light sleeper (hat the
officers of the guard and the sentries had to put felt over
their boots to avoid disturbing him.

GOVLRN Ml N r I HOUSi:. PlrSHAWXR AND RAWALPINDI,

Tuesday, 29th April, 1947
After an early breakfast, we set olf for a tour of the
Khyber and for the at Jamrud. We passed the

famous Islamia College, where a few years ago Jan Scott
had been the Principal. On the way back we were re-
galetf by cries of "Pakistan Zindabad" from a number of
the students who were perhaps alive to the important role
their college could play in the training of much -needed
officials for the new State they were so fervently hailing.
We passed the fort where the Guru Hari Singh is buried,
and were told how on his death his body had been prop-
ped up in Jamrud for all to see. We then came to the
great Jamrud Fort hewn out of the rocks — the garrison
of the Khyber Rifles.

All the way on our twelve-mile journey the khassidan
were spaced out guarding both sides of the road from
nearby hillocks. They were ;i tribal police force, about
one thousand six hundred strong, who were encouraged
to keep order among their warlike brothers through shar-
ing in Government benefits. The Afridis have apparent-
ly squatted on the Pass ever since the days of classical
Greece. Their system of rule was described as being one
of heredity based on character, which, if it is accented,
is as stable a system as any. Mr. Lowis explained that
we were moving up into the heart of the Pathan king-
dom, which had two ethnic boundaries -the Hjndu Kush
and the Indus. We reached the top of the Pas's at Char-
bagh, and from there we looked out into Afghanistan.
Lady Mountbatten told me she first came to the Khyber
as a girl of nineteen, and was very much of a pioneer in

90

MISSION WITH MOU NTB ATTEN

doing so. Each detail of the rugged route had remained
vivid in her memory.

We then turned back to Landi Kotal, where Mount-
batten met the tribal Jirga of Maliks (elders) representing
the Afridi, Shinwari, Zakahe, Malikdin, Sipah, Salmani
and Kullaghori clans. The scene provided an extraordi-
nary contrast with the bleak, austere grandeur of the Pass
itself. Landi Kotal camp, indeed, was just like a leafy
Sussex village in summer time. The Jirga itself was a
colourful assembly. Many of the tribesmen squatting in
the shade of the trees looked very old and benign, and
it was difficult to imagine that they were some of the
toughest warriors in the world.

Their spokesman, one Khan Abdul Lalif Khan, 'who
spoke in Pushtu translated by Caroe, put forward at some
length, and with occasional supporting interjections from
his fellow leaders, the various demands. Several of these
were of a local character, but on the wider front he plead-
ed that, in the event of the British Government vacating
India, the Khyber should be returned to them. More-
over, he made it clear that while they belonged to no
particular party, their sympathies were with their Moslem
brethren. Indeed, he indulged in a considerable anti-
Nehru and anti-Hindu diatribe. Nehru, who was actual-
ly stoned when he visited the Frontier last year, had warn-
ed Mountbatten to expect a hand-picked Jirga, but I must
say that this one seemed to be genuinely representative.

Mountbatten's reply dealt with all the specific points
raised, advising that it was up to them to negotiate their
agreements with the successor authority. He added a
characteristic personal point, "As I expect you know," he
said, "1 am a sailor, and had the honour of fighting in
a battle in the North Sea in company with H.M.S. Ajridi,
called after your tribe because of its famous warlike quali-
ties. Although we have had to fight you Afridis in the
past on occasions, we respect and like each other. Your
Jirga has a reputation for wisdom and foresight. For the
last sixteen years you have behaved and stuck to your

FRONTIER VISIT

91

agreements. In this critical time, when power is to be
handed over, do not lose that reputation."

As tokens of good-will Khan Abdul Latif Khan then
presented the Viceroy with a number of gifts, including
a haversack, Pathan dagger and chappals, and a rifle of
splendid craftsmanship made somewhere in the Khyber
caves. After a short break for coffee, which only helped
to heighten the home-from-home feeling, we again set
off in our single file of cars down the hills back to Pesha-
war.

On our return, a second but smaller Jirga. this time of
Wazir and Mahsud tribesmen, was awaiting us in the
grour^ds of Government House. They, too, were very
outspoken in their attitude to a Hindu raj. Mountbatten
assured Lhcm, 44 1 have taken note of what you have said
about Pakistan, and 1 have taken action about the release
of prisoners from gaols. Arrangements arc being made
among themselves as to when they will come out. The
sooner the present tension can be relieved the better for
all concerned.** There followed short talks with Hindu
and Sikh minority delegation, who, not unnaturally, spoke
with much more moderation.

Immediately after lunch we left by air for Rawalpindi,
arriving there an hour later. We had hardly touched
down and set foot in Command House before the Gover-
nor, Sir Evan Jenkins, whisked us off to Kahuta, scene
of some recent severe communal rioting. Dusty, and with*
parched throats after a twenty-five-mile car drive, we ar-
rived to find that the havoc in the small town was very
great. Picking our way through the rubble, we could
see that the devastation was as thorough as any produced
by fire-bomb raids in the war. This particular commu-
nal orgy involved the destruction of Sikhs and t^eir liveli-
hood by Moslems who were proving difficult to track
down. The Moslems in the area seemed to be quite pleased
with themselves, and to be unable to appreciate that the
local Sikh traders were one of the principal sources of their
own prosperity. Economically the ruin which the two

92

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

communities inflict upon each other is complete and horri-
fying both in its immediate and long-term implications.

After a thorough tour — and on such occasions no detail
escapes their eagle eyes — the Mountbaltens sat at a small
table and listened to various local leaders and representa-
tives explaining the situation and putting forward their
grievances. One Dewan Pinki Das Sabharwal regaled us
with a highly coloured address some five pages in length
which was not on the agenda. Jenkins was not unnatu-
rally annoyed, as the remarks were full of gross accusa-
tions against himself as Governor and gave various strange
statistics, including a reference to three thousand one
hundred and ninety-nine forcible conversions.

On our return to Rawalpindi I met some Indiafi and
British Press friends at the local hotel and went into
some of the difficulties they arc having in filing stories
from here. 1 got back only just in time for the dinner
at Command House, where I sat next to Colonel Still,
an intelligent man who engaged me in an interesting talk
on Parliamentary democracy and the need for the "cun-
ning good man" to run it. He gave a definition of bar-
barism as "an absence of values to which appeal can be
made". Piopaganda was thus to be seen as a concession
to, if not an actual by-product of, barbarism.

via hoy's house, ni/w diliii, Wednesday,

30th April, 1947

Our party split up — Mountballen returning direct to
Delhi, and Lady Mountbatten carrying on with her tour
of the riot areas. I found myself busily engaged with
correspondents who were anxious to receive background
guidance on the result of the visit. It was necessary to
tread warily. The full force of Congress and Moslem
League interest was temporarily focused on the Province,
and the air was full of speculation.

My first job was to deal firmly with Altaf Hussain, the
Lditor of Dawn, who published a shockingly inaccurate
story from his Peshawar correspondent under the follow-

FRONTIER VISIT

93

ing banner headlines: 4 *Mountbatten Confers with Fron-
tier Leaders— Manki and Quayyum Refuse to be Releas-
ed on Parole — Huge Demonstration by Palhan Men and
Women - Viceroy Flying to Jamrud." In so far as
Mountbatten had spent over two hours with Manki and
Quayyum, who had both been the chief spokesmen of the
Moslem delegation, his first reaction was to make a per-
sonal protest to Jinnah, but I dissuaded him from doing
this on Hussain's assurance that the story would be cor-
rected to-morrow. This particular correspondent's ima-
ginative powers reach their peak with the reference to the
Viceroy's flight to Jamrud, where there is no airfield!

CJqarly there were few tangible results to report, but
in brimzine the local Moslem leaders into touch with
Jinnah, and thereby the wider context of events, Mount-
batten certainly helped to take the edge off the immediate
crisis. The only chance of calling off the civil disobedi-
ence campaign rests with Jinnah himself. The Frontier
leaders are wild men who, if left to their own devices, have
neither the will nor resource to achieve a reasonable settle-
ment. The whole visit has brought home to us the need
for achieving the wider agreement on India's future as
quickly as possible. Jf we do not, there will be a com-
plete disintegration of what remains of law and order
both in the Frontier and the Punjab, not to speak of the
other northern Provinces. It is certainly a great dispen-
sation that south and central India should be remaining
so calm.

Doon Campbell, of Reuters, telephoned at midnight to
tell me of two very strongly worded statements just put
out by Jinnah and Dr. Rajendra Prasad. Jinnah, he said,
was in effect launching his irredentist campaign against a
"truncated, or mutilated, moth-eaten Pakistan" and de-
manding a "national home" of more ambitious dimensions,
in fact of all Provinces included in Groups B and C of
the Cabinet Mission Plan, regardless of their communal
majorities (i.e., Sind, the Punjab, North-west Frontier
Province, Baluchistan, Bengal and Assam). Prasad's

94

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

statement, it seems, draws attention to the historic Mos-
lem League resolution at Lahore in 1940 which launched
the concept of Pakistan, but which spoke of it as com-
prising areas where Moslems were numerically in the
majority. In the third session of the Constituent Assem-
bly which opened earlier this week, Prasad, speaking as
its new President, had already prepared the minds of
members for the partition of India, but, as a part of the
process, for the division of some of the Provinces as well.

Prasad is one of the most influential of the Congress
high command, and has been holding the key Ministry of
Food and Agriculture in the Interim Government. When
I had tea with him at his home the other day I was im-
pressed by his serenity and undoubted depth of mintl and
strength of chaiacter. He is essentially a moderate and
a conciliator, a man of the people whose good reputation
has little to do with the demagogic arts, but is the out-
come of long and loyal service to the Nationalist cause.
He will undoubtedly have a key role to play in the new
regime, whether in a united or divided India.*

viceroy's housf, nlw delhi, Thursday, 1st May, 1947
\ was present at the lunch-party to-day, and sat next
to Mr. Bardoloi, Prime Minister of Assam, quiet-spoken
and unassuming, as are so many of the front-rank Con-
gressmen.

At to-day's Staff Meeting we had a further discussion
on the problem of the retention of India within the Com-
monwealth. We have received a reminder from London
that in any consideration of the granting of Dominion
Status the Indian States are not at present British territory
at all, and could hardly be incorporated as part of the
British Commonwealth.

As far as British India was concerned, Mountbatlen
came down heavily against the concept of allowing only

* He wav, in fact, to become the first President of the Indian
Republic following the adoption of the Indian Constitution in
January 1949.

FRONTIER VISIT

95

a part to remain in, with the consequent risk of Britain
being ' involved in the support of one Indian sovereign
State against another. He personally favoured the for-
mula that only British India as a whole should be permit-
ted to remain in the Commonwealth. In the meanwhile
a completely non-committal attitude on the question
should be maintained. Ismay's personal view, however,
was that it would be virtually impossible, both on moral
and material grounds, to eject from the Commonwealth
any part of India that asks to remain in. If Pakistan
were involved, relations with the entire Moslem bloc ex-
tending from the Middle East had to be considered. Bri-
tish baCking, if not of the whole, then of a part of India,
might be the one way to avoid a civil war. Ian Scott
subscribed to Ismay's argument.

George Abell, while agreeing that the British would
have a continuing moral responsibility, felt that the worst
way of fulfilling this might be the unilateral support of
Pakistan. I said that I agreed with George, and felt that
support by Great Britain of one part of India only would
result in the sub-continent becoming the centre of inter-
national tension and intrigue. Mieville raised the import-
ant question whether under the Statute of Westminster all
members of the British Commonwealth would have to be-
consulted about the inclusion or ejection of the whole
or parts of India. He added that V. P. Menon, Reforms.
Commissioner and, as such, an ex officio member of his
Staff, had advised him that Patel might be ready to accept
an offer of Dominion Status for the time being.

We are turning our attention to the Bengal situation*
and Sir Frederick Burrows, who was unable to be present
for the Governors' Conference owing to illness, arrived
yesterday for a twenty-four-hour visit. Mountbatten has
enjoyed meeting him again, and found him congenial com-
pany. Burrows made his reputation as a member of the
Soulbury Commission, which duly recommended Domi-
nion Status for Ceylon and was taking its evidence in
Colombo a few months after Mountbatten had establish-

96

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

cd his S.E.A.C. Headquarters in Kandy.* He certainly
provides an interesting contrast to most of his predeces-
sors, at Government House, Calcutta. For he is very
proud of his years of service as a railwayman, and on one
occasion is said to have startled Calcutta society by declar-
ing that the main difference between himself and previous
Governors of Bengal was that while they were accustom-
ed to "huntin' and shootin' *\ he was accustomed to
".shunlin' and hoolin' ' M He delighted in exchanging
military memories with Mount batten, strictly as between
sergeant-major and Admiral.

vk hroy's nonsi. niw dvuu, Iriday, 2nd May, 1947
I have put out the announcement that the Mountbattcns
will be leaving for a short visit to Simla. Mountbattcn is
anxious to make it clear that no interruption of business
is involved, and the statement explains that he has now
come to the end of preliminary meetings with representa-
tive Indian leaders, and will be leaving after the weekly
Cabinet meeting on the 6th, returning in time to preside
over the next one.

1 have also released an account of Lady Mounlbatieif s
adventurous three-day tour, during which she covered
nearly one thousand live hundred miles by plane, besides
considerable distances by car and on foot. She left
Lahore at seven this morning in the Viceroy's Dakota,
arriving over Mooitan, the last place on her long itinerary,
just before 8.30. She was unable to land, as there was
n dust-storm over an area of about twenty miles radius,
and visibility was very poor. The plane circled left and
light at varying heights down to about three hundred feet,
but failed to sight the airfield. Muriel Watson had the
utmost difficulty in inducing her to call off the search,
and she only agreed to do so after she had sent a message

* In fact, it was on the advice of Lord Mountbattcn. after he
had called a meeting with Their Excellencies, the Governor and
Commander-in-Chief, Cevlon, in May 1944, that a Commission
was sent out.

CRISIS AT SIMLA

97

to the Mooltan Commissioner expressing her regrets and
her resolve to return at the earliest possible date.

I set off to-night by the Delhi Mail for a quiet long
week-end with my family at Mashobra, prior to the ar-
rival of the main Viceregal party in Simla on Tuesday.

CHAPTI.R SEV[ N

CRISIS AT SIMLA

"JUL RLIKLAr", MASUOHRA, SIMLA,

Monday, 5th May, 1947
For*thl past forty-eight hours 1 have been able to relax
and from our mountain aerie drink in the splendour and
solitude of the Himalayan landscape. Tor days on end
mists and cloud act like a vast backclolh, allowing one
a vista of no more than the valley below and the neighbour-
ing peak of Shali, a mere twelve thousand feel high, and
snowless in the spring. Then suddenly the curtain rises,
and stretching before one in an uninterrupted arc of over
ninety degrees is the eternal snowline, range after range,
sixteen thousand feet and more. No doubt there arc
many other vistas of the main Himalayan range as im-
pressive as this, for the "roof of the world" covers over
two hundred and fifty thousand square miles and includes
at least forty peaks of over twenly-four thousand feel.
But the splendid and awesome vision from Simla serves
as a symbol of this immensity.

During my brief respite here in Mashobra the pace of
political events in Delhi quickened. Ismay and George
Abell left for London on the 2nd May. taking with them
the draft Plan for ihe British Government's consideration.

On Saturday there was the first major Indian Press at-
tack upon Mountbatten, significantly enough from the
Hindustan Times, lo which some weight has always lo be
given, in so far as it is edited by the Mahatma's son,
Devadas Gandhi, and owned by his wealthiest supporter.

98

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

G. D. Birla. At any given time it is the mouthpiece of
Nehru or Palel or of the Mahatma himself.

The article began by saying, "For the first time since
Lord Mountbatten assumed the Viceroyalty the feeling
that he may not be playing fair has come among Con-
gressmen and Sikh leaders/' There then followed reve-
lations of the Viceroy's main conclusions which were suffi-
ciently accurate as to indicate inside knowledge, and some
no less well informed but somewhat threatening Congress
reactions. These included a demand for special terms
for the Sikhs in the Punjab. There was also an ominous
unwillingness to concede a fresh election on the Frontier.
"The Congress Working Committee", according to the
writer, "has made the Frontier question a test case* It
has made clear to the Viceroy that any proposal to dismiss
the Frontier Ministry and hold fresh elections will make
the Congress change its entire attitude towards the British
Government."

I understand that yesterday Mountbatten had two im-
portant interviews with Gandhi and Jinnah, the net effect
of which made Mountbatten wonder whether Ismay's de-
parture had not been premature. By a freak of chance
the interviews overlapped, and Mountbatten had the poli-
tical insight and social finesse to bring the two leaders to-
gether for their first meeting in three years. But once
the formalities of greeting were over the encounter baffled
Mountbatten's calculations. For Gandhi and Jinnah, with
their chairs far apart, were quite unable to raise their
voices sufficiently, so that they seemed to be like two old
conspirators engaged in long-distance dumbshow. Al-
though Mountbatten strained his ears, much of their con-
versation escaped hfm. However, his primary purpose
was amply achieved, for they agreed to have a full dis-
cussion with each other at Jinnah's house.

Before leaving for Simla. Mountbatten has been gather-
ing in the views of the Governors of ihe Punjab, Bengal
and North-west Frontier Province on the desirability or
.otherwise of referenda for their Provinces. Briefly Caroe

CRISIS AT SIMLA

99

is in favour for the North-west Frontier Province, Bur-
rows non-committal for Bengal, although on balance '
against, and Jenkins took an extremely gloomy view of the
situation, casting doubt upon its acceptability either to
Jinnah or the Sikhs. Mountbatten, however, held firmly
to the view that in the last analysis Jinnah would acqui-
esce, and that the only way the Sikhs could improve their
position was through negotiation.

"THE RETREAT", MASHOBRA, SIMLA,

Tuesday, 6th May, 1947
Jinnah and Gandhi met for three hours at Jinnah's home
in Aurangzeb Road. An agreed statement was issued,
whioh read as follows: —

"We discussed Iwo matters; One was the question of
division of India into Pakistan and Hindustan, and Mr.
Gandhi does not accept the principle of division. He thinks
that division is not inevitable, whereas in my opinion not
only is Pakistan inevitable, but is the only practical solu-
tion of India's political problem.

"The second matter which we discussed was the letter
which we both have signed jointly appealing to the people
to maintain peace; we have both come to the conclusion
that we must do our best in our respective spheres to see
that that appeal of ours is carried out and we will make
every effort for this purpose."

Although the meeting in itself was clearly abortive, the
balance of tactical advantage — as the smoothly worded
text suggests— undoubtedly lies with Jinnah: one more
nail has been driven into the coffin of the Cabinet Mission
Plan. The unresolved question is just how far Gandhi
can or will resist the tidal flow of events towards partition.

"THE RETREAT", MASHOBRA, SIMLA,

Wednesday, 7th May, 1947
My brief respite came to an end to-day, when I was
summoned to Viceregal Lodge. Mountbatten has brought

100

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

up with him V. P. Menon, who was closely involved in
all the 1945 Simla and the 1946 Cabinet Mission Plan
negotiations. Although he has suffered a period of eclipse,
he is still the trusted confidant of Vallabhbhai Patel.

On arrival \ was plunged info two successive Staff Meet-
ings, the first without Mountbatten and the second with
him. At both wc considered fully the desirability of an
alternative plan based on the assumption, which V. P.
held was more than possible, that Jinnah would not accept
the Plan in the draft announcement. Mountbatten said
he had always borne in mind the possibility of rejection
by Jinnah, and in all the interviews he had had both with
him and Liaquat he had watched carefully for any c sign
pointing to such an intention, but none had been given.
Fvery test he had applied led him to the belief that they
intended to accept, and he could see only two possible
suppositions for Jinnah not doing so- -the first, if his real
aim was to keep the British in India, and by prolonging
the bargaining to make it more difficult for the British to
leave, in the hope of obtaining thereby a more favourable
award; the second, if he had reached the conclusion that
Pakistan was not practicable.

But he seriously doubted whether either of these con-
siderations was in Jinnah's mind. None-lhe-lcss he agreed
with V. IVs thesis on the advisability of having available
a clear alternative in his dealings with Jinnah. The second-
line plan would involve demission of power under the
present constitution. It would not in the last resort require
the agreement of the Indian leaders. Provincial subjects
would be demitted#to existing Provincial Governments,
and Central subjects to the existing Central Government;
but it would put the Moslems under the Hindu majority.

A telegram has been drafted for dispatch to London,
giving them ihe background and asking for approval to
'hold such a plan in reserve. Wc also went further into
the possibilities of retaining India in the Commonwealth,
and V. P. confirmed both Patel's and Nehru's positive

CRISIS AT SIMLA

101

approach to the subject and the need for dropping 'the
terms "King-Emperor" and "Empire", to which so many
Indians objected. V. P. was finally asked to prepare a
paper setting out clearly the procedure whereby a form
of Dominion Status could be granted to India under the
alternative Plans of Partition and Demission.

"nit. rijrkat", mashohka, simla,
Thursday. Hlh May, 1947

Al to-day's meeting a problem of some moment affect-
ing our relations with the Indian and world Press was on
our agenda. Ever since our arrival, the Foreign corres-
pondents have been seeking an ofl-thc-record interview
either with Mountbatten or with Ismay on his behalf. The
political negotiations have been so intensive that it has
been necessary to protect Mountbatten from any com-
mitments other than those directly concerned with the
formulation of the Plan itself, and now Jsmay is away for
at least another fortnight. On lop of this, the Hindustan
Times article last week only confirms that I he leading
Delhi editors and their correspondents know far more than
would be available to them through normal channels. The
clamour for some sort of access to the Viceroy, for back-
ground guidance, is more insistent than ever.

My feeling is that while an interview with Mountbatten
himself remains out of the question at this time and would
involve discrimination against the Indian Press, it would
be wise and equitable if Mievillc were to stand in for
Ismay. 1 am convinced that the effect of such contact will
be to damp down speculation, particularly in I he editorial
offices of London and New York, during the critical ten-
day hiatus between now and Mountbatten's proposed pre-
sentation of the Plan to the Leaders. Whether it is "yea"
or "nay" to the Foreign correspondents' request, it will
in either case involve a calculated risk. No decision was
taken to-day. Most of the staff would, I think, like
Mountbatten to say "no" out of hand, but while he is

102

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

rightly adamant that he personally should not take any
part, he shares my view that Mieville should fill the breach.

"the retreat", mashorra, simla, Friday, 9th May, 1947
The Dominion Status question "was discussed at great
length this morning. Mountbatten began by saying he
thought it most desirable that if Dominion Status was to
be granted to India before June 1948 the grant should in
fact take place during 1947. He went so far as to say
that he would like to see Dominion Status by 31st Decem-
ber, 1947 — giving as his reason the startlingly apt pre-
cedent of a plenary session of the Quebec Conference
during the war. The meeting had been asked to approve
a directive that war with Japan must be ended by F948.
To this President Roosevelt had said he would never agree.
Hopkins intervened, "Well, make it 31st December,
1947."— President Roosevelt, "Agreed."

Nehru and Krishna Menon have arrived, and much will
depend on Mountbatten's powers of persuasion with them
if the Dominion Status concept is to come to light. Already
Krishna indicates resistance to any splitting of the Army
if early Dominion Status is accepted. Mieville was inclin-
ed to think that there would be more advantage to India
than to the Commonwealth from India remaining in, but
Mountbatten considered that the value to the United King-
dom both in terms of world prestige and strategy would
be enormous; for India as a whole the immense asset of
constitutional continuity. He appreciated the many ad-
ministrative difficulties, particularly those facing Pakistan,
but these were inherent in the situation anyhow. "What
are we doing?" he" asked. "Administratively it is the
difference between putting up a permanent building, a
nissen hut or a tent. As far as Pakistan is concerned we
are putting up a tent. We can do no more."

He told us that in the rush of business yesterday he had
missed his thirty-fourth anniversary of joining the Navy
as a twelve-years-old cadet.

CRISIS AT SIMLA

103

This afternoon there was a brief respite from the inten-
sive discussions. The Mountbattens brought Nehru out
to tea at "The Retreat". But for the mountains surround-
ing us, it might have been a typical English garden tea-
party. To begin with there was a certain tension which
stifled small talk. Fay, sitting next to Nehru, managed
to elicit from him his views on the sugar shortage (they
had actually brought their own sugar with them) and his
antipathy to Simla. This characteristically was derived
from his aversion to the spectacle of the rickshaw coolies,
whose labours he thought were an affront to human
dignity.

Mountbatten asked Nehru if his responsibilities as
Minister for External Affairs covered communications with
Burma, and if so. what had become of the great road and
airfield projects which had been built during his S.E.A.C.
days at immense cost. There had been clamour for years
for a land link with Burma — were these being kept up?
Nehru showed some interest, but felt that the cost of
maintenance would be very heavy.

After tea Nehru said he would like to see our children.
Mountbatten introduced our son Keith as his godchild,
exclaiming, "He stands up so straight he will fall over
backwards!" We then went on a grand tour of the house
and Viceregal orchards.

The Mountbattens fell in love with the place, and are
quite determined to come back again. During our walk
up and down the orchard terraces Nehru was very agile,
and confessed to a liking for hill-climbing. He gave us a
demonstration of a new technique by walking uphill back-
wards. This, he said, made breathing easier at high alti-
tudes, and rested the calf-muscles.

"THE RETREAT", MASHOBRA,, SIMLA,

Saturday, 10th May, 1947
At our Staff Meeting to-day Mountbatten reported on
a breakfast conversation he had had with Krishna, while
V. P. spoke of contact he had made with Patel. The

104

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

impression grows that the Dominion Status formula in-
creasingly appeals to both the Congress leaders. Krishna
Menon takes credit as the first to have suggested an early
transfer of power to India on this basis, fie thinks Nehru
is attracted to the concept, if only because it may give
Mountbatten opportunity to bring his influence to bear on
the more recalcitrant Princes. V. P. suspects that likely
delay in completing the Indian constitution may also en-
courage Nehru to look towards Dominion Status as an
interim device to fill up the time. The main difficulty on
the Congress side seems to be the fear of the left wing
exploiting Dominion Status as a "sell out" to Britain.

To-day 1 put out the momentous communique announc-
ing that the Viceroy had invited the five Leaders to meet
him at 10.30 a.m., and the Indian Slates' Representatives
in the afternoon, next Saturday 1 7th May. the purpose
being "to present to them the Plan which His Majesty's
Government has now made for the transfer of power to
Indian hands".

At six o'clock this evening, after a preliminary run
through with Mountbatten, Mieville met the Foreign cor-
respondents for the long-delayed background talk, in his
own house. He brought out the important points very
well -the need for a quick political solution, but a demo-
cratic one also; how, in a matter of such magnitude, the
onus of choice must fall upon the people themselves or
their elected representatives; how the Leaders were being
brought step by step towards agreement. This was diplo-
macy by discussion, and not by diktat.

I gather from Lric Britter, who is staying with us, that
the talk has had a very steadying effect, and in particular
provided enlighteamenl for the American Press.

"VIII Rl TRI A I *\ MAS1IOMU, SIMLA,

Sunday, 11th May. 1947
Mountbatten has had a shattering day. He rang me up
at Mashobra just before we were due to entertain a party
of Press correspondents, most of whom had been at yester-

CRISIS AT SIMLA

105

day's talk with Mieville, to tell me just this — that it would
be necessary to postpone the meeting with the Leaders
announced last night in our communique as due to take
place on 17th May. Would, I prepare second communi-
que? This is certainly the stifFest request in political Pub-
lic Relations I have ever received, and having done my
best to conceal my anxiety and mental turmoil from our
tea-party. J arrived at Viceregal Lodge at 6.30 in the even-
ing to find despondency, not to say alarm.

It seems that last night Mountbatten gave Nehru the
chance of reading the draft Plan as revised and approved
by London, and that Nehru, having read it, has vehe-
mently turned it down. He is convinced that it involves
a ma]or departure in principle from the original draft
prepared by Mountbatten and his staff which Ismay and
George Abel! took back with them to London at the
beginning of the month.

Nehru was satisfied that both in the Cabinet Mission
Plan, which he was at pains to stress is still not dead, and
in the Mountbatten draft, his concept of India as a con-
tinuing entity had been preserved. In the London draft,
however, the breakdown seems to him to amount to little
loss than connivance at Balkanisation. He really wants
it to be fully established that India and the Constituent
Assembly are the successors to, and Pakistan and the Mos-
lem League the seceders from, British India. Many of
the detailed objections he raises are trivial, and could in
themselves be easily disposed of. He will have nothing
to do, for instance, with the proposed procedure for
Baluchistan. This is, no doubt, an over-estimate, but the
changes have aroused in him all the old suspicions of
London as the home of an alien Civil Service whose hearts
are hard, and understanding strictly limited when it comes
to handling India to-day. ♦

The one immediate result of his attitude is to make it
necessary for Mountbatten and his staff, depleted by the
absence of Ismay and Abell, to push ahead at once with
a second revised draft at the highest speed for transmission

306

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

to Ismay, who by the time Mountbatten's telegrams warn-
ing him of this volte-face reach him will be a somewhat
confused and frustrated Viceregal envoy.

Having scratched my head over the second communi-
que. I went up with Mieville to see Mountbatten in his
study to discuss the publicity difficulties and dangers be-
fore us. His hair was somewhat dishevelled, but he was
still marvellously resilient. He told us that only a hunch
on his part had saved him from disaster. Without that
hunch, ''Dickie Mountbatten", he said, "would have been
finished and could have packed his bag. We would have
looked complete fools with the Government at home, hav-
ing led them up the garden to believe that Nehru would
accept the Plan." He said that most of his staff, with
natural caution, had been against his running over the
Plan with Nehru, but by following his hunch rather than
their advice he had probably saved the day.

I stressed that it was out of the question for us to -put
out any postponement announcement without ensuring
full clearance and consistency with London. After some
urgent exchanges it was agreed that the announcement
should read as follows: "Owing to the imminence of the
Parliamentary recess in London, it has been found neces-
sary to postpone H.E. the Viceroy's meeting with the
Indian Leaders announced to begin on Saturday 17th May,
until Monday 2nd June."

The wording of this communique, coming so closely
upon our Press party and within twenty-four hours of
our firm announcement to the world of the earlier date,
has caused me more anxiety than any Press statement I
have issued in the^ast or am likely to issue in the future.
1 have visions of the whole structure of confidence and
good-will we have so carefully built up falling to the
ground and an unrivalled feast being provided for the
hungry Press speculators.

The weakness of our position is that at a moment of
crisis we have told the truth, but it is not the whole truth
and nothing but the truth. No one in Delhi is likely to be-

CRISIS AT SIMLA

107

Heve that London was the source of the postponement,
and if they do, that in itself will only help to evoke old
suspicions. Everyone knows that Nehru has been staying
with the Viceroy, and from the strictly Public Relations,
point oi view I believe it would have been preferable to
base the postponement on the grounds of drafting detail.
However, there was certainly no time to argue out the
publicity refinements of the dilemma we are in. The
essence of the matter is that we have put out with the
utmost speed a firm decision no less firmly postponed, and
have secured London's approval for it. Textual adorn-
ments involving delay are unacceptable.

"1HI RI IRFAT\ MASUOBRA, S1M1 A.

Monday, 12th May, 1947
Mount batten, who has now had a chance to sleep on
yesterday's developments, said that although he seems to
have been able to establish his own integrity with the
Indian Leaders, undoubtedly a phobia persists against any
document or proposal issuing from London. Clearly any
re-drafts will have to be made by his own staff in India.
He has decided that one revision mu*t be to take away
<Miy option for independence either lor Bengal or for any
other Province. He felt that it would always be possible
to reconsider this decision if thcic was at any time a re-
quest from both parties for Provincial independence. Nehru
has his own plan similar to ours proposing an early de-
mission of power to the Interim Government on a Do-
minion Status basis.

After the meeting Fay and I were guests at a small
"family" lunch-party which took place under a cedar
tree in the garden Krishna Menon, who has stayed on
to patch up some of the rents in the Plan caused by
Nehru's visit, was there. Most oi our discussjon was
taken up with the Indian Boy Scout movement, in which
Krishna is interested. Here again politics and intrigue
seem to dominate the scene. After lunch Mountbatten
held forth on the strategic problems facing India, whether

108

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

united or partitioned. It is interesting to note what a re-
velation such discussions arc to the Congress leaders,
whose whole lives have hitherto centred round purely poli-
tical considerations.

CIIAPTI.R LIGHT

THE PLAN REDRAFTED

vk'i.roy's not si:, niw diliii, Thursday, 1 5th May, 1947
MoiiNiRAiUN has HAD a courteous but firm summons
to return to London for consultation. At first he reacted
strongly against the proposal, saying that there was noth-
ing for him to go home for, but the alternative proposal
from the Prime Minister that a member or members of
the Cabinet should come out was even more unacceptable
to him.

vk i roy's jiousl, niav Di Liu, Thursday, 22nd May, 1947
Nehru and Palel have asked Mountbatten to add Kripa-
lani, Congress President, to the invitation list for the
Leaders' meeting. They feel that his presence would help
them in carrying Congress as against purely ministerial
opinion. Moreover, they point out that Kripalani's status
as President is the same as Jinnah's vis-a-vis the Moslem
League. Mountbatten has decided to write and say that
while he recognises Kripalani's importance, he cannot
agree to having him at the meeting itself, but would be
ready to see him privately either just before or just after \
it. This is a typical teasing problem, which is deceptively
trivial at first sight, but which can so easily develop into
a major crisis. If Kripalani is not asked, Congress nurse
the sense of grievance that they have had to make yet one
more capitulation to Jinnah. If he is asked, Jinnah is
duly olfended.

THE PLAN REDRAFTED

109

V. P. has drafted very brief but cogent Heads of Agree-
ment. There are eight in all. It is a bold effort to get
round the difficulty of the Leaders refusing to take the
full burden of unpopular decisions and hiding behind their
inability to decide on behalf of their respective Party
machines. The Heads of Agreement press lor early Do-
minion Status as an interim arrangement based upon the
Government of India Act of W5 with modifications, and
envisaging one or two sovereign States. If one only,
power should be transferred to the existing central Go-
vernment. The sixth Head asserts ihat the Governor-
General should be common to both the Slates. Finally
it attempts to cover the problem of dividing the Armed
Torces. It proposes that units should be allocated accord-
ing to the territorial basis of recruitment and placed under
the control of the respective Governments. It makes a
special provision for the distribution of mixed units.

Mount batten has failed in his eflorls to gel Jinnah and
Liaquat to sign the document or even a letter agreeing
to it. According to him they appeared absolutely to ac-
cept its general principles, but were not willing to state
their agreement in writing. V. P. said that Patel\s and
Nehru's main concern was that Jinnah should accept the
Plan in such a way as to make it clear that it really was
his last territorial demand, and not just an interim arrange-
ment. He felt it would satisfy C ongress if Jinnah made it
clear that he himself accepted the announcement and
would use his good offices to put it into effect.

Mountbalten said that he had cautiously tested Jinnah's
reaction to the threat, failing agreement, of demitting
power to the Interim Government on a Dominion Status
basis. Jinnah had apparently been very calm, and had
said simply that he could not slop such a step in any
event. In some respects this may well turn out to be the
most delicate and decisive moment for Moumbattctrs and
Jinnah\s diplomacy. Mountbalten felt that Jinnah's reac-
tion was both abnormal and disturbing. It was certainly
shrewd. The ballon d'essai has gone up and come down

110 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

again, providing only the evidence that Jinnah has a very
steady nerve. Mountbatten feels that Jinnah is well aware
of his potency as a martyr butchered by the British on the
Congress altar.

viceroy's iiousl, new Delhi, Sunday. 18th May, 1947
The Mountbaltens left Palam this morning at 8.30 for
London. A large party was at the airfield to see them off,
including Colvillc, who, as senior Governor, is temporary
acting Viceroy for the fourth time. Mountbatten is taking
V. P. and Vernon back with him.

viceroy's house, new delhi, Thursday, 22nd May, 1947
Jinnah has dropped a carefully timed and placed bomb-
shell. He demands an eight-hundred -mile "Corridor" to
link West and Hast Pakistan. The technique of releasing
it seems to have been copied from Stalin. Doon Camp-
bell, of Reuters, to whom the story was given, told me
that it was in answer to a questionnaire which he had
lodged with Jinnah some days previously. No one was
more surprised than he to find himself with such a scoop
on his hands. In a telegram to Erskine Crum in London
1 reported, "Jinnah's answers were not verbal, but written
out". As soon as Reuters released the story, Jinnah's
secretary specially rang up Foreign correspondents draw-
ing their attention to it. Correspondents informed me
privately that Jinnah offered this interview to several of
them. They considered he was determined to make the
statement anyhow, and merely used Reuters' request as
a peg to hang it on. Reuters was, of course, a well-chosen
instrument for Jinnah to exert the maximum pressure on
London at this critical stage in the Viceroy's deliberations
with the Government, for through the exclusive use of this
source he was ensuring for himself the greatest possible
coverage in the British Press.

In spite of a lot of inspired speculation to the contrary
by the London correspondents of the Indian papers,
Mountbatten' s negotiations are proceeding smoothly. His

THE PLAN REDRAFTED

111

presence in London has already done much to restore the
confidence of the Cabinet and officials and given coherence
to their proceedings. He has already had valuable meet-
ings with the Opposition leaders, without whose support
the timing of the whole operation, based as it is upon the
quick passage of the Independence Bill through Parlia-
ment, would be frustrated. In the present delicate situa-
tion Mountbatten's personal authority and guidance were
needed to secure their vital co-operation and to set their
legitimate doubts at rest.

Mr. Attlee, who throughout has assumed full personal
control of the Government's India policy and any action
arising from it, has successfully injected a sense of the
utmtfst urgency into his colleagues. The strain falls parti-
cularly on the Lord Chancellor's and India Offices. To
meet Mountbatten's vital timing problem, the Lord Chan-
cellor promised to have the necessary Bill ready for pre-
sentation to the House by the first week in July, which
will involve surely the fastest drafting of a major Parlia-
mentary Bill in our history. Indeed, its scope is without
parallel or precedent in the proceedings of any Parlia-
mentary Government. There was, of course, considerable
concern on the defence aspect of Partition, but otherwise
Ismay was able to send us optimistic and encouraging
news. Dominion Status as elaborated by Mountbatten
and V. P. Mcnon had been warmly welcomed, and only
a few editorial amendments and clarifications were
required.

viceroy's house;, new delhi, Monday, 26th May, 1947
Jinnah's "Corridor" demand has produced delayed, but
none the less definite, reaction. The flames of controversy
are being fanned, and this whole affair is characteristic of
the mounting tension, which will be relaxed only with a
quick political decision. The reserves of good-will which
Mountbatten has so assiduously built up over the past two
months are rapidly running out during his absence in Lon-
don. 1 have advised Vernon: —

112

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

"Prasad and Deo (Congress Secretary) have made force-
ful statements— Prasad says, Minnah's demands will not
merit a moment's scrutiny*, and Deo considers that they
'are increasing under the illusion that the British can still
help him'. The country, however, cannot be intimidated
with such bullying tactics, and the demand for a 'Corridor*
cannot be erantcd.

"Dawn has, of course, hit back at Prasad and Deo with
a provocative leader under the heading 'Cranks AIT, the
key passage of which runs as follows: The demand for
a corridor is not a new one. Quaid-e-Azam Jinnah has
many limes in the past raised that point which is so vital
in the context of Pakistan. If Pakistan is to be real, solid
and strong the creation of a corridor linking up its eastern
and northern areas is an indispensable adjunct. Be that
as it may, we have no doubt, however, that if Muslims
can win Pakistan — as indeed they have already won it -
they can just as well build a corridor somewhere for the
linking up of the two segments of Pakistan. Mr. Deo
knows that too well'.

"On Saturday Nehru gave an interview to the United
Press of America which contains his first public reference
to the extra-territorial issue. 'Mr. Jinnah's recent state-
ment', he said, 'is completely unrealistic and indicates
that he desires no settlement of any kind. The demand
for a corridor is fantastic and absurd. We stand for a
union of India with the right to particular areas to opt out.
We envisage no compulsion. If there is no proper settle-
ment on this basis without further claims being advanced,
then we shall proceed with making and implementing the
constitution for themnion of India'."

Nehru confirmed that his attitude was hardening by in-
timating to Mieville that he was falling back on the alter-
native Demission Plan, in view of Jinnah's rejection of
the main proposals of the draft announcement. He would
like the Interim Government to be treated immediately
by convention as a Dominion Government. Jinnah will

THE PLAN REDRAFTED

113

never commit himself. Nehru alleged that he accepts
what he gets and goes on asking for more. There could
be no one-sided commitments.

vktkoy's irousi:, ni-w diliu, Sunday, 1st June, 1947
J wrote to my mother: —

"We are on the eve of great events here, and I am up
to my eyes in the last-minute details of planning the pub-
licity for Mountbalten's momentous announcement on the
transfer of power which is due to be made on Tuesday.
The atmosphere is very tense, and if the verdict is for
Partition — as it almost certainly will be — considerable
communal unrest can be expected, but any decision will
be preferable to the present uncertainty. It should be
noted, though, that the fury is internal and fratricidal and
that the British are probably more popular with both
Hindus and Moslems than at any time in living memory.

"The main effect of the Government's 20th February
Announcement has been to bring the Congress High Com-
mand round to the acceptance of the partition of Jndia
as inevitable. Gandhi refuses to align himself with this
concept, and is putting up a fierce rear-guard action against
it. • How far he will carry this opposition is one of the
big imponderables.

"Nehru and Vallabhbhai Patel, the two big Congress-
men in the Interim Government, accept Partition on the
understanding that by conceding Pakistan to Jinnah they
will hear no more of him and eliminate his nuisance value,
or, as Nehru put it privately, that by 'culling off the head
we will get rid of the headache'. In this they are being
rather sanguine, for Jinnah's appetite shows signs of grow-
ing with what it feeds on, and his latest demand for an
eight-hundred-mile corridor to join West and Epst Paki-
stan is a good example of his irredentist tactics. Agree-
ment there! ore is being approached from both sides with
the worst possible grace. Partition is undoubtedly a trage-
dy, but a worse tragedy would be to try to impose a unity

114 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

unacceptable to the great majority of the hundred million
Moslems."

CHAPTER N1N1

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

vu troy's nousr, ni,w di un, Monday, 2nd June, 1947
Tur great mom i. nt has arrived. The Leaders drive into
the North Court in their large American cars. T was in
the Viceroy's study, which is now duly transformed, its
dark panels painted a pale green. Tt is quite a small Study,
with an informal almost intimate atmosphere, compared
with the Council Chamber and even the adjoining recep-
tion-rooms. The painting of Clive in the entrance hall
looks down upon this apotheosis of the Raj. Jinnah was
the last to come, a few minutes late. Mountbatten did
his best to promote some friendly small talk, but it was
clear that the atmosphere was electric. The problem of
including Kripalani has been solved by conceding to
Jinnah, Rab Nishtar; so the Big Five have become the
Big Seven.

The conference lasted for just on two hours. Vernon
reported that Mountbatten did most of the talking, and
was in masterly form, giving a closely reasoned analysis
of developments. His opening remarks were a challenge
to them to rise to the level of the events they were creat-
ing. He said that during the past five years he had taken
part in a number #f momentous meetings at which. the
fate of the war had been decided, but he could frankly
remember no decisions reached likely to have such an im-
portant influence on world history as those which were
to be taken at this meeting. He made it clear that he was
not forcing the pace against their will. A terrific sense of
urgency had been pressed upon him by everybody to whom
he had spoken. They had wanted the present state of

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

115

uncertainty to cease: therefore the sooner power was trans-
ferred the better for all.

Having made his last formal attempt to resuscitate the
Cabinet Mission Plan, and Jinnah having for the last time
formally rejected it, Mountbatten then turned to the dilem-
ma presented by Partition. Congress, he said, did not
agree to the principle of the partition of India, but, if
this were unavoidable, insisted on the partition of Pro-
vinces to avoid the coercion of Moslem or Hindu majority
areas, while on the other hand Jinnah resisted the parti-
tion of Provinces but demanded the division of India.

Mountbatten was at pains tn stress the backing of the
British Conservative Opposition. The Plan, he said, was
not a" Parly issue in London. He spoke of his distress
about the position of the Sikhs, and disposed firmly and
finally of the suggestion of a referendum whether Calcutta
should become a Free Port.

With characteristic finesse, he introduced the new Para-
graph 20 of the Plan under its heading "Immediate trans-
fer of power", and defended the resulting Dominion Status
not from the imputation of Britain's desire to retain a
foothold beyond her time but from the possible charge
of quitting on her obligations. Therefore, he said, it was
abundantly clear that British assistance should not be with-
drawn prematurely if it was still required.

Jinnah in one of the earlier interviews had startled
Mountbatten by making a distinction between his agree-
ment with and acceptance of a certain proposal. Mount-
batten invoked this particular piece of pedantry to his
own advantage to-day.

After copies of the Plan had been handed round, he
said he felt it would be asking the Indian Leaders to go
against their consciences if he requested their full agree-
ment. He was merely asking them to accept the .Plan in
a peaceful spirit. When Nehru asked for a further de-
finition of the difference between agreement and accept-
ance, Mountbatten at once replied that agreement would
imply belief that the right principles were being employed.

116

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

bul he had to violate the principles of both sides, so could
not ask for complete agreement. What he asked for was
acceptance denoting belief that the Plan was a fair and
sincere solution for the good of the country. Nehru then
said that while there could never be complete approval
of the Plan by Congress, on balance they accepted it.
Nishtar rounded otr these devious dialectics by pointing
out that acceptance of the Plan really implied agreement
to make it work. Mountbatten cordially agreed, and from
that moment knew that the essential battle was won.

Jinnah then embarked upon an elaborate explanation as
to why he, the all-powerful Quaid-e-Azam, could not take
any decision himself. He entered into the spirit of the
proposals, he said, but both he and his Working Committee
would have to go before their masters, the people, prior
to a final decision. Mountbatten observed that there were
limes when leaders had to make vital decisions without
consulting their followers and trust to carrying them with
them at a later stage. A decision taken at the top and
afterwards confirmed by the people would be in accord-
ance with democratic procedure.

Jinnah then went as near to the brink of affirmative
decision as could reasonably be expected from one who
had got so far by saying "no** so often. He emphasised
that he would go to his masters, the people, with no in-
lent <>f wrecking the Plan, but with the sincere desire to
persuade them to accept it. He could only give his person-
al assurance that he would do his best. He would try in
his own way to bring round his own people.

Mountbaltcn wanted the reactions of the Congress and
Moslem League Working Committees and of the Sikhs
by midnight. Kripalani and Baldev Singh agreed to send
a letter that evening. Jinnah felt unable to report the
opinions of his Working Committee in writing, but agreed
to come and see the Viceroy and make a verbal report.
This satisfied Mountbatten.

To crown his success he secured the agreement of
Nehru, Jinnah and Baldev Singh to follow him with

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

broadcasts to the people over All India Radio to-morrow
evening. Mountbatten said he would let them see his
script in the morning. Patel, who had said very little,
pointed out with a wry smile that the general rule was
for the scripts of broadcast speeches to be submitted to
the Honourable Member for Information (i.e., himself)
before thev were used. Jinnah without a smile retorted
he would say in his broadcast what came from his heart.

Never was Mountbatten's genius, for informal chairman-
ship and exposition more signally displayed. His natural
talent for this procedure had been enhanced by three years
of almost daily discussion as Supreme Commander. Ver-
non told me he had never seen him more alert, keeping
the discussion within his chosen terms of reference. The
atmosphere at the outset was undoubtedly tense, but his
opening speech soon brought with it the sense of sweet
reasonableness and genuine goodwill underlying his whole
sponsorship of the Plan. Not even Mr. Jinnah's formality
and stillness could resist Mountbatten's urgent will to
succeed .

As planned beforehand, Mountbatten asked Jinnah to
stay behind partly lo counterbalance any Moslem League
criticism that he was about to see Gandhi, who never
comes in company with Congress leaders, in a separate in-
terview, and partly to apply more personal persuasion and
form a clearer judgement of the ultimate attitude he is
likely to take. But Jinnah made no comment. All will
now turn on his midnight visitation.

Then at 12.30 the Mahatma arrived. In one sense he
has been present throughout the whole proceedings, and
uncertainty as to his ultimate reaction to the formal pre-
sentation of a Partition Plan undoubtedly had an inhibit-
ing effect on the Congress leaders earlier in the morning.
They were only too well aware of Gandhi's unpredictable
response to the promptings of his inner voice. There have
been widespread fears that he will at the bidding of his
complex conscience go lo extreme lengths to wreck the
Plan in one final effort lo prevent the vivisection of India.

118

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Mountbatten faced this interview with considerable trepi-
dation. Imagine his amazement and relief when the
Mahatma blandly indicated on the backs of various used
envelopes and other scraps of paper that he was observ-
ing a day of silence.

When the interview was over Mountbatten picked up
the various bits of paper, which he thinks will be among
his more historic relics. On them the Mahatma had writ-
ten: "I am sorry 1 can't speak; when I took the decision
about the Monday silence I did make two exceptions, i.e.,
about speaking to high functionaries on urgent matters or
attending upon sick people. But I know you don't want
me to break my silence. Have I said one word against
you during my speeches? If you admit that I have not,
your warning is superfluous. There are one or two things
I must talk about, but not to-day. But if we meet each
other again I shall speak.''

Behind this quaint procedure lay a gieat act of political
renunciation, of self-effacement and of self-control. When
I went in to have a few words with Mountbatten about
the Press communique at the end of this momentous morn-
ing I, too, collected a trophy from the small round table
— nothing other than a "doodle" by Mr. Jinnah extracted
from his subconscious at the moment of his greatest poli-
tical victory. I am no psychologist, but I think J can
detect the symbols of power and glory here.

At four o'clock we had a Staff Meeting, and had a com-
plete run through of the paper on "The Administrative

Consequences of Partition". This is a masterly document
of some thirty foolscap pages, largely prepared by John
Christie, and it will certainly not be possible for posterity
to say that we found a political answer at the expense of
an administrative one. Here is the master plan which,
under the umbrella of Dominion Status, should make pos-
sible essential continuity for the new regimes.

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

119

vic eroy's noi r sr, WAV dklhi, Tuesday, 3rd June, 1947
Mount batten began the day wit h an early morning Staff
Meeting, at which he told us of his dramatic midnight
encounter with Jinnah. As Jinnah had categorically re-
fused to give any answer to the Plan in writing, Ismay
joined Mount batten as a second witness of what he was
ready to say. He began by reiterating at great length the
remarks he had made round the conference table in the
morning, and no amount of pressure from Mountbatlen
would make him agree in a firm acceptance from the
Moslem Leacue Council when thev met. All he would
undertake was that he would use his best endeavours to
persuade ihem in a constitutional manner to accept and
that his Working Committee would support him.

Mountbatlen then reminded Jinnah that the Congress
Party were terribly suspicious of this particular tactic,
which he always used, whereby he wailed until the Con-
gress Party had made a firm decision about some plan,
and then left himself the right to make whatever decision
suited the Moslem League several days later. Mount-
batten warned him that Nehru, Kripalani and Patel had
made an absolute point that they would reject the Plan
unless the Moslem League accepted it simultaneously with
themselves: and furthermore accepted it as a final settle-
ment.

Nothing Mountbatlen could say would move him; he
once more took refuue behind the excuse that he was not
constitutionally authorised to make a decision without the
concurrence ot the full Moslem League Council, and point-
ed out that he could not in any case call this Council
Meeting for several days. Mount batten then said, "If
lhal is your attitude, then the leaders of the Congress
Party and Sikhs will refuse final acceptance at the meet-
ing in the morning; chaos will follow, and you will lose
your Pakistan, probably for good." "What must be,
must be," was his only reaction, as he shrugged his
shoulders.
M. M. — 5

120

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

-i

Mountbatten then said, "Mr. Jinnah! I do not intend
to let you wreck all the work that has gone into this settle-
ment. Since you will not accept for the Moslem League,
1 will speak for them myself. I will take the risk of say-
ing that J am satisfied with the assurances you have given
me, and if your Council fails to ratify the agreement, you
can place the blame on me. I have only one condition,
and that is that when I say at the meeting in the morn-
ing, 'Mr. Jinnah has given me assurances which 1 have
accepted and which satisfy me/ you will in no circum-
stances contradict that, and that when 1 look towards
you, you will nod your head in acquiescence. "

Jinnah's reply to the proposition itself was to nod his
head without any verbal undertaking. Mountbatten's
final question was: Did Jinnah consider that he (Mount-
batten) would be justified in advising AUlee to go ahead
and make his announcement to-morrow? To this he re-
plied, tk Yes". On this last assurance Mountbatten and
Ismay both felt that the maximum possible measure of
acceptance had been wrung out of him prior to his meet-
ing with the Moslem League Council in a week's time.

Shortly after Jinnah left, Kripalani's letter arrived. It
makes certain reservations of detail, but constitutes a firm
general acceptance of the Plan on behalf of the whole
Congress Working Committee.

At their second meeting, Mountbatten resumed by duly
reporting on Jinnah's visit to him last night and his ac-
ceptance of Jinnah's assurances and proposed action.
Jinnah confirmed this by the appropriate silence and nod
of the head. He ttten referred to the three Parties' grave
objections to different specific parts in the Plan, and was
grateful that these had been aired. But since he knew
enough of the situation to realise that not one of the sug-
gestions would be accepted by either of the other Parties,
he did not propose to raise them at this meeting. He ac-
cordingly asked all the Leaders to signify their consent to
this course, which they did; thus voluntarily but almost

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

121

unwittingly disposing of every substantial point of con-
troversy .

After Mounlbatten had pronounced that the Plan seem-
ed to represent as near to a hundred per cent agreement
as it was possible to get, Jinnah. Kripalani and Baldev
Singh all added that they considered that the Viceroy had
correctly interpreted and recorded their views. Mount-
batten said the Plan would now be announced officially,
and none of the Leaders raised any objection.

It luoked, therefore, as though all would be plain sail-
ing, but when Mountbatten appealed for restraint on the
part of subordinate leaders and the burial of ihe past
in order to open up the prospect of building a fine future,
Liaquat could not resist the temptation to suggest that
restraint was needed not so much from subordinate as
from super leaders, for example, Mr. Gandhi at his Prayer
Meetings. This touched oil all the old bitterness of feel-
ing.

Jinnah and Liaquat insinuated that Gandhi was inciting
the people to do as they liked and look to other autho-
rities than the Leaders at this conference, while Kripalani
retorted that all Gandhi's actions were devoted to non-
violence, and Patel considered that Gandhi would abide
loyally by any decision taken. Mountbatten was obliged
to bring this dangerous discussion to a halt by saying he
thought the subject had been ventilated sufficiently. He
accepted Mr. Gandhi's special position on the one hand,
and on the other was sure the Congress Leaders would
appreciate the point of what had been said.

Mountbatten then with a dramatic gesture, lifting it
above his head and banging it down on the table, pre-
sented "The Administrative Consequences of Partition"
to the startled Leaders. This high-powered Sipff paper,
which Mountbatten has had made ready,,for this day, con-
tains thirty-four closely typed pages of foolscap, and is
already a masterpiece of compression. This brings the
Leaders within the hour right up against the hard execu-
tive realities of their political decision. As Mountbatten

122

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

said afterwards, the severe shock that its appearance gave
to everyone present would have been amusing if the gene-
ral atmosphere of administrative indifference were not so
serious.

Here again a slip of the tongue, the merest molehill,
was built up characteristically, if unwittingly, to mountain-
ous proportions. Mountbatien suggested that there might
be preliminary consideration of the paper before it was
submitted to a "Cabinet meeting".* Liaquat and Jinnah
at once raised elaborate objections to the "Cabinet in the
United Kingdom" 1 being the deciding authority. Several
minutes had passed before it became clear that Jinnah
had understood Mountbatien to be referring to the Bri-
tish, and not the Indian Cabinet or Interim Government.
He then complained that he had been misled. "You
mean the Viceroy's Fxecutive Council. A spade should
be called a spade." His mind, he said, worked in con-
stitutional terms.

Liaquat then asked whether majority votes would de-
cide the issue in the inter- Party Partition Committee which
it was proposed in the paper to set up. Mountbatten said
no, negotiations would be on the basis of what was fair.
He relied on a new spirit entering into the discussions, now
that the issue of Partition had beer, finally settled. Liaquat
replied sharply that it was not a matter of a new spirit,
there was difference of opinion on the critical issue of
the division of the Armed Forces.

The discussion, surprisingly perhaps, moved into calmer
waters. It was quickly agreed that division should be
made on the basis*of citizenship, which in its turn would
be based on considerations of geography. Jinnah declar-
ed stoutlv that it would be his intention in Pakistan to
observe no communal differences, and those who lived
there, regardless of creed, would be fully fledged citizens.

At four o'clock the members of the States Negotiating
Committee assembled in the Council chamber to be given
in advance of to-night's official announcements and
speeches the background to the decisions reached by

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

123

Mount batten and the Leaders. It was a difficult meet-
ing. Once again a photographic circus provided light re-
lief and enabled Mountbatten to gel off to a friendly and
informal Mart.

Round the big oval table were seated the cream of the
Princely counsellors. Their Highnesses of Bhopal. Patiala,
Dungapur, Nawanagar and Bilaspur. Sir Mir/a Ismail,
Dewan of Hyderabad. Sir B. L. Milter of Baioda, Sir
Ramaswami Mudaliar of Mysore, Kak of Kashmir, Srini-
vasan of Ciwalior, Sir C. P. Ramaswami Aiyer of Tra-
vancore. Sir V. T. Krishnamachari of Jaipur, Panikkar of
Bikaner, Sir Sultan Ahmed, and D. K. Sen representing
the Chamber of Princes.

It is interesting to note how many of the finest Indian
minds from British India are Prime Ministers of the States.
Many of them are front-rank lawyers, which aids them
in their approach to such constitutional conundrums as
the lapse of Paramountcy. Their relationship to the
Princes they serve is very much that of a barrister with
a valuable brief.

After another very skilful and persuasive explanation
of the origin and purpose of the Plan, Mountbatten was
subjected to some acute cross-examination on its appli-
cation to the Indian States. They were all particularly-
anxious to know whether it would be possible to arrange
for Paramountcy to lapse before the actual transfer of
power in British India— the assumption being, of course*
that the States would then be in a better position to bar-
gain with the successor governments.

Mountbatten did his best to inject a sense of reality into
the meeting. The creation of two new States would in-
evitably mean two strong central governments which could
not afford to delegate their powers instead of one weak
one lor the whole sub-continent which could. On the
other hand, he fell that the acceptance of Dominion Status
by them both offered a measure of protection as well as
compensation to those Princes who had stood so loyally
by their alliances and friendship with Britain. Whatever

124

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

decisions they reached, he advised them to cast their minds
forward ten years and to consider what the situation in
India and the world was likely to be by then.

I accompanied Mountbatten in the Viceregal Rolls to
AH India Radio, where officials were leaning out of all
the windows and cramming the balconies. A small crowd
had also gathered round the entrance to the building. Fay,
who was on a balcony, told me afterwards that a small
group of Sadhus, distinctive in their bright caps of holy
orange, began shouting out slogans just as we were enter-
ing the building. No sooner had they started to demon-
strate than they were scooped into our following police
car. The neatness of the operation made the assembled
Indians, otherwise passively polite, scream with laughter.
These Sadhus have come from various parts of the coun-
try, and have pitched their tents on the banks of the
Jumna, there to protest against the betrayal of Hindu life
and custom which they are convinced any form of Parti-
tion must involve.

After a brief voice test, Mountbatten spoke with a slow
and deliberate diction, in contrast to the quick-fire delivery
of his private conversation. It was a well-balanced oration
without hyperbole, relying for its impact if anything on
under- statement. This was undoubtedly the right note for
Mountbatten to strike. His message was subdued and
objective at the moment of personal triumph.

We were riddling with lights and voice timings through-
out Nehru's moving address, which was compelling alike
in its mood and expression. Here was neither arrogance
nor apology, but a true reflection of the sadness which
accompanies all success — the frustration in victory. Per-
haps Nehru's greatest strength is that although he has
reached the heights as a partisan campaigner he retains
detachment of spirit. The artist and the scholar in him
are always near the surface. So at this climactic moment
he was able to say, "We are little men serving great
causes, but because the cause is great something of that
greatness falls upon us also."

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

125

Then followed Jinnah. The experts in Moslem League
dialectic assured me that his speech was a masterpiece.
As one of them put it to me immediately afterwards,
"This is the language that will be understood in the
bazaars, and it means peace." By objective standards I
could not detect the magic. He seemed to me on this oc-
casion to be well below the level of events which he had
done so much to create.

Nehru's last words had been "Jai Hind", Jinnah closed
with "Pakistan Zindabad". This he said in such a clip-
ped voice that some startled listeners thought at first that
the Quaid-e-A/am had thrown dignity to the winds and
pronounced "Pakistan's in the bag"!

Baldev vSingh spoke last, and in view of the unmitigated
loss which Partition meant for the Sikhs and the intense
bitlerncss it was likely to engender among his co-religion-
ists, his words were eloquent and courageous. He gave
a clear call to India's Defence Forces to uphold their
high standards of discipline, particularly against the pres-
sures of unpleasant internal security duties. In contrast
to Jinnah, he saw the Plan not as a compromise. **l
prefer to call it a settlement."

vin.Rov's Housr, ni.w dllhi, Wednesday, 4th June, 1947
This morning to an audience of some three hundred
representatives of the Indian and world's Press in the Le-
gislative Assembly, Mountbatten has given the most bril-
liant performance I have ever witnessed at a major Press
conference. He began without note or loss of word, ex-
pounding for some three-quarters of an hour a political
Plan of the utmost complexity both in its detail and im-
plication. It was a speech which must have cleared many
lurking doubts among that audience of professional scep-
tics about the Plan's substance and purpose.

When a correspondent tried to draw him on the Moslem
League's demand for a "Corridor" -and thus, on a point
never discussed in the Plan — he replied, "Which para-
graph in the Plan are you referring to?" He was ques-

126

MISSION WITH MOUNTS ATTEN

tioncd about the Sikhs — their prospects and attitude —
and he made it clear that the whole Sikh problem under
the Plan had given him probably more concern than any
other single issue. He was pressed in particular about
the terms of reference of the Boundary Commission which
Is to work out the actual lines of demarcation in the Pun-
jab and Bengal and the Moslem majority district of Syl-
het, in Assam. When a Sikh correspondent asked whether
a property qualification would be a factor, Mountbatten
smilingly replied, "His Majesty's Government could hard-
ly be expected to subscribe to a Partition on the basis of
landed property -least of all the present Government."

During the Conference he gave the first informal indi-
cation that 15th August would be the likely date for the
actual transfer of power to the two new Dominions. Ac-
tually it was on this issue of Dominion Status that he was
subjected to the most searching scrutiny of all, and was
involved in an encounter with Devadas Gandhi, who has
a most disarming manner, and who by the persistence
of his inquiries gave a possible clue, I felt, to his father's
stale of mind.

Mountbatten did not at first quite follow the drift
of what Devadas was asking: but it was, in effect, that
the British should reject any offer on the part of any
single individual State to become a Dominion, and should
insist on India as a whole reaching a decision on the ques-
tion of membership of the Commonwealth. He said he
felt there was "a great potential for mischief" in allow-
ing the respective Constituent Assemblies the ultimate
decision on this matter. Behind the inquiry was the old
suspicion that Dominion Status was something Jess than
independence, together with the new one that if Pakistan
opted to remain in and India to go out, Pakistan might
become a base for British imperialism.

Mountbattcn's last words on the subject were, "From
all the questions that have been asked there is one thing
which I sincerely believe is not yet clear to the people.
Somehow people seemed to have some doubts about this

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

127

word 'Dominion Status*. It is absolute independence in
every possible way, with the sole exception that the Mem-
ber States of the Commonwealth are linked together volun-
tarily. In fact they look for support, mutual trust and in
due course affection."

Whether or not Devadas was wholly satisfied with the
answers to his particular points, the enthusiasm of the
correspondents as a whole, judging from the spontaneous
applause when Vallabhbhai Palel, who was in the chair,
called the proceedings to a close, was remarkable from
such a case-hardened body. J spoke to some of them
afterwards. Andy Mellor of the Daily Herald describ-
ed himself to me as stunned by the performance, saying
that he had never heard anything like it and did not
expect to do so again: Fric Britter called it a tour de
force; while Bob Stimson drew attention to its impact on
the Americans, who had been deeply impressed by the
argument— which was for them a revelation — that Domi-
nion Status provided the bgst constitutional means for
transfer of power, and spell genuine freedom for India,
and was not just a device for enabling the British to hold
on.

Mounlbatten on his returrf to Viceroy's House soon had
indications that there was more underlying Devadas*
doubts than had appeared at the Conference, and all was
not well with the Mahatma. who was proposing to make
highly critical comment on the Plan at his Prayer Meet-
ing this evening. Indeed, last night, just before the Lead-
ers were due to broadcast, he had indicated that they were
not above or beyond criticism, and had even gone so far
as to single out Nehru for a double-edged comment. After
referring to him as "our King", he added, "We should
not be impressed by everything the King does or does
not do. If he has devised something good for* us, wc
should praise him. Tf he has not, then we shall say so."

Mountbatten wisely decided that the time had come to
clear the air with Gandhi and to prevent his apparent
misgivings taking firmer and more dangerous shape. So

128

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

just before the Prayer Meeting he invited him to come
round to Viceroy's House. Gandhi was clearly in a state
of some distress, feeling under the first impact of the Plan
.that his lifelong efforts for the unity of Hindus and Mos-
lems had fallen about him. But Mountbatten, summon-
ing all his powers of persuasion, urged him to consider
(he Announcement not as a Mountbatten but as a Gandhi
Plan; in all sincerity he had tried to incorporate Gandhi's
major concepts of non-coercion, self-determination, the
earliest possible date of British departure, and even his
sympathetic views about Dominion Status.

Once again Mountbatten carried the day; just how de-
cisively can be seen by what Gandhi said to-night. "The
British Government is not responsible for Partition," he
told the Prayer Meeting. "The Viceroy has no hand in
it. Jn fact he is as opposed to division as Congress itself,
but if both of us — Hindus and Moslems — cannot agree
on anything else, then the Viceroy is left with no choice."
The Viceroy had worked y^ry hard and had tried his
utmost to bring about a compromise. This Plan was the
only basis on which agreements could be reached. The
Viceroy did not want to leave the country in chaos; hence
all his efforts. Never surely had a Viceroy achieved such
swift and decisive conquest over Gandhi's heart and mind.

I had a personal telegram of yesterday's date from Joyce
reporting, "A packed House of Commons listened with
intense interest to Prime Minister's announcement this
afternoon. Proposals and first reaction from India un-
doubtedly created profound gratification among all Par-
ties. Sense of unity and recognition of tremendous issues
and possibilities involved were comparable only with most
historic moments during war." After referring to the
splendid B.B.C. reception and coverage he ended, "This
has been a great day for us all".

Mountbatten held a Staff Meeting at 7.30 this evening.
Having broken the deadlock of a generation, there is still
to be no respite for him or indeed any of us.

THE GREAT ACCEPTANCE

129

Already I detect the first sign of a storm over the States.
Bhopal has resigned his position as Chancellor of the
Chamber of Princes, and cannot be deflected from a course
of personal isolation and independence which runs coun-
ter to all the current developments.

Nehru is not reacting -favourably to the Paper on the
"Administrative Consequences of Partition", and there
will clearly now be much more acute difficulty in main-
taining the structure and existence of the Interim Govern-
ment.

vjci roy's Housr. nj;w dli.hi, Thursday, 5th June, 1947
George Jones, the New York Times correspondent, who
has been very ill and is due to leave India in the next
few days, came round to see me this morning to ask for
my personal impressions of Mountbatlen in about three
hundred words, as he wants his last feature to be an ap-
preciation of the Viceroy. Mountbatten in three hundred
words? It is not easy at close range. But I have dictat-
ed this note: —

"Perhaps the most abiding impression is his tremendous:
creative energy, by which I mean not only the energy
which is in himself, but which he injects into all about
him.

"In the three biggest jobs of his life to date- -Chief of
Combined Operations, Supreme Commander and Viceroy
—his capacity as a morale-raiser was given the fullest
scope, for he took on all three jobs when the respective
situations were at lowest ebb and morale accordingly de-
pressed.

"By upbringing and temperament he is at home wfthi
high politics. There is his renowned charm of manner,
and sensitivity to the personal nuances on which *so many
great political events depend.

"His position as Supreme Allied Commander was gootf
training for this job. It involved semi-political respon-
sibility on behalf of more than one nation; it was some-

130

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

thing new in war, and Mountbatten and Eisenhower were
probably the only two military leaders who really had
the chance of a full 'work ouf in this capacity. During
the nine months after the collapse of Japan, as the virtual
military Governor of a vast area comprising half a dozen
countries and some one hundred and twenty million
people, he was wholly absorbed in tremendous problems
affecting simultaneously the status of Indonesia and French
Indo-China, peace with Siam, the rehabilitation of Burma
and the maintenance of law and order in Malaya. To-
gether they comprised the most intensive training-ground
possible for him in the psychology of Eastern nationalism
prior to becoming Viceroy.

"He is essentially an extrovert character, who does not
relish silence or solitude, but is at his very best in public.

"With his staff, he thinks aloud. He carries less pre-
judices than any man f have ever known, and although
he can be relied upon for a clear and decisive point of
view, he always requires of himself and his staff good
reason for holding it. His objectivity and disinterested-
ness, which spring from a number of 1 actors — scientific
training, interest in things mechanical. Royal birth which
removes a great many ol the normal temptations of per-
sonal ambition- -are tremendous sources of strength to
him.

"It would be wrong to suggest a faultless image, and
perhaps the most serious defect is a tendency to get caught
up in trivial detail without realising that it is trivial. Allied
to this trait is anxiety over secondary problems and vanity
over minor achievements. It must be confessed, how-
ever, that in the present assignment he has remained
firmly at his own level, and throughout the five years I
have been with him J have always found him giving those
who serve him the fullest measure of responsibility and
support. All in all a rare and refreshing spirit, and
whether on the quarter deck or in Viceroy's House, a
democratic leader of the first magnitude."

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES 131

This morning Mountbatten held his third meeting with
the Leaders, at which the paper on "Administrative Con-
sequences of Partition" was fully discussed. It was very
hard going, with both sides anxious above all to avoid
administrative decisions and largely unaware of their
meaning. Jinnah was at great pains to explain that both
States would be independent and equal in every way,
while Nehru was equally insistent that India was carry-
ing on in every way as before, and that Pakistan was the
outcome of permission to dissident Provinces to secede,
which must not be allowed to interrupt the work of the
Government of India or the continuity of its foreign policy.
In this atmosphere of recrimination Mountbatten made it
clear that he would not accept the continued requests of
both sides to act as arbitrator on all outstanding matters in
dispute. They have agreed to try to find a mutually ac-
ceptable judge for this thankless task.

The Plan, now forty-eight hours old, has undoubtedly
led to a detente throughout the country as a whole, but
among the Leaders in Delhi it has induced no brotherly
love. The situation here is still very tense, and is such
that the most trivial incident could touch off a major crisis.

CIIAFTLK n.N

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

victroy's Hoiisi, niw Di uir, Sunday, Hth June, 1947
Thl corl oi«" Mountbatten \s problem remains political,
and the most immediate danger is of the dissolution of the
Interim Government caused by the resignation of one or
other of its component parts. It w:is always a feeble
instrument. Now that the principle of Partition is effec-
tively accepted, there is not even the pretence of inner
loyalty and purpose to hold it together. Mountbatten
realises only too clearly, however, that if one or other

132

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

of the Parties were to resign from it before Partition is
ratified by Act of Parliament in Westminster, the pros-
pects of the 3rd June Plan would be gravely imperilled
and his own position hopelessly compromised.

To-day it seemed that this very peril was upon us, for
the Cabinet meeting was only just saved by a desperate
diversion on Mountbatten's part from breaking up in
complete disorder. In an effort to narrow the contro-
versy by limiting its duties, he suggested a moratorium on
all policy decisions and high-grade appointments.

A formula was found for submitting these matters to
Mountbatten direct, to avoid contentious issues being de-
cided by Ihe inevitable Congress ma'jority vole in the Cabi-
net. At this point Nehru sought Mountbatten's approval
for certain diplomatic appointments which he asked him
to agree were not the concern of Pakistan. Liaquat at
once objected, saying that he did not, for instance, wish
to see an Ambassador appointed to Moscow. Unfortu-
nately, just such an appointment was envisaged, and the
nominee was none other than Nehru's sister, Mrs. Pandit.

The ensuing scene was babel, with everyone talking
furiously at once. Nehru asserted that rather than toler-
ate Moslem League interference in the Government 's af-
fairs he would insist on a majority vote being taken, and
that if the Government was to be turned over to the
League he would immediately resign. Mountbatten had
finally to call each member of the Cabinet individually
to order, deferring further discussion of the particular issue
and adding. ' fc We are not going on with the next item
until there is a row of smiling faces in front of me." This
had the intended effect. Everyone laughed; the tension
was broken. But thelncident shows by how thin a thread
the success of the Plan hangs. Critical days and decisions
lie ahead of us.

vicf roy's housl, nlw di r.Hi, Monday, 9th June, 1947
At our Staff Meeting to-day there was a prolonged dis-
cussion on the implications of Dominion Status, and in

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

133

particular of Mountballen remaining on after the transfer
of power to serve ior a limited period as joint Governor-
General of both Dominions. This concept has been en-
couraged on the one hand by Congress's willingness to
propose him without condition either in this capacity or
as Governor-General of India alone, and on the other by
Jinnah urging that he should definitely stay on to see the
Interim phase through in the capacity of a unifying head
of the two States.

Mountbatten's first assumption was that Jinnah also
had in mind a common Governor-General, but only when
he was in London did it become apparent that Jinnah
wanted three Governors-General, one of India, one of
Pakistan and one, Mountbatten himself, in an overall posi-
tion as Supreme Arbitrator for the division of assets, most
of which, of course, are in Jndia. This was quickly ruled
out by the British Government as impracticable. Mount-
batten also told him frankly that it would be quite im-
possible for himself to assume this supra-national role;
but at the same time has been pressing the advantages
from Pakistan's point of view of a joint Governor-Gene-
ralship as the best guarantee of a fair physical transfer.
He has frankly advised us, however, that he is most averse
to staying should the invitation come from only one side.
Jinnah so far has been careful to conceal his final inlen-
lion. If it is in favour of a joint Governor-Generalship,
some special provision will be needed, however, in the
Independence Act, and a decision from him within the
next three weeks is essential.

The All Jndia Moslem League Council met to-day in
(he ballroom on the first floor of the Imperial Hotel. To-
wards the end of its deliberations there was a sudden but
apparently carefully planned eruption of Kfiaksars, who
came in through the garden at the side of the hotel and
startled peaceful residents during tea by rushing through
the lounge brandishing belchas, or sharpened spades. With
these formidable weapons they wrought the maximum of
havoc in the minimum of time and, shouting "Get

134

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Jinnah!", were half-way up the staircase leading to the
ballroom where Jinnah and the Council were still in ses-
sion before Moslem League National Guards could grapple
with them and turn them back. It took police with tear-
gas to bring the disturbance to an end.

Jinnah behaved with great composure. Sidney Smith
of the Daily Express saw him afterwards, and told me that
Jinnah had no doubt but that the assault was an attempt
on his life. The only previous attempt to assassinate him

in Bombay in 1943 — was made by a Khaksar.

The Khaksars, or "Servants of the Dust", are a group
of militant Moslem fanatics with much the same storm-
trooper ideology as the far more formidable Rashtrya
Swam vSevak Saneh, offshoot of the Hindu Mahasabha.
Led by lnayatullah Mashriqi, they have been engaged on
terrorist activities ever since their foundation in 1931.
Their demand is for an undivided Pakistan stretching
from Karachi to Calcutta, and to ihem Jinnah is as much
the betraver of Moslem interests as Gandhi is in the eves
of Hindu extremists of Hinduism.

A party from Viceroy's House going along later in the
evening for dinner round the place in the utmost disoider.
The large grill-room was a shambles. Its air-coolers were
smashed and its furniture broken up. The forces of
fanaticism and revolution are on the move, and this in-
cident confirms that the crust upholding order from the
depths of chaos is dangerously thin. Under the present
tense conditions all the leaders provide far too easy targets
for far too many would-be assassins.

viceroy's houst., nkw dli hi, Tuesday, 10th June, 1947
The Moslem League Council has passed a resolution in
phraseology designed to infuriate the Congress, but in
terms which mark the nearest approach Jinnah is likely
to make to a substantial acceptance of the Plan. After
expressing satisfaction at the abandonment of the Cabinet
Mission Plan, it qualifies its refusal to agree or give con-
sent to the partition of Bengal and the Punjab by decid-

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

135

ing that it had to consider the 3rd June Plan for the
transfer of power as a whole, and by giving full authority
to Jinnah to accept the Plan's fundamental principles as a
compromise.

Dominion Status and the joint Governor-Generalship
was again the main theme at our Stall Meeting to-day.
Jinnah makes no move and gives no sign. In the course
of our discussion, which became somewhat discursive and
hypothetical, Mountbatten said he believed there was con-
siderable confusion in Nehru's mind about the magic date
of June 1948. Nehru was apparently working at immense
pressure to complete the new Constitution before that
date, and had emphasised so strongly that this was his
objective that Congress prestige might seriously suffer if
ihey did not succeed. Mountbatten pointed out that the
date of June 1948 now had no significance whatever, and
he was anxious that J should stress this in all the back-
ground information I gave to the Press.

"•mi ri.trfm", mashohka, simla,
Saturday, 14th June, 1947
George Nicholls, Fay and I left yesterday for Simla
shortly after 5 a.m. to cover as many miles of the parched
plain as we could before the full heat of the sun beat
down upon us. In these early hours there is a life-giving
freshness in the air and it is easy to understand why many
Indians — Sardar Pale! among them- -are up by -4.30 in
the morning, completing nearly half a day's work before
breakfast.

We reached "The Retreat" by lea-lime - the beginning
for me of a week's withdrawal from the Delhi ferment.
Our Simla visit last month was no respite, but, on the
contrary, the most critical and exacting phase of all the
negotiations leading to the 3rd June.

In the Himalayan stillness, where no 'phone rings, it is
possible now to pause and take stock of the progress to
date and the task ahead. I wrote in this vein to mv
mother to-day:--

136

MISSION WITH M 0 UN TB ATTEN

"Mountballen's diplomacy has succeeded for several
reasons, but primarily because of his own personality.
He is a wonderful talker, and able to put across his own
essential sincerity. The outward expression of the man
is his weaving energy. He never lets up, and never allows
a situation to harden against himself. When towards the
end of April the situation looked more than usually dark
and uncertain, Ismay roused my spirits by saying, 'J like
working for lucky men/ No reflection, of course, was
intended by him on Mountbatten's ability. On the con-
trary, it is borne in on all of us that he induces success
and outflanks failure by the range and variety of his
initiative.

"He is very sensitive to the different temperaments of
those with whom he is negotiating, and has, as a result,
won the complete confidence of Gandhi, Jinnah, Nehru
and Patel, who, in spite of their close identification with
the struggle for independence, are as diverse a quartet as
it is possible to imagine. He is, in short, my idea of a
political thoroughbred.

"I must stress the importance of Patel in the agreements
so far reached. He has a rough exterior and uncompro-
mising manner. His achievements tend to remain below
the surface, but he was probably the first of the Congress
High Command to realise that the 20th February state-
ment implied Partition if a political settlement by June
or before was to be achieved. Having absorbed
that vital implication, he has never wavered, and has stood
firm against the inner voices and neural indecisions that
have sometimes afflicted his colleagues.

"Palel's realism has also been a big factor in the ac-
ceptance of the Dominion Status formula for which Mount-
batten has worked so hard. This is inevitably a delicate
plant. Personally I wish we could evolve an even looser
Commonwealth concept which did not so directly involve
the King's Sovereignty but could take in a Republic. This
needs close consideration, because I believe the present
symbolic ties of the British Commonwealth are not really

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

137

applicable to a Congress-controlled Indian Union, and
should be modified to include for the first time on equal
terms peoples of different races.

"We are in the heart of Sikh country here, and the pre-
vailing atmosphere is one of tension and foreboding. Since
the beginning of June sentries have been on all-round-the-
clock guard at *The Retreat* for the protection of our
families and Moslem servants. Undoubtedly both Nehru's
and Jinnah's speeches on the 3rd June helped to calm
Hindu and Moslem fears and to avert the immediate out-
break of a major communal conflict, and taking the sub-
continent as a whole, the popular reaction has in fact been
remarkably calm. Nevertheless, Sikh unrest in the Punjab
is growing hourly. The implications of the 3rd June are
now all too clear to the Sikh people. They see that the
Partition of India means substantially and irrevocably the
partition of the Sikhs, and they feel themselves to be sacri-
ficed on the altars of Moslem ambition and Hindu
opportunism.

"Lying along the perimeter of Hindu and Moslem
power, the Sikhs number some six million - no more than
twenty per cent of the total Punjab population- but they
succeeded in achieving influence out of all proportion to
their numbers by maintaining their own unity and holding
an effective balance of power wilhin a United Punjab.
With Partition, however, they are trapped, and no jug-
gling of a Boundary Commission can prevent their bisec-
tion. They react accordingly, and their leaders, hopelessly
out-maii(Euvred in the political struggle, begin to invoke
more primitive remedies.

"Sikhism, which is based on a most complex religious
and social structure, does not encourage, or at the present
moment enjoy, leadership of high quality. Baldev Singh,
Defence Minister in Nehru's Government, is, as his speech
on 3rd June showed, a man of high character and wide
vision, but he is a voice in the wilderness. Nor does
Patiala, the leadiim Sikh Prince and Chancellor of the
Chamber of Princes in succession to Bhopal, have a de-

138

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

cisivc influence. Power is passing to the wilder men, such
as Master Tara Singh and some of the younger l.N.A.
officers. Rough weather lies ahead of us: in spite of all
that has been already achieved, the outlook is still stormy
and unsettled."

\K f RO\\ Housr, NF:W pij.Hi, Monday, 23rd June, 1947
During the past ten days Mountbattcn and the staff have
been engaged in intensive operations over a wide front
which may be said to add up lo general progress in the
campaign to clinch acceptance of the Plan. The principal
development has been the All India Congress Committee's
clear endorsement of Partition. In spite of verbal cross-
fire and an abortive effort to achieve a Concordat signed
jointly by Kripalani and Jinnah, the main political de-
cision of the two Parties can no longer be said to be seri-
ously in doubt.

At the decisive moment Gandhi came down in favour
of acceptance, and the latent opposition among the more
communally minded members of the Congress High Com-
mand could not take shape against the frail little man's
massive authority.

As for the Provinces directly affected by the Plan, the
Referendum for the North-west Frontier Province has,
after much heart-searching and some evasive action, been
accepted by Congress. At first Dr. Khan Sahib threatened
to boycott it. but on Gandhi's advice the local Red-Shirt
movement is to put its passive-resistance principles into
practice and peacefully abstain. Caroc is retiring on leave
while the referendum is being held. The letters exchanged
between Mountbattcn and Caroc were duly released just
before I left for Simla. Mountbattcn wisely decided to
entrust the Province to a military regime and Lieutenant-
General Sir Rob Lockhart, G.O.C.-in-C, Southern Com-
mand, India, who knows the Frontier well, is to take
Caroc's place as Governor to supervise this very delicate
operation. Nevertheless, I think we can say that as far

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

139

as politics at the centre are concerned the peak of the
Frontier crisis has already passed.

Over Bengal, Jinnah is being particularly difficult. While
demanding portfolios in the Interim Government at the
centre for his own Moslem League as a continuing right,
he refuses them in the Interim Administration for the
West Bengal Congressmen,

Hie Punjab I cgislative Assembly has to-day formally
opted for Partition, following on a similar decision in
Bengal three days ago, where Suhrawardy's move to
achieve an autonomous and united Province finally died
away before the disfavour of the two great Parties. So
the wheel turns full circle, and Congress, which in an
earlier generation had bitterly opposed Curzon's partition
of Bengal, now, forty years later, sponsors the self-same
policy.

The Leaders have taken a basic decision about their
policy towards the States in agreeing to the establishment
of a States Department in Delhi which will deal with all
matters of common concern and with the formulation of
their final relationship. In the meanwhile it was agreed
that the new Department should take over everything short
of Paramountcy from the existing Crown Representative's
Political Department.

That Paramountcy after the transfer of power is a pro-
blem bristling with political and legal difficulties has been
brought home to Mountbatten from various discussions
which he has had during the past ten days with the
Leaders, with his old friend Sir Walter Monckton, con-
stitutional adviser to the Ni/am, and with Bhopul and his
adviser Sir Zaffrullah Khan.* They have been stiessing
that what was good enough under the Cabinet Mission
Plan is far from satisfactory under Partition, which is es-
sentially a communal solution substituting two string cen-
tral Governments for one weak one. So they were press-
ing the claims of Dominion Status for some of the Stales.

* Subsequently the Foreign Minister of Pakistan.

140

MISSION WITH MO U NTB ATTEN

Mountbatten has also seen for himself the paralysis of
Princely uncertainty during his visit to Kashmir, from
which he has only just returned to-day. Both Nehru and
Gandhi have been very anxious that the Maharaja of
Kashmir should make no declaration of independence.
And Nehru, himself descended from Kashmiri Brahmins,
has been pressing to visit the State himself to seek the
release from prison of his friend Sheikh Abdullah, now
President of the States Congress. Last year when Nehru
visited the State he was himself placed under arrest by
the Kashmir Government. Gandhi's view was that he
himself ought to prepare the way for Nehru. The Maha-
raja has made it very clear that he does not welcome a
visit from cither. Mount batten succeeded in deferring
bolh visits by saying he himself had a long-standing in-
vitation from the Maharaja and would like to see him
first.

When he got there he found the Maharaja politically
very elusive, and the only conversations that took place
were during their various car drives together. Mount-
batten on Ihese occasions urged him and his Prime Minis-
ter, Pundit Kak, not to make any declaration of independ-
ence, but to iind out in one way or another the will of the
people of Kashmir as soon as possible, and to announce
their intention by 14th August to send representatives ac-
cordingly lo one Constituent Assembly or the other. He
told them that the newly treated Slates Department was
prepared to give an assurance that if Kashmir went to
Pakistan this would not be regarded as an unfriendly act
by the Government of India. He went on to stress the
dangerous situalion*in which Kashmir would find itself if
it lacked the support of one of the two Dominions by the
dale of the transfer of power. His intention was to give
this advice privately to the Maharaja alone, and then to
repeat it in the presence of his Prime Minister with George
Abell and the Resident, Colonel Webb, in attendance, at
a small meeting where minutes could be kept. ,

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

141

The Maharaja suggested that the meeting should take
place on the last day of the visit, to which Mount batten
agreed, feeling that this would allow him the maximum
chance to make up his mind, but when the time came the
Maharaja sent a message that he was in bed with colic
and would be unable to attend the meeting. Jt seems that
this is his usual illness when he wishes to avoid difficult
discussions.

Needless to say, Mounlbatten is very disappointed at
this turn of events.

To-day's Staff Meeting had no fewer than eleven items
on its agenda, including "Rcconstitution of the Executive
Council", and "Governors-Genera r. Jinnah treats both
subjects with oracular reserve, and, with an exasperating
skill, conceals his intentions, leaving Congress and Mount-
batten open to make the false move. Neither Congress
nor the Moslem League arc showing any real awareness
of the administrative magnitude and urgency of the pro-
blems facing them.

Nearly three weeks have passed since the Leaders receiv-
ed the memorandum on the "Administrative Consequ-
ences of Partition' 1 and accepted in principle the procedure
it laid down by appointing the necessary Partition Com-
mittees. Vernon has worked out a long list of outstanding
items calling for action or decision on their part if full
progress is to be made, to which they have so far failed
to provide any semblance of an answer.

The real weight is falling upon a Steering Committee of
two men appointed after the Partition Committee's first
meeting on 13th June. Nominated by the Congress and
Moslem League representatives respectively, they are H,
M. Patel, the Cabinet Secretary, and Mohammed Ali,
Financial Adviser in the Military Finance Department.
Both are Indian Civil Service men in mid -career .and of
outstanding ability.

With the assistance of expert sub-committees, which it
has been wisely agreed should consist of officials only,
both Patel and* Mohammed Ali are optimistic that the

142

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

administrative principles of Partition can be settled quickly
and most of the actual separation effected by the deadline
of the 15th August. Jn the meanwhile they need rather
more dynamic political support than has so far been forth-
coming.

VK'hROY's i fon si, nfw Delhi, Tuesday, 24th June, 1947
In spite of Gandhi's courageous and decisive interven-
tion at the All India Congress. Committee in favour of
the 3rd June Plan, one can never be quite sure when this
volcano of non-violence will erupt.

1 spoke to Devadas Gandhi on the telephone this morn-
ing, asking when he was proposing to call the next meet-
ing of the All India Editors' Conference, of which he is
the Chairman, In the course of the conversation he drew
my attention to a Reuters report from London describ-
ing the forthcoming Parliamentary procedure for the en-
actment of Indian Independence. This was nothing more
than an account of the traditional ceremonial in both
Houses covering the passage of all Bills into law, the in-
troductory paragraphs of which were worded as follows:
"The British Parliament in thirty minutes of solemn cere-
mony will next month give Dominion Status to nearly
four hundred million people of Hindustan and Pakistan.
The Bill creating the two new nations, inscribed on vellum
and parchment, will be drawn from a magnificent wallet
embellished with the Royal Arms in colours and gold
thread and read to both the Houses of Parliament.""

Devadas said the reference to the creation of two new
nations had very much distressed his father, whose view
was that such a report emanating from Reuters must have
Government authority behind it, and that this "two-
nation" theory was wholly repugnant to the Congress out-
look. In fact it had provoked the Mahatma into issuing
a special message at his Prayer Meeting on Monday in
which he had said, "The papers to-day talk of a grand
ceremonial to take place in London over the division of
India into 'two nations' which were only the other day

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

143

one nation. What is there to gloat over in the tragedy?
We have hugged the belief that though we part, we do
so as friends and brothers belonging to one family. Now,
if the newspaper report is correct, the British will make
of us two nations, and that with a flourish of trumpets.
Is that to be the parting shot? I hope not.' 1

Devadas urged me to take the earliest opportunity to
draw the Viceroy's attention to all this, and expressed the
hope that Mountbatten might see his way to make some
private disavowal of it, and, further, that I might be
authorised to make a disclaimer that would be published.
He added that his father felt so strongly about the matter
that it could be taken fnr granted that he would raise it
at his meeting with the Viceroy to-morrow. I spoke, 1
hope, with sufficient suavity, for 1 was frankly amazed
that such a great man could see fit to make so much of
so inoffensive a slorv. I told him that I was sure much
more was being read into it than it could possibly carry.

I have reported on the whole thing to Mountbatten,
whose reaction to this kind of psychological pressure is
very healthy. It may perhaps be best summed up as the
application of the guiding slogan of lsmay, who told me
the other day that "each morning when I get up J say to
myself Patience and proportion Y"

The visit, planned some lime ahead and without regard
to political developments, has in fact turned out to be
very well-timed. Montgomery has been able to form his
own impression of the progress so far made over the parti-
tion of the Indian Army and to help decisively in solving
the problem of the withdrawal of British forces from India.
With regard to British troops a compromise agreement has
been reached, largely conditioned by the shipping avail-
able, that their withdrawal from India should ba phased
over a period of six months from the date of transfer of
power. Mountbatten has had Monty's support in resisting
any suggestion that they should during this time be used
in any operational role. He appreciates that it is not pos-

144

MISSION WITH M O UNI B AIT EN

sible to hedge a political transfer of power with military
reservations.

vk'FRoy's housl, nlw Dhi-Hi, Wednesday, 25th June, 1947
Mievilie spoke to me in very strong terms about the
delay over any decision on the Governor-General issue
and considers it to be, apart from anything else, rank
discourtesy on the part of J in nan, who continues to play
the role of Delphic oracje and deal in riddles.

Jossleyn Hennessy, correspondent of the Sunday Times
and Kemsley Press, told me this morning that Jinnah's
Secretary, Kurshid, had given him for publication the
story that Pakistan does not want the same Governor-
General as Hindustan, but that it will be impossible for
Moumbatten to leave during the next few months, as there
is so much for him to do. Bob Stimson also came round
to tell me thai Kurshid had said much the same to him,
but with the decorative addition that Pakistan's Governor-
General must be of Royal blood.

vin roy's iiousi, Ni'.w oiii in, Friday, 27th June, 1947
Now that the Punjab and Bengal have declared in fa-
vour of their own partition and, as a result, half of each
will be taking their share in the formation of a new and
separate Constituent Assembly, the full machinery for ad-
ministering Partition is set in motion. The Partition Com-
mittee, which was limited to Congress and Moslem League
members of the Interim Government, now gives way to
a Partition Council of wider authority which includes
Jinnah and can tak$ final policy decisions.

The new Council met for the first time to-day, with
Mounlbatten once again in the chair and once again re-
fusing arbitral status. But there is now no need for him
to do so, as it accepted with surprising speed and unani-
mity Jinnah's proposal thai Sir Cyril KadcliiTe should be
invited to serve as chairman of the Punjab and Bengal
Boundary Commissions, with the casting vote on both.

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

145

Nehru, on his side, secured agreement for the Boundary
Commission to work to very simple terms of reference,
which are, to demarcate the boundaries of the new parts
of either Province on the basis of ascertaining the conti-
guous majority areas of Moslems and non-Moslems, and
in so doing to "take account of other factors". This was
a compromise which met the desire of both parties — the
Moslem League hoping that wide terms of reference in
Bengal would improve their chances of securing Calcutta,
and the Congress and Sikhs calling for the inclusion of
property and other qualifications to give them a belter
chance in the Punjab.

The original intention was to put l he vexed problem
of boundary demarcation in the hands of the United
Nations, bul Nehru objected, on the grounds that this
would involve cumbersome procedure and unacceptable
delay. RadcIinVs colleagues will be four High Court
Judges on each Commission, two each nominated by
Congress and two each by the Moslem League. It calls
for no special prophetic gifts, however, to suggest that the
onus of unpopular decision will almost certainly fall on
RadcIifTe himself. 1 am sure Mounlbalten has been ab-
solutely right not to involve his present or future functions
in these Awards.

vin .roy's not si,, Niw i)U,m, Saturday, 2Hth June, 1947
At our Stalf Meeting to-dav Mountbatten's attention
was drawn to a leading article in Dawn casting doubt upon
the Viceroy's methods and impartiality in the handling of
the Referendum under ihe 3rd June Plan to be conducted
in Sylhet. The complaint is that he has not arranged for
military supervision similar lo that provided in the North-
west Frontier Province Referendum. Mountbatlen was
at first taken aback on this point of fact, sayirfg, "My
God, the fellow is right!" and adding that in the general
rush of business he had not fully appreciated that the Re-
ferendum was under his aegis in the same way as in the
North-west Frontier Province. The implications of the

146

MISSION WITH MOUNT BATTEN

attack in Dawn were wholly misleading, for no irregularity
had occurred or was intended.

I was given the somewhat delicate task of explaining to
Altai" Hussain that the matter was being suitably dealt
with. Hussain, whose gifts of self-expression are primarily
in terms of invective, had closed his leading article with
the threat that "If no satisfactory announcement is made
within ihe next forty-eight hours we shall be compelled
to return to the subject and indulge in some plain speak-
ing". This was my opportunity to do the same with him
at once. I then look him in a more reasonable frame of
mind to see George Abell. and on the understanding that
we would not be subjected to further threats and time-
limits, we assured him that we would keep him posted
with the steps the Viceroy proposed to take.

We parted good friends. It must be confessed, how-
ever, that Hussain is doing little more than reflect the cur-
rent hauteur and touchiness of his Leader. Only to-day
Mountbatten received a letter from Jinnah which provok-
ed the strongest reaction I have ever heard from the usual-
ly bland and urbane Ismay. "It was a letter", he said,
"which I would not lake from my King or send to a
coolie."

vktroy's Hoiisi. ni w oi l Hi, Monday, 30th June, 1947
The Partition Council, largely as a result of Mount-
batten's inspiration, has most surprisingly agreed without
delay or dispute to the procedure for the division of the
Indian Armed Forces.

Great praise is due both to Auchinleck and Jsmay for
providing the framework in which "reconstilution" -as
Auchinleck has shrewdly termed it can take place. But
Mountbatten himself at the critical moment had the good
sense to inject into the discussions Trivedi, the Governor
of Orissa, who, as Secretary of the Defence Department
during the war. is the only Indian civil servant with any
experience of high-level defence organisation. He succeed-
ed in quickly winning the confidence of Nehru and Sardar

ADMINISTRATIVE CONSEQUENCES

147

Paid, as well as enjoying the advantage of a long-standing
friendship with Liaquat Ali Khan. Trivedi by intensive
personal negotiation over the past week has succeeded in
smoothing the way to concessions by both sides resulting
in genuine compromise.

The basic principle adopted is that India and Pakistan
shall each have in their own territories Armed Forces, pre-
dominantly non-Moslem and Moslem respectively, which
as from 15th August are to be under their own operational
control. Both sides have vehemently insisted on complete
military independence as a condition of settlement, Jinnah
and Liaquat Ali Khan openly asserting that they are not
prepared to take over the reins of Government without
their own Armed Forces in being.

Both sides, too, have raised strong objection to any
form of centralised administrative control after the 15th
August, but here Mountbatten has once again intervened
decisively by insisting that the administration of the Armed
Forces should continue under Auchinleck until the Parti-
tion of personnel and physical assets is complete. Briefly
he is to remain in India in administrative control of Indian
Armed Forces for the time being under a Joint Defence
Council, to consist, besides himself, of the combined
Governor-General or separate Governors-General and the
two Defence Ministers.

To avoid confusion with the new Commanders-in-Chief
of both Dominions, Auchinleck will be called Supreme
Commander from 15th August until his task is completed.
The target date is 1st April. 1948, but in the meanwhile
he is to have no responsibility for law and order or any
operational control over any units save those in transit
from one Dominion to another.

It has never been possible to isolate the partitiop of the
Indian Army from its wider political context. In all the
circumstances of suspicion, ill-will and communal clash
it is doubtful whether human ingenuity could have avoided
this tragic necessity or achieved a more workman-like
formula.

148

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

vici-roy's housi., nlw Di.Lin, Tuesday, 1st July, 1947
The tension in the Punjab grows as 15th August ap-
proaches. A straw in the wind is a letter which Auchin-
leck has received and forwarded from a Sikh refugee in
Delhi. He complains, that the Seventh Sikhs arc still in
the Basra area protecting the Persian oil-zone, but that
"during these twelve months tragic events have occurred
in their home-land which have upset the minds of our
brave Sikh brothers abroad. When India is being divided
our men should be home with their kinsfolk. J trust you
will issue orders for their speedy return to their home
before the August drama unfolds itself."

Jenkins reports that the situation in Lahore and Amritsar
gives ground for grave concern. The violence takes the
form of scattered but widespread arson and stabbing car-
ried out by cloak-and-dagger techniques which are very
difficult to suppress by normal police or military action.
Having discovered how easy it is to burn down an Indian
city, the incendiaries are particularly dangerous. Throw-
ing fireballs through windows and skylights and making
full use of roof-tops and narrow city lanes, they are al-
most impossible lo catch in the act.

( It AIM I K l.LFVLN

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

VICi.RO\*S IIOl'Sl 7 , M W DI-.LHI.

Wednesday, 2nd July, 1947
Con(;rfss and Mosu m League leaders have been sitting
in separate rooms at Viceroy's House poring over the terms
of the Draft Dominions Bill, the title of which, incidental-
ly, has been strengthened to that of "Indian Independence
Bill". Jinnah had been excusing himself from taking any
formal view about the C3overnor-Cieneralship until he had
had a chance lo scrutinise the Bill, and delayed his de-

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

149

cision for a few more hours under cover of a desire to
consult with certain close colleagues who were engaged on
the Referenda.

He has at long last "come clean", and Jinnah's verdict
goes in favour of Jinnah. He still professes to nurse the
illusion that it would be possible for Mountbatten to super-
vise a fair Partition by remaining in some stratospheric
capacity above the two new Heads of State. Jinnah in-
dicated that he had taken the decision somewhat against
his will on the insistence of his dose friends, but it would
be interesting to know who those friends are, as it would
seem that his senior colleagues and well-wishers have been
advising him strongly to the contrary, feeling he would
have more power in his hands as Prime Minister. They
were only too well aware that in the division of assets
India starts with the initial advantage of having the over-
whelming percentage of them in her physical possession,
and that accordingly an eight-month spell with Mount-
batten as joint Governor-General must be of primary ad-
vantage to Pakistan.

When IVTountbatlen asked him frankly whether he real-
ised what his decision would cost the new State of his
creation, Jinnah candidly admitted that it would possibly
cost several crores of rupees in assets, but that he was
unable to accept any position other than that of Governor-
General of Pakistan on the 15th August. None-the-less
he added that he particularly hoped Mountbatten would
stay on as Governor-General of India, as he felt that this
would help relations between the two Dominions.

An emergency meeting of Mountbatten's stall' was held
at fsmay's house at 9.30 this morning. The purpose was
to consider various possible courses open to the Viceroy,
who is placed in a most invidious and delicate position.
Ismay thought it advisable for the stall" to examine the
facts of the situation and clarify our own views in order
to provide Mountbatten with objective advice before we
exposed ourselves to his own inevitably subjective
reactions.

150

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Jinnah has certainly maintained the element of suspense
and surprise on this issue to the last moment. We all as-
sumed that he would be bound to prefer the status and
powers of Prime Minister to those of a constitutional
Governor-General, and on the basis of this first assumption
we went farther, and guessed that he would want to take
advantage of Mountbatten as common Governor-General.
Farthest from our thoughts was what has in fact happened

Jinnairs self-selection and Mountbattcn's invitation
from Congress alone.

After a careful consideration the general consensus ol
opinion was that in these unforeseen circumstances
Mountbatten should be strongly advised to accept the un-
conditional Congress offer to him and remain on as Go-
vernor-General of the Dominion of India. The possible
courses of action reduced themselves to three: —

( 1 ) To agree to Jinnah becoming Governor-General
of Pakistan, and for Mountbatten to stay on as Gover-
nor-General of India alone.

(2) To agree to Jinnah becoming Governor-General
of Pakistan, and to ask Congress to nominate someone
other than Mountbatten as Governor-General of India.

(3) To devise a formula whereby Mountbatten would
be enabled to remain as Governor-General of both
l>ominions while at the same lime substantially satisfy-
ing Jinnah's wishes to control Pakistan.

In the meanwhile I have sent a wire to London sug-
gesting that the Hdilor of the Evening Standard be invited
to send a repre^ntative out It) India to study a few of
the elementary facts of the situation here. This proposal
has been prompted by an unusually reckless piece of
"Bcaverbrookese". The proposition put before the
Evening Standard readers in a leading article is, "If it
was possible to set up two Dominions in India, then plain-
ly, had the requisite statesmanship been available, it
would have been possible to convert India into a single

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

151

Dominion owing an undivided allegiance to the Crown*'.
There are also some slap-happy references to "Balkani-
satiori" and "an utterly reactionary step'*, and the whole
of our efforts are denounced as "political auction".

What a pity that Beaverbrook, who genuinely believes
in a liberal Empire in the Western and Southern Hemis-
pheres, does not seem to understand what men of good-
will, who also seek a similar dispensation, are trying to do
here in the East.

viceroy's house, new DbLHi. Thursday. 3rd July, 1947.

We had our Staff Meeting with Mounlbatten this after-
noon, and he asked for our views on ;he Governor-Gene-
ralship round the table one by one. All but one of us
urged upon him that, in the interests of India, Pakistan
and Britain, it was his clear duly to accept the Congress
invitation. Our virtual unanimity and the obvious strength
and sincerity of our collective opinion took him by sur-
prise, for previously, before being confronted by the firm
reality of Jinnah's decision, we had taken the view, in-
formally and as individuals, that it would be undesirable
for Mountbatten to lose his objective and almost judicial
status. But now it is clear to us that Jinnah, by identi-
fying the Pakistan Governor-Generalship with himself, has
created a whollv new situation.

When my turn came to speak I read out the note 1 had
prepared. 1 was careful to confine myself to the publicity
implications of the three courses considered. "ft has
been a political commonplace", I wrote, "that with the
transfer of power Pakistan would become the last outpost
of British Imperialism and that the anti-British bias of
Congress would quickly prevail. Congress invitations to
His Excellency, Colville and Nye knock that criticism
on the head. From the view-point of British prestige it
is a tremendous thing that Congress at the moment of
victory in its seventy years* struggle with the British
should spontaneously invite Englishmen to stay on in this
way.

M.M.— 6

152

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

"Such an invitation gels our relations with the new
India off to a start good beyond all expectations. At the
same time the suggestion that H.h. has sold out to the
Congress is met by obvious evidence that Pakistan and
Jinnah have got exactly what they asked for. In fact
H.F.'s presence at the head of the new Indian State would
naturally be interpreted the best guarantee that its rela-
tions with Pakistan would be carried on in a friendly and
constructive manner, and as a buffer against excessive
Congress claims.

*The argument that with Jinnah in his present mood
and enjoying full powers and with H.h. simply as a con-
stitutional Governor-General, H.K would not be able to
exercise any substantial influence on Indo-Pakistan rela-
tions is a major consideration, but not directly a publicity
problem. While no doubt it would be a limiting tactor
to H.E.'s usefulness, 1 think it would be widely realised
that no one else would be able to do more, and, in view
of his close association with Jinnah at this critical time,
no other Governor-General would be likely to be in a
position to do as much. The argument that a climb down
is involved from Viceroy of all India to Governor-Gene-
ral ot India less Pakistan cannot, I submit, be sustained
nor should it be strongly stressed— <;Iimb down from what?
The whole emphasis of H.E.'s mission here has been on
the future on the beginning of a new chapter in our
relations with Indians, and not on 'the last Viceroy'.

"If H.F. were <o hand over to a successor on 15th
August, he would obviously be leaving on the crest of the
wave, but once it was appreciated that H.b. had been
invited by Congress unconditionally and had turned down
their invitation, I Relieve there would be a considerable
volume of criticism, both immediate and long term, that
he was leaving the job half done and making 'a quick
get-away'."

Among the miscellaneous items, we considered whether
a partitioned Jndia meant also a partitioned Kennel Club.
This was only a test case, for the Military Secretary's

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

153

office is being inundated with queries from various "All
India" bodies as to what they should do next.

viceroy's Housr:, new dpi, hi, Friday, 4th July, 1947
Mountbatten has to-day diverted the crisis over the
future of the Interim Government by calling on all the
members — Congress and Moslem League alike — to resign,
and then inviting them to carry on until the actual pass-
ing of the Indian Independence Bill at Westminster. Be-
hind this action, which plays for time and is not of course
a final solution of the problem, lies a complicated and
dangerous wrangle. Briefly, ever since the acceptance
of the 3rd June Plan Mountbatten has been subjected to
two conflicting pressures. On the Congress side it is
largely a repetition with greater insistence of Patel's com-
plaint, "You won't govern yourself, at least let us govern".
To this Jinnah's reaction is that if any Moslem League
Ministers are removed they will resign en bloc, making
it clear that they are withdrawing from all co-operation
and washing their hands of the whole Partition scheme.
Mountbatten is well aware that any such action on their
part would once again wreck the prospects of peace and
of Pakistan.

Nehru, tired and overwrought and subject to these in-
creasing Congress demands to become master forthwith
in his own house, has been cm the verge of resignation
on this issue over the past week. Jinnah first of all re-
jected outright any formula which involves the actual hand-
ing in of portfolios by ihe Moslem League members as be-
ing an insult to the League. When Mountbatten evolved
a scheme and actually drafted a Press announcement to
meet his susceptibilities under this heading, Jinnah changed
his ground, saying that he would resist the scheme as
illegal under the 1935 Act. This gave Mountbatten an
unexpected opening, for on inquiry in London he found
Xhat there was sufficient foundation in Jinnah's legal com-
plaint to make it impossible for him to proceed with re-

154

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

constitution of the Government in advance of the pass-
ing of the Act.

At the Staff Meeting to-day we argued out at great
length the possibility and consequences of Mountbatten
staying on beyond 15th August as Governor-General of
the Dominion of India only. We have not as yet suc-
ceeded in removing his grave misgivings. He fears the
loss of objective status will be a crippling handicap to his
usefulness and may well dissipate the good-will he has
won from Hindu and Moslem alike.

Mountbatten now wants to have authoritative advice
from London from the King and Prime Minister down-
wards before reaching a final decision. He also suspects
that the Government may feel — not unjustifiably — that he
has misled them and put them in a false position by over-
selling the likelihood of a joint Governor-Generalship.

So he has decided that Ismay should leave for London
at once, officially to be available to the Government while
the independence Bill passes through Parliament, but in
addition to secure confidential guidance at the highest
level as to whether he should stay on or come home. I
am to go as well, and I will use the opportunity to make
a parallel check on Press and other informed reactions
to the new situation.

London, Monday, 7 th July, 1947
We left Palam in the Viceregal York on Saturday after-
noon, touching down at Northolt by tea-time today. My
whole vision of Indo-British travel has been foreshorten-
ed by my sequence#of high speed and even higher priority
flights over the past three years. England has never
looked lovelier than when we Hew low over Beachy Head.
The cliffs of Dover and Calais stood out so clearly and
close together that from ten thousand feet they seemed
to be part of the same mainland, the straits appearing as
the entrance to some mighty river or grand harbour. The
green of English fields from the air has a soft, civilised

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

155

quality not to be found in the vivid dark hues of lands
washed by monsoons.

Ismay was in splendid form on this flight. He has the
Roman virtue nf tvquinimitas. His bland bonhomie is a
perfect foil to Mountbatten, with his more intense and
uneven moods. Ismay had taken great pains over our
itinerary, and so arranged that at our various landing-
points — Karachi, Habbaniya, Malta— we landed in good
time for dinner and left at a comfortable hour in the
morning. He said the journey back to India with ihe
Mountbattens in May had been an ordeal he would never
undergo again. In an effort to beat the clock, all they
had succeeded in doing was playing havoc with everyone's
digestion!

By six o'clock this evening Ismay was in close con-
ference with the Prime Minister at 10 Downing Street.
The Prime Minister did not take long to reach the con-
clusion that the new and difficult situation in no way
lessened, but rather enhanced, the need for Mountbatten
to stay on in India.

London. Tuesday, 8th July, 1947
After dinner yesterday Ismay attended a meeting at 10
Downing Street which lasted beyond midnight. Although
there were some doubts expressed about Mount batten's
personal position arising from the change from, an arbitral
to a partisan status, particularly in the event of disputes
between the two Dominions. Ministers were generally in
favour of Mountbatten accepting the Indian offer. Altlee,
it seems, went so far as to say that Mountbatten could
see this thing through, and no one else could do so.
The Government were deeply impressed by the Moslem
League's, support for the proposition which Jsmay was
able to convey to them in writing from Liaqual. The
position is, in fact, that both sides have now requested
Mountbatten to remain on with one side.

This morning the Prime Minister called in the following
Opposition leaders: Salisbury, Macmillan, Butler, Samuel

156

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

and Clem Davies. Tsmay put the problem before them.
Lord Samuel was rather anxious to revive the idea which
he had originally expressed to Mountbatten in my flat,
of a Viceroy presiding over the two Governors-General.
But the general sense of the meeting was that such a sug-
gestion was now too late to put into practice, and in any
case likely to be unacceptable to the Congress. The
Liberals were whole-heartedly in favour of Mountbatten
remaining as Governor-General of India. But while the
Conservative leaders were personally in full accord with
ihe proposal, they felt that they could not commit them-
selves officially until they had had a chance to consult
Churchill, who was down at Chartwell convalescing from
a recent illness, and Lden, who was also unable to be
present at the meeting.

Attlee accordingly suggested to Tsmay that he should
go down to Chartwell himself, which he did forthwith.
Any expectations Jsmay may have had of a difficult in-
terview with the great man were quickly dispelled. He
did not think the position had been in any way altered
by Jinnah's action, and dictated a message for Jsmay to
send by cable to the Viceroy, the substance of which was
that a constitutional Governor-General retained an un-
limited right to receive information and to give advice,
and that on this basis Mountbatten could give the new
Government aid which he should not withhold. While
leaving it with Mountbatten's conscience and judgement
to decide when his usefulness was exhausted, Churchill
stressed in particular the political value of his role in
mitigating the conwnunal tension, preserving the interests
of the Princes and strengthening the ties of sentiment
between India and the rest of the Commonwealth.

Ismay, much relieved, came back to London post-haste
and told 'Churchill's Conservative colleagues of the inter-
view and message which was relayed to Delhi immediate-
ly. This decisive expression of opinion, combining as it
did the great man's breadth of view and immediate grasp

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

157

of essentials with his ability to relate his exact ideas to
perfect logic, set everybody's mind at rest.

With every day that passes the virtues of diplomacy
by informal discussion are increasingly borne in on me.
It has certainly been possible for Ismay to dispel doubts
both from the view-point of Mountbatten in Delhi and
of the Government and Opposition in London with a
speed and certainty which no amount of long-distance
letters, aides-memoire or telegrams could have done.

London, hrhlay, 11th July, 1947
A summons to Buckingham Palace and a further visit
to 10 Downing Street have enabled Jsmay to complete
the first and most important phase of his mission and to
provide Mountbatten with a conclusive answer to the re-
action of opinion here.

I have also been busily engaged in collecting opinions,
and have written to-day to Mountbatten giving him a
resume of my many editorial interviews.

"I have briefed everyone fully," I wrote, "on the situa-
tion that has arisen, but without in the first instance put-
ting forward any views of my own. 1 can report com-
plete unanimity in urging the need for you to slay on
and in stressing that the British Press reaction to your
doing so will be favourable and sympathetic. Frank
Owen said that if your prestige stood at ninety when you
left in March, it had now risen to one hundred and
ninety, and that any decision you lake, simply on the
grounds that you had taken it, would be regarded as good
and sufficient by the British public. Lord Layton said
that in his view Jinnah's decision would be widely regard-
ed as a selfish and ambitious act, and that it would in-
volve a marking down here with the British Press of his
reputation, which was at its peak during his visit to Eng-
land in December last. Then he had made a very con-
siderable impression.

J 58

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

habbaniya, Sunday, 20th July, 1947
On our journey back we are taking with us Major
Billy Short, who has a very great influence with the Sikhs.
He was attached to the Cabinet Mission, and was at
Baldev Singh's right hand last December. He will not be
a member of the Viceroy's staff as such, but will be
seconded to advise Jsmay, who has deep and well-found-
ed forebodings about Sikh reactions in the Punjab. Short
is a delightful companion, a man of wide human sym-
pathies and of creative if slightly eccentric originality, for
whom India seems to act both as a lure and as a release.

During the flight, once again carefully timed to avoid
all unnecessary inconvenience, Ismay has dictated to his
indefatigable secretary, Betty Green, a personal progress
report of admirable lucidity and judgement. While the
first to admit Mountbatten's great personal triumph in
securing the Leaders' endorsement of the 3rd June Plan
and the sense of momentary elation it produced, he con-
fessed he fell that we were "over Becher's Brook first
time round", and not more than that. He referred to
the confidence and courage of ignorance which enabled
the Leaders to dismiss from their minds the immense
•administrative problems they were creating.

"The biggest crime and the biggest headache", he felt,
was the partition of the Armed Forces. But he can take
most of the credit for the master plan which has been
evolved to achieve a smooth transition. I doubt whether
anyone else could have begun to unscramble this egg.
He can say with truth, "It is just possible that two really
good armies will emerge from the prcKess. It is true
that they will not* in sum total be equal to the single
army out of which they have been fashioned." Provid-
ed the Joint Defence Council can be kept in being to
ensure that the training, equipment and administration
of the two armies are on uniform lines and that they act
in accordance with unified policy, he felt that the damage
of dissection would be substantially reduced.

TO STAY OR NOT TO STAY

159

He was able to report favourably on the present pro-
gress achieved by various sub-committees dealing with the
Partition of the manifold assets and liabilities. This had
meant that the prospects of both the new Governments
being able to function at least on a minimum subsistence
scale on the 14th August "are now not nearly so bad
as we expected".

In his concluding paragraphs, however, he sees all the
signs of danger ahead. *'l was worried when 1 was in
London," he writes, "at the prevalence of the idea that
everything was over bar the shouting. Personally I feel
that we are nothing like out of the wood yet. There is
so much explosive material lying about, and it remains
to be seen whether it can be prevented from going off. I
am for example extremely worried about the Sikhs. They
imagine that they are going to get a far more favourable
boundary than, so far as 1 can judge, the Commission
can possibly award them. All possible precautions have
been taken by dispatch to the areas of potential trouble
of a joint India-Pakistan force under single command,
but, even so, it may be a very unpleasant business. The
truth of the matter is that both sides are in a panic, and
people do sillier things when they are frightened than,
they do under the stress of any other emotion."

We arc returning to a major problem, in some ways
bigger than the problem of getting agreement between the
political parties, and that is how to fit the Indian States
into the new picture. It is not generally realised that the
300 millions in British India are governed by the Gover-
nor-General in Council, whereas the 110 millions in the
Indian States are governed by their own rulers, but in
conformity with the overall directions of the King-Km-
peror expressed through his Crown Representative, the
Political Department and the Residents in each group of
States. Co-ordination of the Government of these vast
parts of India is achieved by the dodge of appointing one
and the same man to be the Governor-General of India
and the Crown Representative of the Indian States— and

160

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

thai man is known as the Viceroy. After 15th August
ihere will be no Viceroy, Paramountcy will be retroccded
and each fndian Prince will become an autocratic indep-
endent sovereign. Unless Mountbatten can get a work-
able solution accepted by all before 15th August J tremble
to think of the chaos that will supervene throughout the
subcontinent.

CIIAPII.R TWI LVh

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

vki:roy\s iioi:si. ( nhw delhi, Tuesday, 22nd July, 1947
Wh arrivi i) hack at Palam this afternoon after a smooth
but none-the-less exhausting Uight. No one has yet suc-
ceeded in making six thousand miles by air a refreshing
experience, and after the hectic tempo of events in Lon-
don we emerged fairly limp to take our part in the vital
last lap of the political transfer.

Jn our absence one crisis — and from the reports we
received from Mountbatten when we were in London the
severest of all so far in its onset and immediate impli-
cations-has been officially disposed of, although tension
is still acute. Mountbatten has reconstituted the Interim
Government so that it now amounts in effect to two
Provisional Administrations, one for India and one for
Pakistan, each dealing with its own business and consult-
ing the other only^n matters of common concern. The
advantage of the plan was that it did not involve any
resignation of the Moslem League members.

The order issued last Saturday, some twenty-four hours
after the Royal Assent to the Indian Independence Act,
spoke of the Governor-General approving kt the redistri-
bution of portfolios". Nehru and Patcl were with great
difficulty reconciled to the new formula. As for Jinnah,

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

161

when Mountbatten presented the proposals to him he said,
yet again, that he would give them his careful attention.
But this time Mountbatten was for once in a position to
tell him that his views and advice were not required, as
he intended on his own initiative and responsibility to
issue an order bringing the new arrangements into force
forthwith.

With characteristic ingenuity, Mountbatten has prepar-
ed for his Staff and all the Ministers and officials concern -
ed in the partition arrangements a small tear-off calendar
giving the day of the month, and under it in bold type
"X Days left to prepare for the Transfer oi Power" until
D Day itself is reached. The Partition Council, how-
ever, has already taken the hint, functioning smoothly
and keeping up to schedule.

Mountbatten is now in the thick of the vStatcs problem.
As with his diplomacy prior to the 3rd June Plan, he
took (he calculated risk, and is personally sponsoring the
Instrument of Accession and undertaking to get all the
Princes into this particular bag, while V. P. sold the pro-
ject to Congress. He embarked with the assurance oi
Patel's decisive support given in a most statesman-like
speech inaugurating the new States Department the day
we left for London. The most intractable problem, how-
ever, is Hyderabad, which will undoubtedly call for spe-
cial action. Mountbatten says he is ready to go there
at short notice, and feels that the only chance of secur-
ing a reasonable settlement is to see the Nizam person-
ally.

viceroy's housi , new Dfci.HT, Thursday, 24th July, 1947
\ spent most of the day dealing with the release of the
important Partition Council statement, which announces
the setting up of a Boundary Force in the Punjab Parti-
tion areas. This special military command will cover
twelve of the fourteen districts which one or other party
claims to be "disputed" and will be Jed by Major-Gene-

162

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

ral "Pete" Rees, who until now has been in command
of the 4th Indian Division.

The nucleus of the new force will in fact be provided
by this Division, and altogether it will consist of some
fifty thousand officers and men, mainly composed of mix-
ed units not yet partitioned and containing a high pro-
portion of British officers. It is probably the largest
military force ever collected in any one area of a country
for the maintenance of law and order in peace-time. It
is certainly the greatest physical preparation that can be
made from available resources against a danger of un-
known dimensions, and it represents a considerable gamble
on communal harmony prevailing over the rest of the
sub-continent. Rees is to have two high-ranking mili-
tary advisers — a Sikh and a Moslem- from the Indian
and Pakistan Armies. After 15th August he will have
operational control of the forces of both Dominions in
the area, and, through the Supreme Commander and Joint
Defence Council, will be responsible to both Govern-
ments.

Mountbatten, who at last week's Partition Council was
given carte blanche to draft the whole statement, has also
succeeded in injecting into it a solemn guarantee of civil
rights for minorities and former political opponents in
both the future Dominions and a clear declaration that
violence will not be tolerated on either side, particularly
in the areas affected by the Boundary Commission
Awards. He is greatly excited over this coup, but frank-
ly does not believe that either Party really knew what
it was signing. He feels, however, that this part of the
statement is potentially more important than the Gandhi-
Jinnah Appeal last ^Xpril, and may well become a "char-
ter of liberty" for all communities.

Perhaps the most substantial phrase of all is the joint
pledge to abide by the Boundary Commission's award,
whatever form it may take. Taken as a whole, the state-
ment is a blue-print on the grand scale, and a consider-
able moral victory for Mount batten's diplomacy.

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

163

viceroy's house, new delhi, Friday, 25th July, 1947
To-day Mountbatten had his first and last meeting with
the Princes. For never again will they be addressed in
full session by a Viceroy and Crown Representative. This
was no formal hail and farewell, bui a political occasion
of the first order. The Princes are divided and uncer-
tain, .baffled by the pace of events. Mountbatten for his
part had no detailed directives from London to support
him. The brief references to the States both in the 3rd
June and Cabinet Mission Plans only serve to underline
that the essential transfer of power is between Britain
and British India.

He used "every weapon in his armoury of persuasion,
making it clear at the outset that in the proposed Instru-
ment of Accession, which V. P. Menon, had devised, they
were being provided with a political offer from the Con-
gress which was not likely to be repeated. Indeed, it
was not even a firm offer as yet, and the main chance
of it being one rested on his capacity to provide Patel
with "a full basket" of acceptance. He reminded them
that after the 15th August he would no longer be in a
position to mediate on their behalf as Crown Representa-
tive, and warned those Princes who were hoping to build
up their own store of arms that the weapons they would
be likely to get would in any case be obsolete. One
point in particular, made with perfect timing and empha-
sis, did not fail to find its mark with Their Highnesses.
If, he said, the Instrument of Accession was accepted,
he had good reason to think that Patel and the Congress
would not interfere with their receiving honours and titles
from the King under Dominion Status, which he knew
meant much to them as exponents of the monarchical
order.* In this connection it has undoubtedly been a
source of strength in his relations with the Princes that

* Lord Mountbatten himself invested the Maharajas of Jaipur
and Bikancr with the Grand Cross of the Star of India (G.C.S.I.)
after the transfer of t power.

164

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Mountbatten has been able to speak not simply as Crown
Representative, but as a cousin of the King.. For these
hereditary rulers the blood Royal carries its own author-
ity. The core of his message this afternoon was con-
tained in the cogent phrase. "You cannot run away
from the Dominion Government which is your neighbour
any more than you can run away from the subjects for
whose welfare you are responsible".

I cannot imagine, however, a more difficult assembly
for any man to have to address than this one. Here was,
in fact, an audience of hereditary shepherds in the un-
enviable position of lost sheep. Once again Mount-
batten's morale-raising talent was seen to full advantage.
For he somehow managed to infect them with his own
spontaneous enthusiasm and powers of decision. In the
process what began as an occasion of high seriousness
soon developed into one of flippancy and banter, as
Mountbatten began to deal with the mass of questions
cogent and obtuse which were thrown at him.

Thus a certain Maharaja, absent from his State and
from India at this critical moment, did not seem to ap-
preciate the importance either of coming himself to the
meeting or even of briefing his Dewan. For the Dewan
had been sent no instructions whatever. "Surely",
Mountbatten asked, "you must know your Ruler's mind,
and can take a decision on his behalf?" "I do not know
my Ruler's mind," the hapless Dewan replied, "and I
cannot get a reply by cable." Mountbatten thereupon
picked up a large round glass paper-weight which hap-
pened to be on the rostrum in front of him. ,4 I will look
into my crystal," he said, "and give you an answer."
There followed ten seconds of dramatic pause when you
could have heard a princely pin drop. "His Highness,"
Mountbatten solemnly announced, "asks you to sign the
Instrument of Accession."

So accurately had he gauged the sentiment of this parti-
cular audience that everyone broke out into delighted

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

165

laughter at this; sally, which was clearly regarded as neat-
ly combining the rebuke courteous with the advice timely.
For on the whole it was probably wise to strike the humo-
rous note as being the best method of penetrating what
seemed to be quite a high proportion of thick skulls.

I returned to Viceroy's House and had a chat with
Mountbatten, who had changed with remarkable speed
from his "Number Tens" into a lounge suit. I was able
to report that his whole performance, which was techni-
cally and tactically hardly less remarkable than the Press
Conference, had made a very deep impression on all
sides. I said it was clear that we would have to pro-
duce for the Press a sub-edited edition of the full con-
fidential speech, and J proposed to go straight round and
work on this with V.P. Whatever V.P. and I produc-
ed, he said, would satisfy him. and he did not want to
see the text again. He felt that the questions had been
incredibly unrealistic, and that very few of the Princes
or their representatives seemed to have any idea of what
was going on around them. Unless they accepted the In-
strument thev would be finished.

Mountbatten can regard the whole occasion as yet an-
other personal tour de force. The Princes, Jeaderless,
riven with dynastic and political dissensions, tried des-
perately to hide behind opportunism and indecision, but
events were moving much too fast and on too large a
scale to allow of any such halting tactics. Whatever the
merits of earlier policies, the situation which Mountbat-
ten as the last Crown Representative has to meet is such
that only through some comprehensive and substantial
act of mediatisation can the Princely order in India hope
to avoid being swept away as a feudal anachronism. By
a far-seeing act of statesmanship he has offered them the
chance of survival, admittedly out of the main stream
of Indian power politics, but with their basic personal
prerogatives and succession rights secured. The times are
out of joint for the Princes. This is all now that any of
them can expect or, indeed, that most of them want.

166

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

viceroy's Housr, nlw df.lhi, Saturday, 26th July, 1947
I had an interesting talk with George Abel! about the
dinner-party Their Excellencies gave last night to the
Jinnahs. It was quite a small and informal affair, com-
prising only House guests and some of Mountbatten's
staff. Jinnah completely monopolised the conversation by
cracking a series of very lengthy and generally unfunny
jokes, When Mountbatten tried to even out the con-
versation by talking to the guests next to him and leav-
ing Jinnah to tell one of his stories to Lady Mountbatten,
Jinnah broke off and interrupted across the table with,
44 1 think Mountbatten would like to hear this one." Jt
is customary for the Viceroy, representing the King, to
precede his guests to and from the dining-room, but im-
mediately this dinner was over the Jinnahs got up at the
same time as Their Excellencies and walked out with them.

viceroy's house, new deli/1, Sunday, 27th July, 1947
Once again Mountbatten sent for me while he was im-
mersed in a cold bath. He told me what is now an
amusing but easily could have been a very different story.
He was thrashing out with Lord Killcarn, whom he had
invited up from Singapore, the possibility of him accept-
ing the Governorship of East Bengal, as Jinnah is very
anxious to have a high-calibre British administrator act-
ing for him in this outpost of Pakistan. They were dis-
cussing terms of service, and Killearn asked whether there
was any possibility of Darjeeling being included in the
Province, and if not whether some special arrangements
could be made for him to stay at one of the Assam Hill
stations, such as Shillong, in the very hot weather. He
said he was now sixty-six, had. some young children and
would not be able to survive the heat of Dacca the capital.
Moreover, he understood the proposed residence of the
Governor in Dacca was in a quite derelict condition.
Mountbatten promised to look into the whole matter.

It so happened that his next inteiview was with Bardo-
loi, Prime Minister of Assam. After dealing with a

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

167

number of routine questions on Assam which he was
able to dispatch in a few minutes, he asked about Dacca.
Was there any high ground there? Bardoloi said there
was nothing higher than eleven hundred feet in the whole
area. Mount batten then asked about Darjeeling and
which way the Award was likely to send it — into Paki-
stan or India? Bardoloi replied that it was almost cer-
tain to remain in India. Mountbatten then raised ques-
tions about Shillong and the Hill Tracts.

The purpose of these inquiries was completely mis-
understood by Bardoloi, who rushed over to Gandhi in
a stale of great alarm, complaining that there was some
major intrigue afoot to incorporate Darjeeling, Shillong
and the Hill Tracts into Pakistan. Gandhi for his part
said that while he did not put it past the British to or-
ganise a double-cross of this nature, he could not believe
that Mountbatten himself would be a party to it. Bar-
doloi then saw Patel, who worked himself up into a state
of great distress about it all. The result was that V. P.
rushed up to Mountbalten's bedroom this morning full
of alarm.

Mountbatten was of course able to explain the whole
thing, and hopes in the next day or so to be able to
laugh it off with the Congress leaders, but he regards
the incident as revealing, and points out that if he had
not established close relations with V.P. and if V.P. had
not felt himself abie to go straight to his bedroom this
morning, this petty misunderstanding could easily have
developed into a major crisis, and may still involve a con-
siderable expenditure of lime and effort to explain away
to the satisfaction of all.

viceroy's house, ni w delhi, Monday, 28th July, J947
There was a colourful reception at Viceroyls House
to-night in honour of over fifty Ruling Princes and a
hundred of the States Representatives. The splendour of
it only seemed to strengthen the sense of unreality and
pathos surrounding the Princely order at this lime. When

168

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

unity of purpose was of overwhelming importance for
them, they were to be seen uneasy and obsessed with
their own problems of precedence, each anxiously watch-
ing what the other was doing — and, as a Dewan remark-
ed of one of them, "wandering about like a letter with-
out a stamp".

Those of Their Highnesses who had not already signi-
fied their intention of signing the Instrument of Acces-
sion were duly shepherded by the A.D.CYs one by one
for a friendly talk with Mountbatten. He in his turn
passed them on in the full view of the company to V.P.,
who conducted them across the room to see Patel. There
were Maharajas three deep in a semi-circle watching this
process.

One veteran Prince was heard to remark, "Who's H.F.
getting to work on now?" Craning forward to see, he
added with relish, "There's no need for him to work cm
me. I'm signing to-morrow!" Fay' overheard the fol-
lowing exchange between an old Prince and a young one.
The old Prince asked, "How are things in your State?"
The young Prince replied, "We have been having trouble
in one place (which he named), but we have reached a
settlement now. 1 ' "We have trouble everywhere," the
old Prince exclaimed, "but I don't let it reach the stage
of a settlement."

VICTROY'S HOUSl, NIVV DLL HI,

Wednesday, 30th July, 1947
Mountbatten left at first light this morning for Calcutta,
where he is to make a rapid last-minute survey of the
critical situation 4here.

During the brief lull provided by his absence 1 have
to-day had my long-promised interview with Gandhi, ar-
riving at midday for an appointment at his home among
the Untouchables in the Bhangi Colony.

1 found him on a platform raised a few inches off the
ground and reposing on some cushions with a very large
bolster at his back. During our conversation two secrc-

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

\69

taries came in silently, and behaved as well-trained
acolytes are expected to do.

As 1 entered Gandhi said smilingly, "You will not ex-
pect me to get up." I was offered a chair, but 1 chose
— almost subconsciously -to sit down cross-legged in front
of him. I began by recalling that the last time I had
the privilege of meeting him was seventeen years ago,
when I was a boy at Westminster School. He had come
very unexpectedly to speak to us, and we had all been
deeply impressed by the event. He said he half -remem-
bered the occasion, and added that he had been invited
by some very kind Canon. I recalled that two days after-
wards Lord Halifax had also come to the School to ad-
dress us, and that in that year of the Irwin-Gandhi Pact
the abiding memory was of the cordial terms in which
each had spoken of the other. Both had left on our
schoolboy minds the impression that here was the essen-
tial human good-will from which a genuine agrcemenl
could spring. "1 was very close to Lord Halifax in those
days," Gandhi said almost wistfully; "not that 1 am not
so now."

I said that 1 had just come back from London, where
I had witnessed the Indian Independence Bill pass through
both Houses of Parliament. I took the occasion to pre-
sent Gandhi with three copies of the Hansards of those
Debates — a gesture that seemed to please him — and drew
particular attention to Lord Samuel's tribute to him in
the Lords. He said he had noticed it, and that it was
very kind of him to have made these remarks. He had
once had some correspondence with Lord Samuel, and
in the argument Lord Samuel had been magnanimous
enough to admit himself in the wrong. That, Gandhi
observed, was a very good sign in a man.

Turning to the general situation arising from 'the Act,
he said that with the casting off of British domination the
most tremendous responsibility had been thrown upon the
Congress leaders, who had been brought up on* only a

170 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

few lakhs of rupees, and now had the vast resources of
a State at their disposal. Both Governments needed time,
a breathing space in which to establish themselves. He
regarded Partition as an evil, but was ready to admit that
out of evil could come good, if only the two Govern-
ments would play fair with each other. I said that it
was not simply the future of India that was at stake, but
that of the whole of Asia. The countries of South-east
Asia in particular were looking to India, and the Chinese
civil war only enhanced India's potential influence. He
agreed emphatically. "The whole world", he said, "is
looking to us. India is under the microscope."

When f turned to my particular business and interest
here — the Press— I mentioned the need for Indian papers
to begin taking a world view, and for Indian journalists
to gain new experience in overseas assignments. He
agreed that the need existed, but this particular conten-
tion inspired him to take up a favourite theme of his.
"There is", he said, "a dangerous tendency for Indians
to look to others for salvation. We must keep our self-
respect and help ourselves. Look at the case of medi-
cine and doctors. I do not know of a single Englishman
who has come to India for treatment, but one is always
hearing of Indians going abroad to be treated by this 01
that famous European surgeon. It is not right that India
should only he a place for Indians to die in. There are
many splendid surgeons, including Dr. Ansari. Admitt-
edly", he added mischievously, 4 Dr. Ansari is concern-
ed primarily with rejuvenation and offering one the chance
of becoming thirty again and having a harem!"

The core of rys argument was that with Tndia now
having won her political freedom it was the duty of In-
dians to show their faith and pride in their country not
only by words but also by deeds. They had to realise
that the amenities and assets which they had assumed
were the monopolies of the outside world were not in-
evitably so at all. This was the real challenge of Indian
Independence.

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

171

viceroy's house, new DELHI. Friday, 1st August, 1947
I was given an account of to-day's luncheon at Vice-
roy's House to several of the leading Princes. After
paying their bread-and-butler respects to Their Excel-
lencies, they ran the gauntlet of A.D.C.'s, who helped to
form virtual "Aye" and tk No" lobbies on their attitude
to Accession. Patiala and Bikaner entered into the spirit
of the thing by passing through the "No" lobby and then
roaring with laughter.

Apart from Hyderabad and Kashmir, which present
special problems, Mountbattcn's advice is having a de-
cisive effect, and only two or three of the senior Princes
seem to consider there is any advantage or merit in hold-
ing out against Accession. Unfortunately, Mountbatten's
friend Bhopal is the leader of this group, which includes
his close and important neighbour, the Maharaja of
Indore. As the ablest Moslem Prince, I would guess
he is not averse lo playing an important role in the higher
politics of Pakistan. He has lor some time been one
of Jinnah's closest advisers. Unhappily for him, his
State is predominantly Hindu and in the heart of Indian
territory.

The burden of work falling upon Mountbatten and his
staff seems, if anything, to increase as each day brings us
nearer to the transfer of power. I have enough Public
Relations and Press problems calling for immediate deci-
sion and implementation to keep a whole Central Office
of Information busy. Very careful thought has to be
given to the planning of the elaborate ceremonial in
Karachi and Delhi. Jinnah has raised difficulties about
the degree of precedence to be accorded to Mountbatten
in Karachi on 13th August. ft has been politely but
none-the-less firmly made clear to him that Hjs Excel-
lency's visit will be in hi* capacity as Viceroy, and any
proposal that he should sit below Jinnah at the special
meeting of the Legislative Assembly is therefore out of the
question.

172

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

My tasks include submission of drafts for the King's
messages to the two new Dominions, and assistance in
polishing the texts of Mountbatten's formal Addresses
to the two Legislative Assemblies, which all involve deli-
cate problems of emphasis. Mountbatten would prefer
to speak without any notes, but we have all prevailed
upon him to admit* somewhat grudgingly, that this would
be inappropriate on such historic and formal occasions,
with the world's Press and radio picking up every word.

vkkroy's hoi isi.. ni.w on. rn, Tuesday, 5th August, 1947
Following to-day's Partition Council and Joint Defence
Council meetings, Mountbatten was in secret conclave with
Patel, Jinnah and I iaquat, having decided to introduce
them to an officer of the now depleted Punjab Criminal
Investigation Department seni down by Jenkins to give
him a verbal report. This officer told of various state-
ments made by instigators of disturbances arrested after
incidents. These interrogations and intelligence from other
sources implicated the Sikh leaders in a number of sabo-
tage plans, including a plot to assassinate Jinnah during
the State drive at the Independence celebrations in Kar-
achi next week. Jinnah and Liaquat immediately de-
manded the arrest of Tara Singh and other Sikh leaders.
Patel, however, was strongly opposed to this course, argu-
ing that it would only precipitate a crisis already beyond
control.

Mountbatten said he was prepared to support the ar-
rests, but only if the authorities on the spot felt that this
would be a wise step. He has therefore written off to
Jenkins to consider with Trivedi and Mudie,* the Gover-
nors designate of ^he East and West Pun jabs, as a matter
of urgency the desirability of arresting Tara Singh and
his more hot-headed colleagues shortly before the 15th
August.

* Sir Francis Mudie, Governor of Sind until the transfer of
power, subsequently accepted an invitation from Mr. Jinnah
to serve as the first Governor of West Punjab.

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

173

Mountbatten has a very high opinion of Jenkins, who
has held the fort in the Punjab under conditions of intoler-
able strain and slander. No man could have done more
to preserve the last vestiges of order in the distracted
Province. He deserves, but is far from receiving, the
gratitude of both sides for his unremitting labours.

viceroy's jioi'si:, niwdj lhi. Thursday, 7th August, 1947
We have our lighter moments. The Minutes of the
sixty-eighth Viceroy's Staff Meeting held this evening be-
gin as follows: Item i. Astrology. The Viceroy said that
he had just seen Mr. Mangaldas Pakwasa, the Governor
Designate of the Central Provinces, and suggested that
he should eo down on the 13th rather than the 14th
August to start taking over from Sir Frederick Bourne,
thus enabling Bourne to leave to become Governor of
Fast Bengal by the 15th. Mr. Mangaldas Pakwasa had
said that this was out of the question on astrological
grounds. The Viceroy pointed out that there was a com-
plete lack on his staff of high-level advisers on astrology.
This would be remedied forthwith. "H.F. the Viceroy
appointed Press Attache to the additional and honorary
post of Astrologer to the Governor-General."

Following the Staff Meeting I met the cause of my astro-
logical "appointment", Mangaldas Pakwasa, at a small
lunch-party given by Vallabhbhai Patcl, to which Fay and
I were invited. The occasion was informal. In addi-
tion to Eakwasa and ourselves, there was only one other
guest, aW American visitor, Mr. Dall. Shankar, Patcl's
Private Secretary, who was a contemporary of mine at
Oxford, and Maniben, the Sardar's devoted, one might
almost say, dedicated, daughter, brought the lunch-party
up to seven. Patel's home is nearly next door to Nehru\s
and is, if anything, smaller and even less pretentious than
the Prime Minister's residence.

It is a commonplace to draw the political contrast be-
tween Nehru and Patel, who after the transfer of power
are likely to provide India with a virtual duumvirate; but

174 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

the variations in personality and appearance are hardly
less striking. Dressed in his dhoti, Patel conjures up the
vision of a Roman Emperor in his toga. There are, in
fact, Roman qualities about this man — administrative
talent, the capacity to take and sustain strong decisions,
and a certain serenity which invariably accompanies real
strength of character.

He lacks Nehru's world reputation and world outlook,
and he has deliberately confined himself to the tasks that
involve surveillance of domestic politics. Here his powers
and responsibilities are as wide as they well can be; they
include control over all Government Information, Internal
Security, the Police and, last but not least, the vital pro-
blem of relations with the Indian States. The comple-
tion of his Accession policy should bring into the Indian
Dominion more citizens than will be lost to it through
the creation of Pakistan, for (excluding the twenty mil-
lions in Hyderabad and Kashmir) there are some ninety
million States* subjects involved, which is considerably
more than the population of Pakistan: he also holds in
his hands nearly all Congress patronage. This is a for-
midable concentration of personal power under any
regime. In spile of all these preoccupations, Patel has
a shrewd grasp of India's strategic position in the world
at large.

Off duty, as he was to-day, he is indeed the embodi-
ment of the gentle Hindu, full of benevolence and smiles.
He was interested to hear my first-hand account of the
passing of the Independence Bill in London, anP in the
course of conversation the general subject of speech-
making cropped up. He and Maniben laughed when I
asked whether he enjoyed making speeches, Maniben re-
minding me that her father was a great orator in Gujerati.

Throughout most of the meal Maniben, who is on the
inside of all the Sardar's official and lop-secret activities,
remained the silent acolyte. Dressed in the austere sim-
plicity of her Khadi sari, and wearing at her waist a giant
bunch of keys, she gave the impression of an efficient

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

175

and wholly absorbed comptroller of the domestic house-
hold.

Nearly all the Indian leaders are surrounded by wo-
men members of their family, whether as wives, sisters
or daughters, who exercise an extremely powerful influ-
ence on their careers. J had come out to India under
the naive impression that Indian women were complete-
ly submerged and had no say or interest in matters of
State. This is certainly not the case at the summit of
affairs. Miss Fatima Jinnah, Mrs. Vijayalakshmi Pan-
dit, Begum Liaquat Ali Khan and Mrs. Kripalani are
formidable personalities whose ambitions and interests
measure up to those of their respective menfolk. Not all
of them would be content to remain so quietly in the
background as Maniben, but it is doubtful whether the
influence of any of them in their respective households
exceeds hers with her father.

Moreover, Lady Mountbatten has. 1 know, been deep-
ly impressed by her contacts with Indian women in the
whole field of social service. Not only are their capa-
bilities outstanding, but they are casting off the shackles
of subordinate status. An important facet of Indian In-
dependence is the emancipation of Indian women. Lady
Mountbatten\s leadership at this time is giving a great
fillip to this liberating process.

viceroy's housi". Ntw Dhun, Friday, 8th August, 1947
Mountbatten has had several requests to broadcast to
America, and even one proposal that he should hold
everything to visit the U.S.A. as the star guest at a big
Press-sponsored convention! In view of the tremendous
pressure upon his time and energies, it has been necessary
automatically to turn down all requests, but on my ad-
vice he has agreed to speak in a special programme whicn
is being broadcast throughout the United States to cele-
brate the second anniversary of V.J. day, and will in-
clude the recorded voices of the leaders of nearly all the
United Nations. Although he will be on the air for only

176

MISSION WITH MOUNT BAT 1 EN

three minutes, 1 feel this presents a splendid opportunity
to drive home the double meaning of the 15th August.
He asked me to prepare him a draft, which he has sub-
stantially accepted.

After approving the elaborate arrangements for him to
broadcast a recording ol his message from his study, his
words were beamed from All India Radio via the B.B.C.
to America for actual transmission on the 15th. "Two
years ago to-day", he declared, "I had just returned from
the Potsdam Conference, and was in the Prime Minister's
room in 10 Downing Street, when the news of the Jap-
anese surrender came through. Heie, as I speak to you
to-night in Delhi, we are celebrating an event no less
momentous for the future ot the world India's Inde-
pendence Day. Jn the Atlantic Charter, we, the British
and Americans, dedicated ourselves to champion the sell-
determination of peoples and the independence of nations.
Bitter experience has taught us that it is olten easier to
win a war than to achieve a war aim; so let us remember
August 15th— V.J. Day not only as the celebration of
a victory, but also as the fulfilment of a pledge."

via roy's houm , nj w on in, Saturday, 9th August, 1947
At our Staff Meeting to-day we had a full discussion
on the Punjab crisis. Over and above reports from Jen-
kins of a most serious situation in the boundary area, and
urgent requests from him for more army, air and police
reinforcements, Mountbatten was confronted with a Pub-
lic Relations problem of some magnitude which had a
direct bearing on the maintenance of morale and order.

It is rumoured ftiat RadcliHe will be ready by this even-
ing to hand over the Award of the Punjab Boundary Com-
mission to the Viceroy, hollowing the expected but none-
theless complete failure of his Hindu and Moslem col-
leagues to reach any semblance of agreement, Radcliffe,
under the terms of reference, has had only to consult
himself. Responsibility for publication, however, rests
with the Viceroy. Mountbatten from the outset had given

INSTRUMENT OF ACCESSION

177

his staff the most explicit directions that they were to
have no contact whatever with Radcliffe while he was
engaged on his difficult and delicate arbitral task and has
himself kept clear of him after the first welcome. We
had accordingly no firm knowledge how far or by what
route he had proceeded.

Various points of view about publication were put for-
ward. On administrative grounds it was argued that ear-
liest possible announcement would be of help to Jenkins
and would enable last-minute troop movements to be made
into the affected areas in advance of the transfer of power.
Alternatively, it was suggested that in so far as the Award
would in any case be bound to touch off trouble, the best
date to release it would be on the 14th August. Mount-
batten said that if he could exercise some discretion in
the matter he would much prefer to postpone its appear-
ance until after the independence Day celebrations, feel-
ing that the problem of its timing was really one of psy-
chology, and that the controversy and grief that it was
bound to arouse on both sides should not be allowed to
mar Independence Day itself.

With this view I wholly concur, and would go further,
and say that for the Radclitfc Award to precede or co-
incide with Independence Day would be to risk destroy-
ing at one stroke the whole symbolic significance of free-
dom to Hindu, Moslem and Sikh alike. The Indian's
facility for friendship can be so easily frustrated, his ex-
pectations and environment alike make the margin be-
tween happiness and mourning dangerously narrow. The
condition of his joy is that it should be unconfined, and
that he should have a temporary reprieve from his eternal
fears. ,

No final decision was taken at our meeting to-day, and
Abell was instructed further to discuss the timing pro-
blem with Jenkins. To underline the independent status
of the commission, Mountbatten decided that the an-
nouncement when it was made should not be in the form

178

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

of a communique from Viceroy's House, but should be
published as a Gazette Extraordinary.

Jenkins has firmly rejected any suggestion that the Sikh
leaders should be arrested before 15th August. He has
advised Mountbatten that he thoroughly discussed the
suggestion with Mudie and Trivedi, and they were all
unanimous in recommending that such arrests would be
more likely to endanger than improve the present pre-
carious situation. All three had therefore decided that
no arrests should be made. Mountbatten feels that as
he has arranged to drive with Jinnah in the State pro-
cession, which is the occasion mentioned for the possible
attempt on Jinnah's life, he can accept their decision with-
out personal reproach.

vi< kroy's house, ni.w dm, hi. Tuesday, J2th August, 1947
Three days have passed since the first warning, and the
Award is still not readv. At this afternoon's Staff Meet-
ing — our seventieth and probably the last — Mountbatten
agreed, in view of the uncertainty and our impending de-
parture for Karachi, that John Christie and 1 should call
on Radcliffe immediately to find out when we might ex-
pect the Awards to be in the Viceroy's hands.

For the duration of his stay in Delhi Radcliffe was given
the Comptroller's House on the Viceregal estate, where he
could work in isolation. Christie and 1, hurrying round
at very short notice, arrived to find that he was changing
for dinner. When he appeared on the scene it was clear
that our interview would not be an easy one, and that he
was just as much alive to the proprieties of the situation
as we were. He explained that both the Punjab and Ben-
gal Awards were complete and ready, but that the Sylhct
Award was not.

Jt seemed, therefore, that unless Mountbatten was to
make a major issue of the matter, it would be physically
very difficult for all three Awards to come into his pos-
session before his return to Delhi on the evening of 14th
August, or for the texts to be printed and available before

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

179

the 16th— Independence Day itself being a national holi-
day. We returned at once to Viceroy's House and advised
Mountbatten of the position, who was greatly relieved to
have this ready-made solution at his disposal.

CHAPTKR 1 IIIRT1 1 N

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

(lOVl RNMl NT HOUS1 , KARACHI,

Wednesday, J 3th August, 1947
Moiinthatti n llm 10R Karachi this morning to perform
his last official duty as Viceroy of a united British India.
This is, appropriately enough, to convey His Majesty's and
his own greetings to the new Dominion of Pakistan on the
eve of its inception. As we stepped off the aircraft. Their
Excellencies were greeted by Hidiyatullah, the benign Gov-
ernor-elect of Sind. There was also the usual bevy of
photographers. As they drove off to Government House,
Colonel Birnie, Jinnah's Military Secretary, told Mount-
batten that he had been given information of a plot to
throw a bomb at Jinnah during to-morrow's .State proces-
sion, and that there had been discussions as to whether
to cancel the drive or alter the route. Jinnah, however,
had taken the view that if Mountbatten was ready to go
through with the drive, then so was he. Mountbatten at
once agreed that there should be no change of arrange-
ments.

Jinnah and Miss Jinnah were awaiting the Mountbattens
in the entrance hall, which had been decked up to look
just like a Hollywood film-set, and all four were subjected
to takings and re-takings under the dazzling light and sizz-
ling heat of the arc-lamps. 1 made contact with Colonel
Malik, the Government Information officer, at the Palace
Hotel, and met some of the Foreign correspondents, who
were rather critical of the Karachi proceedings to date.

180

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Sonic argued that Mountbatten had been insulted by Jinnah
not being ai the airfield to meet him, but I at once ex-
plained that J was sure Mountbatten did not consider that
there had been any lack of courtesy or breach of etiquette
involved. At yesterday's Constituent Assembly there had
been, they said, an atmosphere of complete subservience,
with everyone vying to outdo everyone else in verbal pros-
tration before the Quaid-e-Azam.

In answer to my explicit inquiries, Malik gave me clearly
to understand that Jinnah was not proposing to make any
set speech for publication at to-night's banquet, and I ad-
vised Mountbatten accordingly. Imagine my surprise
when, towards the end of the banquet, before all the as-
sembled notabilities, comprising not only the Pakistan elite
but a far from negligible nucleus of a Diplomatic Corps,
Jinnah arose, adjusted his monocle and began reading with
deliberate and somewhat laboured emphasis from a set
script. The speech turned out to be one of considerable
political significance, in particular for its cordial references
to the new Dominion's future relationship with Britain
and to Mountbatten's contribution to the creation of Paki-
stan.

If Mountbatten felt any dismay at being caught in this
oratorical ambush he certainly did not show it, and by a
fine feat of improvisation gave the impression of being
even more word perfect than the Quaid-e-Azam with his
notes. For ten minutes the appropriate phrases and
thoughts flowed from him in smooth sequence. He is a
born raconteur, and his informal but quick-firing eloquence
is ideally adapted to after-dinner speech-making.

This was not tflfe only hazard triumphantly surmounted
lo-night. About a quarter of an hour before we were all
due to lake our places at dinner, young Lieutenant Ahsan,
whose first day it was as A.D.C. to Jinnah, following his
transfer from Viceroy's House, discovered that three dis-
tinguished guests high up on the table plan had failed to
arrive. Bill Birnie and the wretched A.D.C.'s were thus
left with the decision whether to leave gaps in high places

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

181

or undertake the revision of the seating plan throughout.
With stout resolve, they chose the latter course." Mount-
batten and Jinnah were at once advised of the dilemma, and
played their part in the operation by maintaining prepran-
dial small talk for over half an hour, while the staff made
feverish rearrangements.

After dinner we were merged in a larger reception, and
lo an accompaniment of sofl drinks and sweet music play-
ed by a band of bearded warriors in kilts, the party ran
its appointed course. Considering what lay behind all the
arrangements — the hurried last-minute arrival of so many
officials, the creation of a Government and a regime almost
overnight— the reception was an administrative triumph.
Jinnah himself as the host and hero of the occasion was
an aloof, almost lonely figure, which may have helped to
create a somewhat subdued atmosphere at this historic mo-
ment. He was to be seen, with his silver hair and imma-
culate white ashkan, towering above most of his guests,
and talking to very few of them. They, for their part, did
not presume to button-hole him. Here, indeed, was the
apotheosis of leadership by remote control.

I had never dreamt that the creator of a nation at the
moment of reaching the promised land could, when sur-
rounded by his devoted followers, be at such a distance
from them. Finding him standing alone, I spoke with him
for a few moments. I tried to find suitable words of con-
gratulation, but they died away before his mood of pre-
occupation, almost of reverie.

GOVtRNMfcNT HOUSE, KARACHI AND GOV1.RN MINT HOUSE

new delhi, Thunday~triday> 14th-15th August, 1947
Accommodation at Government House, Karachi, is
strictly limited. The number of V.J.P.'s here for to-day's
ceremonies has taxed Bill Birnie's resources to the utmost.
Housing and hotel shortage is acute; but by dint of dis-
persing and doubling up we were all successfully accom-
modated.

182

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

We were up early this morning for the ceremonies at the
Legislative Assembly. 1 arrived about half an hour before
Jinnah and the Mountbattens, passing along part of tne
official route. Neither the scale nor the enthusiasm of the
crowds was anything like as great as I had expected. It
did not seem to be on a higher pitch than some annual
opening of Parliament. In the grounds facing the As-
sembly, however, with its small, semi -circular, shell-shaped
chamber, every available inch was occupied. The Mount-
battens as they drove up were given the same cordial re-
ception as the Jinnahs, who had arrived a few minutes
ahead of them. Cordiality, too, was the key-note of both
Mountbatten's and Jinnah\s speeches and of the reaction
of the assembled Members. The precedence problem died
a natural death. Lady Mountbatten pressed Miss Jinnah's
hand alTcctionately as Jinnah sat down after giving his
address.

If Jinnah's personality is cold and remote, it also has
n magnetic quality- the sense of leadership is almost over-
powering. He makes only the most superficial attempt to
disguise himself as a constitutional Governor-General, and
one of his first acts after putting his name forward was to
apply for powers under the 9th Schedule rather than Part
H of the 1935 Act which gave him at once dictatorial pow-
ers unknown to any constitutional Governor-General re-
presenting the King. Here indeed is Pakistan's King Em-
peror, Archbishop of Canterbury, Speaker and Prime
Minister concentrated into one formidable Quaid-e-Azam.

The proceedings were over within the hour, and Jinnah
and Mountbatten drove back in State together. Once
again the greetings of the crowd, apart from some lorry-
loads of hilarious sailors of the Pakistan Navy and the
usual excitement of children, were decorous rather than
ecstatic. As they turned in at the gates of Government
House, Jinnah put his hand on Mountbatten's knee and
said with evident emotion, 4 Thank God [ have brought
you back alive." By midday the Mounlbattens had paid
their last farewells - Miss Jinnah embracing Lady Mount-

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

183

batten, and Jinnah, still emotional, declaring his eternal
gratitude and friendship. They were flying back to the
tremendous ceremonial round confronting them in Delhi.

As we passed over the Boundary area of the Punjab
we could see several large fires, beacons of ill-omen domi-
nating the landscape for miles around.

No sooner had we touched down than I was caught in
a whirl of last-minute publicity arrangements. Tight and
complex time schedules are involved, rehearsals with photo-
graphers and camera-men, discussions with the Informa-
tion Ministry, distribution of hand-outs, invitations and in-
quiries from Delhi's hundred and twenty Jndian and for-
eign correspondents. Right up to the closing minutes
of the day Mountbalten and his staff were busy at their res-
pective desks. The Viceregal machine in the task of dis-
mantling itself was at full pilch to the end.

As the midnight hour drew near and the last telegrams
from Viceroy to Secretary of Slate were being drafted and
dispatched, I found myself alone with Mountbattcn in his
study. To enable it to assume its sovereignty at the exact
moment when the new order came into being the Legisla-
tive Assembly was convened late on the night of the
14th. After the passing of the resolution proclaiming In-
dependence and inviting Mount batten to become the first
constitutional Governor-General, Prasad and Nehru were
to call on Mount batten and convev the invitation form-
ally. It was expected that they would arrive at about
12.45 a.m.

As midnight struck Mountbalten was sitting quietly at
his desk. I have known him in most moods: to-night
ihere was an air about him of serenity, almost detach-
ment. The scale of his personal achievement was too
great for elation, rather his sense of hislory and the fit-
ness of things at this dramatic moment, when* the old
and the new order were reconciled in himself, called forth
composure.

Quite deliberately he took off his reading-glasses, turned
the keys on his dispatch boxes and summoned me to help
M. M.— 7

184 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

tidy the room and stow away these outward and visible
signs of Viceregal activity. Although there was a whole
army of servants outside, it never occurred to either of
us to call them. Only when all the papers had been put
away and his desk cleared were they called in to move
some of the furniture and provide room for members of
the Press who had been invited to witness the event.

Correspondents who had been at the solemn ceremony
at the Legislative Assembly began to dribble in. They
reported that immense crowds had gathered on the route
and that we could expect Prasad and Nehru to be some-
what delayed. The proceedings in the Assembly had ap-
parently been most impressive. With moving eloquence
Nehru had said, **Long years ago we made a tryst with
destiny, and now the time comes when we shall redeem
our pledge, not wholly or in full measure, but substan-
tially. At the stroke of the midnight hour, when the
world sleeps, India will awake lo life and freedom."

Weary but happy, having escaped from the greetings
of tremendous throngs, Prasad and Nehru finally arrived.
In the little scene that ensued, friendship completely burst
the bounds of formality. The Press correspondents
flanked the room, photographers stood on the circular
table. Although Nehru had given approval that the Press
should be there. I think he must have forgotten that he
had done so. Whether it was the presence of an audi-
ence, or just the normal reaction after the great scenes
in the Assembly, neither of them seemed lo know quite
what to do.

Finally Mountbatlen and Prasad stood facing each
other, with Nehru, half sitting on Mountbatten's desk be-
tween them. Prasad began murmuring a formal invi-
tation. However, he forgot his lines, and Nehru played
the role of benign prompter. Between them they ex-
plained that the Constituent Assembly had just taken over
and had endorsed the request of the leaders that Mount-
batten should become the first Governor-General. To this
message he smilingly replied, "I am proud of the honour.

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

185

and I will do my best to carry out your advice in a con-
stitutional manner".

Thereupon Nehru, handing over a large and carefully
addressed envelope, said in ceremonious terms, "May I
submit to you the portfolios of the new Cabinet?'* The
ceremony was all over in less than ten minutes, but there
was more humanity and hope in this unrehearsed en-
counter than in most of our Te Deums and victory
parades.

I was once more alone with Mountbatten. Just to
satisfy his curiosity and remind himself of the exact names
of the Government to which he had previously agreed
and which he would be swearing-in in a few hours' time,
he opened the large envelope, but he was not to see his
Prime Minister's submission that night, for by sublime
oversight Nehru's envelope was empty.

(KWERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Friday, 15th August, 1947
I doubt whether it will be given to me to live through
a more crowded or memorable day than this.

At 8.30 the trumpets and the sea rlet-and -gold which
had heralded in twenty Viceroys summoned the State en-
trance of the newly created Earl Mountbatten of Burma
into the Durbar Hall, the first Governor-General of the
free India. The strangeness of this great occasion lay
not in its points of contrast with Mountbatten's earlier
Viceregal installation, but in its essential similarity to the
March ceremony. Now, of course, it was the function
of an Indian Chief Justice, Dr. Kania, to administer the
Oath to the Governor-General, and for an Indian Secre-
tary of the Home Department to officiate in swearing in
the Ministers of the new Dominion. Once again the rich
red-velvet canopies were lit with hidden lights above the
golden thrones. The carpets were a veritable field of the
cloth of gold. Lady Mountbatten in gold lame herself
adorned the splendid scene.

186

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

The Mount bat tens had only just taken their seats on
the throne when the whole Durbar Hall resounded with
the explosion of one of the photographers' flash-bulbs.
There was a momentary ripple of anxiety at this realistic
portrayal of a bomb. The Mounlbattens, with the full
force of the floodlights upon them, gave no outward sign
that they had either seen the flash or heard the report.
At the end of the ceremony the great bron/e doors of
the Durbar Hall were opened and the link between the
old order and the new was proclaimed with the playing
of "God Save the King" followed by the Jana Gana
Maria.

A few moments later and the whole distinguished com-
pany had dissolved, to be lost in the vast concourse mass-
ing round the Council House. No sooner had the Mount-
battens on their Slate drive passed out of the main gates
of Viceroy's -from now on Government- House and
down the slope between the Government Secretariat build-
ings, than they were themselves engulfed and their landau
almost lifted oft the ground by the dense laughing throng.

I had moved quickly by a side route from Government
House and had managed to slip into the Council House
before the pressure became loo heavy: but as the minutes
went by it became increasingly difficult to admit the vari-
ous official guests through the great doors without also
letting in a flood of citizens who were generating their
own fren/ied enthusiasm with rhythmic chants of 4 *Jai
Hind". Before long the great circular Council House was
like a besieged fortress, and nobody knew how a wav
would be made for the Mountbattens, on reaching the
entrance, to leave jheir carriage arid actually get inside.

For a short while the situation looked ugly. The
crowd, estimated at over a quarter of a million, began
making formidable rushes to break into the building, and
Nehru and other Government leaders had to be sum-
moned from the Chamber to try to calm them down.
At first their appearance only fanned the flames of ex-
citement, but somehow, with Indians of all descriptions

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

187

on every side pressing to shake ihem by the hand, the
Mounlbattens— their decorations and regalia miraculous-
ly intact- -were safely shepherded into the main building.

Within the Chamber itself the enthusiasm and expect-
ancy, though not less genuine, were sufficiently restrain-
ed to allow the formal ceremonies to come into their own
again. Prasad began by reading nut a whole scries ol
congratulatory messages from all over the world, but by
a technical hitch, comparable no doubt with last night's
missing letter, he forgot to read out President Truman's
message - a lapse which was remedied only after Dr.
Grady, the American Ambassador, had expostulated in
a loud whisper.

To the usual accompaniment of photographic barrage,
Mountbatlcn then rose to address the Assembly. He be-
gan by reading out the King's message, which was cor-
dially received, and then proceeded to speak with far more
emphasis and spirit than he usually does when he has
to keep to a script. Although the words had been care-
fully chosen, their underlying sincerity quickly drew the
sympathy and applause of the packed Assembly. Re-
ferences to the success of the Accession policy, to his
request to be regarded "as one of yourselves" and to the
leadership of Nehru and Patel were all acclaimed. But
his solicitude for Gandhi drew the most prolonged cheers,
and it was some time before he could proceed.

In appearance he looked magnificent but approachable.
As one Indian put it, 'His gift for friendship has triumph-
ed over everything". It was psychologically sound for
him to stress that he would definitely go when his work
was completed in April. He also succeeded in convinc-
ing his audience that no pressure would be put upon them
to stay within the Commonwealth They were entirely
free to make their own choice. Many told me after-
wards how delighted they were that his speech had been
so substantial. That it was in effect a policy declaration
undoubtedly came as a welcome surprise.

188

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Prasad followed with a long address which he spoke
first in Hindi and then in English. In both languages
he was almost, inaudible. Of the Congress elder states-
men Prasad is a moderate by conviction and tempera-
ment. Where some of his colleagues may be lured into
the pursuit of dialectical points beyond the bounds of good
sense or self-interest, Prasad rarely indulges himself in
outbursts, or over-statements. To-day he spoke from the
heart. "Let us gratefully acknowledge", he said, "while
our achievement is in no small measure due to our own
sufferings and sacrifices, it is also the result of world
forces and events, and last though not least it is the con-
summation and fulfilment of the historic tradition and
democratic ideals of the British race." After tributes
to the Mountbattens as representatives of that race he
added, "The period of domination of Britain over India
ends to-day, and our relationship with Britain is hence-
forward going to rest on a basis of equality, of mutual
good-will and mutual profit."

After the speeches the National flag was unfurled on
the Council House and a salvo of thirty-one guns was
fired. The Mountbattens* drive home was only the se-
cond of several tumultuous rides during the day, and all
the way back to Government House the cries of "Jai
Hind" were mixed with "Mountbatten Ki Jai", and even
"Pandit Mountbatten"!

After lunch our procession of cars sped out to the
Roshanara Gardens, where the Mountbattens in the blaz-
ing heat mingled with five thousand school-children. Here
was an abundance of Indian side-shows to amuse, amaze
and even horrify. The spectacle of a fakir apparently
biting the head off a snake, when added to the prevailing
heat and clamour, nearly caused poor Pamela to pass
out on the spot. But she and her parents stood up to
this symbolically significant visit with the utmost verve
and good -will.

In accordance with long-established Indian custom at
limes of rejoicing, the Mountbattens* last act before leav-

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

1 89

ing was to hand out gifts of sweets to the children. I
do not deny that in pressing them to add this engage-
ment to their already overcrowded list 1 have had its Pub-
lic Relations value in mind, feeling that it was likely
to make a deep impression on Indian sentiment because
it was a genuine gesture of goodwill and could readily
be seen to be such.

On their return to Government House the Mount-
battens only just had time to change for the culminating
public ceremony, the unfurling of the flag near the war
memorial in Princes Park. When we reached the special-
ly constructed arena we showed our tickets to cheerful
officials, who waved us on through numbered lanes. The
planning for the whole ceremony had been based upon
the assumption that a crowd of some thirty thousand
people would be there, but unfortunately for the plan-
ners the numbers were nearer three hundred thousand.
The result was that the first impression of everything
under control gave way to one of incomparable confu-
sion when we emerged into what were supposed to be
the parade-ground and reserved stands. We were sur-
rounded by the happiest of human hubbubs. The
crowds had taken complete possession of all the chairs,
standing on the backs, arms and seats, approximately six
Tndians to a chair.

In this maelstrom of rank and race, sex and, caste were
all lost in one vast unison — the desire of myriad human
beings to reach the central dais with its flag-pole. In
fact, the crowd became like some gigantic ocean remorse-
lessly converging on a tiny island and liable at any mo-
ment to engulf it. Nehru himself only managed to reach
the central platform by some desperate providence, and
when he saw Pamela Mountbatten struggling to get
through the good-natured crowd he rushed at tfiem kick-
ing out at random and snatching the topee off the head
of one Indian in order to crash it down on the head of
another. A distraught A.D.C. thought a riot might start
at any moment, but he had missed the mood of this

190

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

mighty assembly. On all sides there was laughter and
good humour.

Near where I was standing one hero was trying to ride
a bicycle. I got the impression that somehow the crowd
had caught up with him before he had reached his des-
tination, with the result that he could neither get on with
his journey nor get olT his machine. Fay, Marjorie
Brockman and Pamela Nicholls were all trapped between
the stands and the dais, but cheerful people shouted,
"'Make way for the memsahibs!" Fay finally reached the
B.B.C. recording van, where Wynford Vaughan Thomas
was frantically engaged on one of his most vivid and
spectacular outside broadcasts. He told me afterwards
that it was the greatest crowd scene he had ever witnessed.

Suddenly the cheering swelled into a roar, and from
where 1 stood I could just catch a glimpse of the A.D.CYs
in white followed by the fluttering lance pennants of the
Governor-General's Body Guard, then the Governor-
General's carriage and more Body Guard. The carriage
and escort, moving fitfully, at last reached a point about
twenty-five yards from the flagstaff. I could see the
Mountballens standing up, waving to the crowd, which
was cheering and waving back at them. Nehru made
some last frantic efforts to call for order and clear a little
space, but his pleas were in vain, so there was no alter-
native but for Mountbattcn to stay in his carriage, and,
while the flag was being hoisted, take the salute from
there.

Just as the flag was unfurled light rain began to fall
and a rainbow appeared in the sky, matching the saffron,
while and green of the flag. If Hollywood had added
this last touch, we would all have complained that once
again they were overdoing it; as it was, it would seem
to provide a dramatic omen to refute the gloomier astro-
logers. I must confess it would have taken a man of
iron scepticism to be unimpressed by such an augury at
such a moment.

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

19!

Mountbatten's return journey to Government House
was the final triumph of friendly informality. Nehru
was unable to get back to his car, so Mountbatten pull-
ed him into the State carriage, where he sat on the hood.
En route four women, a child and a Press photographer,
in grave danger of being crushed under the wheels, were
duly rescued by Mountbatten and joined the party, help-
ing to swell the numbers in the carriage to twelve— shades
of Curzon and his Durbar!

Then, as grand finale to this historic day, we repaired
to the State banquet at Government House, which was
attended by most of the Cabinet, Diplomatic Corps, and
military and civilian leaders. One or two of the Princes
who felt uneasy about their degree of precedence when
in the company of members of the new Government
were the only notable absentees. The climax was reach-
ed when Nehru rose to propose the health of the King,
and Mountbatten replied with the toast of the Dominion
Government. Both speeches, delivered without notes,
were for the benefit of the assembled nuests alone. There
were thus none of the restraints imposed by the demands
of world publicity.

All present, said Nehru, would have seen how enthu-
siastic the crowds in Delhi had been in celebrating this
great day. Similar scenes were undoubtedly being enact-
ed all over Jndia. Politics and economics had an im-
portant place in the relations between nations; but he
wanted to stress the importance of the psychological and
emotional factors in dealing with the people of India-
Those who merely sat in their offices in Delhi handling
political problems and economic planning— important as
those issues were— were not in real touch "with the nation.
Different views might be taken of the benefits In^lia might
or might not have derived from her past connection with
Britain, but it was altogether wrong that rule should be
exercised by a Great Power over a'people striving to be
free. Now that India had attained her independence, the

192

MISSION WITH MO UNTB ATTEN

'people not only showed their joy, but also made plain a
remarkable change in their attitude towards the British.

In paying a special tribute to Mountbatten, he said he
had seen so clearly from the outset how vital it was to
act quickly and to make the correct psychological ap-
proach to India in giving effect to the policy of His
Majesty's Government. Whatever shape the relations be-
tween Britain and India might take in the future, a new
start had been made, and he hoped and believed that
the friendship between them would endure.

Mountbatten in his reply said that his predecessors had
been unfortunate in having to sit on a stationary bicycle,
which was a very difficult balancing feat. He had, how-
ever, been given the "Go ahead" to start pedalling. It
had been his function to pedal faster and faster, until a
point was now reached when he was handing over the
bicycle to his Government, who had gripped the handle-
bars firmly.

1 sat next to l ; eroze Gandhi, Nehru's son-in-law, Man-
aging Director of the influential Lucknow National Herald.
1 stressed what was in my heart to say that whether India
stayed in or went out of the Commonwealth the con-
solidation of friendship between our peoples was all that
mattered.

At 9.15 p.m. three thousand guests filed upstairs and
were individually presented to the Mountbattcns — their
final social tour de force on this day of days. All the
State rooms and drawing-rooms were thrown open, and
the floodlit Moghul gardens, festooned with fairy lights,
-were lovely too look upon, ft was by now cool and the
air soft and scented. The party went on in an atmos-
phere of cordial good cheer into the early hours of the
morning. Gone was the sense of strain and stiffness which
was so evident among the Tndian guests at the first garden-
parly in March. Here was the social ease which only the
underlying sense of equality recognised on all sides can
bring.

INDEPENDENCE DAYS

193

So many appropriate words have been written in the
many souvenir editions of the newspapers, but 1 liked
best K. M. Munshi's comment on Mountbatten's ap-
pointment as Governor-General: —

"No power in history", he writes, "but Great Britain
would have conceded independence with such grace, and
no power but India would have so gracefully acknowledg-
ed the debt."

Part II

THE FIRST GOVERNOR-GENERAL

CHAPTER FOURTEEN

WAR OF SUCCESSION

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Saturday, 16th August, J947
Very early this morning the National flag was hoisted
over the Red Fort in Old Delhi, and Nehru addressed a
crowd estimated at some half a million, stretching, J am
told, all the way to that other monument of Moghul
splendour, the mighty Mosque of the Jama Masjid. But
the rejoicings of the morning were all too soon tempered
by the depression of the leaders this afternoon, when
Mountbatlen handed over to them the Radcliffe Award.
He allowed them two hours in which to digest its terms
before summoning a formal meeting in the Council Cham-
ber of Government House. Liaquat was there, and not
the least of Mountbatten\s achievements in Karachi this
week was in securing Jinnah's reluctant agreement for
Liaquat to make this visit at all, coming as it did within
twenty-four hours of his assumption of the Premiership
of Pakistan. I was present at this sombre and sullen
gathering, where the only unanimity was in denunciation
of this or that communal "in justice". The field was thus
left clear for Mountbatten to point with well-timed em-
phasis the moral that in so far as.it was imjpossible for
all the parties to be equally satisfied with Radcliffe's
verdict, the best evidence of its fairness seemed to rest in
the undoubted equality of their displeasure.

We were given the first shots of what will undoubtedly
be a prolonged and passionate controversy. Liaqual's
dismay at the inclusion of the Gurdaspur District in East
Punjab was offset by Patel's anger over the Ghittagong
Hill Tracts passing to Eastern Pakistan, while the resent-
ment of both was blanketed by Baldev's dumb depression.

197

198

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

None of the Leaders, however, saw fit to carry their critic-
ism to the point of repudiating their unconditional pledge
made in advance to accept the Award whatever its terms
might be.

Even as we met, momentous news was coming in from
both the partitioned Provinces which provided at once a
warning and an example of the need for bold leadership.
In the Punjab the people are taking the situation into
their own hands. What Jenkins has aptly termed the war
of succession has broken out in full fury in the land of
the five rivers. This afternoon Auchinleck gave a terse
and terrifying situation report to the Leaders which has
caused them to decide on an immediate reinforcement of
the Boundary Force.

In Calcutta, on the other hand, where the danger of a
similar succession struggle was deemed to be no less acute,
all is comparatively quiet, with only sporadic acts of viol-
ence. Gandhi has made his healing presence felt. With
his sense of the fitness of things, he left Delhi before the
Independence celebrations, no doubt feeling that it would
be difficult for him to play an appropriate role in these
official rejoicings and that more urgent duties awaited him
in the Fast. On the 13th he invited the last Moslem
Prime Minister of a United Bengal, Shaheed Suhrawardy
— a man of fairly luxurious tastes- -to lake up his abode
with him in a small home in the Moslem quarter and to
share ir^his acts of dedication. That night Hindu youths
stoned the place. Gandhi's response was to mark yester-
day's Independence celebrations as a day of fasting.

In view of the grave Punjab developments, Nehru and
Liaquat have decided to go together at once to Ambala,
and thence to Amfitsar, where they can make an appre-
ciation and take the highest-level decisions on the spot.

GOVJRNMFNT HOUSL, NFW DL1.HI,

Friday, 22nd August, J 947
Mountbatten has written a long letter to Nehru and
Patel urging the need for economic planning. He is

WAR OF SUCCESSION

199

afraid these stern economic realities may be swamped by
political considerations and by attempts to apply some
of the more eccentric of Gandhi's theories, including the
rigid enforcement of prohibition of all alcoholic drink,
upon which a large proportion of provincial revenues de-
pends, and the wholesale abolition of totxl and cotton
controls, without which the general price structure may
collapse, enabling speculators to sei/e the helm.

GOVIRNMLNT HOUSE, NtW DLLH1,

Monday, 25th August, 1947
In the morning Mountbatten had a difficult session with
the Joint Defence Council, the point of controversy being
the future of the Punjab Boundary Force. The two Go-
vernments would like to see the Force broken up and
reconstituted on national lines with Indian and Pakistan
Commanders-in-Chief. Mountbatten went into the meet-
ing aware that this idea would be completely unaccept-
able to Auchinleck and Recs, and thai in any case it ran
counter to his own views. He managed so to steer the
discussions that the matter was not formally raised, but
could not divert Chundriiiar, the Pakistan Finance Minis-
ter and representative at the meeting, from making some
highly critical comment about the Force's conduct.

This was too much for Mountbatten, who had just
urged that a word of appreciation from the Leaders to
the officers and men of the Force was urgently needed to
maintain their sorely tried morale. If the Force did not
receive proper support, the only thing would be to re-
move it, and then the responsibility for the resulting blood-
shed would rest squarely on those who had caused it to
be taken away. Tndeed, at one moment Mountbatten
raised a ripple of amusement when he turned on Chundri-
gar with the fatherly reproof, "I hate to think what your
Governor-General would say if he heard you talking like
this."

The meeting authorised the publication of a communi-
que about the Boundary Force. Vernon and I were en-

200 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

trusted with the preparation of a draft for everyone's ap-
proval, with the result that we spent the afternoon run-
ning between the Pakistan High Commissioner's house in
Hardinge Avenue, where Chundrigar is staying, and
Nehru's office in the Secretariat. Chundrigar was most
insistent that a clause should be inserted indicating that
severe action would be taken against the Boundary Force
in the future if it failed in its duty. We were ourselves
already trying to tone down another sentence which in-
dicated that the Boundary Force "with a few exceptions"
was doing a good job.

We emerged from the discussions with the offending
words deleted. The whole episode makes it abundantly
clear that both Governments will have to change their
attitudes to military forces doing difficult jobs on their
behalf if they are not to have mutinies on their hands.
The days of glory from sniping at the upholders of law
and order are over.

While waiting in the ante-room to Nehru's office, we
reflected on the function of a minor official who spent
the time spinning a paper-weight, answering the odd tele-
phone call, glancing at the odd envelope and generally
letting things take their course. It was hard to believe
that one was sitting in a Prime Minister's office.

On our return to Government House, Mountbatten
showed me a telegram from Monckton saying that he had
been compelled to resign his position as constitutional
adviser to the Nizam although he still had His Exalted
Highness' confidence. He added that he felt that he ought
not now to stay # at Government House, as this action
might be misconstrued. The news came as a great blow
to Mountbatten. "We're sunk!" he exclaimed.

Hver since July the difficult negotiations between
Hyderabad and the Government of India as to their rela-
tions after the transfer of power have largely turned upon
the influence and availability of Monckton as a member
of the Nizam's delegation.

WAR OF SUCCESSION

201

As late as the 12th August, Mountbatten, with no settle-
ment in sight, advised the Nizam that he had secured a
special extension of two months beyond Independence Day
during which the Government's offer to receive Hydera-
bad's accession would remain open. He also explained
that although he would no longer be Crown Representa-
tive, he had been authorised to continue negotiations on
India's behalf, and in the meanwhile had secured Indian
recognition of the status quo in Berar, which was legally
a part of the Nizam's dominion, but hitherto administered
by the Governor of the Central Provinces. Finally he was
able to give the vital assurances to the Nizam, after con-
sultation with V. P., that the new Dominion would not
regard Hyderabad's decision not to accede in present cir-
cumstances as a hostile act, and to add that he was satis-
fied that the leaders had no intention of applying diplo-
matic pressure by means of economic blockade.

The negotiations with the Hyderabad delegation were
due to be resumed to-day. On receipt of Monckton's
telegram Mountbatten called for V. P., and was discuss-
ing the new position with him when Vernon and 1 left to
deal with the Boundary Force communique. On our
return the situation seemed to have improved. A tele-
gram from the Nizam had arrived asking Mountbatten to
see Monckton on his behalf and encourage him to stay
on in his service. The Nizam confessed that if Monckton
returned at this juncture he would have great difficulty in
appointing someone else in his place.

Monckton came round at once, and explained that he
had resigned because of a most violent attack against him
in the Hyderabad Press organised by an extremist Moslem
organisation in the State, the Ittchad-ul-Muslimeen. He
said that the Prime Minister (the Nawab of Chhatari)
and the Minister for Constitutional Affairs, both fellow-
members of the delegation, had also resigned for the
same reason. The Nizam had refused to accept Chhatari's
resignation. Monckton said he was prepared to with-

202

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

draw his own only if there was a previous public with-
drawal of the Ittchad's statement.

Monckton advised Mountbattcn that he had brought
the Nizam up to the point of ottering a treaty which
would cover the three central subjects of Defence, Ex-
ternal Affairs and Communications, and was confident
that he could persuade him to accept the equivalent of
accession provided the lerm "Instrument of Accession"
was given sonic such sugar-coating as "Article of As-
sociation". Mountbattcn pointed out that this was the
precise issue over which Patel was most adamant, in so
far as he was afraid of being accused of breach of faith
with all the other Princely signatories to Accession Instru-
ments, But Mountbatten promised to do his utmost to
get his Government's support for the substance of acces-
sion if Monckton on his side could secure the Nizam's
assent to it.

The news has also come through to-day that Bhopal
has at Jast acceded — he was allowed ten days grace before
his Instrument of Accession was actually published. "It
is almost as hectic as it was before the 15th August/' was
Mounthillen's comment.

GOVhRNMKNl HOUSf , W W DLLIfl.

Wednesday, 27th August, 1947
V. P. and 1 had an important talk with Mountbatten
in his bedroom early this morning on the subject of the
Punjab Boundary Force and the Press attacks being made
upon it both in the Hindustan limes and the Indian
News Chronicle. V. P. said there was a growing feeling
on both sides that flie new Governments should have more
direct military contiol over their respective areas. Mount-
batten agreed that although the Boundary Force was un-
doubtedly the best military answer to the problem, he was
ready to concede that in this instance psychological reasons
might outweigh purely military ones. His mind was
moving in favour of retrocession of the Boundary Force's
area.

WAR OF SUCCESSION

203

We then discussed the Press situation. V. P. thought
we should not take the Delhi Press too seriously, as the
big Provincial papers were all very steady on the issue.
The Hindustan Times this morning carried a direct attack
on Rees and a most objectionable cartoon implying that
the Supreme Command's Headquarters were deliberately
depriving the Dominion Armies of good officers in order
to retain big jobs for themselves. As a result of our talk,
Mountbatten has decided that he will see Devadas Gandhi
and Sahni, the Hindustan limes' and the Indian News
Chronicle's editors, this afternoon, and has instructed mc
to arrange the meeting.

Devadas and Sahni duly arrived at four o'clock, anti-
cipating, I suspect, a drily reception, but Mountbatten
was in his best form, delivering his disapproval from be-
hind a smoke-screen of engaging frankness. He has the
rare knack of combining vehemence with bonhomie. He
started the session with a general homily on the need to
avoid attacking the military, who cannot answer for them-
selves. If soldiers begin answering back you get a situa-
tion, he said, as in Mexico, where they throw out the
editors. As against this dangerous example he stressed
the recent case of General Barker in Palestine, where
Press criticism of the General's conduct was levelled not
at the General himself, but at Bellenger, the Secretary of
Stale for War and the Minister answerable to Parliament
for the General's actions.

Mountbatten then turned to a general account of what
was happening in the Punjab. The Sikhs, he said, had
launched an attack just as Giani Kartar Singh and Tara
Singh before the 3rd June had told him they would.
Mountbatten had expostulated with then] at the time,
stressing that the British would have gone. It would be
Indian fighting Indian. But they were adamant, 'and had
in fact observed that they were wailing for us to go. The
situation was now out of their control. In an area less
than two hundred by one hundred and fifty miles con-
' laining some seventeen thousand inhabited localities and

204 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

only about the size of Wales, some ten million people
were on the move. At this moment, through the with-
drawal of all the Moslems, the police in the East Punjab
were suddenly and catastrophically seven thousand under
strength.

Mountbatten then explained in detail the military vir-
tues of the Boundary Force and the capabilities of Pete
Rees, whom he described as perhaps his ablest divisional
commander in the Burma campaign. It was Rees — "the
pocket General'* — who had led the famous "Dagger"
Division in its successful dash to liberate Mandalay. He
had explained to the Defence Council that the limiting
factor now was that Rees was under civilian control. It
was only fair to add that Nehru had indicated that he was
very impressed with Rees.

Mountbatten next explained the military alternatives by
pressing one hand against the seam of his trousers and
taking the seam as the Boundary Force command head-
quarters with its subordinate commands radiating out on
both sides of the seam from his fingers. The national
commands he described merely by turning the finger-tips
of both hands in upon each other and placing them at
right angles to the seam.

Sahni said at great length that he felt very bitter, as
he came from the Boundary area. Devadas made no
ellorl to defend the cartoon or the attack on Rees. Some
constructive ideas arose during the talk, which lasted near-
ly two hours. These included sponsored Press visits and
dissemination of neutral news by leaflet, the setting up
of strongholds guarded by mixed forces to give immediate
succour to refugee^, and the appointment of custodians
for refugee property to cover movable as well as immov-
able belongings.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Thursday, 28th August, 1947
Lady Mountbatten and Rajkumari Amrit Kaur, the new
Minister of Health, have just come back from the heart-

WAR OF SUCCESSION

205

land of the communal frenzy, visiting no fewer than
twelve refugee centres and camps, as well as seven hos-
pitals and a number of other medical units, engaging in
numerous conferences with officials, from the Governors
of the East and West Punjab downwards. It has been a
heroic errand of mercy to the point of danger at the hour
of trouble.

There could be no more compelling catalogue to testify
to Lady Mounlbatten's devotion to duty. Her report on
the situation on both sides of the Boundary is disquieting
enough. The refugees are now in a state of mass hysteria.
Neither side has any trust in the intentions, assurances or
actions of the other Dominion. She reports also that there
is a complete lack of confidence in the Punjab Boundary
Force.

"THE RKTRhAT*\ MASHOBRA, SIMLA,

Saturday, 30th August, 1947
Mountbatten was in Lahore yesterday to take the chair
at the Joint Defence Council, which Jinnah, to everyone's
surprise, attended as a member. After prolonged discus-
sion the decision was taken to disband the Boundary
force. Pete Rees received very lew thanks from cither
side for his efforts to carry out a task of unparalleled
difficulty. Without the whole-hearted backing of the Gov-
ernments and Press on both sides, the position of the
Boundary Force and its Commander became rapidly un-
tenable, and otherwise steady and experienced troops be-
gan to feel the tug of communal loyalties deeper even
than their military discipline.

Now that the Punjab Boundary Force and the Joint
Defence Council's authority over it are at an end. Mount-
batten's last executive responsibility lapses. He considers
that as a matter of policy he should confirm his new con-
stitutional status by freeing himself from day-to-day con-
tact with the executive or from any direct administrative
interference in the Government's action to restore the im-
mediate situation. He has accordingly decided to go ahead

206

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

with earlier arrangements and visit Simla for ten days
of well-earned and badly needed rest.

Meanwhile lsmay has gone for his much-needed rest
to Kashmir and has been asked by Mountbatten to do
his best to gel the Maharaja to make up his vacillating
mind and accede without further delay to whichever
Dominion he and his people desire, thus ending the un-
certain and dangerously unstable position in Kashmir.

CTIAPTI R HFTl.rN

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

(JOVERNMl NT MOUSI!, NI.W DCLIIT,

Saturday, 6th September, 1947
Wi wi rl on the road early yesterday morning, arriving
at Government House during the afternoon, where we
found V. P. awaiting Mountbatten with a message from
Patel hoping that he will grip the situation firmly without
delay. Nehru came round immediately to enlist his active
and overriding authority to deal with the emergency, fol-
lowed by Patel.

The decision of ihc Prime Mimster and Deputy Prime
Minister of the new India, taken only three weeks after
the exhilaration of Independence, to recall Mountbatten
in this way, is a great tribute to the quality of their
character and leadership. For by this act they have shown
themselves big enough to recognise I hat Mountbatten's ex-
perience in high-leyel administration is something which
they have not yet acquired.

After Mountbatten had had two or three hours to ac-
quaint himself fully of the scale of the crisis, he proposed
that an Emergency Committee should be set up. This
was at once agreed to by Nehru and Patel, and at their
insistence Mountbatten accepted the chairmanship. Noth-
ing less will meet the case, for we are in fact confronted

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

207

with the deadly perils of war emergency without having
available the normal instruments or priorities of war to
counteract it. With the spread of communal fears and
frenzies which we are witnessing in the Punjab, the scale
of the killings and the movement of refugees become even
more extensive than those caused by the more formal con-
flicts of opposing armies. As with nearly all the great
migrations of history, the people themselves hold sway
and create conditions which many can exploit but none
can command.

The fact that Delhi itself is in the epicentre of this earth-
quake automatically converts a provincial into a national
crisis. In this respect the Punjab catastrophe is perhaps
even more deadly for India than for Pakistan, whose
capital, Karachi, is at a safe distance from the disturb-
ances. None-lhe-less Jinnah on his side has already made
an urgent broadcast appeal to his people to help in restor-
ing peace and in building up the new State. Even if the
Boundary Award was "unjust, incomprehensible and even
perverse," Moslems had agreed to abide by it. The new
nation should see to it that what had been won by the
pen was not lost by the sword.

It is easy to forget how far to the north Delhi lies-
north even of Mount Everest. 1 here arc those who argue
that it has alwavs been too far removed from the hub of
Indian life, and that with Partition this objection is rein-
forced; but a voluntary change of capital is one thing, a
compulsory evacuation by the new Government within a
month of attaining Independence quite another. And this
is undoubtedly the issue, for nearly half a million refugees
are moving towards the city, already overcrowded, bring-
ing in their train disorders and disease wholly beyond
Delhi's administrative resources to control. *

Mountbatlcn had an exhaustive discussion with his own
stalT in advance of the first meeting of the Emergency
Committee of the Cabinet over which he was to preside
later in the afternoon. We were all asked to make rccom-

208

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

mendations, and we are all to be at the disposal of the
Committee, lsmay is being recalled from Kashmir.

My own suggestions to help meet the Press and Public
Relations side of the problem included proposals to secure
the earliest possible publicity link-up with Pakistan; the
re-naming and regrading of the Committee to Council of
State; the appointment of a Public Relations sub-Com-
mittee to consist if possible of a representative from the
Ministry of Information, the Commander-in-Chief's staff
and myself; the firm avoidance of censorship which the
Government may be tempted to impose, and finally the ,
importance of playing down Mountbatten's role as chair-
man. With this last concept Mountbatten whole-heartedly
concurred, as also with my views on the dangers of cen-
sorship. The Council of State concept was not seriously
discussed and, owing to the tempo of the day's events, can
be said to have been still-born. The Public Relations
sub-Committee was no sooner mentioned than it was ap-
proved, and 1 was commissioned to promote it at once
with the Ministry of Information and the Commander-
in-Chief.

Mountbatten's reaction to the crisis was to set in motion
procedure already tried and proved both at C.O.H.Q. and
in S.E.A.C. He said his objective was to convert the
Emergency Committee into a daily staff meeting at which
spokesmen from every department of the "command"
(in this instance Government Departments) could raise
and answer questions. Out of these meetings priorities as
between departments would be established. Once again
Mountbatten showed himself a firm believer in the "sov-
ereignty of discussion". Only by this means does he
consider that the snags can quickly be uncovered and the
solutions found.

He also resolved to resume his old war and map-room
procedure to provide the Cabinet and himself with the
maximum factual information by visual aid both with
regard to the number of disturbances and the movement
of refugees. To this end he has decided to call in Pete

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

209

Rees, whose Boundary Force Command closed down last
week, to become head of a small Military Emergency Staff
operating inside Government House. Pamela, who, with
her medical and welfare work and her Presidency of the
Caravan Club (an Indian youth movement), has already
done her full share to keep the Mountbatten flag flying,
is to be his personal assistant.

The first Emergency Committee met in the Council
Chamber of Government House at five o'clock, and sat
for over two hours. Nehru opened the proceedings by
turning to Mountbatten and saying, 44 1 will only take
your advice on one condition — that you will take the
chair". And Mountbatten accepted under another con-
dition: that the fact is not to be published. Complete
secrecy will be difficult, but, as 1 stressed at an earlier
Staff Meeting, there could be no keener advocate of Press
and Radio silence on this assignment than myself, and
I am determined to do all in my power to maintain it.

It has been agreed that the Committee should consist
only of essential Cabinet Ministers and other vital people,
such as the Commander-in-Chief, the Supreme Com-
mander's representative, the Chief Commissioner of Delhi,
the Chief of Police, the Director-General of Civil Aviation,
Medical and Railway representatives. Everyone else is to
be co-opted as required. The Ministers who are to join
Nehru and Patel as permanent members are Baldev Singh
(Defence), Matthai (Railways) and Neogy (in the newly
created post of Refugees). Altogether fifteen of us were
there for this initial meeting.

The general mood at the outset was of dazed bewilder-
ment and aimlessness before the unknown. Nehru, for
whom all the horrors of the first month of Independence
seemed to come as the crucifixion of his life-wori, looked
inexpressibly sad and resigned. Patel was clearly dis-
turbed with deep anger and frustration. But for Mount-
batten, weighed down by none of these inner misgivings,
the occasion called forth all his powers of objective and

210

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

dynamic decision, and he at once radiated confidence and
a sense of purpose where none had existed before.

As soon as the actual constitution of the Committee had
been decided we were promptly plunged into a number
of "most immediate" items. The Ministry of Refugees
had still to be set up. The Committee wanted to know
by the next morning the name of the person appointed to
be secretary to the Ministry. It then proceeded to tackle
the difficult but uigent problem of accommodating this
wholly new Department. Ismay was given the task of
acting in a liaison capacity between the Fmergency Com-
mittee and the Pakistan Government.

In the general zeal to get going, our newly fledged Pub-
lic Relations Committee has been directed to "attempt to
improve the standard of reporting of the Delhi newspapers
on the communal situation, and to report"! On this oc-
casion J think the result will be limited to our "reporting",
but it made everyone feel good, and that is the crux of
the matter.

There was an exhaustive discussion on the imposition
of martial law-. Mountbatten considers there is a strong
case for it in the Punjab, but only if all four Governments
concerned are ready to back it. As this seemed on the
whole unlikely, the Committee called for urgent examina-
tion of ways and means to stiffen existing acts in force
in the Fast Punjab. Altogether some twelve items were
cleared, from the setting up of a relief committee under
Lady Mountbatten to the control of R.A.F. transport and
the dropping of leaflets, from the freezing of assets to the
disposal of jeeps. Everyone left the session somewhat
breathless. *

To-morrow Trivedi, the Hast Punjab Governor, with his
Prime Minister. Gopi Chand Bhargava, and Home Minis-
ter, Swaran Singh, are to attend the Committee.

From Calcutta comes news of Gandhi's "miracle". His
initial partnership with Suhrawaidy did not achieve all
that he had hoped: isolated stabbings and acts of violence
continued. So on Monday he began a fast to end only

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

if sanity relumed to the city. On Thursday he was able
lo call it oil" after leaders of the various communities had
given guarantees that the masses had already responded
to the Mahalma's appeal through soul resistance for a
change of heart.

After one of his Prayer Meetings, Hindus and Moslems
by their thousands mingled and embraced in the Maidan.
Hardened Press correspondents report that they have seen
nothing comparable with this demonstration of mass in-
fluence. MountbaUcn's estimate is that he has achieved
by moral persuasion what lour Divisions would have been
hard pressed lo have accomplished by force.

(iOVFKNMl N I IIOUSI , NIVv DM, III,

Sunday, 7ih September, 1947
Our meeting began at eleven, but Trivedi and the Fast
Punjab Ministers failed to arrive on time. Mountbalten
started off by reporting that the situation in Delhi had
worsened very considerably during the previous twenty-
four hours. There had been a large number of incidents,
including the slabbing of employees on the Government
House estate, and far too many refugees were coming
through before there was any organisation to receive them.

He turned at once lo the question of banning the carry-
ing of all weapons, which of course raised in its turn the
problem of the kirpans or swords worn by the Sikhs.
Patel felt that any suggestion of banning kirpans would
raise great difficulties, as they had been recognised by the
Government as religious weapons for many years. Mount-
batten argued that the unqualified right of Sikhs to carry
kirpans at this time stood in the way of precautions for law
and order taken by every city in the world, but he agreed
that the basic question was, which decision would lead to
fewer people being killed— the banning of the kirpan or
the safeguarding of Sikh religious feeling?

"If we go down in Delhi'*, Mountbatten warned, "we
are finished." Ismav suecested reinforcinc the police with
a cadre of special constables. Patel was doubtful, but

212 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Nehru in favour. Trivedi finally arrived at ten to one,
starting off with an impassioned speech which was clearly
based on the mistaken assumption that the Emergency
Committee was nothing other than a Grand Inquisition on
himself and his Government. In answer to Mountbatten's
inquiry about the East Punjab's capacity to preserve law
and order, and suggestion that this was the problem of
top priority, Trivedi replied that the most urgent issue
confronting him was the evacuation of refugees.

In view of the late arrival of the East Punjab conting-
ent, it was decided to meet again later in the day, and
we resumed at 6 p.m. It was a rather better meeting this
time. Nehru and Patel stood firm about the Sikhs, and
there is to be a ban on all weapons. "1 will not tolerate
Delhi becoming another Lahore", Patel declared, and
Nehru added, "I am certain in my mind kirpans may have
to be taken away." Jeeps also are to be stopped from
plying the streets- -Nehru speaking of them as "a source
of much mischief".

The reports coming in which show the Delhi situation
to be rapidly deteriorating call for coolness and strength.
There has been a massacre at Willingdon airfield, and the
Sikhs have delivered threats to the Australian High Com-
missioner and to the United States Ambassador. Mount-
batten warned the meeting that the whole reputation of
India is involved in providing complete physical security
for its diplomatic representatives.

As token of his resolve to back his words with action,
Mountbatten has put his Body Guard at the disposal of
the Garrison Commander. Normally the Delhi Garrison
is of brigade strength. But it has been pushed out bat-
talion by battalion into the riot-torn Gurgaon district to
try to keep the trouble out of the city itself. When, there-
fore, the trouble came in, there was simply no Garrison
available. The Body Guard is certainly a corps d'elite,
and in order to proclaim the perfect non-communal dis-
cipline, they have been patrolling the streets in sections

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

213

of armoured cars, each consisting of one manned by Pun-
jabi Mussulmans and one by Sikhs operating in concert.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NTW DELHI,

Monday, 8th September, 1947
Less than forty-eight hours after our return Mount-
batten's "Map Room" is in action. Situated in the ante-
room next to the Council Chamber, it is designed to pro-
vide members of the Emergency Committee before their
morning meetings with intelligence appreciations — sup-
ported by visual aids— of the disturbances and refugee
movements on both sides of the Punjab Boundary. Much
midnight oil has been burned to get the maps and flags
in the correct position in time for this morning's meeting.
There was a somewhat inauspicious start to the proceed-
ings, as the unfortunate Lieutenant-Colonel detailed to
give the situation report to the assembled notables fainted
while doing so— undoubtedly from overwork.

My afternoon was given over to the first meeting of
the United Council for Relief and Welfare — a title arrived
at, incidentally, only after prolonged discussion — which is
designed to co-ordinate the growing volume of voluntary
relief. Lady Mountbatten was in the chair, and handled
this body of volunteers and individualists with a perfect
blend of charm and strength. They emerged from the
session a potential team with a central purpose.. No fewer
than fifteen different organisations were represented at
Government House to-day, and it is safe to say that only
a dire emergency, together with Lady Mountbatten's ad-
ministrative and diplomatic skill, would have brought
them under one roof to pool their experience and effort.

Peter Howes tells me, incidentally, that among the many
emergency duties falling on Mountbatten's British and
Indian A.D.C.'s, attendance on Lady Mountbatten 'is hard-
ly the most popular. For in the course of her tours of
hospitals it usually involves assisting her to bring in to
the local infirmaries any bodies they may see in the streets.
She is not deterred from carrying out these errands of

214

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

mercy, even when passing through areas where sniping is
going on.

Jn the evening I had a long talk with the Nawab of
Chhalari, the Nizam's Prime Minister. While anxious to
be loyal to His Exalted Highness, he is finding it hard
to interpret the diverse instructions he receives. Clearly
his period of office and influence has not long to run.
He and Monckton, who are both staying at Government
House, had a meeting with Mountbatten to-day.

In the present emergency here in Delhi Hyderabad ap-
pears a less pressing problem, which makes Mountbatten
think that this may be the psychological opportunity to
promote the verbal variant to accession. At the Hydera-
bad end, the Nizam, in token of his desire to retain
Moncklon's services, issued a week ago a strongly worded
finnan (or official statement) condemning the attacks
made on the members of his delegation as damaging the
interests of the State. This he followed up with letters
to Mountbatten confirming his confidence in Monckton
and repudiating in picturesque terms the activities of the
HtchaU, and in particular of its fanatical president, Kasim
Razvi.

But while the Nizam himself may be moving haltingly
towards an accommodation. Congress intelligence (which
is remarkably well informed on States' affairs) has been
picking up disquieting data about the efforts of the Nizam's
Government to place orders for armaments in Czechoslo-
vakia and in general to build up its separate sovereignty.
Chhatari, however, is well aware that any such course
would be disastrous for Hyderabad and India alike, and
the mood of to-day's meeting was one of genuine desire
on both sides to break through the deadlock. It has been
conceded that the principals in the negotiations may not
be able to agree on a formula at the first attempt, and on
this understanding it was decided thai Monckton and
Chhalari should return to Hyderabad in a fresh effort to
narrow the gap.

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

215

Just before turning in I looked out from my bedroom
window towards the old city. 1 could see several big fires
raging, and half expected to hear the, wail of air-raid sirens
and the drone of aircraft, or at least the shouting of mobs,
but whatever horrors and sufferings were being endured
at that moment, no Sound of them reached out to me to
break the sultry and sinister silence of the night. In pur-
suit of "feature epics" there is a British Press report of
half a million people fighting in the blazing streets of
Delhi, but this is manifestly gross exaggeration, and gives
u wholly misleading picture of the furtive hit-and-run
character of so much of this arson and muiiier. L want to
try to see for myself wh?t is really happening.

CJOVLRNMl NT HOUSE, WAV DELHI,

Tuesday, Vth September, 1947
To-day Mountbatten has seen Gandhi, who has just
arrived in Delhi from his "miracles" in Calcutta, about
which he is characteristically :.hy and self-deprecating. He
confessed to Mountbatten that he had changed his mind
about Government House, which hitherto he had de-
nounced as the symbol of alien and false power. Now
he was glad to find that it had been kept "a secure island
in a sea of insecurity". He was convinced that the emerg-
ency staff and the Committee working and deliberating
far removed from public clamour may well have saved
the Central Government.

This morning's Emergency Committee meeting had be-
fore it reports of a serious situation developing in Peshawar
and other parts of the North-west Frontier Province, now
in Pakistan. The immediate? ministerial reaction is to
believe the worst. There are moments when one feels
that these two new nations are obsessed with some over-
whelming death-wish and that there is no real awareness
that to pursue the communal feud to its end must mean
self-slaughter.
M. M. — 8

216 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Thursday, 11th September, 1947
V. P. told me before the Emergency Committee meet-
ing that the Delhi situation was undoubtedly improving
and that the Sikhs were answering Patel's appeal. But at
the meeting itself I got the impression that Patel was
changing his mind on the kirpan issue. There was quite a
brisk exchange between the two strong men of the Go-
vernment. "Murder", said Nehru, "is not to be justified
in the name of religion." "This is not fair," Patel re-
torted. "There is no question of doing so, but the Gov-
ernment must respect all religions."

A Delhi Emergency Committee has now been set up
to deal specifically with the crisis in the capital and to
leave the Cabinet Emergency Committee, from which it
derives its authority, free to deal with the wider problems.
One of the most dynamic members of the Cabinet, C. H.
Bhabha, the Commerce Minister, is to be chairman, and
H. M. Patel, the Cabinet Secretary, has been seconded
to him. It will substantially take over the Municipal Ad-
ministration, .and meet on the same day-to-day basis as
the parent body, which was in danger of becoming lost
in a jungle of local detail.

In order to bring the emergency home to us, Lady
Mountbalten has very justly imposed austerity on Gov-
ernment House kitchens. At a dinner-party for our dis-
tinguished visitors, Lord Listowel* and Sir Gilbert Laith-
waite, Their Excellencies and guests, with customary cere-
monial, were regaled with a three-course repast consisting
of some cabbage-water masquerading as soup, one piece
of spam and potato, a biscuit and a small portion of
cheese. Listowel was impressed, but not quite as it was
perhaps intended he should be, for he asked one of us
afterwards whether this dinner had been specially laid
on for his benefit!

* The Earl of Listowel succeeded Lord Pethick-Lawrence as
the last Secretary of State for India in April, and Sir Gilbert
Laithwaite was then his Departmental chief.

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

217

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Friday, 12th September, 1947
This morning's Emergency Committee was a bad meet-
ing, one Minister defeating its purpose by raising a whole
series of low-level departmental problems, and another
simply grinning at his Ministry's lack of office accom-
modation. No sense of grip was conveyed. It has, for
instance, taken all day to get a loud-speaker for the
Purana Oila Fort, which Moslem evacuees in their
thousands have converted into a veritable ghetto. From
the account given at the meeting, the Purana Qila situa-
tion is clearly very grave. Nearly eighty per cent of the
refugees there have been inoculated, but there is hardly
any food coming in to them, and without loud-speakers
it is impossible to impose order upon the confusion or
create confidence from the prevailing panic.

This evening at six o'clock Nehru addressed the Diplo-
matic Corps in the Map Room. This was his first con-
tact with them s since the onset of the crisis. He spoke
with telling simplicity and frankness, and made no at-,
tempt to score debating points or hide behind apologies.
With the scholar's eye, he related the immediate incid-
ents of the tragedy to the deeper trends. "The history
of India", he said, "has been one of assimilation and
synthesis of the various elements that have come in. . . .
It is perhaps because we tried to go against the trend of
the country's history that we are faced with this. ... It is
for our common good that the situation must be controll-
ed as soon as possible. Otherwise tremendous injury will
be done to both Dominions. This is why we have had
meetings at Ambala, Lahore, etc. Of course it is easier
to come to conclusions at the conference table than to
put them into effect, but still it is extremely helpful that
we have a more or less common policy."

The assembled Diplomats afterwards expressed their ap-
preciation of his objective and moderate approach. Hither-
to they have been without reliable guidance, and this
should do much to restore their confidence in the regime.

218

MISSION WITH MOU NTBATTEN

After the Diplomatic Corps had left J was called in for
a talk with Nehru and Mountballen on the subject of an
alleged statement by Tara Singh which was being given
currency in Pakistan. He is described as using words to
the effect that "This is war". General Thimayya, Area
Commander, is to make a report on what really happen-
ed. Nehru is not unduly disturbed, but Mountbatten
stressed the peri! of letting inflammatory phrases or reports
of phrases in the present crisis pass unchecked.

Nehru then said he proposed to give another Map Room
talk, this time to the Press, and asked me for guidance
on the points I thought he should make. I said that he
should stress the scale of the administrative burden car-
ried by both the central and Last Punjab Governments;
and that in urging on the Press the need to look at the
problem in perspective he should himself help them to
do so by providing as much authoritative data as possible.

While we were talking, a telephone call came through
from Liaquat asking him to come to Lahore for a meet-
ing on the convoy problem. It is assuming serious pro-
portions in view of uncertainly about the Sikh attitude to
a very large Moslem convoy passing through Amrilsar.
Nehru at first was unwilling lo go to Lahore, saying he
could see no use in the visit, but Mountbatten pleaded
with him that it was vital for regular contact between the
two Prime Ministers to be maintained, and declared that
the whole reputation of the Government was at stake on
the successful clearance of this major refugee convoy.
Nehru, convinced by the force of Mountbatten's argu-
ment, finally agreed to go, and, on my suggestion, to say
so at the Press conference.

Already, at the end of the first week of its existence,
the Emergency Committee has launched a formidable ad-
ministrative counter-olfensive against the prevailing chaos.
It has requisitioned civilian transport, dispatched to Pro-
vinces and Slates ready to receive them tens of thousands
of non-Moslem refugees who had cume to Delhi, arrang-
ed for special trains for Moslems to go lo Pakistan, pro-

RESPONSE TO EMERGENCY

vided guards, called for volunteer constables, arranged
for the saving and harvesting of crops from deserted lands,
given orders for the searching, of passengers for arms on
trains and for the slilfening ot punishments for delinquent
military and police guards of trains.

It has cancelled public holidays, including vSundays,
helped to keep going two newspapers as well as All India
Radio, arranged tor Government servants to be brought
to their work and for the telephone system, to be main-
tained, provided guards for hospitals, arranged for the
collecting and burying of corpses found in the streets, for
the movement of food, for the broadcasting of daily offi-
cial bulletins to the Provinces and for large-scale cholera
injections. This is but a random selection showing the
variety and scale of its actions.

(XWhKNMI.NI HOUSr, N1W Dl.Llll,

Saturday, JSth September, 1947
Nehru's Press conference was fairly successful, but he
spoke a 'little too long and was not quite so convincing as
to the Diplomats yesterday. He included most of the
points J was anxious for him to make, but he did not
punch them home quite hard enough, and gave the im-
pression of being — as indeed he is- a very tired man.

Nonc-the-less to see Nehru at close range during this
ordeal is an inspiring experience. He vindicates one's
faith in the humanist and the civilised intellect. Almost
alone in the turmoil of communalism, with all its varia-
tions, from individual intrigue to mass madness, he speaks
with the voice of reason and charily.

The negotiations tor the transfer of power between March
and August did noi seem to me to evoke his full powers.
A certain moodiness and outbursts of exasperation were
the visible signs of overstrain; but now somehow he has
renewed himself, and in this deeper crisis he is shown
at his full stature— passionate and courageous, yet objec-
tive and serene: one of the enlightened elect of our time.

CHAPTER SIXTEEN

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 14th September, 1947
Moi'ntbatten held a Staff Meeting which was largely
taken up with the discussion of the Purana Qila situation.
Patel is apparently on the verge of**deciding to send in a
battalion in order to round up Moslem arms. Mount-
batten argues that any such action would be disastrous
and the surest way to provoke a massacre, and he is at
a loss to understand how any such order could be serious-
ly considered.

At the ten o'clock meeting of the Emergency Council
Patel mentioned prolonged gunfire from some Delhi
houses and pressed for action to clear up resistance poc-
kets. General Lockhart, since 15th August the Com-
mander-in-Chief, said that he could clear up the whole
of Delhi in three days if he could concentrate troops on
this particular job.

\ had a cood talk with Mountbatten, and found him in
his usual buoyant mood. He has been seeing British
troops awaiting repatriation, who told him they hate to sit
around and watch all this misery, powerless to do any-
thing about it. So he suggested that N.C.O.'s and men
should offer their help to organise the camps.* He adds
that he hopes to* phase himself out of the Emergency
Committee in about three weeks, first having the meetings
every other day, and then handing over the chairmanship
to Nehru. He confessed that he is now thankful that he

* Their help proved invaluable and enhanced British prestige
all round.

220

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

took everyone's advice, and did not leave India on 15th
August.

Ismay is back from Karachi. 1 saw him just before
he went in to report to Mount batten on his visit. He
told me it was, lucky he went when he did. He found
Jinnah claiming to have lost all faith in the Government
of India and on the point of breaking off diplomatic re-
lations with it. Of the forty-eight hours lsmay was there
he was closeted with Jinnah for no less than eleven. He
was, incidentally, the first guest at Government House
since the 15th August. He feels that he must have won
the confidence of Jinnah, who called him to his face "a
good fellow", and issued him a cordial invitation to come
and see him whenever he wanted to.

Apparently Jinnah was full of wrath against Congress,
saying that he could never understand these men's hatreds
and was now beginning to feel that there was no alter-
native but to fight it out. Jsmay said he grappled with
him, asserting that he was not given to overstatement but
was ready to stake his life that the Government of India
were determined to put down the troubles to the best of
their ability. They were sincere men, and at the full
stretch in their efforts. Ismay thinks that he has caused
Jinnah to pause on the brink of precipitate action, but
that his visit was only just in time.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 15th September, 1947
At this morning's Staff Meeting there was a round-up
on the general situation arising from Ismay's Karachi visit.
Mountbatten's analysis is that the Moslems and Hindus
are at least under the control of their respective Govern-
ments in approximately equal ratios, but that the Sikhs arc
uncontrollable and even their leaders afraid of them.
V.P/s view was that there was no immediate prospect
of harmony beiween Pakistan and India. Whereupon
Mountbatten visualised the worst case as war between the
two Dominions. If harmony is impossible, at least we

222 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

should try to keep as far away from war as possible.
V.P. felt that even this hope was dissipated, with Jinnah
in his present frame of mind.

Mounlbatten asked about Sikh motives. Was the ob-
jective to set up a Sikh State? V.P. replied no. Poli-
tically they had lost out, and had not even gained the
Jullundur division. Their motive was almost entirely re-
venge. V.P.'s son was operating with three Sikhs who
had lost their families. Their only objective was two
Moslem lives for every one of their relatives'. Tara
Singh, he felt, was essentially a frightened man.

The Emergency Committee meeting was a little better
than yesterday's, but still far too much time was taken
up on small miscellaneous items. Trivedi and the East
Punjab representatives failed to arrive because of bad
weather. Nehru reported on his visit to Lahore yesterday,
and referred to the important decision he and Liaquat had
taken to stop the hold-ups due to the policy of searching
refugees for arms before crossing the boundary. But no
sooner was the meeting over than Liaquat made a speech
alleging that the Government of India was not carrying
out arrangements agreed upon, and asserting, "To-day we
in Pakistan are surrounded on all sides by forces which
are out to destroy us".

Eor the past ten days wc have been completely absorb-
ed in the Punjab cataclysm and the salvage of Delhi. Now
a new crisis is building up from a wholly unexpected
quarter. It has come to our notice that Junagadh, one
of the two hundred and eighty Kathiawar States, failed
to accede to either Dominion on 15th August, and is
now proposing to tlo so to Pakistan, Jinnah concurring
in the act. It is fair to say that in the welter of great
events immediately before and after the transfer of power
Junagadh was simply overlooked and, as a result, is now
bracketed with the two major Stales of Hyderabad and
Kashmir as being outside Patel's "full bag".

Junagadh itself is a veritable patchwork quilt. Some
three thousand three hundred square miles in area, with

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

eighty-two per cent of ils seven hundred thousand in-
habitants Hindu and ils Ruler and Government Moslem,
it is completely surrounded by Stales which have acceded
to India. Inside Junagadh are islands of territory from
these States, and inside these States islands, of Junagadh
territory. Her railways, ports and telegraphs are an in-
tegral part of the Indian system. The Nawab is an eccen-
tric of rare vintage whose preoccupation in life seems to
be his pet dogs, of which he owns eight hundred, each
with its own human attendant. On one occasion he or-
ganised a wedding for two of his dogs, costing three lakhs
of rupees (twenty-one thousand pounds), and a Stale
holiday was proclaimed in honour of the event.

How has all this confusion over Junagadh come about?
At Mount batten's meeting with the Princes on 25th July
the then Dcwan asked a series of questions, none of which
gave any sign of an intention to accede to Pakistan. In-
deed, he went so far as to advise Mountbattcn that he
proposed recommending to the Ruler to accede to India.
Hie Junagadh Government had declared that Junagadh
would make common cause with the other Kathiawar
States, all of which have acceded to India. On the 10th
August, however, just five days before the transfer of
power, there was a coup d'etat. A group of Sindi Mos-
lems took over the Government. Shah Nawaz Bhutto-
became Dewan, and the Nawab a virtual prisoner in his
own palace.

It has been freely recognised that the act of accession
is the prerogative of the Prince. But India's readiness
to recognise such acts was governed by a lime limit of
15th August, which was, of course, the basis of Mount-
batten's urgent appeal to the Princes on 25th July. More-
over, arising from that speech two other powerful 'factors
have always been inherent in the choice of accession-
first, in Mountbatten's own words, certain "geographical
compulsions which cannot be evaded", and secondly, the
communal majorities of the Ruler's subjects.

224

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

Although Junagadh has a sea-board and a small port,
Veraval, and thereby can claim direct access to Karachi,
it is clear that any final decision by the Prince to accede
to Pakistan would automatically be a direct challenge to
the essential validity of the whole accession policy, with
disastrous effects both upon the Kathiawar States and
upon the Hyderabad negotiations, where the Moslem ex-
tremists would be greatly encouraged. Jinnah has clearly
seen the wider possibilities presented by the Junagadh
error of omission. No pressure has been put by the
Government of India on Junagadh to accede, but when the
likelihood of accession to Pakistan loomed large, two for-
mal approaches were made by Delhi to Karachi for some
declaration of Pakistan's intentions. No reply has so
far been received.

Mountbatten called me in for meetings he is having
with Ismay and V.P. on the Junagadh situation. V.P. is
full of anxiety, and tried to persuade Mountbatten of the
desirability of making a military and naval demonstration.
He has prepared a paper based on the assumption that
Pakistan is ready to help Junagadh with men and money.

J went round to see Ismay at his house in the evening,
and found him perturbed by the somewhat feverish at-
mosphere induced by Junagadh. He considered that the
Information Report, assessing Pakistan's likely interven-
tion as a loan of eight crores rupees (some six million
pounds) for the development of Junagadh's port and a
garrison of twenty-five thousand troops, could only be
regarded as childish in the light of her current resources
and commitments.

(X)VERNMLNT HOUSF, NEW DELHI,

Tuesday, 16th September, 1947
We are advised that the Junagadh Accession has been
sealed, signed and delivered to Karachi, but this is not
yet an official certainty. I was present at a further meet-
ing which Mountbatten had with Ismay and V.P. Ismay
spoke with great cogency about Jinnah's probable tactics

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

225

and strategy over Junagadh. Clearly on its face value the
State is worthless to him. It is an impossible military
liability. By no stretch of the imagination is it his policy
to incorporate isolated pockets of Moslems, for there are
already some forty million of them outside the Pakistan
homeland.

Ismay sees the move essentially as one of traps; and
teasings on Jinnah's part. He hopes by luring India into
a militant reaction to secure a verdict on legal points and
to create a valuable precedent for any attitude he may
care to adopt towards the far greater Princely objectives
of Kashmir and Hyderabad. For Junagadh is in some
respects, Hyderabad in miniature — a Moslem Prince and
oligarchy ruling over a predominantly Hindu State in the
middle of Indian territory.

I have prepared the draft communique on the Junagadh
situation. The Indian case on paper is strong enough,
but as for possible Press reaction, I have felt obliged to
give this warning. ''Although the above arguments are
cogent in themselves, 1 doubt whether they would out-
weigh the damaging impression that would be created
with the Foreign Press by joining issue to the point of
military demonstration at this time. Any such action
however justified would almost certainly be regarded as
precipitate and aggressive. The Foreign Press are very
much on the qui vive for warlike policy on the part of
the two new Dominions." I urged that from the Public
Relations viewpoint the immediate step should be no
more than a straightforward non-recognition statement, the
Government reserving to itself its future freedom of ac-
tion, but leaving open the possibility of full negotiation.

On the Punjab sector of Indo-Pakistan relations Nehru
has replied with commendable moderation to Liaquat's
stormy utterances in Lahore. The Indian leaders, he
declared, had sought to avert Partition, but once it was
decided upon the Government had tried to discharge faith-
fully all the obligations flowing from that decision. He
spoke of derelictions of duty on both sides of the frontier,

226

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

which he and his coJJeagues condemned and were resolved
to eliminate.

Al the Fmergency Committee to-day Mountbatten has
gained his point, and the Committee is now to meet every
other day. There was an important discussion on the
Delhi refugees. Dr. Zakir Hussain, chairman of the Mos-
lem Refugees Committee, gave a disquieting report on
the current situation, urging lhat the present influx of re-
fugees into the camps must somehow be stopped. Disease
was breaking out; there were some fifty thousand already
in the Purana Qila; sixteen thousand had been moved
from the Ridge to Humayun's Tomb, but ten thousand
more had promptly turned up there.

U)VT.RN MI NT HOUSL, NI.W DFL1II.

Wednesday, 17th September, 1947
Mountbatten had long talks with both Nehru and Palel
prior to the crucial Cabinet meeting this afternoon on
Junagadh. He summoned all his powers of persuasion to
head them off any decision which the world could inter-
pret as putting India in the wrong, or any commitment
to an act of war against what was now Pakistan territory.
He reiterated lsmav's thesis that the whole manoeuvre was
almost certainly a trap and part of a wider campaign
which Jinnah might be expected to launch for the express
purpose of presenting Pakistan to the world as the in-
nocent weak State threatened by the ruthless aggressor.
He urged them to stand by the principle of a referendum
both to discover the people's will and to disavow any in-
tention of annexing territory.

Mountbatten had #o difficulty in carrying Nehru with
him at once, but it took rather longer to persuade Patel,
whose whole Accession policy, as well as his personal
emotions, were more closely atTected by Junagadh. How-
ever he, too, was duly convinced by Mounlbatten's argu-
ments, and in particular by the impressions Tsmay had
formed of Jinnah's mood and motives. They both went
straight into the Cabinet to explain their new point of

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

227

view and, although they must have taken their colleagues
by surprise, ( understand they soon gained the day for
a cautious approach. The two decisions of substance taken
at the meeting were that Indian and local troops of ac-
ceding States should be disposed round Junagadh but
should not occupy it, and that V. P. should visit the Slate
to explain to the Nawab and Dewan the implications of
their accession to Pakistan.

GOVERNMENT HOUSF, W W DELHI,

Friday, 19th September, 1947
Liaquat is here as guest of the Government of India.
It has been agreed under the new dispensation that dis-
tinguished Government guests should stay with the Go-
vernor-General.

In the afternoon, B. L. Sharma, Unni Nayar and my-
self met Colonel Majid Malik to try to work out ways
and means of improving Press facilities and liaison in
the East and West Punjab. No hint was given to us at
this meeting that Liaquat had invited a number of Foreign
correspondents to meet him after dinner to-night in his
suite at Government House. T may say that Lady Mount-
batten, somewhat startled by a request for drinks for
twenty in Liaquat's room after dinner, had asked me
whether I had any clue as to the reason, f could throw
no light on the mystery until a few minutes later — B. L.
Sharma rang me up in some agitation for details about
Liaquat's kt Press conference".

The Mountbattens were on the point of going into din-
ner with their guests, who included both Nehru and Lia-
quat. T at once pushed through an urgent message.
"Sharma, who is very worried, advises me that the meet-
ing is to be confined to Foreign correspondents. He
thinks it will be exploited by the Tndian Press, who will
say that the Prime Minister of Pakistan has made Go-
vernment House a base for propaganda by inviting the
Foreign Press and omitting them/' I also drew attention
to the difficulties involved in inviting and selecting re-

228

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

presentatives of the Indian Press at this last moment and
in keeping the conference wholly off-the-record. In so
far as I considered the situation to be most embarrassing
and liable to cause much misunderstanding, 1 felt the best
solution would be to invite Liaquat to call his party off
on grounds of pressure of work.

This message brought the Mountbattens and Nehru
straight out into the adjoining study, where, with the zest
of a schoolboy, Mountbatten said he would tackle Liaquat
over dinner if, and only if, Nehru would agree to play his
part by converting the occasion into a joint off-the-record
session, in which case he himself was prepared to take
the chair. The meeting should be put back half an hour,
and I was to gather in a limited last-minute list of Indian
correspondents. Nehru, I think, derived almost aesthetic
satisfaction from the beauty of this plan and his usually
sad expression gave way to a smile and the hint of a
wink. At all events he found Mountbatten's proposal
irresistible, as Liaquat did over dinner!

The conference itself was a tremendous success, and al-
though no word of it could be quoted, it brought fresh
hope and faith at a decisive moment to correspondents
many of whom were seriously beginning to wonder
whether any will to peace was to be found at any level
within the two Dominions.

Mountbatten got the proceedings off to a good start.
The two Prime Ministers, he said, had come together be-
cause there was much common ground between them.
"That is not to say that cither wants to help the other Do-
minion for its own sake, but both know that unless they
come to grips with th*e difficulties confronting them there
is danger of anarchy that will be disastrous to both."

Nehru stressed that in spite of all the developments of
the past few months, the main problem was economic.
"The other trouble will pass, but this we must solve or
it will solve or dissolve us." The talk of war that was
going around was "completely wild and absurd. If war

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

229

should come all our dreams of prosperity would collapse
for a generation."

Liaquat was no less explicit. "1 agree that talk of war
is absurd," he said; "if war should come it would be
ruinous to both India and Pakistan; even more, it would
mean another world war. None can contemplate that with
equanimity. Pakistan wants peace for all nations but es-
pecially with India. We are, after all, two parts of the
subcontinent. We could never dream of waging war
against India."

Bob Trumbull, of the New York Times, asked Nehru
how the immediate psychological problem was to be
solved? "The first thing," Nehru replied, "is to reduce
fear, the most enervating of emotions. Once we have
done that we can get on with other things, and the normal
factors of life will resume operation." Nehru was asked
if he was satisfied that he had complete control of his
Government for the implementation of his policy, and
if the British were doing all they could to help? Were
both the Prime Ministers satisfied that the other Govern-
ment was doing all in its power to remedy the situation?

Nehru responded with a brief dissertation on London
School of Economies lines. "I am not satisfied with any-
thing in India, and have not been for thirty years. Of
course we must meet the situation in every way we can,
partly by psychology and partly by force. If I may draw
on my Socialist background, what is happening now is to
a large extent an upheaval in the lower middle classes —
the classes that first supported Hitler. When society is
upset, strange elements come to the surface. Sometimes
these are fascist or fascist-inclined. These groups take ad-
vantage of the situation. Undoubtedly there has been a
communal trend in what has happened, but the Uend now
is away from killings and towards increased looting. There
are instances of Sikhs looting Sikh shops, Hindus looting
Hindu property and Moslems looting Moslems. In a sense
this is worse, but in another way it is a hopeful sign. It

230

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

is something we can deal with by persuasion or force, and
that is* the way we must deal with it."

Liaquat showed himself to be in general agreement with
this thesis. The only qualification he made was in reply
to a question to them both as to how these "brown-shirt"
elements were to be combatted and the initiative taken
back from them. "J don't agree," Liaquat said, "that
the young elements in the Moslem League have the initia-
tive. Besides, we are taking steps to restore discipline in
the League. That is the important point." Asked if the
two Dominions would welcome foreign capital and techni-
cal assistance in the task of recovery from this disruption,
Nehru replied, "Of course we shall welcome foreign capi-
tal and technical assistance for our development but not
foreign vested interest". To which Liaquat added, "Same
for us".

Everyone went away feeling that the two Prime Minis-
ters had risen above prevailing hatreds and shown them-
selves to be men of constructive outlook and compatible
temperament. In the last analysis they were both moder-
ates who had drunk deep of Western thought, and who
were more effectively inoculated than some of their col-
leagues against l he communal virus.

GOVI-RNMl.NT HOUSI", NI/W DM,HI,

Saturday, 20th September, 1947
Constitutional Governor-Generalship brings no respite,
and Mountbatten seems fated to have to juggle with three
or four crises at once. Jn the midst of all the preoccupa-
tions with the Punjab and Junagadh, Walter Moncklon
has just arrived at government House with the rest of
the Hyderabad delegation- -spokesmen of the Nizam's
strange statecraft— for a further meeting with Mount-
batten. The Ittehad-ul-Muslimeen — the extremist Mos-
lem organisation in the State, which has been playing an
increasingly powerful role in the formation of Hydera-
bad's policy since the transfer of power — got to work
again on the Nizam while he was in a recalcitrant mood

SHADOW OF JUNAGADH

231

in a further effort to secure Monckton's removal. Monck-
ton was in Delhi at the time, but after he had returned
to warn the Council of the perils of a breakdown and of
his own intention of leaving immediately for England, the
Illehad at the last minute seems to have been somewhat
frightened by its own handiwork, and to have pleaded
with him in forcible terms that if he were to leave them
now it would be a disaster. Mounlbatten is still hopeful
that all will be well, even though little more than three
weeks is left of the two months extension.

At to-day's meeting, which V. P. attended, the delega-
tion stressed the importance attached by the Nizam to
the distinction between accession and association. Acces-
sion, they felt, would lead to bloodshed. They were also
frightened of interference from outside. Both Mounlbatten
and V. P. gave assurances that their fears were without
substance, that the Indian Government had behaved cor-
rectly, and that its resources were at the Ruler's disposal
if required to deal with disturbances. Mounlbatten warn-
ed that unless agreement could be reached by the 15ih
October, breakdown must be envisaged, which would, he
thought, be serious enough for India, but even more so
for Hyderabad. The delegation has depositee! some Heads
of Agreement which are designed more to keep the ball
in play than to decide the match.

Monckton said afterwards that he felt there was no
fundamental difference of approach between Mountbatten
and himself. He would continue to look for the formula
which would allow statutory independence for Hydera-
bad, and which, while containing no direct reference to
the word "accession", would incorporate it on a de facto
basis. Hyderabad, he added, was in no position to play
the role of the fullv fledged sovereign State. Provided the
negotiations do not break down completely, he thinks that
the Nizam will press him to stay on a little longer, but his
decision to do so or not depends upon whether he can
see a reasonable hope of achieving a compromise. If
there is any such prospect he feels he ought to stay, if

232

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

only because peace and order in the State may largely
depend on his availability. But if not, it would be useless
for him to remain. Both the Nizam and his Government
are very volatile statesmen, pursuing a very inconsistent
and wavering line of policy.

CHAPTER SEVENTEEN

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 21st September, 1947
This morning at 7.15 a party of sixteen left Palam air-
field by the Governor-General's Dakota to make a round
tour of some four hundred miles over the routes of the
great refugee migrations between the East and West Pun-
jab. The Government House party included the Mount-
battens, Ismay, Vernon and myself. The Government
witnesses were Nehru, Patel, Neogy, Rajkumari Amrit
Kaur, General Lockhart, H. M. Patel and Shankar. As
we approached the Ravi we had our first aerial vision of
the scale of this desperate exodus. We were looking
down on one of the greatest movements of population in
recorded history, and then only on a small segment of it.

Hindus, Sikhs and Moslems have before now, in res-
ponse to some crisis, gathered up their worldly goods and
moved away, but these earlier treks were usually limited
to one community, and there was always the expectation
that the wanderers^ would ultimately come back to their
home-land. To-day, however, there is this difference:
the numbers on the move are incomparably greater than
ever before, and this time there will be no return.

We struck the first great caravanserai between Feroze-
pur and Balloki Head, and pursued it far across the Ravi.
We flew, in fact, for over fifty miles against this stream
of refugees without reaching its source. Every now and

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

233

then the density of bullock-carts and families on foot
keeping to the thin life-line of the road would tail away,
only to fill out again in close columns without end.

At Balloki Head, the actual boundary, the refugees
waiting to cross the bridge overflowed and took on the
appearance of a squatters' township. Here they had been
brought to a standstill, but the general movement was
very slow, and we could see men on horseback passing
up and down who seemed to be giving some coherence,
if not command, to the closely packed mass. At the
roadside some families were flanked by their cattle, in
many cases their only worldly asset, but few, if any,
would be able to pass their livestock across the bridge.
Already the flow of human traffic across it was beyond
any conceivable capacity for which it had been built.

As we flew back into India we came down low over
the northernmost of the Moslem refugee convoys making
its slow and painful way along the main Lyallpur-Lahore
road. Their exodus brought them across the Beas River,
and involved an elaborate detour to save them from pass-
ing through Amritsar. We estimated that it took us just
over a quarter of an hour to fly from one end to the other
of this particular column at a flying speed of about a
hundred and eighty miles per hour. This column there-
fore must have been at least forty-five miles long.

At the conference on Sunday, Nehru and Liaquat had
told us how, to begin with, they had set their faces against
any wholesale transfer of populations, but how events
had rapidly become too large for them and had dictated
the course of their policy.

To-day we saw for ourselves something of the stupend-
ous scale of the Punjab upheaval. Even our brief bird's-
eye view must have revealed nearly half a million refugees
on the roads. At one point during our flight Sikh and
Moslem refugees were moving almost side by side in op-
posite directions. There was no sign of clash. As though
impelled by some deeper instinct, they pushed forward
obsessed only with the objective beyond the boundary.

234

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 22rui September, 1947

At this morning's Emergency Committee, Cabinet
Ministers took a rather firmer and more urgent view than
hitherto or the need to defend refugee trains. Tn the past
few hours reports have come in of no fewer than four
serious attacks on refugee trains, two on Moslems in .lul-
lundur and at the Beas bridge and two on non-Moslems
in the Lahore area. There was anxious discussion on the
measures needed to tackle these bestial outrages.

During his visit Liaquat had referred to one train start-
ing off with two thousand passengers, of whom only seven
hundred had arrived at the other end, and of another
completely lacking in any water supplies for a three-day
journey. As in all these train horror stories, there is the
usual factual confusion and difficulty in securing reliable
data. In the meanwhile rumours fan hatreds.

One encouraging factor is that both the Governments
of the United Provinces and East Punjab are showing
strength in their resolve to tackle the disorders. Collective
fines on villages which are known to be involved in these
attack* are being imposed and levied within twenty-four
hours. Should night trains be abandoned? In the effort
to provide protection for passengers at night, sizeable
Army contingents were involved. During one of the in-
cidents several officers and sixty-four men had been en-
gaged in a desperate hand-to-hand struggle.

As the debate continued. Mount batten raised the wider
issues- -the need for establishing the proper priorities be-
tween the general maintenance of law and order and the
rapid movement of refugees. He went further, and asked
what was to be done after the refugee movement was
over. More troubles might easily flow from failure to
tackle these questions with the utmost urgency and on
an all-Jndia basis. We must know now what the plans
for them arc, and planning meant what is being done not
only for to-day, but for next week and far beyond. Where
will they go? Will it be an orderly settlement? Will it

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

235

be dominated by black market, corruption and squeeze?
This raised one of the greatest administrative probJcms
in history. In a few days the head of the great fifty-mile
column would have crossed the border. They were leav-
ing the rich colony district of the Punjab. They were not
going to a Promised Land. Their new home was superior
only in that it provided physical safety.

Matthai said that the first two phases of the refugee
problem — where to move them on arrival and how to
feed them for the next six months --were the most diffi-
cult. The longer-term planning, he felt, was relatively
easier. What arrangements, he asked, had been made
for getting in the next harvest? Neogy said that many
refugees had been attracted by the standing crops, and
were spreading out to gather them. Some fifty thousand
had already done so. He added that he was drawing up
a scheme for collective farming. But. Mountbatten warn-
ed, there are at least two hundred thousand rcfueees in
the convoy we saw yesterday, and immediate feeding
arrangements will be needed for them. Patel remarked
that there was three months' food in the East Punjab,
but that the distribution of it was the real problem.

During this prolonged discussion Ismay whispered to
me that all this really should be thrashed out in Cabinet
committee under the Prime Minister's chairmanship; but
I must say that I am inclined to think that it still needs
Mountbatten's presence to provide the sense of urgency
and establish the correct priorities.

OOVIRNMINI" IHH'SI", N LW DELHI,

Tuesday, 23rd September, 1947
To-day's biggest development has been Jinnah's appeal
to the Commonwealth to intervene in Pakistan's disputes
with India. Nehru has apparently written a moderate and
statesman-like reply. As with all Jinnalfs major policy
decisions, it would seem to be carefully timed and to
coincide significantly with reports that have been reach-
ing me from Foreign correspondents of an upsurge of

236 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

anti-British feeling and comment in Pakistan. These in-
clude newspaper attacks on British officers on much the
same lines as in India, assertions that the present troubles
are mainly due to a British-Banya alliance, and criticism
of Mountbatten himself, who is alleged to be disgruntled
at not having achieved the double Governor-Generalship.
It is noted that these themes are not discouraged in high
places, and that the formation of public opinion on such
matters is in the hands of very few. I get the impression
that with his approach to the Commonwealth, which can
only be a source of embarrassment in all the Dominion
capitals, Jinnah may well be over-playing his hand. India,
however, is in danger of doing just the same thing over
Junagadh. The Jam Sahib of Nawanagar has just in-
dulged in a bellicose Press conference calling for "coats
otf" and "no non-resistance", etc.

The Amritsar situation is still very grave. Cholera has
broken out, and the train attacks continue. Yesterday's
decision to cancel all trains passing by Amritsar has been
discussed to-day at the highest level, and Nehru, after
consultations with Mountbatten, has confirmed that the
decision is still in force. Telephonic communication with
Amritsar is very difficult, but I succeeded on behalf of
the Associated Press of India, who had been completely
baffled in their attempts to get through, in securing from
their local correspondent the text of a joint Peace Appeal
from the two Sikh leaders, Tara Singh and Oodham Singh.
Without Government House priorities, the "Appeal"
might have been indefinitely delayed, but high import-
ance was placed both by Mountbatten and Government
circles on its rapid publication. The tone of their langu-
age had, in keeping with their patriarchal appearance,
much more of an Old than New Testament ring about
it. After boldly denouncing shameful attacks upon women
and children, they added fiercely, "We do not desire
friendship of the Moslems, and we may never befriend
them. We may have to fight again, but we shall fight a
clean fight, man killing man."

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

237

What effect this crude appeal will have on their follow-
ers it is difficult for anyone who has not made a close
study of Sikh psychology to say. Both are undoubtedly
big men in the complicated hierarchy of Sikh religious
politics. The trouble is that the situation, as at other
moments of supreme crisis in Sikh history, seems to have
passed out of control of the leaders. Billy Short explain-
ed to me how the essence of the teaching of Guru Nanak,
the founder of Sikhism, was "Where five of you are
gathered together, there am 1." The Sikh tradition, ac-
cordingly, is one of cell formation and spontaneous local
leadership. Here is the source at once of Sikh strength
and weakness. In the higher reaches of command the
prevailing atmosphere is one of indiscipline and intrigue,
and Short considers that authority is passing from the
older leaders, such as Tara, Oodham and Giani Kartar
Singh, to a number of younger men, chiefly ex-rndian
National Army officers.

The Sikh leaders are at great pains to describe the
Hindus as their brothers, but there are not many out-
ward signs of brotherly love, and Tara Singh has been
almost equally vehement in his dissatisfaction with the
East as with the West Punjab Government. Jf Partition
has meant immense economic sacrifice for the Sikhs, it
also entails political concentration. Lying within easy
reach of Delhi, they may comprise after the mass migra-
tion some fifty per cent of the total population of the new
East Punjab Province.

Informed observers see in this situation all the ingredi-
ents of a Sikh nationalist movement, and consider that
already the solution which has been mooted of creating
a new Indian province of Sikhistan fails to measure up to
Sikh demands. One complication, however, is the attitude
and status of the Sikh Princes. Led by the Maharaja of
Patiala, they can be expected to co-operate more willing-
ly with the Government of India, and are far from en-
thusiastic about the aims of the Sikh party leaders. They

238

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

may well hold the balance of power in this obscure
struggle.

Billy Short has been working with the energy of a
beaver to secure a Sikh-Moslem truce, and there is to be
a meeting at Lahore to-morrow at which it is hoped Tara
Singh will be present, lsmay is ready to play a mediating
role should the occasion warrant it.

(iOVT.RNMhN I HOUSF, NI1W DfcUII,

Wednesday, 24th September, 1947
At to-day's Emergency Committee there was another
general discussion of policy on refugee movements. Chetty
urged that top priority should be given to the clearing of
Delhi, and went so far as to say that he wanted refugees
to be stopped from coming into the city, and all non-Delhi
refugees - Moslem and non-Moslem — already in to be en-
couraged to leave. Nehru turned to the need for the rapid
creation of the new East Punjab capital city. He was
convinced that there were many who would want to go
to-day, a large proportion of them people of substance.

Palel, the administrative realist, argued that top priority
should be given to keeping the trains going and to the
evacuation of the refugee camps, which he said were "re-
servoirs of discontent". Mountbatten believed that an
even more urgent problem than the resumption of the
trains was the slowness of the progress of the refugee
columns and the need to get them movinc asain. He went
on to say that there was still. far too high a premium on
lawlessness. We must reassert the civic sense. As far as
he knew, there was still no single instance of a trial either
for murder or arson committed during the present trou-
bles. There was also, he felt, the failure of the hitherto
famous Intelligence system. What steps were being taken
to remedy this?

Disquieting reports have been reaching Mountbatten
about the morale and treatment of British officers. They
have had to tackle overwhelming disturbances while lack-
ing the military power or civil support from either side to

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

23$

suppress them. The feeling has grown that their effort is
entirely unrecognised. They have had to serve without
the basic amenities, particularly mail. Mount batten and
Ismay have both been pressing Nehru and Jinnah to issue
statements paying tributes to their work. Jinnah replied
frankly that he considered the reference he made in his
speech at the banquet in Karachi on 13th August was
sufficient.

The problem has now become acute as a result of a
statement to-day made by the influential Liberal leader
Pandit Kunzru, who is reported as saying that had British
officers acted impartially, the situation would probably
have been brought under control in the East Punjab. He
also alleged that a British officer had been responsible for
not preventing a large number of casualties in the Sheik-
hupura massacre at the end of August. JVlountbatlen rang
Nehru at once about these grave allegations, pointing out
that the statement as reported was both untrue and libell-
ous, and that unless it was immediately refuted the posi-
tion of British officers in the Indian Army would become
unbearable. Nehru promised to make an early statement.
Whereupon Gandhi intervened to suggest that perhaps a
better way would be for Kunzru himself to make a public
retraction. Jsmay, however, is not satisfied with this solu-
tion, which in his view meets the demand of Indian but
not of British opinion, and he has persuaded, Nehru to
issue a statement based on reliable evidence which cate-
gorically denies that the culprit at Sheikhupura was of
British nationality. The whole incident shows that good-
will is still a delicate plant, but one which Nehru is al-
ways ready to nourish.

(iOVLRN Ml NT HOUSK NI.W DI I.HI,

Friday. 26th September, 1947
Unwittingly Gandhi seems to have added to the gene-
ral tension, for during his Prayer Meeting this evening he
made passing reference to the possibility of war with
Pakistan in an address otherwise wholly devoted to his

240

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

worship of God as truth and non-violence, but the phrase
in question, "If Pakistan persistently refuses to see its
proved error and continues to minimise it the Indian Gov-
ernment would have to go to war against it," has touch-
ed a raw nerve, and undoubtedly aroused intense and
almost scared speculation among the Press, and will al-
most certainly find its way into the world's headlines to-
morrow.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

Saturday, 27th September, 1947
Mountbatten received a letter the other day from a Mr.
Karda, pointing out the difficulties listeners to the All
India Radio were experiencing in hearing the programmes
and recordings of Mahatma Gandhi's words at his
Prayer Meetings. This has led Mountbatten, who feels
that these daily messages, with the exception of yester-
day's, on which he immediately tackled Gandhi, are one
of the great factors for the creation of confidence and
sanity, to raise the matter with Gandhi personally, and
to instruct me to follow it up in more detail. The out-
come is that [ have had a revealing and, 1 think, valu-
able talk with Gandhi ji at Birla House this afternoon.

As I came into the room he was busy writing a note,
and did noj look up. When he did so he coughed rather
heavily, "See — this is how I greet you!" I had been told
during the morning that the interview would have to be
postponed. But he now explained that the message that
1 should not come had been sent without his authority,
and that he had it altered, as he was not so ill that he
could not talk to rile. He said that Mountbatten had
not actually discussed with him the possibility of his mak-
ing a studio broadcast, but had merely handed over the
letter from Mr. Karda at the end of their last talk, sug-
gesting that 1 should explain the position to him.

I began by pointing out that the broadcast reception
of his Prayer Meetings was by no means satisfactory.
The great listening audience eagerly awaiting his guidance

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

241

were not always hearing very much of what he v said. Often
not more than one word in five came through. A num-
ber of special problems were involved in maintaining the
audibility of outside broadcasts. There was the extra-
neous noise of the meeting itself. No doubt it was
necessary at times for the Mahatma to turn his head away
from the microphone. I did not add that his voice was
very low and his tempo very fast. I pointed out that
although wireless was a tremendously powerful medium
for direct contact with the mass as individuals, very few
of the world's leaders had fully exploited it. 1 consider-
ed that it would greatly help in pacifying public opinion
if he could be prevailed upon to make a studio broadcast
over All India Radio.

Gandhi's initial reaction was against the idea. "To
make a set speech in a studio would be for me theatrical,
f need to express myself through a living audience,
whether it consists of five, or five lakhs." I explained
that it was not necessary for him to go to a studio, and
that the broadcast could be made just as well where he
was sitting now in the form of a dialogue with his friends.
He returned to his objection that the speech would have
to be prepared in advance. This was contrary to his
method of speaking spontaneously what was in his mind.

I replied that although a set script within a time limit
was the normal procedure for radio talks, in his case,
with his tremendous authority, the deepest* impression
would be conveyed if he spoke extempore for as long as
he liked. He said he had often passed All India Radio,
which he understood was one of the most up to date,
even by European standards, but he had never been inside.
He assumed that 1 had in mind only one special broad-
cast. I replied that I had not presumed to suggest more,
but if he could be prevailed upon to speak periodically,
T was sure that the impact on opinion would be even
greater. "J have never really given full consideration to
talking over the wireless," he said. "I would like two
or three days to ponder over the arguments you have put

MISSION WITH M O U N r i BATTEN

forward. There are many hurdles to jump before I can
make up my mind, but I think you have jumped over
the first of them."

He then turned to wider themes. He said that what
worried him most was that the trouble here in Delhi and
the Punjab seemed to be deeper. He was unwilling to
admit that his and Suhrawardy's influence had been deci-
sive in Calcutta, and would not in fact feel confident
about his own influence unless he achieved a measure of
success here. He described in detail how he and Suhra-
wardy had started on their joint enterprise in Calcutta.
Suhrawardy had shown great courage and endurance. His
appearance in Gandhi's Ashram was a dramatic depar-
ture from the comfortable mode of life to which he was
accustomed. By pledging himself on behalf of the Mos-
lem minority, he had willingly accepted both discomfort
and danger.

f suggested that the difference, perhaps, between Cal-
cutta and Delhi was that he had been present in Calcutta
to grip the crisis at the outset, whereas he had only ar-
rived here when the troubles, were in full Hood. He said
that this was not wholly true. There had already been
quite a long sequence of disturbances before he and
Suhrawardy set to work. The fact was that somehow
the atmosphere in Calcutta was favourable to his influ-
ence; but here at present it was not. He spoke of the
angry man <who had asked him the day before how it was
that if he really was a Mahatma and a miracle-worker
he could not put matters right : "I dealt with him yester-
day, as you no doubt saw." Gandhiji said he was pro-
foundly anxious ab#»ut the communal situation. Unless
checked, the climax could only be that no Moslem could
regard himself as safe living in India and no Sikh or Hindu
in Pakistan.

During the latter part of our talk Rajkumari Amrit
Kaur and the famous Miraben (Miss Slade) came in,
and a young girl throughout took a full note of the con-
versation. Of his Calcutta adventure— one of the most

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

243

dramatic achievements of his life — he had spoken with
real zest. Clearly the incongruity of his association with
Suhrawardy had appealed to his ever-present sense of
humour. His eyes sparkled as he described the details
of their joint bargain. One docs not come away with
the impression of a very old man in his dotage, or even
anecdotage, but of one who lives with the intensity of
youth and retains the boyish sense of fun which tragedy
and the passing of time cannot wither.

GOVI RNMI.NT HOUSII, NI-.W DhUII.

Sunday, 2tith September, 1947
Throughout my talk with Gandhi yesterday he showed
himself to be wholly unperturbed by the stir which his
Prayer-Meeting reference to war had produced. Speak-
ing again last night, he was at great pains to put the
phrase into perspective, as he had promised Mountbatten
he would. Gandhian dialectic claimed that indication of
when a cause for war could arise between the two States
was designed not to promote war but to avoid it as far
as possible. His final plea was simply, "India knows,
and the world should know, that every ounce of my
energy has been and is being directed to the definite
avoidance of fratricide culminating in war". This is un-
doubtedly the truth, but so great is his influence that his
words assume a prophetic and almost mesmeric power.
The concept of war is so repugnant to his nature that the
use of the word at all by him was bound to be given
special significance by the Press and public.

Sir Archibald Carter, the Permanent Under-Secretary
of the Commonwealth Relations Office, is at Government
House on the last lap of a big Eastern tour he has been
making. The idea has been mooted that Ismay should
return home with him to give a personal report oif deve-
lopments here since the transfer of power. Mountbatlen
considers that such a visit is urgently needed at this time,
if London is to see the critical first six weeks of Independ-
ence in their proper perspective. Moreover, he called

244 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

me in this afternoon to say that he thought I could once
again usefully supplement Ismay's contribution to enlight-
enment by giving background guidance to my various con-
tacts. Relations between the British correspondents in
Delhi and the new Government have been far from happy,
and some objective third-party view might well be of help
to London editors. Indeed, it has already been neces-
sary for me to invoke Mounlbatten's help in promoting
better understanding. He took the chair at a meeting
at Government House on Friday between Nehru and Patel
and representatives of the Foreign correspondents to dis-
cuss the growing list of outstanding grievances. After
some plain speaking on both sides, an immediate break-
down was averted and dangerous suspicions largely dissi-
pated.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 29th September, 1941
Mountbatten's day has been taken up with important
policy conferences over Junagadh and the Punjab. The
Junagadh crisis looks more and more like a highly ex-
plosive game of chess, with the State, its neighbours and
satellites providing the chequer-board, and Karachi and
Delhi moving the pieces. Tsmay, from the conversations
he had with Liaquat during his last visit to Delhi, is
quite convinced that Pakistan's strategy is to use the whole
Junagadh contest as a bargaining counter for Kashmir.
This interpretation is borne out by a significant remark
Liaquat made to Mountbatten on the same visit. "All
right," he told him. "Let India go ahead and commit
an act of war, ancf see what happens."

The first move was V.P.'s visit to the State ten days
ago, which produced only limited results. He met the
Dewan, who told him that the Nawab was indisposed,
and therefore could not see him. However, the Sheikh
of the small State of Mangrol, which up to the transfer
of power had been under the suzerainty of Junagadh, used
the occasion of V.P.'s presence in the neighbourhood to

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

245

get away from his own State and voluntarily to accede
to India, thus following Babariawad, which had already
acceded. But the Sheikh, on his return to Mangrol,
which coincided with V.P.'s to Delhi, found himself ob-
liged to renounce his accession. On the 22nd the Gov-
ernment of India decided that the circumstances in which
the letter of renunciation was written were such as to
justify them ignoring it. Junagadh followed up this
bloodless victory over Mangrol by sending troops into
Babariawad.

These developments were near enough to a checkmate
to infuriate Patel, who considers that an act of war has
already been committed by Junagadh in sending troops
to Babariawad, and that India should take all the neces-
sary steps to oust them. Indeed, unless there is a show
of strength and readiness in the last resort to use it, he is
ready to resign. Just as Kashmir is close to Nehru's
heart, so Junagadh is part of Patel's homeland. It is
easy to dismiss this as mere provincialism, but it is neces-
sary always to remind oneself that the concept of India
as a nation is by European standards of geography and
population considerably larger than life.

Mountbatten wrote to Nehru yesterday making the dis-
tinction between the planning of and preparation for mili-
tary operations and their actual execution, stressing that
a direct conflict between the two Dominions would not
only undermine their moral reputation, but also put their
physical survival in deadly peril. This advice is accept-
able from Mountbatten. Unfortunately, the three Chiefs
of Staff, who are all British, in their appreciation of the
Junagadh situation, have quite independently underlined
the Governor-General's estimate of the danger to a point
where they have clearly overstepped the boundary be-
tween military and political advice. Thus further fuel
has been added to Patel's indignation.

To avoid any further confusion of this nature, while
at the same time to minimise the general risk of false
decision and precipitate action by the Government,

246

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Mountbatten has recommended the establishment of a
Defence Committee of the Cabinet. Within this context
he has in mind ancillary committees such as the Chiefs
of Staff Committee, Joint Intelligence and Joint Planning
Committees; but he has at the same time propounded
one vital modification of the British practice in which
ihe Chief of the Imperial General Staff is wholly divorced
from Operational Command. He has insisted that India
would do better to adopt procedure whereby from each
of the three Services one and the same officer should
double the role of Commander-in-Chief and Chief of
Staff. Nehru and Patel approved this idea, and lsmay
has been asked to draft a paper elaborating its organisa-
tion in time for to-morrow's Cabinet.

As for Junagadh, Mountbatten has urged an interme-
diate course which allows for military reinforcement to
continue, bul only in undisputed territory around the State.
He has also asked that I.iaqual should be advised of the
scope and nature of all impending troop movements to
Kalhiawar. finally he wants a clear public statement
that India will accept the verdict of the popular will in
all States where accession is in dispute.

He raised some big questions this morning. Transla-
tion from central to provincial spheres of duty may well
have been behind his plaintive plea that k4 No paper plans
work out". He says covered accommodation for at least
live lakhs (five hundred thousand) will be needed this
winter, and he posed the problem whether this covered
accommodation should have priority over the use of vil-
lage schools and homes. Building resources do not allow
of proceeding at full throttle with both. He wants the
new hast Punjab Capital to be designed to hold a million
people. He agrees that it should start from scratch.
Mountbatten strongly advised that whatever land is se-
lected should be fro/en and no freeholds allowed, other-
wise it would become a speculators' paradise.

Trivedi next uirned to the security of the canals along
the Indo-Pakistan boundary. The standstill agreement

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

247

by which they have been controlled since 15th August
is not working. Shots have been fired on workers. Who
is responsible? Surely not the Pakistan Army? General
Lockhart said the Pakistan Army was undoubtedly in a
state of alert and expecting immediate invasion from the
Bast Punjab. Trivedi replied that he had been expecting
an identical attack from the West. Somehow confidence
must be re-established. The proposal is that there should
be a twice-weekly meeting with Mudie, the West Punjab
Governor, the two Prime Ministers and the Area Com-
manders.

The train situation was discussed. The trouble-centre
is now between Ludhiana and Amritsar, and there have
been serious breakdowns along the main-line East route.
Some of the Sikh Princes are adding to Trivedi's difficul-
ties. Kapurthala pushed a column of refugees from his
State into the main column without warning the East
Punjab Government, and there were heavy casualties from
starvation, while there has been a similar ruthless removal
of Moslems from Faridkot.

At lunch to-day Trivedi told us that Sikhs and Moslems
pass each other on the road and show fraternal unity in
criticising their own Governments! I sat next to Mr.
Thapar, an East Punjab Government official, who has been
making a close study of the whole casualty position. It
is, of course, notorious that refugees, principal victims of
atrocities, make very unreliable eye-witnesses. When-
ever it has been possible to check the facts, the assess-
ment of casualties by eye-witnesses has proved to be in-
flated more than a hundred-fold.

In Mr. Thapar's considered view it is most unlikely
that the total casualties of killed and wounded will turn
out to be more than one per cent of the total population
in the area of disturbance.

The troubles which had in fact started in Rawalpindi
and Mooltan in March 1947, causing major migrations
and continuing thereafter, came to a head with the trans-
fer of power. Lahore was reported as out of control,

M. M. — 9

248

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

with one per cent of the town on fire, by 14th August;
by the 15th twelve per cent was reported to be in flames.
The storm then passed to Amritsar.

Under prevailing conditions Simla was wholly imprac-
ticable as the administrative centre, so, in spite of the
lack of physical facilities, he decided to move to Jullundur
because the situation could be more easily controlled from
there.

The first policy concept was to try to stop mass eva-
cuation. His own tour between the 15lh and 27th August
had been devoted to that end. By the 28th he had the
feeling that the situation was in hand. Then followed
the massacre of Sheikhupura in the West Punjab. There
were varying estimates of the casualties there. Mudie
put them at three hundred, but the Army situation report
gave the minimum figures as between seven hundred and
eight hundred. There was a violent reaction in Amritsar.
With this, Trivedi said, the realisation came to him that
a major transfer of population was inevitable. From that
day to this he has been trying lo carry this policy through
and to keep his Ministers up lo the mark.

<K)V1RNMIN1 JlOl'Sh, NhW DHLHI,

Tuesday, BOth September, 1947
A meeting has duly taken place of the Prime Minister,
Deputy Prime Minister, Ministers of Defence and Finance
and the Minister without Portfolio. It described itself as
a Provisional Defence Committee, and then approved its
own permanent composition and functions, receiving full
Cabinet approval later in the day. The three Service
Commanders-in-Chief, who are now automatically Chiefs
of Staff of their <fwn Services as well, are to attend all its
meetings. Mountbatten has been invited to take the chair
in a personal capacity k4 in view of his knowledge and ex-
perience ot high military matters".

Whatever the risks of misrepresentation across the bor-
der, this development is a notable victory for moderation
and sane counsel. The Defence Committee instrument

MIGRATION OF PEOPLES

249

and Mountbatten's guidance freely invited and informally
given cannot fail to serve as a restraining influence at a
time of great stress, when passions are clouding judge-
ment and the price of experience is high.

For the past three weeks the Emergency Committee
of the Cabinet serving as the chosen instrument for im-
mediate high level decision has directed all the agencies
of this new-born and stricken Government. It has been
artificiaPrespiration, and not wholly scientific in method,
but the heart of India has continued to beat. The crisis,
after reaching its peak in Delhi, the East Punjab, and
Northern India as a whole, slowly but surely begins to
ebb. Every morning we have anxiously watched the
flags in the Map Room to see if the reported tension in
the United Provinces, in such cities as Lucknow and
Cawnpore, would burst out into a fresh orgy of killings,
but the firm action of the Provincial Governments but-
tressed by support at the Centre has somehow held the
movement of refugees along the Punjab-United Provinces
border. There has, of course, been a wider dispensation
- the frenzy having spent its first destructive force — dis-
ease and famine, which by all the laws of probability
should have exacted the final penalty, by the deeper laws
of providence have so far passed over without doing so.
As far as human effort is concerned special credit is due
to those responsible for health and food services on both
sides of the border. A prodigious number of cholera in-
jections, vaccinations and other inoculations have been
carried out. India has flown large supplies of cholera
vaccines to Pakistan. The works of mercy and healing
shine out in the communal darkness.

CHAPTER EIGHTEEN

REPORT FROM LONDON

(JOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

Wednesday, 1st October, 1947
We are leaving for London in two days' time. In the
meanwhile 1 am trying to gather in as much background
information as possible to ensure that I am fully briefed
on the latest facts and opinion trends.

This morning I had a most informative talk with Patel's
private secretary, Shankar, at Aurangzeb Road. We be-
gan by discussing Press problems. Jn spite of the modus
vivendi secured at last week's Government House meet-
ing with the Foreign Press, it is clear that the Sardar and
his circle are still full of resentment at British Press treat-
ment of the Punjab troubles. He went so far as to ask
me whether these were all the thanks Congress leaders
were to get for the considerable political risk they had
taken in accepting Dominion Status at all? I told Shan-
kar that J thought history would accord to the Sardar
great credit for his part in the transfer of power, and that
his realistic attitude on the three major issues, Partition,
Dominion Status and relations with the Indian Princes,
was statesmanship of a high order.

I came away with the firm impression that the Sardar
was well aware of the solid and immediate advantages
Dominion Status conferred on India. In the wider con-
text of the worljj conflict he clearly appreciates that if it
comes to a show-down, India's interests are likely to be
closely interwoven with those of the Western Powers.
This being so, Dominion Status, or its equivalent, enables
India to come within the orbit of Western good-will with-
out incurring the formal liabilities of a treaty relation-

250

REPORT FROM LONDON

251

ship. It must be stressed that Patel has never actually
intervened in external affairs, and that this field is Nehru's
unchallenged responsibility. Moreover, the prevailing
view-point of Nehru places higher hopes on India's capa-
city to stand outside the struggle of rival World Powers,
and, in the process, to build up a neutral bloc in Asia
which could play a constructive mediating role through
U.N.O. and bv other means.

Shankar said that the Sardar had met with great success
yesterday at Amritsar. He had made a big speech to
what was perhaps the most representative gathering ol
Sikh leaders since the transfer of power. Nearly all the
falhadas had been present, and had responded favourably
10 his call for moderation.

Liaquat is back in Deihi for to-day\s Joint Defence
Council. I understand that this morning's meeting was
a very difficult one. At the small lunch-party afterwards
at which Nehru and Liaquat were Uic two guests and
Vernon and myself were the slalf members, the atmos-
phere was still snmewhat strained. Liaquat, who was in
a pea-green coat and looked far from well, got involved,
in an argument with Nehru over the movement of Mos-
lems from Ambala. It was one of those occasions when
we would all have liked to change the subject but seemed
powerless to do so.

The background to all this tense talk is the action of
the Pakistan Government in closing the Balloki Bridge
across the Ravi, which is in the West Punjab. At the
Council meeting Patel did his utmost to persuade Liaquat
to open the Bridge, but in vain. Mountbatten, however,
in a private talk with him afterwards, made a final ap-
peal, and had the satisfaction of getting him to reverse his
verdict before he lett for Pakistan.

There has also been some plain speaking over Juna-
gadh. Mountbatten at first had great difficulty in mak-
ing either Prime Minister raise the subject at all - Liaquat's
attitude being "Why should 1? We have done nothing
wrong. Jf India is worried, let India raise it", and Nehru

252

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

feeling that for himself to initiate discussion would only
be interpreted as a sign of weakness, but Mountbatten
finally prevailed on Liaquat to make the first mention.
Mangrol and Babariawad were the points of contention.
Mountbatten and Nehru underlined the clear right of both,
with the lapse of Paramounlcy, to accede to India. Nehru
called on Liaquat to order the withdrawal of Junagadh
troops from Babariawad. Just as he was. doing this, a
telegram was handed in indicating that Junagadh troops
had now entered Mangrol as well. Nehru undertook not
to allow Indian troops to enter either State until the legal
position of both had been definitely established by higher
authority, provided the Junagadh forces were immediately
withdrawn.

Liaquat' s attitude on this was reasonably conciliatory,
but on the wider issue of Pakistan accepting Junagadh's
accession in the first place he was adamant that they had
been right in doing so. He takes his stand on the legal
grounds that the ruler has the absolute right to accede
without reference to the moral or ethnic aspects of ac-
cession.

(JOVIiRN Ml. NT MOUSL, NEW DlvLHI,

Thursday, 2nd October, 1947
A few days ago the Daily Telegraph published a sen-
sational report to the effect that Auchinleck during his re-
cent visit to Karachi had staled, "Refugee traffic could be
peaceably resumed in both directions if the Sikhs of the
Punjab and the Sikh States could be effectively disarmed."
Not unnaturally, Patel was greatly disturbed by the story,
and has discussed its implications at some length with
Mountbatten. In order to foreshorten surmise and corres-
pondence, Mountbatten suggested, and Patel agreed, that
I should take the earliest opportunity to see Auchinleck
personally and check on the story's authenticity, and if pos-
sible secure his agreement to a disclaimer.

1 went round to the Supreme Commander's house this
afternoon. It seemed very quiet and deserted. The tre-

REPORT FROM LONDON

253

mendous activities of the past six weeks have indissolubly
linked Government House with the new order, but the tide
of events has flowed past this residence of the C.\s in C,
India, so that it now evokes only the memories of former
greatness. Auchinleck glanced quickly through the report,
and at once explained, in his usual measured hut incisive
manner, that he had no recollection whatever of saying the
words attributed to him either to Mr. Jinnah, with whom
he had prolonged confidential discussions about the future
of the Supreme Command, or to anyone else, least of all
ihe Daily Telegraph correspondent, whom he had not met
and did not know. After a few pithy remarks on the
subject of Press sensationalism, he invited me over a cup
of lea in the garden to draft a disclaimer with him. This
took only a few minutes to compose, and within the hour
I was able to report, "Mission completed".

Auchinleck \s position as Supreme Commander is becom-
ing daily more difficult. His experience, prestige and inte-
grity have been very valuable assets in keeping the parti-
tion of the Indian Army clear of the great political dispute
from which Partition itself has sprung, but already there
are signs that the Supreme Command is being subjected
in just the same kind of pressures which made the already
baffling task of the Punjab Boundary Force finally impos-
sible.

Keeping in mind the tension engendered by the Punjab,
it is greatly to the credit of Auchinleck and his staff that
ihey have been able to make such headway without so far
attracting major controversy. From the formation of the
South-east Asia Command in the autumn of 1943 onwards
f have watched Auchinleck play the role of self-denial.
Now he is called upon to preside over the most painful task
of all — the partition along communal lines of an Army the
glory of which under British command had been its capa-
city to embrace the loyalties of all Indian races and reli-
gions in a common service.

254

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Karachi, Friday, 3rd October, 1947
Yesterday was Gandhi's seventy-eighth birthday. For
the first time the Court Circular, on Mountbatten's instruc-
tions, has referred to him as "Mahatma Gandhi". Hither-
to it has always been the formal and largely meaningless
"Mr.". The actual occasion of this change is the refer-
ence to Lady Mountbalten's birthday visit to him yester-
day at Birla House. 1 have written a note to Ian Stephens,
Editor of The Statesman, who has for so long been plead-
ing for this particular courtesy.

On touching down at Karachi, Tsmay was at once driven
off to stay the night with Jinnah, the rest of us being bil-
leted at the airfield. Accommodation is desperately short,
but, for all that, Karachi is beginning to assume the cosmo-
politan atmosphere of a capital city. A growing Diplo-
matic Corps throngs the Palace Hotel, where this evening
I was given one of the best dinners I have had in all Asia.

airborne K arach I- 1 1 AHiJA n i ya , Saturday, 4th October, 1947
Apparently Jinnah was in an angry and difficult mood.
He is utterly convinced that the Indian leaders* real aim
is to strangle Pakistan at birth, that Gandhi has never ac-
cepted Partition and under the guise of religious teaching
is all the time spreading "Hindu poison", and that Nehru,
in spite of the appearance of moderation, is not really
master in his own house. He regards Patel as the real
dictator, who, he alleges, has entered into an unholy alli-
ance with the Hindu Mahasabha and would be quite ready
to overthrow the Congress if it failed to serve as an ap-
propriate instrument for his anti-Moslem designs. It is
clear that Jinnah, living in almost total isolation both from
his followers and the outside world, is a far from happy
man who is trying to exorcise his fears by nourishing his
hatreds.

I -ON don , Saturday, 11th October, 1947
T have to-day sent off my first personal progress report
lo Mount batten, beginning with congratulations to him on

REPORT FROM LONDON

255

the birth of his first grandson and to the baby on starting
life in the best Mounlbatten style by its attention to punc-
tuality!

"I have had lunch [I continued] with Clement Davies,
who described the political settlement of 1 5th August as a
miraculous achievement which had enhanced our prestige
throughout the world and was in no wise offset by subse-
quent developments in the Punjab. In his view both the
Russian and American case against our 'imperialism' in
India were for ever destroyed, and no amount of special
pleading from either quarter could reinstate it. The pre-
sent disturbances only brought home the full extent of our
past achievement, but Churchiirs 'I told you so* line was
reprehensible and in any case fallacious. We could only
have stayed on against world and British opinion; more-
over, the communal explosion would inevitably have en-
gulfed us if we had tried to stay.

London, Saturday, 18th October, 1947
Tn just under a fortnight I have had in all some fifty
interviews, two full-scale Press conferences— -one at India
House with the Indian correspondents in London, and the
other with Francis Williams in the chair to the Lobby Cor-
respondents in the House of Commons — a short talk with
Sir Stafford Cripps and two meetings each with Noel-Baker,
and Patrick Gordon-Walker, the new Secretary, and Under-
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations.

Cripps, his power and prestige in the Government en-
hanced by the recent Cabinet reshuffle, has become co-
ordinator-in-chief of the nation's entire economic effort, his
mission being to pull the country back from the precipice
confronting it during the convertibility crisis in the sum-
mer. No one talking to Cripps can fail to be impressed
by his lucidity of mind and serenity of manner. If he is
somewhat didactic, it is because he is in a position to be.
None-the-less it is possible to appreciate that this element
of certitude in his make-up, while of service to him in

256

MJSSiON WITH MOUNTBATTEN

reaching decisions of high policy, may well have been a
source of weakness during his momentous negotiations with
idle Indian leaders in 1942 and 1946. Jf intellect could
have scaled the problem, his success would have been
assured .

Noel-Baker and Gordon-Walker are clearly determined
to bring fresh ideas to this new Department, which is a
somewhat uneasy amalgamation of the old India and Domi-
nions Offices. Both start from scratch as far as Jndia is
concerned, but that should not be a disadvantage in their
case, for Noel-Baker's special knowledge of international
relations and Gordon-Walker's of history give them the
right background.

ia>nix>n, Wednesday, 22nd October, 1947
1 have sent olf my final progress report to Mountbatlen
before we leave for Delhi on Saturdav.

"Fleet Street [1 wrote] finds genuine difficulty in adjust-
ing itself to the transition of Congress from an anti-British
movement into a Dominion Government, and there is a
tendency to assume that Pakistan will inevitably have closer
connection with Britain than India. On the other hand,
lliere is considerable suspicion of Jinnah's aims and mo-
tives, Nehru's stock is rising, and he is most highly thought
of in Government circles. Patel is still almost completely
unknown.

"In the interviews J have had with Cripps, Noel-Baker
and Gordon-Walker I was questioned about the High
Commission's organisation both generally and from the
Press viewpoint, f gave it as my personal opinion that
its scope was inevitably restricted by your special status
and influence, but that with your departure it would be-
come one of the most important missions in the world.
Hie objective should be to try to maintain through the
High Commission the good personal relationships that
you have been able to establish with the Indian leaders.
Cripps said that if action was to be taken on this it would
need to be done fairly quickly and he hoped you would

REPORT FROM LONDON

257

put forward your own views on this important matter
when you return to London for the Royal Wedding.

"Noel-Baker wondered whether India was giving con-
sideration to the possibility of a new capital city. He
realised that for the present Delhi had all the admini-
strative facilities, but from what he had seen and read it
would seem to be physically and politically vulnerable
and too far removed from the' heart of the Indian Domi-
nion. Discussing Partition, he argued that from the view-
point of international relations there was a prima facie
case to be made out for it. A Central Government cover-
ing four hundred and len million people was too large a
unit for effective action or treatment through international
agencies, and it was by means of such agencies, incident-
ally, that he believed British help and influence both in
India and elsewhere might be most effectively brought
to bear.

"He wanted to know about the progress and prospects
of the Left in India, and 1 said that I thought they had
suffered a temporary setback from taking such a direct
anti-communal line. The price of Jinnah's victory had,
of course, been a big boost for the Hindu Mahasabha. He
asked how Government spokesmen could express appro-
priately their good -will towards the new regime. 1 re-
plied that 1 felt that an appreciation by His Majesty's
Government of the administrative load carried by the new
Governments and reasoned recognition of their difficul-
ties in any public statements would be well received, and
that a balance should be held between over-emphasis on
the \sister Dominions' theme and the appearance of neu-
tral indifference to their problems.

"I was asked more than once about the prospects of
Dominion Status, and, on the basis of my talk with
Shankar, 1 said that I had the impression that the, matter
was still being weighed in the balance. I was also asked
about the position of Patch After stressing his important
role in Congress's three great decisions over Partition,
Dominion Status and the Accession of the Princes, I said

258

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

1 felt that, as the effective controller of the Congress
Party, his first loyalty was likely to be to that Party and
to its future. It was obviously in some danger of break-
ing up, as it could no longer be held together solely by
the anti-British appeal. He had already largely deprived
himself of the Princes as an alternative issue, and he
must be under some pressure to substitute the Moslems,
if only to avoid being trumped by the Mahasabha and
the Rashtriya Swayam Sevak Sangh (R.S.S.S.). Cripps
suggested that the relationship of Nehru and Patel was
a normal one as between the statesman-leader and the
party second-in-command.

"Finally Noel-Baker was anxious to hear about your
intentions and the likelihood of your being asked to slay
on. I said that I could not believe that you would easily
reverse your publicly declared intention of leaving in the
spring, but thai here again the Indian Government had
not reached a decision, but were, it seemed, shelving the
matter for as long as possible."

London, Thursday, 23rd October, 1947
lsmay asked me to invite John Bcavan. the London
liditor of the Manchester (iuardian, lo see him on the sub-
ject of a controversial leading article published nearly a
fortnight ago, entitled "Retrospect"; it was the most
sweeping attack on the whole of Mountbatten's policy
that I have seen in a newspaper of this calibre. The article
spoke of the hustle with which the withdrawal was carried
out and the tossing away of responsibility. "The British
departure turned into cut and run." It was alleged that
no effective machinery for joint action between the succes-
sor Governments of India and Pakistan was. set up fol-
lowing the Partition announcement of 3rd June. Why
was no olTer made to stiffen the Punjab Boundary Force
with British troops? "Jn fact all seems lo have been
staked on the gamble that if Partition was carried through
at break-neck speed the turbulent and malignant would
be too much out of breath to stir, and the gamble failed."

REPORT FROM LONDON

259

Ismay was in eloquent form, and in his; answers to each
point of criticism certainly succeeded in exposing the limi-
tations of ex post facto arguments and assertions. He ex-
plained that no amount of advance planning — and there
had been plenty — could have wholly provided against the
force of the Punjab explosion and the particular form it
took. He recalled the Punjabi, saying, <fc If one counts
up to eleven one does not strike the man", but the people
were simply not prepared to do just that. Civilised peo-
ples tended to chng to false concepts in their attitude to
acts of savagery. He recalled Winston Churchiirs de-
finition of fanaticism as applied to Ihe 1880 war against
the Mahdi. Fanaticism, wrote Churchill, is not in itself
a cause of war, but is something that can be exploited
when war has begun, ft u the outcome of oppression by
the strong of the weak.

So, when the Manchester Guardian complained of lack
of foresight in setting up administrative machinery, it had
to be remembered that not everything could be solved by
Chiefs of Staff papers. Improvisation was necessary, and
the Chiefs of Staff themselves had to be ready to deal
with just such emergencies as they arose. With, for in-
stance, Dunkirk, we had no idea where we would reach
the sea. We might have gone back along our lines of
communication.

"India in March 1947'\ he said, "was a ship on fire
in mid-ocean with ammunition in the hold. By then it
was a question of putting the fire out before it actually
reached the ammunition. There was in fact no option
before us but to do what we did/' He would be frank
and say that he had just spent the unhappiest six months
in a long official life, so he hoped he would not be accused
of false complacency in saying that if he had had the time
over again he would have given the same advice .

karacht — new DELHI, Monday, 27th October, 1947
We left Northolt on Saturday in a Lancaster, as the
Governor-GeneraFs York was unserviceable and in pro-

260

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

cess of a complete overhaul to be ready in time for the
Mountbattens* return for the Royal Wedding.

CHAPTER NINETEEN

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Tuesday, 28th October, 1947
We arrived at Palam, very tired, at one o'clock in the
morning. Vernon was there to greet us with the news
that since dawn Monday Indian troops have been march-
ing, or rather flying, into Kashmir, I was just about to
get into bed at a quarter to three when Pete Rees called
me and said that Mount batten wanted to brief me at once
on the latest Kashmir developments.

Events, Mountbatten said, had taken a serious turn, and
three hundred and thirty men of the First Sikh Battalion
were flown in to block a major invasion by North-west
Frontier tribesmen, who are moving rapidly on Srinagar,
the summer capital. He was very anxious that I should
begin making my Press contacts early in the morning, but
realised that it was essential that I should first be acquaint-
ed fully with the salient facts of a crisis which came to
a head while we were on our journey from London. I
was aware only that early in September there had been
a hitch in the newly established relations between Kashmir
and Pakistan — the Kashmir Government accusing Paki-
stan of failure to,, provide supplies of several essential
commodities and protesting about a number of small
border raids, and Pakistan making counter-complaint.

Three days before the transfer of power and the Acces-
sion time limit the Kashmir Government announced its
intention of signing standstill agreements with both India
and Pakistan. Subsequently the Indian Government's
policy has been to refrain from inducing Kashmir to

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

261

accede. Indeed, the States Ministry, under Patel's direc-
tion, went out of its way to take no action which could
be interpreted as forcing Kashmir's hand and lo give
assurances that accession to Pakistan would not be taken
amiss by India. The Maharaja's chronic indecision must
be accounted a big factor in the present crisis. Almost
any course of action taken quickly would have saved his
State from this turmoil. Procrastination alone was fatal,
but in combating major crises it would seem that, as with
the Nizam, this is the only weapon in his diplomatic
armoury. "

The military and political implications of to-day's move
are grave, and Mountbalten is, of course, under no illusion
about that. Although his role can only now in the last
resort be advisory, I get the firm impression that his pre-
sence may already have helped to save his Government,
overburdened and distracted with the problems of the
Punjab and Junagadh, from the most dangerous pitfalls.
It was a sudden emergency, calling at once for restraint
and quick decision. Mountbatten's extraordinary vitality
and canniness were well adapted to the demands of the
hour.

I gather from him that it was last Friday night (24th
October), at a butfet dinner in honour of the Siamese
Foreign Minister, that Nehru first spoke of bad news and
reported that tribesmen were being taken in military trans-
port up the Rawalpindi road. State forces, it seems, were
absent, and altogether a most critical situation was deve-
loping. Mountbatten attended the Defence Committee on
Saturday 25th, at which General Lockhart read out a
telegram from the Headquarters of the Pakistan Army
stating that some five thousand tribesmen had attacked
and captured Muzafl'arabad and Dome! and that consider-
able tribal reinforcements could be expected. Reports
showed that they were already little more than thirty-five
miles from Srinagar.

The Defence Committee considered the most immedi-
ate necessity was to rush in arms and ammunition already

262 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

requested by the Kashmir Government, which would en-
able the local populace in Srinagar to put up some de-
fence against the raiders. The problem of troop rein-
forcements was considered, and Mountbatten urged that
it would be dangerous to send in any troops unless Kash-
mir had first offered to accede. Moreover, accession
should only be temporary, prior to a plebiscite. No final
decision was taken on these vital questions on the 25th,
but it was agreed that V. P. should fly to Srinagar at once
to find out the true position there.
S The information which V. P. brought back to the De-
fence Committee the next day was certainly disturbing.
He reported that he had found the Maharaja unnerved
by the rush of events and the sense of his lone helpless-
ness. Impressed at last with the urgency of the situation,
he had felt that unless Jndia could help immediately all
would be lost. Later in the day, on the strong advice of
V. P., the Maharaja left Srinagar with his wife and son.
V. P. had impressed upon him that as the raiders had
already reached Baramula it would be foolhardy for His
Highness to stay on in the capital. The Maharaja also
signed a letter of accession which V. P. was able to pre-
sent to the Defence Committee.

As for the military outlook, V. P. advised that the
troops left in Srinagar had no prospect whatever of hold-
ing the invaders, for they consisted merely of one squa-
dron of cavalry. In the light of this depressing data the
Cabinet decided that the Maharaja's accession should be
accepted and that a battalion of infantry should be flown
in at dawn the next day.

Mountbatten then explained to me in more detail the
reason for the line* he had taken on accession at the De-
fence Committee and the modification it involved to his
previous approach to the problem. He said that while
urging the Maharaja to make up his mind about accession
before the transfer of power, he had all along, from his
visit in June onwards, exerted his whole influence to pre-
vent him from acceding to one Dominion or the other

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

26*

without first taking steps to ascertain the will of his people
by referendum, plebiscite, election, or even, if these me-
thods were impracticable, by representative public meet-
ings. When during the past forty-eight hours it became
clear that the Government were determined, against the
military advice both of their own Chiefs of Staff and
of himself, to send in troops in response to a request from
Kashmir for aid, he returned to the charge about accession.

He considered that it would be the height of folly to
send troops into a neutral State, where we had no right
to send them, since Pakistan could do exactly the same
thing, which could only result in a clash of armed forces
and in war. He therefore argued that if indeed they were
determined to send in troops, the essential prerequisite
was accession, and unless it was made clear that this ac-
cession was not just an act of acquisition, this in itself
might touch off a war. He therefore urged that in the
reply his Government asked him to send on their behalf
to the Maharaja accepting his accession ofTer he should
be allowed to add that this was conditional on the will of
the people being ascertained as soon as law and order
were restored. This principle was at once freely accepted
and unilaterally proposed by Nehru.

As a first step towards popular Government after his
accession, the Maharaja has released Sheikh Abdullah,
leader of the National Conference, the strongest political
party in the State, and is appointing him head of a Pro-
visional Administration. The legality of the accession is
beyond doubt. On this particular issue Jinnah has been
hoist with his own petard, as it was he who chose, over
Junagadh, to take his stand on the overriding validity of
the ruler's personal decision.

Just before 4 a.m. Mountbatten mercifully dismissed
us, otherwise I think 1 would have dozed off in front of
him.

During this incredible day everything happened at once.
Over and above a long list of Press interviews I was called
in for a talk with Mountbatten and Nehru to consider a

264

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Government statement about its administrative achieve-
ments to date — a somewhat academic exercise at this
particular moment, f was shocked to see how haggard
and ill Nehru looked.

Mountbatten is disturbed by the editorial attitude of
The Statesman, which in its anxiety over the decline in
Indo-Pakistan relations has denounced the injection of
Indian troops into Kashmir, and he asked me to arrange
for Tan Stephens, the editor, to come and sec him. About
an hour later Stephens was with us, and Mountbatten be-
gan by saying, "You can't build a nation on tricks".
Jinnah at Abbotabad, he continued, had been expecting
to ride in triumph into Kashmir. He had been frustrated.
First there was Junagadh, then yesterday's fantastic hold-
up of the Hyderabad delegation. India's move on Kash-
mir was an event of a different order. Her readiness to
accept a plebiscite had been declared from the outset. A
large-scale massacre, including a couple of hundred British
residents in Srinagar, by tribesmen would have been in-
evitable if no military move had been made. The Maha-
raja's accession gave complete legality to the action so
far taken.

He wound up by telling Stephens that as a result of
Auchinleck's intervention Jinnah has been prevailed on
to invite Mountbatten and Nehru to Lahore to-morrow
to discuss the Kashmir crisis. This is certainly a remark-
able development, and, in answer to inquiries from Doon
Campbell, Andrew Mellor and others, 1 duly stressed its
hopeful significance. I was not able to tell them, how-
ever, what lay behind this invitation or just how vital
Auchinleck's role has been during the past twenty-four
hours.

In the middle of to-day's Defence Committee, Auchin-
leck rang up Mountbatten from Lahore to say that he
had succeeded in persuading Jinnah to cancel orders given
the previous night for Pakistan troops to be moved into

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

265

Kashmir. The order had reached General Gracey, the
acting Pakistan Commander-in-Chief in the temporary ab-
sence of General Messervy, through the Military Secretary
of the Governor of the West Punjab, with whom Jinnah
was slaying. Gracey replied that he was not prepared to
issue any such instruction without the approval of the
Supreme Commander. At Gracey 's urgent requesl,
Auchinleck flew to Lahore this morning and explained
to Jinnah that an act of invasion would involve automati-
cally and immediately the withdrawal of every British
Officer serving with the newly formed Pakistan Army.

Before Auchinleck left him he had not only called off
the order, but also invited Mountbalten and Nehru to
come to Lahore, Vernon, however, arriving late for din-
ner after some harassing hours on the telephone, an-
nounced, "It is the end". The whole plan, he said, had
broken down, as Nehru could not go to Lahore because
of illness.

After the film-show to-night Mountbalten called in
Ronnie, Vernon and myself for a chat on the day's events.
Mountbatten said he had pressed strongly for the Lahore
visit at this morning's Defence Committee, and they had
all been sufficiently in awe of him not to raise a voice to
say him nay, but he understands that at the Cabinet this
afternoon, although his presence was still felt, the pres-
sure on Nehru not to go was very heavy, and that on
reaching his house he practically collapsed and had to be.
put to bed. Mountbatten is sure that his illness is
genuine. Nehru has incidentally agreed to Mountbatten
forwarding a message to Jinnah to say that he is ill and to
ask for a postponement. Mountbatten has decided to
telephone Jinnah in the morning in order to give him a
personal account of Nehru's state of health, and to try to
bring him down to Delhi.

The Government are undoubtedly jibbing at Lahore,
and there is criticism not merely of place but of the timing
as well. A comparison has even been drawn with Cham-
berlain's visit to Godesberg. There is an appreciable

266

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

danger of Kashmir causing the growth of a mock heroic
psychology here which it is the duty of our party at Go-
vernment House to try to mitigate, but, as. Ronnie rightly
says, we have to get inside the problem or we will have
no influence at all.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Wednesday, 29th October. 1947
Mountbatten went round to see Nehru in his room this
morning. Palel joined them, and there was a frank talk
about the general desirability of Ihe Lahore visit. Mount-
batten asked about going himself alone, saying he had no
feelings of personal pride when the question of saving
ihe two countries from disaster was at stake. Patel re-
plied that he and the rest of the Cabinet were strongly
opposed to either of them making the visit. Mountbatten
then pointed out that Liaquat was also ill, and another
meeting of the Joint Defence Council was in any case due
to be held this week. It would be a friendly gesture for
Nehru and himself to go to Lahore for that purpose.
Nehru agreed, and Mountbatten returned to Government
House, where he at once made his telephone call to Jinnah,
who expressed pleasure at this proposal. Five minutes
afterwards Doon Campbell rang me up to ask whether
there was any truth in the rumour that Mountbatten had
been speaking to Jinnah on the telephone!

Mountbatten had a ninety-minute talk with Gandhi to-
day. At yesterday's Prayer Meeting the Mahatma struck
an almost Churchillian note over Kashmir. His line was:
the result was in the hands of God; men could but do or
die. He would not shed a tear if the little Union force
was wiped out like the Spartans bravely defending Ther-
mopylae, nor would he mind Sheikh Abdullah and his
Moslem, Hindu and Sikh comrades dying at their posts
in the defence of Kashmir. That would be a glorious
example to the rest of India; such heroic defence would
affect the whole sub-continent, and everyone would forget
that Hindus, Moslems and Sikhs were ever enemies.

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

267

The immediate military situation is serious. The Com-
manding Officer of the battalion flown in on Monday has
been killed, and there has been a withdrawal, and fairly
heavy fighting is going on four and a half miles west of
Srinagar.

It is, noteworthy that the situation in Hyderabad has
reacted sharply to the Kashmir crisis. Only twenty-four
hours after the Indian acceptance of Kashmir's accession
and the fly-in comes the report of a dramatic hold-up of
the Nizam's delegation by an Ittehad-inspired mob on
the eve of its departure for Delhi to sign a Standstill
Agreement. We are still awaiting the full details of this
extraordinary development, but it is clear that the Nizam,
in his efforts to cling to his prerogatives, is allowing him-
self to come incieasingly under the influence of the Ittehad
extremists.

GOVERN MI NT HOUSI . NliW DELHI,

Thursday, 30th October, 1947
Pete Rees kindly called in to see me after dinner to
keep me posted with news. The situation in Kashmir, he
said, was very obscure, and there was no proper intellig-
ence. He was convinced that if the tribesmen had follow-
ed their own looting instincts they would have been in
Srinagar by now; but under the leadership of ex-I.N.A.
officers they seemed, fortunately, to be more cautious.

After a difficult Defence Committee, Nehru's attendance
at the Joint Defence Council in Lahore was formally con-
firmed and announced, but he has since had to send a
message to Mountbatlen that the doctor had decided that
he is still not well enough, and so after all Mountbatlen
will go alone. Nehru is also greatly distressed by a Paki-
stan Government statement, issued with a sense of timing
which seems to be Jinnah's stock-in-trade technique of
applying diplomatic pressure. It is, in fact, a method
which makes diplomacy almost impossible. In the state-
ment the Kashmir accession is described as being "based
on fraud and violence, and as such cannot be recognised".

268

MISSION WITH MOU NT BATTEN

There was, it added, conclusive evidence that Kashmiri
troops were used first to attack Moslems in the State and
even to attack Moslem villages in Pakistan near the
border. All this had provoked the Pathan raiders — and
so on, in terms which make it probably as well that Mount-
batten cannot take Nehru with him.

GOVERN MF NT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 2nd November, 1947

Since the troubles began J have been cut off from my
family. I took the chance of a lightning visit by Peter
Howes to Simla to see them for a few hours. We left on
the return trip to Delhi first thing this morning.

All was quiet save for signs of recent communal troubles
at Karnal. We saw lorries bringing out Moslems from
the walled township. Moslem women were cowering
against the wall. As we rushed past, the car radio was
thundering out Bach's Prelude and Fugue in F minor.
The incongruity of sound and scene and circumstance
stirred thoughts in me which went deeper than words.
What are the bounds of human experience? It was as if
by one strange apocalyptic flash all the grandeur and
misery of the world had been revealed.

On our arrival at Government House I found 1 was
due to dine with the Mountballens. The Maharaja of
Bikaner was among the guests. After dinner Bikancr gave
a running commentary on a film describing his State's
part in the movement and welfare of refugees. By means
of some fine colour photography the film told the story
of how more than five lakhs of refugees had been phased
through Bikaner. #They passed in their thousands over
largely barren land, imposing almost overnight an im-
mense strain on the State's resources and limited lines of
communication. Yet throughout the whole operation only
one hundred and fifty Moslems died on the way.

Mountbatten, who was in good heart, told me he was
very pleased with his three-and-a-half-hour talk with
Jinnah at Lahore. They were able to exchange views with

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

269

rather more freedom than if their respective Prime Minis-
ters had actually been with them. Jinnah began by com-
plaining that the Indian Government had failed to give
timely warning to his Government of its intentions.
Mount bat ten replied that Nehru's first action after leaving
the meeting at which the decision to fly in the troops was
taken was to telegraph to Liaquat. Jinnah then reiterated
the published statement that the accession was not bona
fide, since it rested on violence and fraud, and would thus
never be accepted by Pakistan.

The argument then got into a vicious circle. Mount-
batten agreed that the accession had indeed been brought
about by violence, but the violence came from the tribes,
for whom Pakistan, and not India, was responsible. To
this Jinnah would retort that in his opinion it was India
who had committed the violence by sending in the troops,
and Mountbatten would continue to stand his ground that
where the tribesmen were was where the violence lay.
Thus it went on until Jinnah could no longer conceal his
anger at what he called Mountbatten's obtuseness.

Mountbatten advised Jinnah of the strength of the
Indian forces in Srinagar and of their likely build-up in
the next few days. He told him that he considered the
prospect of the tribesmen entering Srinagar in any force
was now remote. This led Jinnah to make his first general
proposal, which was that both sides should withdraw at
once and simultaneously. When Mountbatten asked him
to explain how the tribesmen could be induced to remove
themselves, his reply was, "If you do this 1 will call the
whole thing off", which at least suggests that the public
propaganda line that the tribal invasion was wholly be-
yond Pakistan's control will not be pursued too far in
private discussion.

On inquiry Mountbatten found that Jinnah's attitude to
a plebiscite was conditioned by his belief that the com-
bination of Tndian troops in occupation and Sheikh Ab-
dullah in power meant that the average Moslem would
be far too frightened to vote for Pakistan. Mountbatten

270

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

proposed a plebiscite under United Nations Organisation
auspices;, whereupon Jinnah asserted that only the two
Governors-General could organise it. Mountbatten at once
rejected this suggestion, stressing that whatever Jinnah's
prerogatives might be, his own constitutional position al-
lowed him only to act on his Government's advice.

Jinnah's mood was one of depression, almost fatalism.
He kept harping on the masochistic theme that India was
out to destroy the nation of his making, and his attitude
to every personality and act of policy across the border
was coloured by that general assumption. Mountbatten
with Ismay, who was present for most of the conversa-
tion, did his utmost to reassure him. It is doubtful
whether he made any headway, but at least they left good
friends on the surface. Mountbatten says that as a mili-
tary operation the speed of the fly-in on 27th October left
our S.E.A.C. efforts standing. It certainly seems to have
left Jinnah standing as well and to have been a perform-
ance wholly outside his calculations.

In spite of Mountbatten's optimism and frankness, the
events of the past few days have inevitably caused a
widening of the breach between himself and Jinnah, which
this latest meeting has by no means narrowed. For Jinnah
would seem to have judged Mountbatten by himself and
assumed that he retains almost Viceregal powers. This
might well lead him to the further assumption that Mount-
batten was the real author of the letter accepting Kash-
mir's accession, the directing hand responsible for the
daring and dash of the fly-in and in general the moving
spirit in causing tfcis serious setback to Pakistan's in-
terests and aspirations.

If this is so, it is a tragic misreading of the facts. Ever
since the acceptance of the 3rd June Plan, Mountbatten
has regarded as the central feature of his mission the pro-
motion of good-will between the two successor States.
Jinnah is not insensitive to issues of personal reputation,
and it is strange that he cannot see that disappointment

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

271

here would be likely to be regarded by Mountbatten as
a measure of personal failure.

Apart from his vexation over Kashmir, it may well be
that Jirinah does not consider that on wider grounds
Mountbatten now enjoys the powers to serve as a re-
straining or mediating influence in India. As we have
seen, Jinnah's concept of the proper functions of a Go-
vernor-General were made plain enough when he at once
invoked the special powers allowed under the Independ-
ence Act.

Last but not least, although the two men have a con-
siderable personal respect for each other, Jinnah is now
wholly dedicated to the aims of his statecraft.* Deeper
fears and colder calculations which are beyond Mount-
batten's means to penetrate seem to possess Jinnah at this
time.

GOVERN MF NT IIOUSI., NEW DELHI,

Monday, 3rd November, 1947
With the Kashmir crisis holding all the limelight,
Hyderabad has escaped attention, yet only yesterday —
some two and a half months after Independence Day —
Mountbatten found himself receiving an entirely new
Hyderabad"! delegation of three led by Moin Nawaz Jung,
one of the strong men of the ittehad, and, it would seem,
several stages further avvav from settlement' than on the
15th August. Indeed, after developments which most
significantly came to a head the night after Kashmir's
accession and the fly-in, and which can only be described
as of Ruritanian improbability, it is remarkable that the

* Just how deep was this regard of Mr. Jinnah for Lord
Moimtballen was revealed to me recently by a personal friend
of Mr. Jinnah's. He told me that just before his death Mr.
Jinnah went .so far as to say, "The only man I have ever been
impressed with in all my life was Lord Mountbatten. When I
met him for the first time I felt he had "nur *' ("nur" approxi-
mates in English to a "divine radiance"). He said that Mr.
Jinnah added that he had never doubted Lord Mountbatten's
integrity the whole time he was in India.

272

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

negotiations should be continuing at all. But for Mount-
batten's and Monckton's persistence and will-power they
would have broken down completely by now. As it is,
the Nizam has succeeded only in completely forfeiting
whatever reserve of confidence the Government of India-
and Patel in particular — had in him, and I doubt whether
their relations can ever be the same again.

During Ismay's and my visit to London, Mountbatten
used all his resources as a conciliator to find the formula
that would close the gap between accession and associa-
tion. He even went so far as to recommend a lavish docu-
ment — a hand-written vellum scroll, perhaps — with a head-
ing confined to some such archaism as "Know all men
by these presents". It could then be accepted by both
parties as an "Instrument", without suffix or prefix, but
meaning accession to the Sardar and association to His
Exalted Highness!

In the belief that the Nizam was susceptible to moderate
influences only so long as Monckton was at his side,
Mountbatten worked hard to secure agreement for a visit
from V. P. Menon to the State so that negotiations could
be continued in Hyderabad. The day before V. P. was
due to leave — all the necessary clearance having been
secured at both ends — the Nizam turned the visit down,
on the grounds thai V. P.'s presence would give rise to
demonstrations and counter-demonstrations. The tone of
this refusal and of Patel's reply to it were sufficiently offen-
sive to the susceptibilities of both parties to have brought
the negotiations to a final halt.

Al this stage Mountbatten asked Monckton to come to

Oelhi as his personal guest, and Monckton propo&e^l on
the 10th October a year's Standstill Agreement which
would give India most of the substantial advantages of
accession while preserving the Nizam's symbolic status.
Mountbatten succeeded in securing an extension beyond
the two months for conducting the discussions on this
basis. There followed some intense and bitter bargaining,
when once again the complete collapse of the negotiations

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

273

seemed imminent, but on the 22nd October a draft Stand-
still Agreement was prepared with various revisions which
was acceptable both to V. P. and to the Nizam's
delegation.

The delegation at once returned to Hyderabad to clinch
the matter, and on the same evening showed the draft to
the Nizam, who did not like the look of it and decided
to refer the whole text to his Executive Council. The
Executive Council, with the delegation present to explain
points of detail, spent the next three days in discussing
the draft, and on Saturday the 25th October, with a for-
mal vote of six in favour and three against, advised the
Nizam to accept and sign the Standstill Agreement with-
out further revision or delay. The delegation duly re-
ported the result of the vote that evening to the' Nizam,
who indicated his approval of the decision. The Nizam,
it seems, spent most of the next day preparing two col-
lateral letters which involved an undertaking on his part
not to accede to Pakistan and covered his position in the
event of India leaving the Commonwealth or war break-
ing out between India and Pakistan. During the evening
the delegation called for all the documents,, as they were
due to leave for Delhi early the next morning. But the
Nizam, without explanation, excused himself from adding
his signature that night.

At three o'clock in the morning a crowd estimated at
about twenty thousand swarmed round the three adjacent
houses occupied by Chhatari, Monekton and Sir Sultan
Ahmed. There v/ere loud-speakers in the crowd telling
them to remain orderly and to create no disturbance be-
yond preventing the delegation from leaving. No Hydera-
bad police were seen at any time, and the Ittehad pub-
licly took credit for this militant challenge. At about five
o'clock in the morning Chhatari ultimately managed to
make contact with the Army authorities, and the delegates
and Lady Monekton were then safely evacuated to the
house of an officer of the Hyderabad Slate Forces.

274

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

At 8 a.m. the Nizam sent a message to the delegates
that they should not leave for a few days. He also advised
Mountbatten by telegram that owing to "unforeseen cir-
cumstances" they could not return forthwith, and trusted
that the Governor-General would not mind if they came
on Thursday or Friday at the latest. Mountbatten at once
agreed. When the Nizam actually saw the delegation in
the afternoon of the 27th he said he wanted them to stay
while he took final stock of the situation, but he expressed
complete agreement with his Council's decision. He
roundly denounced the lttehad and Razvi, who, it seems,
was personally responsible for organising the opposition,
and asserted that he would force Razvi to accept the
decision.

The next morning, at a second interview with the de-
legation, the Nizam called Razvi in, but far from con-
verting him, it was Razvi who dominated the Nizam,
spoke of the agreement as meaning the death of Hydera-
bad and pleaded for a chance to reopen negotiations in
what he regarded as more favourable circumstances aris-
ing from the Indian Government's preoccupations with
troubles elsewhere. He proposed a new delegation, pre-
ferably of three dissenting voters in the Executive Council,
Monckton, Chhatari and Ahmed all explained that any
such course of action would be illusory and disastrous,
and thereupon tendered their resignations.

On Thursday the 30th the Nizam had a last interview
with Monckton and Ahmed before the former left for
London and the latter for Delhi. Ahmed, who at once
reported the whole of the above bizarre episode to Mount-
batten, fired a parting shot at his former master by say-
ing in effect, "This will be the end of you, and your
money".

At the same time a telegram from the Nizam advised
Mountbatten that owing to "the changed political situa-
tion" the old delegation had been dissolved and a new
one created from the ranks of the dissenting voters with-
in the Council. Moin Nawaz Jung, the new chairman,

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

275

is also a brother-in-law of Mir Laik Ali, who has succeed-
ed Chhatari as Premier, and who up to September was
Representative of Pakistan in United Nations.

The possibility that all this manoeuvring may be the
prelude to some attempt by Hyderabad to align herself
with Pakistan cannot be overlooked, and was very frankly
dealt with by Mountbatten at his Lahore meeting with
Jinnah". There has been general contact between Karachi
and Hyderabad both before and after the transfer of
power, but Jinnah was at pains to stress that he has had
nothing whatever to do with the Nizam's reversed decision
and has never discussed any form of agreement with him.

Jvloin on his* arrival began by taking a lofty line that
the Nizam wanted Hyderabad to be an independent so-
vereign Stale in close association with the two Dominions
and with a foreign policy in general conformity with
India's. But Mountbatten has been extremely tough with
him and his delegation, which he met for the first time
yesterday. He told them that he had never in the course
of his experience in international negotiations over some
years come across so naive and extraordinary a procedure
as Hyderabad was now trying to adopt by reverting to a
draft which had already, after days of patient examina-
tion, been rejected by the other party. He has made it
clear beyond all equivocation thai the Government still
abide by the final version of the Standstill Agreement as
worded when the previous delegation left Delhi, as ac-
cepted by the Nizam's Council and, until his sudden vdte-
(ace, by the Nizam himself. m If the Nizam continued to
repudiate his own decision, the responsibility for break-
ing off the negotiations would be his alone, and the Indian
Government would make it clear to the world that this
was so.

Nehru has made a big broadcast offering a ¥ United
Nations controlled plebiscite for Kashmir, which Mount -
. batten raised with Jinnah on Saturday. It is altogether
a moderate and well-argued statement. But Jinnah's ob-
jection, which he made quite clear at the Lahore meeting,

276 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

is not to the idea of a plebiscite as such, but to the pre-
sence of Indian troops in Kashmir while it is being held,
which he claims likely to prejudice any chance of it being
impartial. Both Nehru and Patel seemed to think that a
referendum could not be held during the winter months,
and would in any case take time to organise. Mountbatten
is concerned about the complacent assumptions in much
of the thinking about Kashmir, and has pressed for a
military appreciation of just what a long-term commitment
over a wide front would mean.

GOVERN MINT HOUSfj, NEW DELHI,

Thursday, 6th November, 1947
1 called round to see Alan Moorehead at the imperial
this morning. David Astor, the editor of The Observer,
asked him to undertake a series of special feature articles
on India and Pakistan since Independence. This is his
first visit to India, and already the vast canvas excites
his imagination. Even a short conversation shows him
to be a most gifted impressionist, with a particular forte
for descriptive analysis.

"What," I asked, "is your first reaction to India?" "It
is rather like Spain," he replied— "men sit hating each
other like the wrath of God- -then, because the sun is too
hot, shrug their shoulders and say 'what is the use?' " He
thought the phrase "India's pathetic contentment" was
the complete reverse of the truth. On the contrary, he
felt their mood was one of "apathetic discontent".

GOVERN Ml NT HOUSF, NEW DELHI,

Saturday, Sth November, 1947
The Joint Defence Council met this morning after pro-
longed and vain efforts by Mountbatten to secure the pre-
sence of Liaquat and Jinnah. The Pakistan representatives
were Nishtar, the Communications Minister, and Moham-
med Ali, who as Secretary-General to the Government is
already one of the most influential figures in the new
regime. Mountbarten invited Nehru and V. P. to join

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

277

Nishtar and Mohammed Ali al lunch. Afterwards he
steered the conversation into two separate rooms, Nehru
and Nishtar talking politically, and V. P. and Moham-
med Ali considering the problem at the official level.

For the first time, the technique of broadcast invective
and controversy has been temporarily set aside, and a
serious effort has been made to seek a detailed working
formula for a settlement of the dispute. There was a
rather larger area of common ground than had been ex-
pected, but diametrically opposed views were held about
the withdrawal of forces. Pakistan wanted the withdrawal
to be simultaneous by both sides, while India was ada-
mant that withdrawal could be effected only after Kashmir
had been cleared of the raiders. To encourage the Indians
that they are negotiating from increasing strength comes
the news that the offensive ordered on Tuesday has suc-
ceeded and that Baramula has been recaptured. Altogether
the Mountbatlens can leave for London tomorrow with
easier minds about Kashmir than had seemed possible
forty-eight hours ago.

On the other hand, the Junagadh problem causes re-
newed worry. At last Monday's Defence Committee it
was reported as little more than a routine item that Indian
forces had duly entered Mangrol and Babariawad on the
1st November and that the occupation had been carried
through peacefully. It was reasonable to hope that Patel
would be satisfied for a decision on the occupation of
Junagadh itself to lie in the pending tray until greater pro-
blems were safely resolved.

But to-day at about one in the morning the Dewan
formally invited the Indian Government to take over the
administration of Junagadh in order to save the State
from complete breakdown pending an honourable settle-
ment of the several issues involved in Junagadhls acces-
sion. The Dewan advised Liaquat that he was acting with
the support of public opinion, the authority of the State
Council and of the Nawab himself, who had a short while
before flown to Karachi. The Government at once ac-

278

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

cepted the request authorising their Regional Commis-
sioner in Rajkot to implement it.

All these developments were only brought to Mount-
batten's notice late this evening. It is the first time since
the transfer of power that the Government have carried
out a major act of policy without fully consulting or noti-
fying him in advance of the event, tie feels this may be
due to Patel's and V. P.'s desire to spare him embarrass-
ment.

Finally, to complete the day's anxieties, the Nizam,
recklessly drawing on the last reserves of good-will to-
wards himself in Delhi, seeks to buy yet more time before
signing the Standstill Agreement. His delegation, which
left Delhi yesterday, has been brought by dint of four
days sustained efTort to the point where it was ready to
advise the Nizam to accept the Standstill Agreement with-
out amendment. The Nizam, on the strength of Mount-
batten's forthcoming London visit, has now asked for a
postponement until the 25th November. Mountbatten,
after consultation with the Government, has replied agree-
ing to this, provided a settlement is reached by the end
of the month,

GOVERN ML NT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 9th November, 1947
We set out very early for Palam to see the Mountbattens
off on the first leg of their flight to London. Right up
to the last moment Mountbatten was far from happy about
going at all, but, quite apart from Princess Elizabeth being
a cousin, the bridegroom, Lieutenant Philip Mountbatten,
is not only his jpephew, but has made his home with him
in England for the past eighteen years.

At 10 a.m. 1 attended the Swearing-in of Rajagopala-
chari, who in Mountbatten's absence will be acting as
Governor-General. Since the transfer of power this
famous elder statesman of the Congress Party has been
serving with distinction as Governor of West Bengal. The
ceremony took place in the Council Chamber in the pre-

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

279

sence of the Cabinet. "C. R.", as he is generally called,
dressed in his white dhoti and smiling benignly through
his large dark glasses, gave the Hindu salutation. Every-
one stood while Banner jee, the Secretary of the Home
Department, read out the words of the Royal Commis-
sion — "To our trusty and well beloved Chakravarti Raja-
gopalachari greeting". The Chief Justice, Kania, ad-
ministered the oath to which only one alteration was
made, the substitution of the words "affirm" for "swear".

The ceremony was all over Within five minutes, but this
was quite long enough lo convey the full sense of its his-
toric significance. There were both fulfilment and drama-
tic irony in the spectacle of this Congress campaigner be-
coming the first Indian to act as head of State by means
of the form and title of the Raj which it had been his life
work to supersede.

1 attended the acting Governor-General's first lunch-
party which he gave to members of his staff. C. R.'s mar-
ried daughter Srimati Namagiri, who is shy and retiring,
is acting as hostess. The A.D.C.'s laid on the normal
procedure for outside guests, our staff party being lined
up for individual introduction. The ladies all curtsied,
but C. R. pleaded, "Don't do that for me!"

After* the lunch he called for Vernon and myself. We
expected little more than a few formal pleasantries, but
our talk was far more prolonged and illuminating than
that. We emerged from this encounter strongly impressed
that when the time came here was the ideal successor
lo Mountbatten. There could, of course, be no greater
contrast between the two men's minds and outlook.
Mountbatten — dynamic, extrovert, tackling events at the
surface with feverish activity: C. R.— introspective, essen-
tially a scholar and thinker, anxious primarily about the
underlying causes.

He asked about the scope of my work, and tfien pro-
ceeded to analyse the role of the Indian Press, which, he
said, had a long way to go before it could achieve its full
freedom. I asked him what influence it had on politics,
M. M. — 10

280

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

and he said, "Very little". The Congress had completely
dominated the political scene, and the Press, instead of
providing informed criticism, was nothing more than a
body of political propagandists. If there were to be a
change in the balance of power all the Press would do
would be to follow suit, and one lot of propagandists
would succeed another. He said he had just written to
an old journalist friend of his in Madras, who was a critic
of the Government, saying thai the essential thing for the
Indian Press to do was to concentrate first of all on ad-
ministrative matters rather than on political formulae.
Once they began dealing with things which affected the
daily lives of the people, they would begin to exert a
genuine influence.

I told him I particularly admired '/'he Hindu of Madras.
He said that this was not surprising, in view of my British
outlook and training, as here was a paper brought up on
the best traditions of nineteenth-century British Journal-
ism. He agreed with the point Vernon made that Indian
journalism was much nearer to American in its tendency
to outspokenness and over-statement. C. R. drew atten-
tion to the excellence of the British magazine Country
Life, which covered such a wide range of subjects and
which had almost a religious quality about it. He felt
that until India could produce papers of equal value to
this, the British would continue to have the advantage
over her!

He then turned to the general situation and said he
was profoundly unhappy. Archibald Nye, who had "an
almost missionary zeal", had tried to console him, but
the events of tin* last few weeks had largely shattered the
dream of a lifetime. "1 had alwavs assumed that we were
better than other people, that under the leadership of a
man who had somehow found the secret of combining re-
ligion and politics without compromising his politics or
contaminating his religion, we would, through our belief
in non-violence, make rapid strides as soon as independ-
ence had been achieved." There was a sense of mission

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

281

while fighting British rule, but that now seemed to be lost
in the savagery and suffering that Indian people were in-
flicting upon themselves.

f remarked that the problem which distressed him as
affecting the Indian people seemed to be common to
everyone throughout the world; much the same dilemma
was facing Europe; perhaps the problem and the solution
were common to all people. There was really no con-
solation, he replied, in knowing that the evil was not con-
fined to Tndia. *T am not distressed at the usual struggles
lor power — the jealousies and intrigues; the trouble with
India is that she has a solution to these problems through
her religion and that she has now seemed temporarily to
fortzet it."

He said he was hoping and praying for a revival of the
Vedantic religious spirit. Their religion had something in
common with Christianity, and indeed all other religions;
but the Vcdas were not based so much on the principles
of Christian leadership, they were more closely related to
the European pagan philosophies of Socrates and Marcus
Aurelius. It was a code of conduct which had been known
to the people over centuries and which helped to conquer
their fears. Fear, he felt, was at the root of the trouble.
Revenge was only fear at one remove. Nor was it genuine
revenge that indulged in the indiscriminate massacre of
women and children. Someone had said that if we could
experience the full force of other people's suffering we
should all die; that there was some form of compensation
which prevented us from fully appreciating the horrors
that surrounded us.

Turning to the Bengal situation, he said that it was
wonderful to see that Bengal had been free of the com-
munal disturbance; in fact the East and West Berfgal Go-
vernments have been working to date on a closer under-
standing than East and West Pakistan. There had been
common action from the outset between the two Prime
Ministers.

282

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

There had admittedly been quite a considerable move-
ment of middle-class Hindus from East Bengal, but this
was not the outcome of persecution on the part of the
East Bengal Government. These Hindus had moved be-
cause they did not think the prospects of security were
very good, in much the same way as capitalist interests
had moved out of the Dominion into the States. The
only people who would come to any harm in the long run
would be the Hindus themselves.

C. R. was pessimistic about the political prospects in
England, and felt that developments in India had done
the Labour Government a great deal of harm. I said
1 believed that Churchill had rather over-stated the case.

He said that the Indian Government were living literally
from hand to mouth. A tremendous burden was resting
on Nehru. The main ray of hope was the presence of
Gandhi ji. Jt was essential that his outlook should prevail.

Just as we were leaving, the A.D.C. came in to report
that Mr. Bhabha would be ten minutes late for his ap-
pointment. "Thank goodness! I am most relieved to
hear it," said C. R. — a reaction one would not expect to
hear from Mountbatten!

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

Monday, 10th November, 1947
] have just prepared a Public Relations appreciation
which recapitulates all the major developments since my
return here from London. These are the principal points
1 have made: —

"Guidance on the tangled Kashmir, Hyderabad and
Junagadh situation is not easy to give, and reliable in-
formation on the military situation in Kashmir is parti-
cularly difficult to extract. It should be noted that when
Mountbatten visited Kashmir in June he did everything
possible to impress upon the Maharaja the urgent neces-
sity of acceding to one or other of the successor Domi-

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

283

nions before the 15th August and of basing his decision
upon some expression of the popular will.

"Moreover, Mountbatten was empowered to advise him
on the authority of Patel that if his decision was to throw
in his lot with Pakistan and join their Constituent As-
sembly in advance of the transfer of power, it would not
be' regarded as an unfriendly act by India. There is,*
Mountbatten warned him, 'only one way for you to bring
disaster to your country, and that is to do nothing.' His
hesitation, followed by the inability or unwillingness of
Pakistan to prevent tribal incursion into the State, have
undoubtedly been the primary causes of the present crisis.
It is probable that nothing short of a full-scale tribal in-
vasion to the gates of his capital would have induced the
hesitating Maharaja to accede at all.

"1 am convinced that the Government of India were
absolutely right to accept his Accession before offering
to give him military aid, and to regard it unilaterally as
an interim measure until the destiny of the State can be
finally decided by a confirming plebiscite. It should be
stressed that the accession has complete legal validity both
in terms of the British Government's and Jinnah's express-
ed policy statements. But just how narrow the escape
has been from irreparable disaster is to be seen from
Jinnah's dramatic invasion order given at midnight on the
27th October to his Commander-in-Chief, General Gracey,
and cancelled solely as a result of Gracey seeing fit to
refer the order to Auchinleck. Auchinleck's immediate
intervention caused Jinnah to pause just long enough for
second thoughts. Only thus were the two Dominions
saved from being forthwith in a state of open war with
each other.

"The Nizam of Hyderabad is undoubtedly playing for
time to see how Kashmir develops before taking a final
decision in favour of the Standstill Agreement. Tn the
attempt he has carried on what can only be described as
Ruritanian negotiations. The Ittehad which he originally
encouraged has now become a veritable Frankenstein, and

284

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

the whole issue now turns on whether the Nizam has the
political and moral strength to resist the opposition to
any form of agreement with India. If the Hyderabad pro-
blem can be solved 1 am confident that we shall be able
to surmount the hump of the crisis.

"At his meeting with Mountbatten in Lahore on 1st
November, Jinnah asked him to believe that he had al
first been against accepting the accession of Junagadh and
had demurred for some time only to give way finally to
the insistent appeals of the Nawab and Dewan. But this
was not the line taken a month earlier in Delhi by Liaqual,
who gave no indications of any such misgivings. But
whatever the motive or explanation, by accepting Juna-
gadh^ accession in the first place Jinnah was inevitably
inviting a sharp reaction.

"Patel has responded to the challenge in a way which,
if it raises domestic morale, is hardly calculated to win over
world opinion. But although the Government's action in
occupying the Slate will provide material for the suspici-
ous and ill-disposed to summon up analogies with recent
European history, it can still be claimed that there has
strictly been no violation of law. It is perhaps worth
noting that the invitation from the Junagadh Premier to
administer the territory in the Ruler's absence docs, not
in the Indian Government's view prejudice the Accession
issue. Nehru has olfercd early discussion of the whole
problem, but Pakistan demands what it calls the restora-
tion of the Nawab's administration before such discussions
can begin. Jndia points out that it was the Nawab's ad-
ministration and nobody else who decided to call in their
troops. All this, however, leads into a labyrinth of detail
and a web of propaganda, and it is important not to get
lost in the one or entangled in the other.

"Taking the larger view of developments to date,
Kashmir, Hyderabad and Junagadh are essentially one
situation and react on each other. A move towards agree-
ment in any one of these three Slates would ease the situ-
ation in the other two. Accession has been amply vindi-

KASHMIR IMBROGLIO

285

cated. AH the acceding States have held firm, and in the
three cases where there has been trouble the Ruler has
each time been of a different community from the over-
whelming majority of his subjects. If the Accession
policy had not been duly sponsored and pressed home by
Mountbatten and Patel there would undoubtedly have
been complete chaos. As it is, the scale of the consoli-
dation is indeed impressive. In so far as the Princely
States before the transfer of power formed no part of Bri-
tish India, their accession now means the incorporation
into the Indian Union of larger territories and populations
than have been lost to it by the creation of Pakistan.

''Mr. Churchill's recent speeches in Parliament during
the Debate on the Address on Burmese Independence
and on the Punjab troubles have aroused old phobias.
In two respects I feel thai what he said should not be
allowed to pass unchallenged. First, although we arc ad-
mittedly wallowing here in a statistical morass, all the
data available to us suggest that his round figures of the
number of people who have lost their lives in the recent
disturbances are an inflated estimate. Secondly, the im-
plication of his speech on Burma, that Dominion Status
is something less than Independence, should surely be
taken up at once by the British Government as being
false in political fact and legal theory and in any case
completely contrary to its declared policy.

"My own impression, which has been confirmed since
my return, is that the Government of India will not force
the pace on withdrawal from the Commonwealth, and if
they can find a suitable excuse for letting the matter re-
main in the pending-tray they will do so. I have for
some time fell that one of the major objectives of Jinnah's
policy has been to keep this issue at the* boil
and if possible to tease India out of the Commonwealth,
leaving Pakistan as the 'Northern Ireland* of the sub-
continent. Mountbatten, as a cousin of the King, by
his continued presence in Delhi as Governor-General of

286

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

India, inadvertently makes it difficult for Jinnah to pro-
mote this concept.

"Be that as it may, evidence is accumulating that
Mountbatten is to be made the target of a fairly heavy
propaganda barrage from Karachi. The first salvo was
an article in the Pakistan Times to-day accusing him of
being in active command of the Kashmir operations. His
return to London for the Royal Wedding should be the
best refutation of this fantastic charge. But the depress-
ing truism remains — the bolder the lie the wider the cre-
dence; from which it often follows that to deny an un-
truth is simply to spread a suspicion."

CHAPTER TWENTY

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

GOVhRNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Tuesday, 11th November, 1947
To-day is the great Hindu celebration of Deepawali. As
with our Christmas, the emphasis is placed on the family,
and particularly on the children. All the houses are be-
decked with lanterns, for it is the festival of the lights.
C. R. called me in this morning saying he had composed
a short Deepawali greetings which he thought might ap-
propriately be his first message as Governor-General. The
message addressed to the people of India had a peculiar
rhythmic beauty, for, like Nehru, C. R. is a master of
English prose. #

"We may not/' he wrote, "have the mind to indulge
in festive rejoicings when we are surrounded by difficul-
ties, and so deeply immersed in anxieties as we are to-
day, but Deepawali is a great national day associated with
hope and joy from time immemorial in India. The lights
that are lighted on that day also represent the hope for
more and more enlightenment, and the holy anointing

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

287

done on the morrow of the festival is associated with the
cleansing of the spirit symbolically called the Ganga Shan.
May this Deepawali serve to purify the hearts and en-
lighten the minds of people everywhere in Jndia irres-
pective of caste or creed or so-called race."

OBSERVATORY HOUSE, GOVERNOR-GENERALS LODGE, SIMLA,

Wednesday, 26th November, 1947

On all sides there are signs of a detente giving rise to
the hope that the storms which have threatened to over-
whelm the sub-continent following the transfer of power
may at last be subsiding. All India Radio provided per-
haps the most promising series of news items to be heard
in any one evening since the transfer of power. First
there is the Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad. Mount-
batten on his return from London has— as, Patel announc-
ed in the Legislative Assembly yesterday — seen the Hy-
derabad delegation "for the last time", and precisely the
same Agreement is being taken back for the Nizam's sig-
nature as a month ago.

Secondly, Nehru has made an important statement oit
Kashmir, which, while it once more accuses Pakistan of
conniving at invasion, indirectly repudiates the recent dan-
gerous suggestion of Sheikh Abdullah that there might
now be no need for a referendum. If Nehru had not
done this promptly, Mountbatten's own position would
have been very difficult. Nehru has simply repeated the
terms on which Accession had been accepted— that is, an
Interim Government followed by reference to the popular
will under an impartial tribunal. He rejects the doctrine
of a simultaneous withdrawal of troops as providing in
itself mere confirmation of Pakistan's connivance.

The third item of good news is a Joint Defence Coun-
cil meeting, with Liaquat coming to Delhi to-morrow for
it. This will be the first personal encounter between the
two Prime Ministers since the Kashmir invasion.

Finally from Karachi comes the official announcement
of the intention to disband the All India Moslem League

288 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

and to confine the operations of the League to Pakistan.
This is an enlightened decision which will help to free
many of the forty million Moslems living in India from
a difficult double allegiance. As such, it is a powerful
and timely contribution to peace in the sub-continent.

OBSERVATORY HOUSL. GOVFRNOR-GFNLRAL'S LODGE, SIMLA,

Saturday, 29th November, 1947
The Nizam has signed at last, and Patel has made a
good statement paying tribute to Mountbatten for his de-
cisive role in the negotiations. Certainly patience has
been called for in dealine with the old Nizam, who ad-
heres stubbornly to the methods of traditional oriental
diplomacy. Wholly divorced from the developments of
the outside world, he seems incapable of taking any deci-
sion until he has enmeshed himself in the webs of his
own intrigues.

It has been a niggling operation until the last. When
the delegation had their final meeting with Mountbatten
on Tuesday they began pleading for very minor amend-
ments such as the substitution of "will" for "shall", and
finally even a semi-colon for a comma, in a desperate
effort to justify their existence and make good the asser-
tion that the Government of India had agreed to changes
in the text approved by their predecessors. It was for
this reason that Mountbatten was at pains to stress that he
would not agree to the change of even a comma. Some
small amendments in the collateral letter were accepted,
but here India stood firm in refusing to allow Hyderabad
to have its own diplomatic representation.

The Ittehad and its extremist leader, Kasim Razvi —
who was incidentally in Delhi during the last bout of
negotiation — can claim no more than that the Standstill
Agreement has been brought about by a purely Hydera-
badi delegation. But this face-saving device has been
effected only at the expense of PateFs confidence in the
Nizam and his intentions. For all that, the Standstill

PROCrRESS AND RELAPSE

289

Agreement allows a breathing space of a year for heads
to cool and hearts to soften.

OBShRVATORY HOUSE, GOVERNOR-GFNERAl/S LODGE, SIMLA,

Monday, 1st December, 1947
The London Press is beginning to comment on the re-
cent signs of an Indo-Pakistan detente. First fruit of the
Standstill Agreement with Hyderabad is the Nizam's de-
cision to release the local Congress political prisoners.
Most of the key men, including Swami Ramanand Tilth,
the President of the State Congress, have been under ar-
icst during the negotiations.

OBSERVATORY HOUSE, GOVERNOR-GEN I RAl/S LODGE, SIMLA,

Saturday, 6th December, 1947
Nehru has made a major statement on Foreign policy
to the Legislative Assembly. This is the field in which
his mind can spread itself, and I suspect that he gets the
deepest satisfaction from being the Foreign Minister in
his own Government. He is making a determined bid
to keep India out of the scramble of power politics. He
hotly denies that his aim is neutrality, but its broad effect
will be something very like it. He calls for co-operation
with both the United States of America and Russia, and
makes no reference to Britain or the Commonwealth, be-
yond saying that he hopes to improve India's relations with
some Commonwealth members, which would seem to im-
ply a flank attack on South Africa.

In a reference to the decision taken by the United
Nations over the partition of Palestine, Nehru commend-
ed the Indian proposal for two autonomous States within
a federation. This, he asserted, is regarded in United
Nations circles as wiser than partition, which had already
led to so much trouble and would lead to more. India,
he added, would gain in prestige by taking an independ-
ent line in this way on major issues of world policy. He
made the point that politically Foreign policy depended

290

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

on economic trends within a country. India's economic
policies were not yet fixed, but had been diverted by the
pressing needs of the immediate internal crisis.

At the same time, Asaf Ali, Nehru's first Ambassador
to the United States, bids in Washington for American
financial backing, urging that India was solvent and a
good market. Asked about Indo-Pakistan relations, he
replied he expected they would be close — at any rate at
I he economic level.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Thursday, lltk December, 1947
I have been acquainting myself fully from the records,
and from a long talk 1 have had with Mountbatten on
the varying and often dramatic developments in the Kash-
mir situation over the past fortnight, during which time
there seems to have been almost a year of diplomatic
effort. Mountbatten has struggled with what I can only
describe as heroic zeal to close this breach and prevent
the whole sub-continent falling apart from a mono-maniac
obsession over the political future of a single Indian State,
import ant enough in itself, but containing only four mil-
lion out of its four hundred million inhabitants.

One of Jsmay's most important contributions to peace
was the part he played both early in November and dur-
ing the "cordial" talks between Liaquat and Nehru in
Delhi only last week. Yet again Mountbatten had great
difficulty in bringing the leaders together, as yet again
Liaquat prefaced the meeting with a telegram designed
to infuriate Nehru, to whom it was this time directly ad-
dressed. He has ,pnee more described Abdullah as a
''Quisling", has accused the Indian Government of at-
tempting to eliminate the whole Moslem population of
the State, and repeated his demand for setting up an im-
partial independent administration immediately.

Nehru fortunately is not the man to let his justifiable
indignation degenerate into false pride, and Mountbatten
duly prevailed on the two Prime Ministers to have their

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

291

first man-to-man talk on Kashmir since its accession.
After a long preliminary presentation of his case by Nehru,
Liaquat, who was obviously very tired and weak after
his recent illness, managed to ask a number of pertinent
questions and to put forward proposals which Nehru pro-
mised to consider. Ismay, with his own outstanding skill
and experience in the drafting of high-level formula and
with the support of V. P. and Mohammed Ali on behalf
of the two Governments, at once put these proposals into
more formal shape, and they provided the basis for four
further meetings during the next two days.

Briefly the proposals were: that Pakistan should use
all her influence to persuade the rebel "Azad Kashmir'
forces to cease fighting and the tribesmen and other "in-
vaders" to withdraw from Kashmir territory as quickly
as possible and to prevent further incursions. India
should withdraw the bulk of her forces, leaving only small
detachments of minimum strength to deal with disturb-
ances. The United Nations Organisation should be ask-
ed to send a commission to hold a plebiscite in Kashmir
and to* recommend to India, Pakistan and Kashmir, be-
fore it was held, steps which should be taken to ensure
that it was fair and unfettered. Certain steps which it
was intended to take towards this object, such as the
release of political prisoners and the return of refugees,
should be published right away.

With Ismay's help the position reached at the end of
the talks was that, while there was no definite agreement,
Nehru's criticisms were confined to detail. Liaquat, for
his part, who came to Delhi insisting on the complete
withdrawal by both sides, an impartial administration be-
fore a plebiscite, and an impartial plebiscite, only fully
gained the last and partially gained the first of these con-
ditions. He thus showed himself ready to make a con-
cession of principle. Ismay left quite convinced that the
formula was both on political and administrative grounds
a workable solution and the only one that has so far
been propounded. The atmosphere when Ismay left was

292 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

promising. It seemed that the foundations had been well
and truly laid; but conciliation is heartbreaking work.

Two days ago, and only two hours after Mohammed
Ali, who had stayed on, was airborne for Karachi, Mount-
batten was present at what he has described to me as
one of the most depressing meetings it has ever been his
Jot to preside over. For the second time Patel and Bal-
dev Singh appeared before the Defence Committee as
messengers of woe. They had just returned from the
front, and the reports they brought back, together with
independent information reaching Nehru, hardened the
Cabinet's heart against agreeing to the immediate plebis-
cite, or even, for the present, to continuing negotiations.
The grievance was three-fold. First, reports of large con-
centrations of invaders, including tribesmen in the West
Punjab; secondly, the allegation that Liaquat had no
sooner left Delhi than he had done all in his power to
encourage new raiders to invade the State; and thirdly,
and perhaps more emotionally disturbing, continuing
stories of ghastly atrocities, including the wholesale mur-
der of non- Moslems and the selling of Kashmir* girls.

Contact was only resumed as a result of Mountbattcn
planting a discreel suggestion with Liaqual that he should
telegraph Nehru confirming the date for a resumption of
negotiations. Liaquat did this, urging that the only way
lor bloodshed to be stopped was for the representatives
of the two Governments to continue to meet together.
Nehru at once responded to the spirit of this message
,and accompanied Mountbattcn to Lahore for last Mon-
day's Joint Defence Council.

The discussion en Kashmir lasted, with a break for a
dinner-party, from three in the afternoon until midnight
— seven hours in all. This meeting took place in a gene-
rally friendly atmosphere, with only occasional outbursts.
None-the-less it convinced Mountbatten, who tried every
means he knew of reconciling the divergent views, that
the deadlock was so complete, and the political pressures
both internal and external so intense, that only the in-

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

293

traduction of a third party with international authority
acting in an agreed capacity could now break it.

At this point, therefore, Mountbatten injected the sug-
gestion that the United Nations Organisation might, be
called upon to fill the third-party role. Liaquat welcom-
ed the proposal as strengthening his hand in any action
needed to call a halt to the raiders. He did not, inci-
dentally, confirm Jinnah's assertion that they could be
called off by command simply from Karachi. Nehru want-
ed to know under what section of the Charier any refer-
ence to U.N.O. could be made. As it was now midnight,
Mountbalten suggested that a further study should be
made of this point. Nehru nodded his head wearily, and
the meeting ended with the project left open.

Since returning to Delhi, Mountbatten has seen Gandhi
and V. P., who are both favourably inclined to the in-
vocation of U.N.O. , and to-day he has had a further talk
with Nehru, whose attitude to the idea is now less negative
than it was at Lahore.

To-night there was a dinner for the Diplomatic Corps,
followed by a showing at Government House cinema of
the film of the Royal Wedding. There was also shown
an Indian Government film on Kashmir of doubtful qua-
lity or propaganda value. There was a glorious shot of
various sub-human types described as "captured tribes-
men", in the midst of whom could be discerned the mild
features and modest figure of Eric Britter of The
/ lnies:

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DEEHI,

Sunday, 21st December. 1947
1 had an interesting talk with Sri Krishna, one of the
best informed of the Delhi political correspondents. His
reports are syndicated to a large number of English and
vernacular newspapers. The line he took is symptomatic
of the new spirit of self -analysis which has come with
Independence. Frank criticisms which were reserved cx-

294

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

clusively by the Nationalist Press for the British Raj are
now directed towards fresh targets;.

He referred to reports of a split in the Cabinet, and
claimed that the immediate cause of tension between
Nehru and Patel was the action of Maulana Azad, the
Minister of Education in the Cabinet. Patel has recently
set up a sub-committee consisting of H. M. Patel, V. P.,
and Bannerjee to vet the appointment of all higher-grade
civil servants. Azad has just appointed the well-known
scientist Bhatnagar, who is not a career man, as the Prin-
cipal Secretary to his Ministry, without reference to this
sub-committee. There is also a dispute over the status
and function of the famous Moslem seminary, Aligarb
University, which remains on the Indian side of the bor-
der. •

Maulana Azad, a great scholar and a man of retiring
disposition, has during the past ten years been a central
figure of controversy. As the leading Moslem Congress-
man and as President of the Congress throughout the war,
he was titular head of the movement during the vital
negotiations with both the Cripps and Cabinet Missions.
He embodied in his position and person perhaps the most
important symbol of the Congress aspiration to be a na-
tionalist as against a communal party. His status was
thus the focal point of Gandhi's clash with Jinnah, who
always maintained that politically no one but a member
of the Moslem League could represent Moslem interests.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 22nd December, J 947
I had a most revealing talk to-day with Robert Stimson
of the B.B.C., who has just returned from a fortnight's
coverage based on Karachi. During his stay he had an
important interview with Jinnah, who covered the theme
of Pakistan's staying in the Commonwealth and duly com-
plained of "British neglect". From what Stimson tells
me, there can be little doubt but that Jinnah himself is
the spearhead and inspirer of the anti-Mountbatten cam-

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

295

paign which is now being developed in Pakistan. The
attack is not concentrated on any single grievance or cri-
ticism, but is designed to exploit over a wide front Mount-
batten's vulnerable position as Governor-General of only
one Dominion and to create the general impression of a
man who is anti-Moslem and pro-Hindu.

Although it is privately recognised in responsible circles
there that Mountbatten is a moderating influence, Jinnah
seems to have reached the firm conclusion that Mountbat-
ten's continued presence as Governor-General is operat-
ing against Pakistan's interest, particularly in terms of
her relations with the rest of the Commonwealth. Stim-
son agrees that Jinnah's attacks on Mountbatten are the
corollary to his reproaches about British neglect. The
criticisms are being duly reflected at lower levels and
among European "old koi hais". Complaints were dir-
ected in particular against Mountbatten's reference in a
speech during his recent London visit to only three per
cent of the Indian sub-continent being affected by the
recent disturbances. This is not surprising, for perspec-
tive is rarely acceptable either to ihe purveyors or con-
sumers of prejudice.

Stimson's general impression was that, subject to four
great queries, Pakistan was perhaps a stronger entity than
some of the critics recognised. Those queries were:
whether she could avoid war; whether Jinnali had long
to live (in Stimson's opinion he looked fitter than in
August, and he was himself at pains to say that he hoped
to be operating for at least twelve years); whether she
could secure economic support, and whether she could
retain any of her Hindus.

He thought that the Sindi Moslems were not so bitter
as those in the West Punjab, and although Karachi was
safer for Hindus than Delhi was for Moslems, the Hindus
there were under a constant cloud of threat and petly
persecution. A good deal of the rice crop had not been
gathered in. There had been a wholesale exodus of bank

296 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

staffs and a complete breakdown of the Hindu economy,
on which so much of the State depended.

Stimson was astounded at what he called the fantastic
optimism of the old guard, but there was as well a core
of young, efficient and incorruptible Moslem leaders im-
bued with a sense of mission who were determined to
make the new State work. Everything depended on
whether they could succeed.

On Saturday the Indian Cabinet finally decided to ap-
peal to ihc United Nations accusing Pakistan of helping
the raiders. Liaquat and Mohammed Ali have been in
Delhi since last evening, but nothing has emerged from
yesterday's or to-day's discussions which makes it pos-
sible to cancel or postpone this sombre decision. Most
of the time has been taken up by the usual atrocity claim
and counter-claim. Nehru to-day handed in the official
letter of complaint which is a necessary preliminary to a
reference to the United Nations. Liaquat promised a
reply in due course. So ends the first phase of the poli-
tical and diplomatic struggle over Kashmir.

COVER NMF.N1 HOUSE, Nb.W DfcLHl,

Friday, 26th December, 1947
Following the failure of the Delhi talks with Liaquat
earlier in the week, a very critical situation has develop-
ed both over Kashmir and the payment of the cash bal-
ances. Mountbatten's warnings about the dangers and
limitations of Kashmir as a battle-ground are being all
too quickly borne out. Indian troops in Kashmir suffer
a similar handicap to the Russian forces in Finland dur-
ing 1939, when Russian superiority in man- and weapon-
power was largely offset by the nature of the terrain.

The full weight of Mountbatten's military authority is
against any extension of already vulnerable and tenuous
lines of communication. Already the outpost garrisons
are in trouble. The garrison at Poonch is completely cut
off, save for air supply. Two infantry companies at
Jhangar, attacked by a force of some six thousand in-

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

297

vaders, have suffered heavy casualties, and a relieving
force has had to turn back.

But perhaps the most serious news is of a concentra-
tion of another formidable enemy force, estimated at six
thousand, in the Uri area. Uri is the farthest point so
far reached in the advance towards Domel. Withdrawal
from Uri would renew the threat to Baramula, Srinagar
and the Vale all over again.- In Mount bcitterfs view the
fall of Uri might well give overwhelming impetus to the
argument, stressed with ever-increasing insistence in Gov-
ernment circles, that the only way to deal effectively with
the raiders is to occupy their bases or "nerve-centres" in-
side West Punjab - and this would mean war.

Mountbatten had a private staff meeting at 1 1 .30 this
morning with Ronnie, Vernon and myself— V. P. joining
us. It was quite like old times. We discussed the draft
of a letter he has prepared over Christmas Day to Nehru
urging the overwhelming need for caution and restraint.
I suggested a new paragraph to stress how embroilment
in war with Pakistan would undermine the whole of
Nehru's independent Foreign policy and progressive so-
cial aspirations. V. P. thought the revision an improve-
ment, and Mountbatten agreed to its inclusion.

I honestly believe that this letter as finally dispatched
will stand the scrutiny of history and should serve to
steady and strengthen Nehru in handling a problem of
peculiar personal intensity. His origins as a descendant
of Kashmiri Brahmins, his friendship and political as-
sociation with Sheikh Abdullah make it difficult for him
to stand above this problem at the moment of decision.

Towards the end of September in a letter to my mother
I wrote: —

"F should say that Nehru has never shown io better
advantage than during the past months. He has moral
and spiritual reserves which seem to enable him to stand
above the day-to-day administrative crisis and to resist
the psychological pressures."

300

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Mountbatten's signature as well as his own from those
which did not.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELTH.

Tuesday, 30th December, 1947
f have just read in The Spectator an interesting appre-
ciation of Wavell's and Mountbatten's handling of the
Indian situation by Brigadier Desmond Young, who was.
for some time in charge of Public Relations at G.H.Q.
India when Lord Wavell was Commander-in-Chief.

"The impact", he writes, "of Lord Mountbatten's
forceful personality and astonishing energy produced elec-
trifying results. He swept the Indian Leaders along at
such a speed that they had no time to draw breath to
quibble. In this highly charged atmosphere Partition was
rushed through before the Hindu hatred of the idea had
time to gather weight." He then turns, however, to what
he calls^Mountbatten's "two mistakes". "First," he as-
serts, "he was not only to consent to splitting the Indian
Army but also to insist on accelerating the process. The
ideal would have been to retain the Army intact under
Field Marshal Auchinlcck for two years from Independ-
ence Day to assist the two Governments impartially in the
maintenance of order. His second mistake was to accept
the Governor-Generalship of the Indian Union when Pa-
kistan refused a Joint Governor-General. His acceptance,
perhaps under pressure from His Majesty's Government,
inevitably put him in a false position in the eyes of Mos-
lems when the trouble started."

In view of the* source and possible currency of these
two particular criticisms I have written to Joyce in Lon-
don as follows: —

**I need hardly stress that Mountbatten and Ismay
would have fervently welcomed any practicable arrange-
ment for Auchinleck to stay on, but it was Jinnah who

PROGRESS AND RELAPSE

301

was most insistent of all in refusing to have anything
to do with the retention of a joint military system after
the transfer of power and in demanding the immediate
creation of the Pakistan Army. The break-up of the
Supreme Command was expedited not only at the re-
quest of the Government of India, without whose good-
will Pakistan's interest in the matter would not have been
.served, but also at Auchinleck's. own recommendation.
In any case, Pakistan's objection as stated by Liaquat to
Mountbatten was based on a completely inflated concept
of the Command's real powers."

As for the second "mistake", after referring to the
highly embarrassing implications of Jinnah's last-minute
rejection of the Joint Governor-Generalship ] have point-
ed out: —

"The Congress offer to Mountbatten was made without
any strings attached to it, and quite apart from possible
Moslem reactions, it is certain that Congress opinion would,
with far more justice, have objected to his refusing theii
offer simply because the Moslem League had not invited
him as well. But the true position about the Moslem
attitude is that a dominant factor in Mountbatten's deci-
sion to accept the Indian invitation was the pressing piea
of both Jinnah and Liaquat made on their own and Paki-
stan's behalf that he should do so. There is'no reason
to doubt but that their request was made in anticipation
of trouble ahead. So if Mountbatten is now placed in
a false position with Moslem opinion, the remedy rests
with those responsible for guiding it in Pakistan."

GOVERN Mr NT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Wednesday, 3 1st December, 1947
1947 ends in foreboding over the future of lndo-Pakistan
relations generally and Kashmir in particular. It is diffi-
cult to stand back and assess the credit and debit balance
of our last nine prodigious months in India. The imme-

302 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

diate situation seems always to overwhelm our thoughts
and attention. The occupational risk is to be preoccu-
pied with the daily task.

Over Kashmir at least we go forward into 1948 with
some clarification of the crisis. Attlee has, as Mountbat-
ten anticipated, turned down the proposal of a lightning
personal intervention, feeling that there is no specific
role which he would be able to play save that of con-
ciliator in general terms, and he prefers to rely on the
"proper channels" of the United Nations. He has, how-
ever, sent an excellently worded message to Nehru urging
caution.

On receipt of his reply the Government have decided
to proceed with their appeal to the United Nations with-
out waiting any longer for Liaquat's reply. The word-
ing of the complaint, which has been drafted while Mount-
batten is still in Gwalior, is moderate in tone save for
one disquieting phrase which reserves freedom of military
action to the Government if the situation requires it.
Mountbatten has pointed out that the Security Council
Committee cannot be expected to react favourably to a
threat or even the hint of one.

Mountbatten has done everything in his power to urge
on Nehru what an invasion of Pakistan territory would
mean, particularly as the whole problem at India's re-
quest is sub judice. Quite apart from the catastrophic
effect on world opinion, it would involve the automatic
departure of British officers serving with both Dominions.
This in itself might well, I suppose, work more imme-
diately against Pakistan's interest than India's, but in any
case f think Nehru is well aware that any such move
would mean that Mountbalten's mission would be at an
end.

Liaquat's reply to Nehru's formal letter of complaint
came in just after the dispatch of the Indian reference
to the United Nations. It is a lengthy catalogue of coun-
ter-charge deliberately not confined to Kashmir, but rang-

CALL TO REPENTANCE

303

ing over the general theme of India's refusal to accept
Partition and resolve to destroy Pakistan. He wants the
intervention of the United Nations to extend from Juna-
gadh to genocide, "so that all pending differences may
be possibly resolved"..

As a footnote to these international developments it is
encouraging to learn from the situation reports that no
attack has developed on Uri, and that the Indian troops
there have made no contact with hostile forces, for
Mountbatten continues to feel that this would be the
event which might well touch off the wider conflict. My
new year motto is Ismay's "Patience and proportion".
Clearly we shall need more than our ration of both in
the coming year.

CHAPTER TWENTY-ONE

CALL TO REPENTANCE

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Wednesday, 7th January, 1948
With the willing concurrence of Patel, the Minister for
States, Mountbatten is meeting the major and minor
Princes in two separate conclaves at Government House
this week, and once again is trying to provide them with
the impetus which seems to be so sadly lacking from
within their own ranks. He urged upon the major Princes
to-day the desirability of forming a committee of privi-
leges to regulate the conduct of their dynastic affairs.

During the general discussion Aiwar alone saw fit to
remonstrate. In a high-pitched and querulous voice, he
observed, "if the people wish to live in hell, one .should
not compel them to live in paradise". When Mount-
batten was trying patiently to explain the advantages of
the Princes and their families entering the Indian Union
Diplomatic Service, Alwar interrupted him to say, "This

304 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

should not be a favour. If Menon can be States Secre-
tary, why not Bikaner?" "I am not here dispensing
favours," Mountbatten replied sharply; "1 am just trying
to make common-sense of the situation." I noticed, in-
cidentally, that at the morning meeting Bhopal gave V. P.
a brotherly embrace, which is usually reserved for a salu-
tation from one Prince to another.

(lOVI RN Mf'NT HOUSE, N1W 1)1 LHI,

Friday, 9th January, 1948
Patrick Maitland, editor of The Fleet Street Letter,
whom I met on my last visit to London, has written asking
me a number of questions for background guidance. Seek-
ing my views on the prospects in Kashmir, he asks, "Is
this conflict going to drag on for many months, and even
for years, does the Indian Government honestly suppose
it will gain anything by going to the Security Council, or
are the Indian forces in such an unfavourable military
position that the Indian Government has taken this course
in desperation?"

I have replied, "The general perspective in which 1 see
the conflict from here is that Kashmir is really the last
major outstanding issue between the two Dominions. If
one could achieve the basic solution here, everything else
would fit into place. The battle-ground is not of India's
choosing, is at the end of long and bad lines of communi-
cation and is one in which it will always be difficult for
her to deploy her full strength. Therefore from the mili-
tary point of view we could anticipate a protracted strug-
gle. The problem^ however, is essentially political, and
centres round the will and capability of both sides to give
effect to a cease-fire. In this respect it is somewhat similar
to the Indonesian dispute.

"I think it would be quite wrong to indicate that India
is appealing to the United Nations as the result of military
desperation. On the contrary, India feels that she. has a
very strong case both morally and in law, and that the
•Security Council is the proper forum in which to present

CALL TO REPENTANCE

305

il. Perhaps the most dangerous feature of the situation
is unwillingness to recognise what the cost of failure would
be or to appreciate that a war on this issue between the
two Dominions would surely bring the sub-continent into
the vortex of the world power politics struggle."

ClOVl.RNMhNT HOUSE, NIW DEI-HI,

Saturday, l()th January, 1948
This afternoon Mountbatten completed Part Two of his
exhortation to the Princes. This time he spoke to some
fifty of the minor biethrcn or their representatives, arguing
once more the wisdom and virtues of mcdiatisation and
urging again as precedent the example of the German
principalities and the settlement they made with Napo-
leon's Confederation of the Rhine. Many of the rulers
whose knowledge of history and political theory had been
severely taxed came away from the conference blinking
as thouim having looked too lone at a bright lieht. But
I think it is fair to say that a tew of the more discerning
members are alive to the sense and value of his advice.

To-night the Mountbattens gave a dinner-party to the
Princes. It is good to find His Highness of Dholpur at
Government House in the thick of all the discussions,
for when 1 last saw him in July he had given me the im-
pression that he would retire to his State and never be
seen in Delhi again. 1 had a talk with him after dinner,
and he is worried about agitations which he feels the Con-
gress arc inspiring in his and neighbouring States. When
I asked him whether he had any details, the only instance
he gave was a recent inflammatory speech by Dr. Lohia
in Gwalior. Dr. Lohia, however, is one of the leaders of
Jai Prakash Narain's Socialist wing of the Congress, which
may soon be splitting off altogether from the Congress
movement. They have, in fact, been opposed to Mount-
batten's and PatePs Accession policy, and by no stretch
of imagination can they be regarded as agents of Patcl
or the States Ministry.

306

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 12th January, 1948
The first news that Gandhi is to begin another of his
major fasts unto death came through to me at a Press
party at the Delhi Gymkhana" Club. The startling sud-
denness, of the announcement at his Prayer Meeting made
its intended impact on all of us. J was particularly sur-
prised, as earlier in the evening, on returning from a game
of squash with Vernon, I had passed the french windows
of Mountbatten\s study, and could see Gandhi there with
him for an interview which 1 was aware had been arranged
at short notice but did not understand to have any special
significance.

He had, in fact, come round to see Mountbatten im-
mediately after his Prayer Meeting, at which he had de-
clared that the fast would end "if and when I am satisfied
that there is a reunion of hearts of all communities brought
about without any outside pressure but from an awakened
sense of duty. . . . With God as my supreme and sole coun-
sellor I felt that I must take the decision without any other
adviser.*' Indeed, prior to the Prayer Meeting he had been
observing a day of silence, with the result that neither
Nehru nor Patel was informed in advance of his proposed
course of action. He then went on to lay bare his pro-
found unhappiness at the continuing bad communal at-
mosphere in Delhi, which seemed to prevail at all levels
of life, and his resolve to meet this situation by his own
chosen act of atonement.

During this talk with Mountbatten, Gandhi went out
of his way to ask for a frank opinion about India's refusal
to pay to Pakistafi the fifty-five crores from the cash
balances, which Mountbatten did not hesitate to give him,
saying that he considered the step to be both unstatesman-
like and unwise. Gandhi said that he proposed to take
the matter up with Nehru and Patel, and added that he
would make it clear to them it was he who had initiated
the inquiry and sought Mountbatten *s views.

CALL TO REPENTANCE 307

As for the fast, Mountbatten at once realised that n
would be impossible for him to challenge the dictates of
Gandhi's conscience, and told him without hesitation that
he welcomed his brave move, and earnestly hoped that it
would serve to create the new spirit that was so badly
needed. On this note of fellowship and understanding
Gandhi left to give effect to his great decision. The fast
is due to begin at eleven o'clock to-morrow morning.

At the Gymkhana Club the party fairly quickly dis-
solved, as various correspondents went back to file their
reports and interpretations of the act. The general im-
pression was that the fast was well-timed and that nothing
less drastic would regain for the Mahatma the psychologi-
cal ascendancy achieved in Calcutta. Much would turn
upon the attitude of the Sikhs, over whom Gandhi had
so far been unable to exercise the same measure of in-
fluence as over Hindus and Moslems. Throughout his
stay in Delhi there had, of course, been the ever-increas-
ing pressure of Sikh refugees from the East Punjab upon
the capital.

There was also considerable speculation about the mean-
ing and effect of Gandhi's move in terms both of his own
and Nehru's relations with Patel. Gandhi's intervention
over the unilateral proposal to impose a sanction against
Pakistan by withholding the fifty-five crores under the
partition of assets is likely to give edge to a Government
crisis. For he has clearly reacted very strongly against
this move, and seems to be prepared to face a head-on
collision with Patel about it.

Nehru and Patel have undoubtedly been drifting apart,
a process which has a cumulative effect as an ever-grow-
ing number of followers hitch their wagons to these two
major stars in the political firmament. The rivalry *is thus
intensified by their respective satellites. Gandhi may well
hope by a supreme effort to heal the breach between the
two great men in the Indian Government, realising that
he alone has the status to do it, and that if he fails not

308 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

only the Congress Parly but the entire regime would be
placed in deadly peril.

' You have to live in the vicinity of a Gandhi fast to
understand its pulling power. The whole of Gandhi's life
is a fascinating study in the art of influencing the masses,
and judging by the success he has achieved in this mysteri-
ous domain, he must be accounted one of the greatest
artists in leadership of all time. He has a genius for act-
ing through symbols which all can understand. Fasting
as a means of moral pressure and purification is part of
the fabric of Hindu life. There is the unmistakable sense
of everyone being drawn out of his preoccupations to
share in a painful responsibility which no man can wholly
ignore

tiAJNt'K, kikanF'K, Wednesday, 14th January, 1948
In spite of Gandhi's fast, it has been decided not to
cancel Mountbalten's long-awaited visit to Bikaner, but
as a mark of respect for the Mahatma, there will be no
State banquet.

Just before our departure Patel and Nehru came along
separately to see Mountbatten. Their immediate reactions
to Gandhi's decision are perhaps the best summary of the
two men's divergence of opinion and outlook at this time.
Patel complained that the timing of the fast was hope-
lessly wrong, and that it was likely to have the opposite
effect to what the Mahatma hoped from it, whereas Nehru
could not conceal his pleasure and admiration at Gandhi's
action.

lallgarh PALACE,* RIKA MR, Friday, 16th January, 1948
On our return to the Palace, while waiting to go into
lunch 1 had an illuminating talk with Panikkar, who is
still serving as the Maharaja's Dewan. He was optimistic
about the outcome of Gandhi's fast, which in his view
was undoubtedly directed at Patel. He added there was
a definite clash between Patel and Gandhi when Gandhi

CALL TO REPENTANCE

309

arrived in Delhi three months ago. Gandhi said then,
"Vallabhbhai, I always thought you and 1 were one. 1
begin to see that we are two." Palel was in tears over
his misunderstanding with Bapu.*

Panikkar interprets the relationship thus, Patel, al-
though controlling the machine, is aware that Gandhi is
still master of the masses, and that he could never hope,
even if he so wished, to break the Mahatma's influence.
Gandhi on his side is out to strengthen Nehru's hand, yet
does not want to break Patel in the process, but only to
bring him to heel.

This led Panikkar to pay tribute to Gandhi's political
acumen. He said he had just had his first meeting with
him after a gap of some twenty years, and had urged him
to go slow in his campaign for constitutional development
within the States. Gandhi protested, "You are asking
me to crystallise reaction." 41 1 had no answer to this/*
said Panikkar. "Jt was true." Gandhi's habit, he added,
was to speak the language of his audience. Thus it was
that such occasions as his Prayer Meetings were deceptive
in their simplicity. In private conversation he was ex-
tremely acute. He also stressed that Gandhi is backed by
what he called a remarkable intelligence system. Personal
letters come pouring in to him from all parts of Jndia
reporting on the state of the nation.

We heard this afternoon that the Cabinet decided to
transfer the fifty-five crores to Pakistan as a gesture of
good-will. After the film-show to-night Mountbatten said
This was the best news in three months. But Panikkar
expressed concern to me about Patel 's possible reaction to
the decision.

Mountbatten spent a very useful (me and a half hours
in conversation with Panikkar this afternoon. This I be-
lieve the first full-length meeting they have had for some
time. The more T see of Panikkar the more impressed

* Bapu meaning Father— a term of endearment used to des-
cribe Mahatma Gandhi by many of his followers as well as in
the Indian Press.

310 MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

1 am by his intellectual power and political shrewdness.
He is the rare blend of the scholar and man of affairs who
can bring his profound knowledge of history to the service
of contemporary events. He is one of about half a dozen
men who may well have a great influence in the shaping
of Indian policy at home and abroad. He has his enemies,
and there are some who assert that he is ambitious and
untrustworthy, but I suspect that he suffers from the jeal-
ousy of those who resent being confronted with a superior
intellect. It is the occupational risk of very clever men
to be regarded as dangerous by their less gifted brethren.

Panikkar tells me that his advice was that Mountbatten
should give top priority to the wider problem of Indo-
British relations rather than to the specific Dominion
Status issue. He stressed that Nehru was now more firmly
persuaded of the need for Indo-Brilish understanding. He
hoped that Mountbatten would not be leaving until the
broad principles had been settled. Mountbatten has sug-
gested that Panikkar should accompany Nehru on his
proposed visit to London in February, and should remain
as a constitutional adviser to the Central Government
rather than leave for China.* His instinct, however, is
to leave India for a couple of years, and not get too close-
ly caught up in the political imbroglio.

GOVl RNMENT HOUSK, NKW Dhl.HI,

Saturday, 17th January, 1948
We left for Delhi first thing in the morning, duly im-
pressed by this example of Princely hospitality. Bikaner
blends tradition with reform, and is setting a good ex-
ample to his fellow-rulers in promoting his subjects' social

* Panikkar duly became the first Indian Ambassador to China,
originally to the Nationalist Government of Chiang Kai Shek.
After its overthrow on the Chinese mainland Panikkar's general
prestige was such that Nehru was able to send him as first Am-
bassador to the Chinese Peoples Republic, where he presented
his credentials to Mao Tse Tung. In this position he was destined
to act as a vital link between East and West both before and
during the Korean crisis.

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

311

solidarity among themselves and their political loyalty to
the new dispensation.

Shortly after our return the Mountbattens called on
Gandhi at Birla House. He is by now very weak. After
he had greeted them with the words, "It takes a fast to
bring you to me", they had a brief discussion on the pos-
sibilities of breaking it. Gandhi said he had laid down
seven conditions, all affecting the basic security and civil
rights of Moslems both in Delhi and India as a whole,
which would have to be implemented before he could be
induced to call it off.

CHAPTER TWENTY-TWO

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 18th January, 1948
Foli,owing the Cabinet's decision over the fifty-five
crores, an inter-communal Peace Committee was set up
under the direction of Prasad and Maulana Azad. It act-
ed with commendable energy, and this morning succeeded
in convincing the Mahalma that the necessary change of
heart had taken place in Delhi to enable him to break his
fast, which had lasted for a hundred and twenty-one and
a half hours and had drawn deeply upon the frail little
man's reserves of strength.

The fast has undoubtedly done much to raise Moslem
morale; but there were signs of Sikh resliveness, and bands
of Sikhs carrying black banners passed outside Birla House
chanting "Let Gandhi die". Sikh representatives, how-
ever, duly took their part on the Peace Committee.

In a message he sent to his Prayer Meeting this evening
he declared that if the pledge was fulfilled it would revive
with redoubled force his "intense wish and prayer before
God to be able to live the full span of life doing service
M. M. — 11

312

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

to humanity to the last moment. That span, according to
learned opinion, is at least one hundred and twenty-five
years, some say one hundred and thirty-three."

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 19th January, J94S
Vincent Sheean, who is on a special visit here for a
number of American papers "in search of more history",
and Bob Neville, the Delhi correspondent of Time and
Life, had lunch with us to-day. Discussing the fast,
Sheean, who clearly revels in original theories, thinks
Gandhi gave it up— although he would never consciously
admit it — because of the change in the weather. The sun
did not shine, and Gandhi had been going out and sun-
bathing. This would be God's way of telling his inner
voice to relent and break fast. There has always been a
close relationship between mystics and meteorology. He
says he told Ed Snow about this before the fast was ended.
Both agreed that Gandhi's fast is a phenomenal event
which argues the vital power of religion. Neville stressed
how Roosevelt always tried tft bring religion into his
politics.

They were both eye-witnesses of incidents which must
surely place Nehru among the most informal and delight-
ful of the world's great men. Neville told how Nehru
disposed of a man who was lying down in the road in
front of Birla House and stopping all the traffic from
coming or going. The man described himself as "the
voice of Krishna". After some fruitless argument Nehru
picked him up by the fect and pulled him away, rubbed
his hands and walked off as if nothihg had happened!

Sheean in the course of an interview at the Prime Mini-
ster's house was taken into the dining-room by Nehru to
see a Chinese painting. While groping about for the
light, Nehru stumbled over the body of a man asleep on
the floor. "Someone is asleep here," he said, and pro-
ceeded to carry on the rest of the conversation in whispers!

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

313

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Tuesday. 20th January, 1948
Rejoicing over Gandhi's survival from his fasting ordeal
were marred to-day by a bomb incident in the garden of
Birla House. The bomb, a home-made affair, went off
during the first Prayer Meeting which Gandhi has attend-
ed since the ending of his fast. The force of Us explosion,
however, was broken by a wall, which was slightly dam-
aged. No one was hurt, and there was no panic, Gandhi
continuing to conduct the meeting without showing any
sign of awareness that anything untoward had happened.
Jndeed, Lady Mountbatten, who went straight round to
visit him, found him wholly unperturbed. He told her
he thought that "military manoeuvres must have been tak-
ing place somewhere in the vicinity".

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 26th January, 1948
The injection of the United Nations into the Kashmir
crisis has slowed down the tempo of the political dispute
almost as effectively as the weather has blanketed the
military operations. The first session of the Security
Council did not take place until the 15th January.
After full-length statements of case and a series of pri-
vate conferences, a preliminary resolution setting up a
commission was passed on the 20th. It has always been
Mountbatten's hope in supporting a reference to the
United Nations that it would lead to the earliest possible
dispatch of a commission— certainly by the end of Janu-
ary—to the scene of the conflict; but it now seems that
the Security Council are settling down to seek an agreed
resolution on the general issues of principle beforehand.
Lf this proves to be the case then a big political opportu-
nity may well have been missed and a serious psycho-
logical blunder committed.

The Indian and Pakistan "Heads of Proposals" bring
out two main points of difference in their answers to the
questions,, what, if any, troops are to remain in Kashmir

314

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

before the plebiscite is held, and should the existing ad-
ministration be changed? India wants the present ad-
ministration to be transformed into a Council of Mini-
sters under Abdullah's leadership. This Council should
then convene a National Assembly elected on Propor-
tional Representation. This Assembly should then elect
a new Government, which should hold a plebiscite under
United Nations control. India insists on the complete
removal of the tribesmen and the denial to them of Paki-
stan bases before being ready to consider the withdrawal
of Tndian troops.

Pakistan's position is quite simple. Her demand is
for simultaneous and complete withdrawal of all forces
and a neutral Administration. At Lake Success this thesis
is the easier one of the two to present, and certainly for
the deleeates, several of whom until a lew weeks aao had
probably never heard of Kashmir save as a lush holiday
resort, to understand. But unless India can establish
some early formal recognition of her legal title and moral
grievance as a plaintilf, we can anticipate an early dis-
illusionment in Delhi with the processes of the new in-
ternationalism.

agra, Tuesday, 27 th January, 1948
Kingsley Martin, editor of The New Statesman and
Nation and a champion of the India League days, is pay-
ing his first visit to India as the guest of Nehru, who is a
very old friend of his. At the moment Kingsley is slay-
ing with us at the Comptroller's House. During the lull
provided by the Mountbattens' tour of Nagpur I had the
idea of taking him on a sight-seeing tour of Agra and the
Taj Mahal, but this was easier said than done, as nearly
all the Government House transport was temporarily laid
up. Nehru, on hearing of our dilemma, at- once put a
car at our disposal, and we drove off down the hot and
dusty road on our pilgrimage to the shrines of Moghul
greatness.

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

315

A journey with Kingsley is in itself an education. He
has tucked away in his memory a whole library of signi-
ficant facts and experiences to which he can refer at a
moment's notice. But in spile of many years of hard
editorial effort, he retains a wonderful boyish zest. J
suspect that we started out with a certain prejudice against
the Taj just for being as famous as it is. I had seen it
once before from the air. when it looked like some mini-
ature of itself in sugar icing, while on green.

On reaching Agra, after passing on the way the mighty
tomb of Akbar, we were pleasurably surprised to find that
the Taj was off the beaten tourist track, and that its actual
environs were solitary and unsullied by commercial taint.
Like all the great Moghul mausoleums, it is enclosed, and.
like Humayun's tomb in the Lodi Gardens at Delhi, the
tomb itself is completely invisible until you pass through
the outer entrance. Then at the first sight the whole
image is totally revealed. Critical judgment is suspended,
and as, one walks from shade into light along the formal
line of cypress trees, the serene splendour of the place
takes possession of the senses.

For me the contrast with the aerial vision was com-
plete; from within it looms very large, and the dazzling
whiteness is shot through with exquisite inlay, which in-
cludes words from the Koran engraved in black marble.
We first saw the Taj in the glow of late afternoon, and
then returned after dinner to see it under the full moon.
We both felt that the romantic haze and the blurring of
outline and detail meant some loss of the aesthetic magic
of the daylight vision. There were no crowds of sight-
seers to disturb the stillness, and only the lights of Agra
and the bend of the River Jumna below recalled us to the
world of life and movement.

■

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Friday, 30th January, 1948
Mountbatten arrived back by air from Madras early
this afternoon with his two daughters; Lady Mountbatten

316 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

having stayed on to complete engagements. They have
had another very arduous tour where, it seems, they once
more received an overwhelming welcome from vast crowds
that lined the streets wherever they went. At about ten
to six 1 ran into George Nicholls, who told me that there
had been an attempt on Gandhi's life, and that he had
been hit in three places. Half an hour later I heard from
Pearce, Mountbatten's driver, that Gandhi was dead.
He had heard the news over the car radio, and told me
that His Excellency was going round to Birla House im-
mediately.

While f was standing by the car, Mountbatten came out
and motioned me to come with him. He was very tense,
and spoke in short, staccato sentences. He said that
Rajagopalachari had rung through from Calcutta impress-
ing on him the need to take the utmost precautions about
Nehru. Only two days ago while in Amritsar two men
had been arrested carrying grenades while he was address-
ing a public meeting.

Mountbatten thought this was a most grave develop-
ment, and that Nehru was now entirely alone and poli-
tically exposed. Everything depended upon his capacity
to keep a grip on the situation in the next few hours.
It was absolutely essential that he should speak to the
nation at the earliest possible moment, but at the same
time should give himself the chance to think out what he
was going to say, because the nation would inevitably
take its lead from him.

By the time we had reached Birla House the crowd
had gathered and was peering into the windows of our
car, only a few recognising Mountbatten in the dark. All
was confusion. Young men were milling around in the
grounds and pressing against the french 'windows. Inside,
most of the members of the Government and leading
Congressmen were standing with the listlessness of grief.
We made our way to what I believe was Gandhi's bed-
room. There was a smell of incense. Inside the room
were about forty people, including Nehru and Patel.

MAHATMAS MARTYRDOM

317

Everyone was in tears. Just outside were numerous san-
dals which people had taken off before entering the room.

In the far corner was the body of Gandhi ji. At first
I thought it was completely covered in a large blanket,
but then I realised that his head was being held up by one
of about a dozen women who were seated round him
chanting prayers and sobbing in a plaintive rhythm.
Gandhi's face was at peace, and looked rather pale in
the bright light. Also they had taken away the steel-
rimmed glasses which had become almost an integral part
of his features. The smell of the incense, the sound of
the women's voices, the frail little body, the sleeping face
and the silent witnesses — this was perhaps the most emo-
tionally charged moment I have ever experienced. As 1
stood there 1 felt fear for the future, bewilderment at the
act, but also a sense of victory rather than defeat; that
the strength of this little man's ideas and ideals, from
the very force of the devotion he was commanding here
and now, would prove too strong for the assassin's bul-
lets and the ideas they represented.

After standing for some time in silent homage, we
moved out into the main hall. As the evening drew on
the crowds outside multiplied; one could see their faces
pressed against the windows, and they banged insistently
upon the glass. Members of the Cabinet were in one
room, and Mountbatten went in to talk to them.

I heard Mountbatten saying that at their last interview
Gandhi had said that his dearest wish was to bring about
full reconciliation between Nehru and Patel. On hear-
ing this, they dramatically embraced each other. He
came out a few moments later, saying that he had succeed-
ed in getting Patel to broadcast at the same time as Nehru
to-night. This he felt — with justice — was a most im-
portant point to have gained. He reiterated that every-
thing turned on Nehru's gripping, the situation immedia-
tely.

The tension is such that one careless word and rumour
will spread like a forest fire. Even on our arrival Mount-

318

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

batten was greeted by a scaremonger who told him, "It
was a Moslem who did it!" At that moment we still did
not know the religion and name of the assassin, but
Mountbatten, appreciating that if it was a Moslem we
were lost anyhow and that nothing could then avert the
most disastrous civil war, replied in a flash, "You fool,
don't you know it was a Hindu."

I learnt from V. P. Menon a few minutes later that
the assassin was apparently a Mahratla, who fired three
limes at point-blank range just as Gandhi was leaving to
attend his Prayer Meeting. I also spoke with the Doctor,
who was somewhat dishevelled and who had attended
Gandhi in his last moments. He complained that there
had been no medical stores in the house, but admitted
that they would have done no good. Gandhi had just
had time to sip a little water before losing consciousness,
which he never regained.

There was a considerable discussion about the funeral
arrangements. It seems that Gandhi has left the most
explicit instructions through his Secretary, Pyarelal, and
others that his body is not to be preserved or embalmed.
On the contrary, in accordance with Hindu practice, it
is to be cremated as quickly as possible. Gandhi was
strongly opposed to any special worship of his remains.

Mountbatten had rather favoured allowing at any rate
some twenty-four hours for the funeral to be properly
arranged, but it is clear that it will have to take place
to-morrow and will impose a very heavy strain on the
Delhi administration. At Mountbatten's suggestion,
Nehru agreed that the whole thing should be taken over
by the Defence Ministry and that all available troops in
Delhi should be on duty. Mountbatten has put his own
Body Guard and the Government House Gurkhas at the
disposal of the Area Commander.

As the moments went by with people standing or sit-
ting about in various parts of the house— some, like
Maulana Azad, in silent contemplation, others, like K.
M. Munshi, acting as self-appointed organisers and try-

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

319

ing to take charge of things — the crowd outside was stead-
ily growing in numbers and in its insistence on seeing the
Mahatma's body. Hundreds of eyes seemed to be peer-
ing into the house from all sides, and there was some
anxiety whether the french windows could much longer
take the strain of the throng pressing against them.

I warned Nehru of this danger of a mass invasion. He
looked inexpressibly sad and careworn, but talked quite
quietly and with amazing self-discipline, saying that all
was arranged. The body would be taken outside and
placed on a table to enable the crowds to-night to file
past and pay their last respects. As the clamour of the
crowd increased, he himself went out into their midst
without any form of protection and spoke to them. H.
V. R. fengar, his secretary, told me that he is really wor-
ried about the Prime Minister's safety, and Mountbatten
spoke earnestly with Indira and H. M. Patel, stressing
the need for taking the utmost precautions.

We left at about twenty to eight, taking Maulana Azacf
and Devadas Gandhi back with us. When Devadas re-
marked that it must have been a madman, Mountbatten
replied that if that was all to it, he for one would not
be worrying, but that there were all too many signs of
its being the outcome of a calculated conspiracy. Mau-
lana, who does not allow himself to speak in English,
though he can do so, nodded his head in agreement.
Mountbatten thought it was a great catastrophe, and only
hoped and prayed that by Gandhi becoming a martyr it
would make everyone in India think seriously and, where
necessary, mend their ways.

Back in the A.D.C. room I found Kingsley Martin,
Gordon- Walker, who arrived yesterday, and V. P. Menon.
V. P. said he was still too stunned to have any reaction,,
but believed that it could only have a good effect on all
the best minds of India. While we were speaking, the
Jam Sahib came in* told us that he had flown specially
to Delhi to-day in order to meet Gandhiji at 6 p.m. Only
this morning I myself had been in touch with Pyarelal

320

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

and arranged for Gordon- Walker to see Gandhiji to-mor-
row evening.

GOVI-RNMF.NT HOUSE, NLW DELHI,

Saturday, 31st January, 1948
Throughout the night the crowds filed past the body
for the last darshan, or showing. His sons had under-
taken the ceremonial washings. After breakfast the
Moirntbattens-Lady Mountbatten having flown back in
the night — and most of his staff repaired to Birla House
to be present for the departure of the funeral cortege on
its six-mile journey through New and Old Delhi to the
Raj Ghat, an immense open space by the banks of the
Jumna. Military contingents of all three Services were
moved briskly to take up positions; on the route, and il
was clear that both the military and civil authorities had
done splendidly in meeting the almost impossible admini-
strative demands made upon them.

Of one anxiety at least they were relieved. When the
first news of Gandhi's assassination broke there was mo-
mentary if unexpressed dread that the assassin might have
been a Moslem, and, if such had been the case, the com-
munal consequences would indeed have been perilous.
It was quickly announced that the assassin, Godse, was a
Mahratta and a member of the Hindu Mahasabha. The
effect of this news will be to cause deep stirring of the
Hindu conscience.

On reaching Birla House we were all jammed into even
a denser crowd than last night. The cortege consisted of
a funeral carriage draped with the Congress flag, covered
wilh flowers and drawn* by a parly of sailors. The Gov-
ernor-General's Body Guard was there as escort. Mini-
sters and Generals jostled for position by the funeral cor-
tege with the humblest citizens, as Gandhi would have
wished. The four-anna Congressmen, who had been sol-
diers in his many battles, were there in force. The body
was brought down from the balcony and placed upon
the bier.

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

321

Once again I was deeply impressed by the serenity of
his face. The head was cushioned in flowers. Around
the body sat Gandhiji's sons and granddaughters, the girls
still weeping and gently stroking his head. Patel also
sat immobile beside the body, pale and weary and look-
ing straight ahead of him. He took no part in the strenu-
ous efforts which both Nehru and Mountbatten were mak-
ing to impose some order on the surrounding chaos and
clear a way for the cortege to start upon its long, slow
journey.

The speeches of both Nehru and Patel last night were
very moving, and gained in strength from their lack of
preparation. Apart from the personal loss, the blow
smites Patel with particular severity. There were first
of all the reports of differences between himself and
Gandhi; then, as Home Minister in charge of internal
security, he was officially responsible for Gandhi's safety.
It is true that after the bomb incident ten days ago Gandhi
specifically refused police protection, but there is clear
evidence that the two attacks are part of one conspiracy,
and the fact remains that the police were unable to track
it down before the fatal shot was fired. Indeed, Gandhi's
last interview had been with Patel, and it was in hurrying
from this talk a few minutes late for his Prayer Meeting
that the assassin crossed his path. Palel resolved to un-
dergo the immense physical ordeal for a man of seventy-
two of accompanying the body all the way to the burn-
ing-ghats.

At last the cortege began almost imperceptibly to move.
It was now nearly eleven o'clock, and immense crowds had
gathered all along the route. Indeed, they were far too
great for cither the police or military to hold in check.
Their constant pressure kept the pace of the procession
down to little more than a mile an hour. The slowness
of the advance encouraged those spectators watching it
pass by to try to accompany it; which meant that in due
course the hosts following along behind were almost as
overwhelming as those ahead.

122 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

On our return to Government House we climbed up
to the dome of the Durbar Hall and looked down on the
cortege, now some two miles away from us on the great
■open "Kingsway". We could detect no visible movement,
and the crowd seemed to have settled round it like some
vast swarm. The commentator's voice, over a portable
radio we had brought up with us, told us that some head-
way was being made. Whether seeing it from the middle
distance or hearing of its progress close at hand, the
strange irony of this scene impressed itself upon me.

We were watching, I suppose, Gandhiji's first and last
darshan along this Imperial avenue. Now the man who
more than anyone else had helped to supersede the Raj
was receiving in death homage beyond the dreams of
any Viceroy. Gandhi dies one evening and is taken for
cremation the following morning. Here is no long-her-
alded State funeral; all the same, the people have flocked
within the hour and by the hundred thousand to have
one last glimpse of him. Who, in the face of this over-
whelming tribute, can honestly assert now that Gandhi
had no genuine mass following?

The Mounlbatlens, their stalT and guests, including
most of the Governors who have arrived for a conference
which it was too late to postpone, set out for the Raj
Ghat. Great care had been taken to avoid the route of
the funeral procession; but as we approached the banks
of the Jumna our cars became swallowed up in the multi-
tude, all pressing towards the cremation ground, and our
speed was dictated by theirs.

As the Governor-Gejneral and his party, some twenty
of us in all, made their way into the great barren arena,
it was difficult at the first glance to appreciate the full
immensity of the crowd, for the ground was too flat to
give a real visual indication of the size. But as we walked
out in lonely eminence towards the small brick platform
and the piled logs, wherever we looked our horizon was
closely packed humanity, and I became oppressed with
much the same sense of claustrophobia as in Birla House

MAHATMA'S MARTYRDOM

323

last night. Here all thai stood between us and a mass
invasion of this reserved territory was a cordon of Indian
Ajr Force men holding the line at intervals of three or
four yards, who, it seemed, would be no more effective
than the french windows of Birla House in holding back
a determined onrush. As a precaution against the danger
of all our party being pushed on to the flames, Mount-
batten decided that we and the nearest section of the
crowd should sit down on the dusty ground.

As the time passed and the tension mounted, close dis-
ciples of the Mahatma sat quietly round the funeral pyre,
threading garlands of small white flowers; otherwise there
was no sense of ceremonial preparation or sequence.
There was ghee for kindling the fire, but it was still in
a large tin which had been opened with a tin-opener; holy
water was in a zinc bucket.

When the cortege at last reached the field, bringing
with it yet another vast multitude, noise and confusion
burst all bounds and, as we had feared, some seven hun-
dred thousand people relentlessly converged upon the
sacred spot. Everyone wished to carry out some last act of
devotion. Statesmen and sweepers, Governors and pea-
sant women mingled to throw flower-petals over the body
before the logs were piled high. The priests read from
the holy books. With pressure of the people threatening
to crush us against the pyre, the ceremonial rites took a
terrifying long time to complete.

When finally the fire was kindled, a great cry went up
of "Gandhi is immortal", and the* crowd now took com-
plete possession. The desperate attempts of some of us
to make a small inner cordon having duly failed, Mount-
batten got up and, scanning the crowds as though ap-
praising a military situation, said quietly, "We mu^t go
now". Linked together in a human chain, we did our
best to follow him. His departure did much to save an
ugly situation, for it started an exodus just where and
when the pressure was most intense. The crowds quick-
ly picked him out in his distinctive Naval uniform and

324 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

did their best to make way. As we slowly extricated
ourselves, the flames and smoke of the pyre billowed
upwards.

It would be idle to say that the mood of this vast as-
sembly was particularly mournful. Jt left much more the
impression of a demonstration arising from the desire to
witness a memorable spectacle. Judging by this after-
noon, grief does not seem to be by any means the sole
response of Hindus to a funeral, and their belief in im-
mortality would seem to be rather more robust than ours
when it conies to the test of ceremonial self-expression.

GOVERN Mb NT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 2nd February, 1948
Bob Stimson called round to see me this afternoon. By
his accidental presence at Birla House when the fatal shots
were fired he was able twenty-five minutes afterwards to
broadcast in the B.B.C.'s one o'clock news an eye-witness
report which beat the entire world's Press. There can
surely be few precedents for such a scoop in the history
of broadcasting. Undoubtedly this first intimation of the
event must have done much to enhance its dramatic im-
pact on the British public. Bob tells me he had no in-
tention of going there for himself, but had at the last
minute accompanied Vincent Sheean, who had particular-
ly wanted to attend a Prayer Meeting. Vincent Sheean,
on witnessing the tragedy, was so deeply affected that he
was unable to cable back any immediate account of it to
America.

Bob tells me that an # American Embassy official was
the unsung hero of the occasion. He was the first to
realise what had happened and to leap forward and grip
the assassin by the arms. There was great discipline
among the crowd, and no one ran away. Everyone's first
thought, he said, was for the old man's safety. Bob tells
me he has seen the assassin, the Mahratta, Vinayak Godse.
He is by no means uneducated and edits a small provincial
newspaper. His attitude was completely intransigent.

M AH ATM AS MARTYRDOM

325

"Cut me into little pieces," he said, "and I will still main-
tain I did right."

Nehru has spoken with great frankness in the Assemb-
ly to-day. The Government, he said, must bear respon-
sibility for not ensuring the safety of Gandhi's life and of
thousands of other lives. Bob feels that the spirit of
assassination may well have been encouraged rather than
exorcised. He is off to see a mass memorial meeting, and
is wondering whether there will be any further attempts
on leaders* lives. He described the situation as "Grand
Guignol in the open air".

Mountbatten's meetings with the Governors of the new
India have, of course, been completely overshadowed by
Gandhi's death, but it has been decided to proceed with
them, and the Governors have been able to strengthen the
administration in its resolve to put down communal viol-
ence. C. R., in his capacity as Governor of Bengal ad-
vocated immediately the suppression of all political or-
ganisations with communal objectives, naming in parti-
cular the Hindu Mahasabha and its militant wing the
R.S.S.S.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

Tuesday, 3rd February, J94S
The volume of the world reaction to Gandhi's death has
frankly exceeded my expectation. From every corner of
the earth have come tributes and appreciations which show
that his influence has reached out far beyond the bound-
aries of India. The full meaning of his life may not be
clear to many, but the importance of its mystery is re-
cognised. As Kingsley Martin, who has been here with
us for the whole drama, put it to me, the world is not
doing so well with the techniques of materialism *and
power politics. It recognised that Gandhi stood for some-
thing different, and, in view of his emphasis on spiritual
values, probably better. He has impinged upon the con-
science of mankind.

326

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

In the words of the New York Times, "He strove for
perfection as other men strive for power and possessions
... the power of his benignity grew stronger as his poli-
tical influence ebbed. He tried, in the mood of the New
Testament, to love his enemies, and do good to those who
despiteful ly used him. Now he belongs to the ages."

The Christian Science Monitor sees him "as the sup-
reme individualist of our times". He thus became more
than a leader of Indian nationalism. He was a world-
wide symbol. The paper then makes a shrewd point which
may be at the root of much of the misunderstanding about
his aims and "dual" personality. "His faith", the article
continues, "that the individual could move mountains
through moral suasion lacked the great contribution of
western thought, a sense of Law. Louis Fischer had said,
4 to most people politics means government, to Gandhi it
means men'. But without government man lacks the
measure of his own ideals, and hence it is that the world
found in Gandhi a blend of wily shifting politician with
guileless unshakeable saint. He proved the moral force of
a single man."

Attlee has broadcast to the nation. Truman has spoken
of a great international tragedy and Joss to the whole
world. Smuts calls him a Prince among men. Jinnah for
his part describes him as "one of the greatest men pro-
duced by the Hind.u community and a leader who com-
manded their universal confidence and respect".

Yet, unhappily, it is just because the confidence and
respect of the Hindu community were not universal that
Gandhi's life has been taken. A tremendous sense of
shame is evident in all the memorial numbers of the
Indian papers. Many of their editions have been out-
standingly well done. I was particularly impressed with
the Hindustfian Standard, whteh, in addition to carrying
three full-page portraits of the Mahatma, leaves its leader
page completely blank save for this one paragraph in bold
type. "Gandhiji has been killed by his own people for
whose redemption he lived. This second crucifixion in

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

327

the history of the world has been enacted on a Friday —
the same day Jesus was done to death one thousand nine
hundred and fifteen years ago. Father, forgive us."

CHAPTER TWENTY-THREE

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI ,

Wednesday, 4th February, 1948
1 had an interesting talk this evening with Nye,* who
wanted to see me on some publicity problems. He said
he was very impressed with Patel, who was a real leader
in the military sense. Once decisions had been taken there
were no vain regrets and the objective was wholeheartedly
pursued. He also had that second great gift of leadership,
the power of delegation. V. P. had been given the job
of organising the States, Patel was hardly aware of the
details. In Nye's view this was the sign of a big man.

He spoke of Communist progress in Madras. They
were cashing in on local divisions inside the Congress.
There was a big feud going on between Brahmins and
non-Brahmins, and the Prime Minister, a non- Brahmin,
was currently "taking it out" of the Brahmins. The Com-
munists, too, were exploiting the failure of the monsoon
by urging the suspension of harvesting operations in order
to secure new relations between landlord and tenant. The
Communists contained a great many young men with
genuine idealism and sense of mission. Their fundamental
mistake, both here and elsewhere in the world, he feels,
lies in their contempt for and breaking of the law. If they
operated more within the framework of legality, fhey
would indeed be formidable.

* Sir Archibald Nye, Governor of Madras and after Lord
Mountbatten's departure LJnited Kingdom High Commissioner in
New Delhi.

328 MISSION WITH MO UNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Thursday, 5th February, 1948
I have been talking to Norbert Bogdan, Vice-President
of Schroeders* Banking Group of New York, who is mak-
ing a detailed survey of financial prospects and economic
trends both in India and Pakistan. He is an experienced
traveller and, 1 should say, a shrewd analyst, making his
first visit to India. For all the tragic convulsions following
on Independence, he is deeply impressed with the achieve-
ments and potentialities of the two new States.

He is just back from Karachi, and had an interview with
Jinnah yesterday. He found him in a far more accom-
modating mood than he had been led to expect. Jinnah
was clearly disturbed about the implications of the Kash-
mir situation, and spoke of Gandhi in much more gener*
ous terms than he saw fit to use in his message, acknowl-
edging to Bogdan how great was the loss for the Moslems.
Jinnah added that he was reputed to have said that cer-
tain men in responsible positions in India were plotting
the economic and political destruction of Pakistan, but
he was ready to give them the benefit of the doubt. The
real trouble was with the extremist groups, and he had
been favourably impressed by the Indian Government's
firm handling of these following on Gandhi's assassination.

There is one "extremist" who seems to have found the
events of the last few days too great for him, and that is
the Socialist leader, Jai Prakash Narain. The Congress
is now an elderly Party which has won its principal vic-
tory, and thus a democratic constitutional Socialist move-
ment has the chance to» build up a powerful following for
itself in the next five years. Gandhi's death left the So-
cialists with only two profitable choices — open opposition
to the Congress or reconciliation with it and its capture
from within. Narain gave a Press conference which did
neither of these things. He urged the need for unity while
at the same time denouncing Patel, thus rendering rap-
prochement with Nehru almost impossible.

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

329

Kingsley Martin tells me he had a long talk with him
yesterday which he found rather disappointing. Although
he was still emotionally and mentally numbed by Gandhi's
death, there was — Kingsley said — a certain lack of firm-
ness in his pursuit of power which is the failing of so
many social democrats of good-will. He also detected a
disquieting indifference to the interests of his followers or
10 the tactical question whether or not his aims should
be to join the Government.

GOVl.RN MI'NT HOUSE, NEW DhLHl,

Saturday, 14th February, 1948
Against the background of mourning for the Mahatma
we celebrate another day of national Independence. This
time it is in honour of Ceylon's assumption of full Do-
minion Status. The violence and civil disorders disfigur-
ing many of the manifestations of rising Asian national-
ism have been noticeably absent from Ceylon. The whole
operation has been an accurate reflection of the people's
sunny and happy-go-lucky temperament. Liberty has
come smoothly because life, for all its grinding poverty,
comes easily. To-day the Ceylon flag with its golden lion
was unfurled on the flagstaff by Mr. de Silva, their Special
Representative in Delhi, and got stuck on the way up.
ft would surely have remained permanently at half-mast
but for the obvious concern of the Diplomatic Corps,
some of whom were shaping to put the flag on top of
the mast themselves. This encouraged the cheerful Mr. de
Silva to make one final and successful tug at the rope.

Both Mountbatten and Nehru spoke — Nehru in the most
informal and paternal mood, calling the island by its
Indian name of Lanka and stressing the deep ties of re-
ligion, history and culture. After the flag-hoisting a»d
the speeches there was tea— Ceylon tea. Nehru gave clear
signs this afternoon that he is beginning to recover from
the stunning impact of Gandhi's death and the pair of
national mourning which has lain heavily upon him. He
came up to us, and after we had made some remark about

330

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

the excellent quality of the tea we were drinking, he waxed
eloquent on the aesthetics of tea-making, commending the
artistry of the Chinese, who, he said, were reputed to in-
fuse their tea with dew collected at dawn. from the lotus
leaf.

The subject of tea recalls a revealing comment made
to us by Oleg Orcslov the other day. He represents the
Tass Agency here, and is due to return shortly to the
Soviet Union. He has for same time been the Honorary
Secretary of the Foreign Correspondents' Association,
continuing to live with his family in the poorer part of
Old Delhi throughout the troubles. During lunch with us
he discussed the transfer of power quite frankly. In an
appreciation of the persistent strength of British influence
he cited in all seriousness and some dismay the Indian
attitude to his tea-drinking habits. "How do you like
your tea?" they would ask. "By itself," he would reply,
at which the Indian would invariably exclaim, "But that is
not the correct way to drink it. The British drink it with
milk and sugar." Nearly all influential Indians with the at-
tainment of Independence show themselves in his view to
be quite unconsciously the exponents of the British way of
life. This, he implied, was the ultimate victory of the im-
perial system — to ensure the continuity of your own
thought-processes and behaviour-patterns among an alien
people to whom you have voluntarily liquidated formal
power.

Narain, among others, has had his answer. Nehru,
broadcasting to-night over All India Radio, declares him-
self distressed bey end measure by whisperings about
differences between Patel and himself. "Of course," he
said, "there have been for many years past differences
between us, temperamental and other, in regard to many
problems, but India at least should know that these differ-
ences have been overshadowed by the fundamental agree-
ments about the most important aspects of our public
life, and that we have co-operated together for a quarter
of a century or more in great undertakings. Is it likely

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

331

that at this crisis in our national destiny either of us should
be petty minded and think of anything but the national

good?"

So an end is. put to speculation, and the lie direct is
given to those who had doubted whether the two big men
of the Government were big enough to hold together. On
their solidarity at this time the future of the entire regime
depends.

GOVl-RNMINT 1I0USI,, M W DI-XHI,

Tuesday, 17 th lebruary, 1948
At our Staff Meeting to-day Mountbatten reviewed the
disquieting Kashmir situation. The reference of the dis-
pute to the United Nations has at least offset the immedi-
ate risk of war, but a new danger is creeping up, the
reality of which it is easier for us here in Delhi than for
the Government in London or the delegates at Lake Suc-
cess to discern. Various suspicions are seeping into the
minds of the Indian Government and the politically con-
scious public which, taken together, could well develop
into a major frontal attack on fndo-British good-will.

Tn the first place, there is bewilderment at the delay
of the United Nations in accepting India's basic complaint
that an act of aggression has taken place in Kashmir. This
is regarded here as no mere formality, but as a basic
point of grievance involving a threat to peace which the
United Nations was especially created to redress. Hence
grows the suspicion that the United Nations is being made
the forum for the promotion of international power poli-
tics. As evidence of this the published attitude of the
American and British delegates. Warren Austin and Noel-
Baker, are cited. Both are wildly accused of being un-
ashamedly pro- Pakistan for a variety of unedifying reasons.

As a natural reaction from this disillusionment, which
is genuinely and nationally felt, the belief is also spread-
ing that India has most to hope, whether in terms of
mediation or even of the veto, from Soviet Russia and her
satellites. Some of this trouble has sprung from the failure

332 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

of the Indian delegation to make its mark. A week ago
Nehru ordered its recall for consultation and, it is to be
hoped, reconstitution.

On the Public Relations side India fared even worse
than 1 had feared she would. Even the Indian Press was
obliged to print large indigestible chunks of Ayyengar's
speeches three or four days after they had been delivered.
The personality of Sheikh Abdullah and the procedure
of Lake Success could not be reconciled, and the Indian
case suffered accordingly. Moreover, the Pakistan dele-
gate was their Foreign Minister, Zaffrullah Khan, an ex-
perienced and popular practitioner in United Nations dial-
ectic, who was as suave ami smooth as the Indian delegates
were awkward and aneular.

Mountbattcn is worried because he feels that Attlee and
Noel-Baker do not seem to be showing themselves suffi-
ciently alive to the psychological influences of this dispute
and that their attempt to deal out even-handed justice is
producing heavy-handed diplomacy. The crux of the pro-
blem as seen in London is India's unwillingness to re-
cognise that a plebiscite carried out under the auspices
of Abdullah and with the sole support of Indian troops,
even with Security Council backing, would not be regard-
ed as fulfilling the condition of its fair conduct. In Mount-
batten's opinion the United Kingdom delegate could with
advantage take a^ less unfriendly line towards India by
supporting the view that the first step should be for Paki-
stan to stop helping the raiders. The question of super-
intending the plebiscite without interfering with the legally
constituted Government* deserved, he felt, more sympa-
thetic discussion and treatment than it has yet received.

In an appraisal of Attlee this morning, Mountbatten
stressed first his absolute intellectual honesty — perhaps his
greatest source of strength — secondly his status as a
liberator and finally his profound personal affection for
and interest in India. These were assets which must not
be squandered. Mountbatten finds his present constitu-
tional position of friendly adviser irksome at times. He

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

333

can no longer step in between London and Delhi, and
his only link now is with the King, who strictly separates
his various sovereignties.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 22nd February, J 948
Walter Monckton has just arrived here following a
week's stay in Hyderabad. We were aware that he was
due to see the Nizam during the middle of February, and
Mountbatten had accordingly written off to His Exalted
Highness urging that he should seize the opportunity of
Monckton's visit to come to a eeneral settlement with
India.

Rather to Mountbatten's surprise, the Nizam at once
agreed with him. I say surprise, because some of the
Nizam's privately expressed opinions of Mountbatten re-
cently have been far from flattering. We are aware that
he has been describing him as no friend of Hyderabad,
as anyhow without power, and has been asserting that it
was immaterial whether Mountbatten helped in future ne-
gotiations or not. But now he replies expressing the hope
That Mountbatten, "as a member of the Royal Family
of England, will give your invaluable help and support
to Hyderabad in the long term agreement which may be
in keeping with the high position Hyderabad occupies in
the eyes of the world". It is interesting to note that he
always invokes Mountbatten's Royal connection, as if it
endowed him with some special virtue and status in ne-
gotiating with Hyderabad.

For a month after the signing of the Standstill Agree-
ment there was almost complete quiet, but shortly after
the New Year there was an incident to show that the calm
was deceptive. A trivial but non-the-less significant dis-
pute arose over the allotment of accommodation* in
Hyderabad for K. M. Munshi, India's newly appointed
Agent-General. The house already earmarked for him
was not ready. So it was suggested that he should go into
one of the vacant Residencies for the intervening eleven

334

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

days. The Nizam at once protested against the proposal,
seeing in it a sinister plot to revive Paramountcy. The
Indian reply was simply that if Munshi was not to be
allowed proper and adequate accommodation, neither he
nor any other Agent-General would be sent at all. At
this stage Mountbatten's good offices were invoked, and
as a result of a brisk exchange of letters and telegrams
the Nizam was induced to give way, and Munshi duly
left on the 5th January to take up his post.

By the end of the month relations between Hyderabad
and India had declined to the point where it could be said
that the whole Standstill Agreement was liable to be de-
nounced by both sides. There was a dangerous increase
in the number of border incidents. The policy of pin-pricks
was leading inevitably to wider irritation. The Hyderabad
Government began by imposing some restrictions on the
export of metals, and followed this up by withdrawing
recognition of Indian Dominion currency in all normal
transactions within the State.

More provocative than either of these moves, a loan of
twenty crores of rupees (over fifteen million pounds) was
understood to have been made available by Hyderabad
to Pakistan. The circumstances of .this deal were obscure
and disquieting. Mount batten has been very carefully
into the matter, and from the evidence at his disposal
it is difficult to avoid the conclusion that it was arranged
by Moin Nawaz Jung, the present Minister for External
Affairs and Finance, while he was actually a member of
the delegation negotiating the Standstill Agreement. This
provocative move was made, moreover, just when the
Indian Government was considering withholding the fifty-
five crores of assets from Pakistan. On the Hyderabad
side come detailed complaints of economic blockade.

On the day of Gandhi's, cremation Mountbatten had his
first meeting with the new Ittehad -sponsored Prime Minis-
ter of Hyderabad, Mir Laik Ali, and advised him frankly
that his Government should mend their ways and general-
ly try to work in a spirit of friendship with India. Mount-

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

335

batten doubts however, whether he made any deep im-
pression. Behind a suave outward manner he detected in
Mir Laik AH's outlook that blend of fanaticism and cun-
ning which we have been reduced to regarding as the
dominant characteristics of the Ittehad and its leaders.
Much now depends on the ability of Monckton to per-
suade the Nizam and his Government to adopt more con-
structive policies, and on Mountbatten to prevent Patel
and the Indian Government losing their patience before
the resources of negotiation have been fully worked out.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Monday, 23rd February, 1948
Walter Monckton and V. P. were both guests at one
of Mountbatten's informal Staff Meetings this morning.
We burst the bounds of our agenda and indulged in re-
miniscence about Kashmir's accession and speculation
about Commonwealth citizenship. On Kashmir, Monck-
ton said that frankly the issues were not understood out-
side the sub-continent. V. P. Stressed that Nishtar's* agree-
ment to the accession policy on behalf of the future Paki-
stan Government was in fact secured before the transfer
of power, and that Pakistan Ministers had subsequently
admitted that the Junagadh accession was essentially a
violation of the agreement. When Kakt came to Delhi
in July he saw Patel, who told him that he did nor want
the accession of Kashmir against the people's will. Through
Mountbatten's good offices he also saw Jinnah at this
time.

Discussing problems of Commonwealth status, Monck-
ton drew attention to the importance of the Nationality
Bill in Britain, which was, it seems, in some measure the

* Sardar Rab Nishtar, Pakistan Cabinet Minister, whose port-
folios included the Pakistan Ministry of States. He was a
Moslem League representative along with Mr. Jinnah and Mr.
Liaquat A.U Khan at the decisive meetings with Lord Mount-
batten on the 2nd and 3rd June, 1947.

t Pandit Kak, the last Prime Minister under the old order in
Kashmir, who had been responsible for the arrest of Nehru on
his visit to Kashmir in 1946.

336 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

outcome of a letter he had written to Cripps. He explain-
ed that the position now is that one can be a subject of
the King without owing allegiance in the citizenship sense.
On the general issue of India and the Commonwealth,
Mountbatten is preparing an aide-memoire which he wants
to have ready in lime for Gordon-Walker to see and to
study. After his stay at Government House at the end
of January, Gordon- Walker went down to Ceylon. He
is now back in Delhi at a crucial moment in the Kashmir
dispute. With a stalemate on the fighting front and a
hiatus at Lake Success, the physical opportunity arises
for renewing informal and indirect diplomacy.

My memory of Gordon-Walker goes back to my under-
graduate days at Christ Church, when as a young History
don there he guided me through the intricacies of seven-
teenth-century Europe. He seems to me to have all the
qualifications for high office, the lucidity of the scholar's
mind, a strong but attractive personality and administra-
tive grip. He is one of the younger Labour intellectuals
treading the Attleean way of Fabian moderation.

He sees the central issue between the two Dominions
in the Kashmir dispute as being now the withdrawal of
troops, and he feels it is easier to envisage the possibility
of compromise both on the plebiscite and the Interim
Government. He has, 1 think, been able to see for him-
self that Mountbatten is not exaggerating the bad impres-
sion caused here by the British attitude at the United
Nations.

In the course of a long talk with Sir Girja Shankar
Bajpai, Nehru's accomplished Secretary for External
Affairs, he has, I understand, stressed quite firmly that
friendship with Russia is obtainable only at the price of
subservience, and that Russia in any case has no basic
interest in India. I also hear, incidentally, that Bajpai
has taken up the question of Korea with the American
Ambassador, Grady. With the demarcation of Soviet and
American influence along the 38th Parallel, the situation
between North and South Korea is very similar to that

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

337

between East and West Germany. Bajpai's argument is,
if United States troops are not leaving Korea, why should
Indian troops be called upon to leave Kashmir?

At this morning's meeting I urged that Gordon -Walker
should be pressed to stay on until 29th February, the date
of a possible visit from Liaqual. I feel strongly that a
British Minister's presence during the next discussions be-
tween Liaquat and Nehru would serve as an inducement
to moderation and compromise. No effective mediating
influence has been available in the right place at the right
time.

Mountbatlen called for a post-mortem from me on the
failure of the Indian case to establish itself with world
opinion at the United Nations. I replied that quite apart
from its actual merits it had been abominably presented,
and that nearly every canon of Public Relations procedure
had either been violated or neglected. Moreover, I felt
that not enough attention had been paid to answering
Pakistan's case against India, in particular the allegations
of Congress "conspiracy" to secure the Maharaja's sub-
mission through Abdullah; just to ignore such charges was
not w ; sc.

C.0V1RNMINT HOUSE, NEW DILI IF,

Wednesday, 25th February, . 1948
Mountbatten's aide-memoire on India and the Com-
monwealth, which sets out to make "certain tentative sug-
gestions as to how the structure of the Commonwealth
could perhaps be altered, particularly in nomenclature, to
allow Asian countries to remain more easily associated
with it," is now ready for Gordon-Walker. Although
there has been a lot of staff discussion and thinking on
the subject, it is very much Mountbatten's own document,
characteristically bold, direct and original. It is also well-
timed, for the Government of India is due to release the
draft of the new Indian Constitution to the Press to-
morrow. After circulation of the draft to Members of
the Constituent Assembly, whose comments arc required

338

MISSION WITH MOTJNTBATTEN

within a month, a revised draft will then be formally sub-
milted to the Constituent Assembly for final approval.

Mountbatten says frankly that although individual
Indian leaders arc alive to the advantages of the continued
Commonwealth connection, their political position has
been weakened and the attitude of the Government ad-
versely affected by the policy adopted towards Kashmir
by the British delegation at the Security Council. This
he puts forward as a political fact, and not as something
over which he is trying to moralise. He said he would like
to see the word "Republic" expunged from the Indian
Constitution in favour of Commonwealth, but without pro-
mising to be successful in achieving this amendment, he
adds," 44 ! think there can be no doubt that there is room
for a Republic within the Commonwealth."

He points out that the word Dominion is not in any case
an easy one for India to swallow, after the Congress re-
solution in favour of a Republic. It still has a debased
meaning here, whether of domination or of status short
of full freedom. He also urges that the term "Common-
wealth citizen" should be considered as a desirable alter-
native to British subject, although both terms could be
used on occasion with advantage. His final point of sub-
stance is that in any arrangement made about the future
structure of the Commonwealth it would be best if pos-
sible to leave the question of the formal link with the
Crown unstated.

CJOVI.RNMINT IfOUSIi, NEW DLLIII,

Thursday, 26th February, 1948
Vernon has asked me to comment on a draft memoran-
dum he is preparing giving a brief survey of the Accession
policy to date with particular reference to Junagadh and
Kashmir. After covering some points of detail, 1 have
made the following brief distinction between these two
events. "Quite apart from the test of majority popula-
tions, the accession of Junagadh to Pakistan was in vio-
lation of the principle of geographical compulsion to which

CONFLICTS CONTINUED 33*

ibe Pakistan leaders had themselves subscribed. The
accession of Kashmir was not. Moreover, from the stra-
tegic and economic points, of view, while Pakistan had
no interest in Junagadh, India had considerable interest
in Kashmir. There were two further special factors in-
volved in the case of Kashmir but absent from that of
Junagadh — the use of force by tribal invasion to over-
throw the Maharaja's regime before accession, and the
presence (also before accession) of an important inter-
communal political organisation in the Slate.

"Taking into account all these 'other factors', the ac-
cession of Junagadh to Pakistan was wholly frivolous,
while that of Kashmir to India was definitely arguable.
It was just because of all the special circumstances attach-
ing to both accessions that the Government of India ac-
cepted the principle of a confirming plebiscite for the
action taken in both Slates. Finally, it should be noted
that when India challenged the validity of the Junagadh
accession, Pakistan asserted the doctrine of the Ruler's
absolute and sacrosanct right to accede, but promptly
challenged that right in the case of Kashmir."

(jovfrnmknt nousr:, nkw delhi,
Thursday, 4th March, 1948

The new Hyderabad delegation, consisting of Mir Laik
Ali, Moin Nawaz Jung (Mir Laik Ali's ambitious and
powerful brother-in-law) and Monckton, are in Delhi and
have had two meetings with Mountbattcn, one on Tues-
day and the other to-day, at both of which V. P. was also
present. Yesterday Mir Laik Ali visited Karachi, and at
Mountbatten's suggestion asked Liaqual to undertake not
to cash the twenty crore loan made by Hyderabad to
Pakistan during the period of the Standstill Agreement.
He returned with this undertaking given to him verbally.

There has been a lengthy recitation of grievance on
both sides, V. P. quoting the loan to Pakistan and the
ordinance making Indian currency illegal, and Mir Laik
Ali claiming the operation of a full-scale economic block-

340 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

ade against Hyderabad. Mountbatlen pointed out that
all communal armies had recently been abolished in India
and that Hyderabad should by the same token disband
the Razakars, the militant offshoot of the Tttehad of whose
depredations increasingly grave reports were being receiv-
ed. He also urged upon the delegation the desirability of
the early introduction of responsible government in
Hyderabad.

We have here the customary deadlock of timing and
procedure concealing the conflict for the ultimate power.
Patel feels that it is useless to negotiate for a long-term
settlement until the Standstill Agreement is working pro-
perly, and that the Standstill Agreement cannot be ex-
pected to work without some measure of responsible gov-
ernment. As a first step towards this, however, Patel
was not ready to back the suggestion that an Interim Gov-
ernment should be set up consisting of an equal number
of Hindus and Moslems. Mir Laik Ali for his part does
not think that he would be able to get beyond parity and
admit a Hindu majority Government until a long-term
agreement is reached, although he concedes that it might
be possible for the two steps to be taken simultaneously.

After the meeting a storm blew up over the issue of a
communique, and Patel refused to agree to the inclusion
of any suggestion that India had committed a breach of
the Standstill Agreement. Here he is on firm ground as
far as the Central Government is concerned. The trouble
is at the provincial levels with local officials. In present
conditions of administrative strain and inexperience it is
easier to give instructions than to ensure that they will be
carried out. Patel, however (perhaps from fear of im-
plying the wider admission), was not even prepared to
state in a communique that the goods due to Hyderabad,
which it was claimed were held up, should be released.
Monckton is extremely upset, and Mountbatten on his
return from a dinner-party has spoken to him over the
telephone promising to follow the matter up personally
to-morrow.

CONFLICTS CONTINUED

341''

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Friday, 5th March, 1948
Monckton left for Hyderabad early this morning and
Mountbatten pursued his inquiries about the communique
in his absence. He talked with Nehru, who was very
reasonable and sympathetic, but anxious that the question
should be settled with Patel as the Minister responsible
for handling the Hyderabad question. Mountbatten was
due to see him this afternoon, but during lunch Patel had
a heart attack and nearly died. He is completely laid up,
and has been forbidden by his doctor to do any work
whatever for an unspecified period, which may well cover
the remainder of our term he r e.

f think he overtaxed his strength at the time of Gandhi's
death by his determination to ride on the funeral carriage
throughout the six-hour journey. When I saw him at the
Raj Ghat he looked drawn and ill and seemed as if in a
trance. The whole tragedy has hit him heavily, and he
has undoubtedly carried more than his fair share of the
burden of criticism as Home Minister for the failure to
see that Gandhi was properly protected. His illness now
is a serious blow for the Government at a critical time
in its affairs at home and abroad, and it serves to under-
line how dependent the regime is upon its two key men.

In the immediate context of Hyderabad and the com-
munique there is no one to be found who will assume
responsibility for reversing his last decision. So Mount-
batten has had to write oil to Monckton that no Press
statement should be issued for the present.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Saturday, 6th March, 1948
Mountbatten has seen K. M. Munshi, India's Agent-
General in Hyderabad, who is active, purposeful and, I
would guess, ambitious. He is moving up in the Congress
hierarchy, although lacking the particular Congress badge
of honour, prison service in resistance to the Raj. This

342

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

not unnaturally only enhances the vigour of his national-
ism to-day.

In his memorial broadcast on the Mahatma he present-
ed himself as the student of ahimsa, or non-violence, who
was ready to grapple with Gandhi on the failure of civil
disobedience in 1942 because "it did not stand the scrip-
tural test of ahimsa; as it evoked wrath in the enemy and
not love". From what he had to say to Mountbatten to-
day, it is clear that he is not placing excessive reliance on
ahimsa for dealing with Hyderabad. If the activities of
the Razakars are not quickly restrained he advocates send-
ing in the Indian police to do so, which, by his own legal
interpretation, he considers would come within the terms
of the Standstill Agreement. He is already convinced that
the Razakars cannot and will not be restrained by the
present regime.

Mountbatten spoke firmly of India's need to adopt ethi-
cal and correct behaviour towards Hyderabad and to act
in such a way as could be defended before the bar of
world opinion. Jn the present state of negotiations
Munshi's proposal for police action was absolutely wrong.
Mir Laik Ali must be given a fair chance to deal with
the Razakars, to implement the Standstill Agreement and
introduce a measure of responsible government.

Mountbatten told me afterwards that while he has no
doubt about Munshi's drive and ability, he is far from
happy whether his temperament or political outlook fit
him for this particularly delicate stage in the handling of
the Ni/am, which calls for unusual diplomatic patience
and non-communal objectivity.

Monckton has now left Hyderabad for London, and
we are afraid may well be ready to throw in his hand
from the belief that further negotiations on the pattern
of this week's performance arc a waste of his time, and
without Monckton the margin of Mountbatten's diploma-
tic initiative wili be further narrowed down.

CHAPTER TWJ NTY-IOUR

BURMA REVISITED

GOViiRN MfcNT IIOUSU, CALCUTTA,

Monday, 8tli March, 1948
Wi ARr oi l on the grand tour, nine days in all, to Cal-
cutta, Orissa, Rangoon and Assam. The Mountbattens'
schedule is fearsome even by their high-powered stand-
ards, and is set out in four slim booklets produced in
four different colours by the Military Secretary's inde-
fatigable staff. Travelling as light as possible, the party,
including servants, still comprises over fifty persons, and
is no small exercise in ceremonial logistics. 1 shall be
staying on in Calcutta during the visits to Assam and
Orissa, which will enable me to meet the Calcutta editors.
We left Pa lam at 8.45 a.m., reaching Dum Dum airfield
at one o'clock, where the venerable C. R., as Governor
of West Bengal, had come to meet us.

After the speeches were over and most of the guests had
left, C. R. came to my table and spoke about nearly, every-
thing with the devastating frankness of the really wise man.
He said he was deeply worried about Kashmir. The
country's resources were being squandered. Jt was like
trying to mend a broken lea -cup at this party and for-
getting all about the guests. He feared that Mountbalten
might not be giving enough unpalatable advice. "Pan-
dit ji'\ he said, "is capable of hearing profoundly unpleas-
ant things," I replied that Mountbatten, with only an
advisory role left to him, did not want to reach the stage
where he could only irritate but not influence.

343

M.M.— 12

.144

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA,

Tuesday, 9th March, 1948
The Mountbattens, after a full morning programme —
Lady Mountbatten's first engagement being at 7.30 a.m.
— lunched with the Bengal Press Advisory Committee at
the Calcutta Club. The President of the Committee,
Tushar Kanli Ghosh, who is also editor of the well-known
Calcutta daily, Amrita Bazar Patrika, gave a short but
highly polished chairman's introduction which was well
above the average in expression and content for such (x*-
casions. Mountbatten took trouble over his reply, which
he delivered with hardly a glance at his notes. It was an
opportunity well taken to establish cordial relations with
a very powerful section of the Indian Press, upon whom
much depends for the creation of communal confidence
in the oartition of Bencal.

In addition to providing such important pro-Congress
papers as the Amrita Bazar Patrika, Calcutta is the main
headquarters of The Statesman. Ian Stephens has
invited me to lunch with the editorial staff and to go over
the office. As Mountbatten pointed out in his speech, it
was from The Statesman's office that, with Stephens' gene-
rous cooperation, two newspapers were simultaneously
produced- The Statesman itself, and "SEAC" under
Frank Owen's dynamic editorship, which for nearly three
years was one of Mountbatten's major morale-raising con-
tributions to the Burma campaign, and post-war activities.

During the brief intervals between engagements, I have,
among other* things, been discussing with Mountbatten a
further outburst by Nehru on the Foreign Press. It is
disquieting, and may well jeopardise the goodwill agree-
ment achieved under Mountbatten's chairmanship in
November.

Mountbatten tells me he had a most illuminating talk
to-day with C R„ who had given his candid opinion that
if Mountbatten had not transferred power when he did

BURMA REVISITED

345

there might well have been no power to transfer. It
might, in fact, have been impossible to produce any Plan
at all, and then the British would have been left with the
whole burden and odium, whether they stayed on or
moved out.

Rangoon -Calcutta, Saturday, 7 3th March. 1948
\ just managed to get to the United Services Club in
time for the annual dinner of the Mining, Geological and
Metallurgical Institute of India, and sat on a very hard
chair through very lengthy proceedings. There was one
memorable moment, however, provided by an impromptu
tribute to Mountbatten from C. R. As there was ap-
parently no Press representative present to catch his words,
I hurriedly noted them down on the back of my menu
card .

He began by saying that he did not wish to emphasise
Mountbalten\s services to India, to which ample testi-
mony had already been given, but to stress rather his
services to Britain. Churchill might feel that what Has-
tings and Clive had won, Mountbatten had thrown away.
But that was true only in a superficial sense. The deeper
realitv was that for the all-round suspicion, bitterness and
ill-will that prevailed during the war years, Mountbatten
had succeeded in substituting unqualified good-will be-
tween Tndia and Britain. "Has not Lord Mountbatten
then done greater service to Britain than Hastings and
Clive? For this is the greatest service of all. In times
to come it will not be Empires that count. It is good-
will *hat counts. Therefore 1 say that he has done more
for Britain than anyone else."

The example of brevity set by Mountbatten, who spoke
for little more than three minutes, and by C. R. himself,
was not, unfortunately, followed by all the other speakers.
The West Bengal Minister of Commerce rattled through
a tightly packed bundle of notes for nearly three-quarters
of an hour. There seemed no reason why he should ever
end, until suddenly, almost in the middle of a sentence,
he made a dramatic pause and announced, "I have good

346

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

news for you, T have finished" — at once sitting down, to
the warmest applause of the evening!

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA,

Sunday, 14th March, 1948
I am deeply impressed by C. R. He has immense
moral authority, which is exerted without any outward
gesture. There is no raising of the voice or haughtiness
of manner. He has the true strength of the humble in
heart. He is, I suppose, one of the oldest of Gandhi's
campaigning disciples, and there is also a family link, for
Gandhi's son Devadas is married to a daughter of C. R.
Only a man of C. R.'s powerful character and deep con-
viction could have dared to resist Gandhi's will in 1942
by advocating the acceptance of the Cripps Plan, and even
promoting his own partition formula at that moment of
inflated expectation. He retired, of course, into the wild-
erness, yet never wholly lost his influence.

It was Gandhi who performed the "miracle" of Cal-
cutta last September, but it is C. R. who, as Governor,
has consolidated the communal good-will which Gandhi
engendered. The minorities here have looked on him
for fairness and friendship, and he has not failed them.
To place a Madrassi Liberal to preside over Bengal's
fanatical and factious politics was, a calculated risk. His
popularity to-day is good to see, and the communal quiet
in this seething, over-populated, hunger-ridden and revo-
lutionary city is in no small measure a reflection of his
benign authority.

[ went in to see*him this morning, and said that as
far as I could tell I alone had taken any record of his
tribute to Mountbattcn at last night's dinner. I told him
I would like to release the text of what he had said to the
Press. He agreed, adding in characteristic fashion that
he hoped particularly that I would send the account to
London, where he liked to think it would do Mountbatten
good as coming from an Indian.

BURMA REVISITED

347

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, CALCUTTA,

Tuesday, 16th March, 1948
I re-joined the Mountbattens' party at Dum Dum,
where the switch was made from Governor-General's Da-
kota to Governor-General's York for the return flight to
Delhi. The Assam visit was, it seems, a great success,
with rather more "organised leisure" than in Orissa or
Rangoon. Turner and Desfor have come back enthu-
siastic about the tribal dancing, which they found to be
highly photogenic.

•For myself the past two days in Calcutta have been
wholly delightful. Before I left, C. R. presented me with
signed copies of his translations for the lay reader of the
great Hindu scriptures, the Bhagavad Gita and Upani-
shads, writing on the fly-leaf of the latter, "In spite of
our obvious failings, I suppose our minds and morals
bear some impress of the holy books held in reverence in
India for some few millennia. No one can understand
the people of India unless one goes through these scrip-
tures sympathetically." All that I have seen of him on
this visit only goes to confirm my belief that he would
be the ideal, even if somewhat unwilling, successor to
Mountbatten as India's first Indian Governor-General.

In this connection Patel for some while now has been
urging Mountbatten with remarkable vehemence and in-
sistence to extend his term beyond April in the interests
of the people of India, and would like him to stay for the
regulation five years. Mountbatten has regretfully refus-
ed to consider this; but when Nehru at the beginning of
this month asked him, on behalf of his Government, to
stay on for at least another year or even a few more
months he finally decided to make the gesture of extending
his time from April to June 1948, this having been .the
date announced in London for his departure when the
original schedule for the transfer of power were set and
published.

CHAPriiR TWENTY-FIVE

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Friday, 19th March, 1948
Onct: morf wt are back in harness in Delhi. To-day
there has been the first meeting between Liaquat and
Nehru for two months. Mountbatten has had some diffi-
culty in bringing them together under the a;gis of the Joint
Defence Council. They have decided that this should
be its last formal session. It was in any case due to
close clown on the 1st April, but Mountbatten had in
mind to continue it in its existing form (under his chair-
manship until he left, and then successively under the
Prime Minister of the Dominion in which it met) for a
further year, with a view to the widening of its function
in due course to cover financial and economic questions,
communications and external affairs. Although this con-
cept did not commend itself to either side, the two Prime
Ministers recognised the value of the Joint Defence Coun-
cil as a pretext and cover for regular personal contact,
and Mountbatten had no difficulty in getting them to agree
that they should continue to meet at approximately month-
ly intervals to discuss matters of common interest and
concern.

Not the least remarkable feature of the past six months
of bitterness and frustration has been the life-line of sanity
thrown out and grasped by both Nehru and Liaquat. One
always feels that if matters could be left to these two,
and the pressures and stresses to which they arc both sub-
jected removed, a firm settlement of all outstanding dif-
ferences; would soon be signed, sealed and delivered.

348

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

349

During this particular discussion, while there was amic-
able agreement on a number of secondary problems, no
mention whatever was made of Kashmir. This was not
for lack of background developments. The Chinese dele-
gate, Dr. Tsiang — the present chairman of the Security
Council — has on his own initiative put forward proposals
which are at last basically satisfactory to India. But un-
fortunately Dr. Tsiang has not waited to gain wider spon-
sorship in the Security Council for his plan. With the re-
sult that it is far more likely to provoke bitterness and
narrow the already slender margin of negotiation and
good-will. Something is seriously wrong with the proce-
dures of Lake Success. Oh, for a return to some "sini-
ster secret diplomacy" to counteract the effect of these
"public disagreements publicly arrived at"!

The new Indian delegation has, J am glad to say, been
reinforced by B. L. Sharma, who is to cover the sadly
neglected Public Relations side of their efforts. He was
only asked at the last minute, and hardly had time to
pack his bag. I managed, however, to send him a num-
ber of personal introductions, and am confident that he
will do well. Sheikh Abdullah has not rejoined the party.
His particular brand of self-assertive oratory bludgeoned
the United Nations delegates and the American public
without persuading them. He generated more heal than
light.

Perhaps the most disquieting, though far from unex-
pected development in the propaganda campaign over
Kashmir at the United Nations, has been the attempt by
Zaffrullah Khan to offset India's complaint by widening
the area of grievance on Pakistan's behalf and in the
process to indulge in what the Americans call "character
assassination". He has now introduced Mountbatten *s
name at a moment when it is impossible on constitutional
grounds for Mountbatten himself to make a public reply.

We have had full staff discussions of the problem, and
Mountbatten has wisely decided to ensure that his answer
to the allegations, together with the relevant facts, should

350

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

be placed on the records of the Joint Defence Council be-
fore it is disbanded, so that it should be brought to the
notice of both the Pakistan and Indian Governments, and
that the British Government should be fully briefed, in
so far as the attacks on himself as Viceroy would almost
certainly implicate them as well.

Zafirullah's two main charges were that, as Viceroy,
Mountbatten knew of a Sikh plan from the beginning
of July, and that knowing it, he failed to take effective
action in the form of arresting the leaders and crushing
the trouble makers despite previous assurances that he
would.

Mountbatlen's memorandum makes it clear that while
no one in the higher spheres of Government was under
any misapprehension about the scale of the Sikh problem
and the urgency of solving it, neither he nor anyone else
was aware of any specific Sikh master plan. There was,
indeed, no hint of such a plan prior to the meeting with
the British Intelligence officer on the 5th August, nor did
the meeting itself provide conclusive proof of the plan's
scale or "operational" significance.* Mountbatten takes
his stand on a letter of admirable lucidity, dated 9lh
August from Jenkins, which forwarded the unanimous
view of all three Punjab Governors— Jenkins himself and
the two successor Governors-designate- that nothing more
should be done before actual transfer of power than to
make plans for the Sikh leader's arresL which could be
implemented quickly on either side of the boundary as
required.

It is interesting to note from this souicc that Mudie,
the Governor-elect of the West Punjab and as such the
principal spokesman for Pakistan's interest, urged that un-
less the West Punjab could be quite certain of the ulti-
mate attitude of the East Punjab on the matter, the con-

* See p. 178 for icferencc to Mountbatten's acceptance of
Ihe risk of driving in state with Jinnah on 14th August, follow-
ing the threat of an attempt on Jinnah s life during this Stale
drive.

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

351

finement of the Sikh leaders not on criminal charges, but
under Jenkins' emergency powers, might be most embar-
rassing. It was not clear, Mudie added, where the leaders
could be confined, without causing trouble — Jenkins could
hardly send them to what would in a few days be a part
of Pakistan; on the other hand, if they were left in the
East Punjab they would be a centre of agitation.

A further Pakistani charge has been brought into the
open with the allegation that the Boundary Commission
award was changed to the disadvantage of Pakistan as a
result of improper pressure from Viceroy's House just
before publication. Here the evidence was a letter dated
8th August sent by Abell to Jenkins slating that the inten-
tion was for (he Boundary Commission Award to be pre-
sented on the 11th, and containing an outline of the en-
visaged Award which showed the tehsils (sub-districts)
of Ferozepore and Zira as going to Pakistan.

Abell was, in fact, shown a strictly provisional forecast
by RadclihVs secretary, which he sent to Jenkins, who
sometime before had asked that if any sort of advance
information could be given him, it should be provided
so as to enable him to dispose police and troops to the
best advantage. This forecast proved^ ultimately to be
wrong to the extent of two tehsils and two days. There
is, in fact, no more nor less to it than that.

The whole baseless proposition is, of course, rendered
plausible by presenting the bald evidence of A bell's letter,
but if there was any reason for Jenkins to have been se-
cretive about its contents at the time, would he have been
so crazy as to leave it for his successor at Lahore? Or,
indeed, if Mudie had thought that his British colleagues
had been playing a dishonourable game, is it conceivable
that he would have Jet this letter leave his possession?
Quite apart from the challenge to Mountbatten's honour,
who would dare to sfccuse a man of RadclihVs legal in-
tegrity and personal reputation of having submitted to
external pressure from any quarter before reaching a judi-
cial decision?

352 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

new delhi, Sunday, 21st March, 1948
The Indian and Pakistan Press have reacted to the
Chinese Plan along expected lines. The Hindustan Times
regards it as "the first serious attempt to solve the dispute
on a reasonable and practicable basis", adding that "the
main provisions are such as can and should be accept-
ed by self-respecting and peace-loving nations". Dawn,
on the other hand, ventures to hope that "the Security
Council will show the same sense of realism as it did be-
fore and in that light view the Chinese attempt at 'com-
promise' by granting one party almost everything and
the other parly nothing". The Pakistan argument is still
that the status of the administration must be decided after,
and not before, a free and unrestrained verdict of the
Kashmir people.

The only new element in this depressing debate is a sug-
gestion in the Hindustan Times, yesterday— and in view
of Devadas Gandhi's and G. D. Birla's connections it is
always advisable to pay some attention to ballons d'essai
released from this quarter. Discussing terms of reference
open to the Kashmiris in a plebiscite, the paper states,
"Wc think it would be wrong and unjust to call upon
them to vote only for accession with either Dominion.
They should be -given a free choice to accede to either
or to be independent."

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

Tuesday, 23rd March, 1948
Mountbatten continues to take a close interest in the
whole question of India's future relations with the Com-
monwealth, and has a*sked us to prepare a short situation
report. There is not, of course, much initiative that he
can take. His views are known both here and in London.
Decision as to India's role and title now rests with those
who frame and approve the Indian constitution. But
clearly we are approaching a climactic moment in the
history of Commonwealth relations when it becomes ne-
cessary- to re-define a concept so largely indefinable. I

Definition and detection

353

recall from my school days the dictum of the wise histo-
rian that "to define, the faith is to limit the faithful". The
Commonwealth has certainly prospered to date on an in-
stinctive understanding of this principle.

I have just been reading a most interesting article in the
January issue of International Affairs* on 'The implica-
tions of Eire's relationship with the British Common-
wealth of Nations". It is by Nicholas Mansergh,f who,
incidentally, visited India — and Viceroy's House — last
summer. In this paper he advocates the doctrine of "ex-
ternal association" as being the most promising formula
for the future development of the Commonwealth and
as being applicable both to Eire and India.

External association involves no formal constitutional
link, and, as envisaged by de Valera, under it Common-
wealth citizenship would be discarded and citizenship of
reciprocal rights substituted. Eire's position in the Com-
monwealth, Mansergh points out, has only been main-
tained so far because, while de Valera has steadily pur-
sued the doctrine of external association, the rest of the
Commonwealth has no less steadily refused to take cog-
nisance of his •actions. Now, with only one more link
remaining to be broken, and Eire's declared intention be-
ing to break it, the agreement to differ can no longer be
sustained.

In a note to Vernon about the Staff paper, I have writ-
ten: "To my mind the key question is whether or not the
concept of the Commonwealth is to be widened beyond
the terms envisaged in the Statute of Westminster. My
personal view is that the Indian decision, when it is reach-
ed, will probably be politically ambiguous, as the Irish
one was, and that it will then be up to the other members
to decide whether the terms of membership need to be
altered to include India or are wide enough as they stand.

* Quarterly publication of the Royal Institute of International
Affairs.

t Abe Bailey Professor of Commonwealth Relations at the
Royal Institute of International Affairs.

354

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Before preparing any paper on the subject I think we
would be, well advised to check up with B. N. Rau*
whether there is any expectation thaUsome new over-all
concept of Commonwealth will be elaborated pari passu
with India's own changed position. I saw Rau at the
Nepalese party the other evening, and said we would ap-
preciate an early talk with him.

"Given adjustments, it would not necessarily follow
that the Indian Head of State would need to be nomi-
nated by the Crown for the Commonwealth link to be
maintained. Some formula for confirming the appoint-
ment of an elected President might perhaps be evolved
which would enable the draft constitution to go through
unamended. Citizenship may well prove to be the key
tcsl, and the issue would be not the supersession of India's
Commonwealth status by some form of citizenship, but
common citizenship comprising Commonwealth status."

GOVfcRNMlNl HOUSI-, NEW DFLHI,

Wednesday, 7th April, 1948
The past fortnight has been comparatively serene at
Government House. The Mountbattens have been most
of the time on tour, havinc been awav from Delhi on four
occasions since the 20th March. They have visited
Kapurthala; at last completed the twice-postponed tour of
Travancore and Cochin in the far south; spent twenty-
four hours at Udaipur, with its artificial lakes and island
palace, and finally have just returned to-day from a week-
end's rest at Mashobra.

There have been moments uf light relief, it seems, on
tour, as when the Maharaja of Kapurthala, now seventy-
six years old — the last seventy-one of which he has been
on the gadi— referred to the Mountbattens during his
speech of welcome as "Lord and Lady Willingdon"!

* Sir Bencgal Rau, now the Chief Indian Delegate to the
United Nations, was the Senior Civil Servant primarily responsi-
ble for the drafting and preparation of the Indian Constitution.

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

355

Coherent conversation with the Maharaja of Cochin,
who was in a very feeble condition, proved difficult, as
the only political question he put to Mountbatten was to
ask him whether he had ever met Stalin, Otherwise his
sole topic of conversation was his family, which numbers
in all four hundred and sixty-one members, in Travan-
core and Cochin the dynastic system is on a matriarchal
basis, the sons of all the female members of the ruling
family succeeding in strict rotation according to age. It
is thus a matter of chance if the ruler of the day is the
brother or third cousin twice removed of his predecessor.
In a family the size of the Cochin dynasty the system in-
evitably means that a series of very old gentlemen follow
each other on the throne in rapid succession.

Mountbatten has come back to meet an immediate
crisis over Hyderabad, On our return from Burma
there was a letter awaiting him from the Nizam. As he
was due to leave Delhi again, and wished in any case to
phase out of the controversy, acting in his constitutional
capacity "on advice", he asked the Ministry of States to
reply on his behalf, and advised the Nizam accordingly.
This States Ministry letter, drafted originally by V. P.,
heated up by Patel and cooled down by Nehru, was not
seen by Mountbatten until after its dispatch, when it was
still very stiff and threatening in tone. It openly accused
the Nizam's Government of breaches of the Standstill
Agreement, and called upon it to fulfil its obligations and
ban the Ittehad and Razakars.

Monckton, who had previously indicated that he would
be washing his hands of the whole matter, has now re-
turned to the scene, reaching Hyderabad on the 2Sth
March. The effect upon him of the States Ministry let-
ter and the general situation which he has found in the
State has been profound. Usually calm and affable, he
arrived in Delhi last night in a mood to do battle with
all comers, the Governor-General included. He brought
back with him the Nizam's reply, a skilfully drafted docu-

356

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

men I which scores several points off the Indian demarche
and has all the hallmarks of his own inspiration. The
opening paragraph of the letter speaks of information
reaching the Nizam which has given him reason to regard
the letter from the Stales Ministry as being in the nature
of an ultimatum, and a prelude to an open breach of
friendly relations. He therefore makes "a final appeal"
to Mountbalten to exercise his good offices and prevent
such a contingency.

As the result of a very frank talk to-day based upon
their firm friendship and deep understanding of each other's
mind and motive, Mountbatten has succeeded in reassur-
ing Monckton that the Government of Jndia envisage no
ultimatum and that they are no party to blockade. Nehru
came along shortly afterwards to confirm this in person.

Another large rock has been thrown into the pool, how-
ever, with the publication to-day in a number of Indian
papers,, including the Hindustan Times, of a bloodthirsty
speech alleged to have been delivered on the 31st March
by the fanatical Ittehad leader, Kasim Razvi, at the in-
auguration of "Hyderabad weapons week". As report-
ed, Razvi urges the Moslems of Hyderabad not to sheathe
their swords until their objective of Islam's supremacy has
been achieved. One of the most sinister phrases quoted
is "our Moslem brothers in the Indian Union will be our
fifth columnists". Language of this nature, of course, is
designed to induce communal strife throughout the whole
of south India, which has so far, by a merciful dispen-
sation, remained immime from the deadly passions of the
north.

GOVERNMENT HOUSL. NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 11th April 1948
The Razvi plot thickens. Monckton left yesterday for
Hyderabad not only convinced of the need for the Nizam
to introduce responsible and representative government
at an early date, but also firmly intending to proffer the

DEFINITION AND DETECTION 357

advice thai he should order the early arrest of Razvi.
But to-day a telegram arrived from Monckton advising
Mountbatten that the Hyderabad Government is satisfied
that the alleged "Jehad" speech of 31st March was never
in fact delivered, and that accordingly it looks like a cal-
culated attempt to prevent the resumption of friendly re-
lations.

Mountbatten called me in at once, asking me as a mat-
ter of urgency to find out the available facts. So I have
in effect donned my deer-stalker hat, and am now ab-
sorbed in solving "the mystery of the Razvi oration".
It will need all Sherlock Holmes' powers of deduction it
I am to sifl my way through the contradictory but in-
conclusive evidence surrounding this episode; as it is, I
share Dr. Watson's bewilderment. The first strange
feature, of couise. is the cxtraordinaiy delay of a week
between the publication of the address in the Indian Press,
much of it in direct speech, with references to the audi-
ence's enthusiastic interjections, and its alleged delivery
on the 31st March.

Two days ago, in the Legislative Assembly, Nehru, in
describing the speech as a direct incitement to violence
and murder, spoke ot it also as "one of the many inflam-
matory speeches of Mr. Ra/vi \ Yesterday, in confirm-
ation of this, the Hindustan Times and other papers duly
quoted from a carefully chosen list ot similar utterances
by Razvi, some of which I had not seen before, but all
of which arc accounted for as having been made from
September onwards. Now, under an authoritative As-
sociated Press of India dateline, Razvi seems to have per-
petrated an even more grotesque verbal aggression than
the one I am trying to track down. For now he is re-
ported as demanding nothing less than the return of ceded
territory in Madras and asserting, with the bravura o*f a
Moghul fcmperor, "The day is not far off when the waves
of the Bay of Bengal will be washing the feet of our sove-
reign".

358

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Friday „ 16th April, 1948
Part of Mir Laik Ali*s and Razvi's denial is that there
was neither a rally nor a weapons week on the 31st March
at which the alleged speech could have been made, but
this is not correct. Eric Brkter* was there, and 1 have
now checked on the facts as far as he knows them. He
tells me that he was present at a parade between eight
and ten on the morning of the 31st, and that Razvi took
the salute at a gathering of between four and five hund-
red Razakars, but that there was definitely no speech
made while he was there. He heard the parade being
dismissed, and stayed on for some twenty minutes after-
wards, returning to a house with a veranda room, where
about twenty or thirty other people were also present. Tea
and cakes were handed round, and the conversation was
confined to small talk. Britter adds that Razvi came to
the door with him and saw him off, but he is naturally
in no position to say whether Razvi held any meeting
afterwards. So the element of mystery remains.

What information I have been able to collect from the
various sources suggests that Razvi's meetings, public and
private, are regularly attended by agents both of Munshi
and the Nizam. No doubt, to complete the circle of hide
and seek, the Nizam's and Munshi's sayings are being
reported back by agents of Razvi. The reality of these
shadowy figures is anyone's guess, but I am ready to be-
lieve that Razvi is providing them with ample source mate-
rial and is engaged on a political campaign which, if it
succeeds, can only enc^in the bloodshed it constantly in-
vokes and in a final rupture between India and Hydera-
bad.

Britter, while certainly holding no brief for Razvi, con-
siders that India is in danger of unduly forcing the pace in
its Hyderabad policy. He believes that time is needed,
by which he means freedom from Congress or Commun-

* Delhi correspondent of The Times.

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

359

ist pressure for some five years, during which the tran-
sitions first to a Government of communal parity and then
to one of Hindu majority rule can be effected. Under
these conditions he considers that the forces of moderation
and reform would prevail, but that present impatience
must induce the violent answer. The obverse to this
image of peaceful change is that the record of the Nizam
over the past quarter of a century encourages the belief
that, if left to his own devices and in possession of a
sovereignty which he never enjoyed under the paramount
power, he will continue to reinforce the prerogatives of
himself and of the communal oligarchies around him.

My sense of the situation is that he is playing for time,
hoping thereby to avoid concessions, and that the domi-
nant need is to bring home to him by all the resources
of persuasion that the transfer of power is a reality, that
the time for finesse is, already over, and that his State's
and his own highest interest lie in a quick settlement.

At the present moment Mountbatten is closely engaged
in meetings to hammer out a formula which will break
the dangerous deadlock. Monckton returned here on
Wednesday, and Mir Laik Ali arrived yesterday. To-
day, in the peaceful seclusion of the Government House
swimming-pool grounds, Mir Laik Ali had lunch with
Mountbatten alone. They were two hours together in
all, and Mountbatten feels that he has at last begun to
make some impression upon Mir Laik Ali's obstinate
personality and devious attitude to the problem. He is
still convinced, however, that he is by no means the ap-
propriate Prime Minister for the difficult diplomacy ahead.
His mulishness in negotiation cannot fail, if persisted in
much longer, to cause a final breakdown.

This is perhaps the decisive moment. Patel is now
sufficiently recovered to have a hand in official negotia-
tions, which means that all the principals, apart from the
Nizam himself, are now directly engaged — Mountbatten
serving as a one-man "good offices commission".

360

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Saturday, 17 th April. 1948
After three days of intense discussion, with Mount-
batten seeing Nehru, V. P. and Monckton each morning
to achieve an agreed line of action before the official
meetings with Mir Laik Ali, a four-point programme has
in principle been accepted. It was taken up by V. P. to
Patel in Mussoori, where he is now recuperating, and, to
Mountbatten's surprise and relief, Patel at last withdrew
his veto on anything other than full accession, giving the
plan his vital support.

The four points calling for the Nizam's agreement
are : - -

(1) Immediate steps to bring Razvi under control,
beginning with a ban on Razakar processions, public
demonstrations, meetings and speeches.

(2) The release of the imprisoned States Congress
members, beginning at once with the leaders.

(3) Genuine and immediate reconstruction of the
existing Government to make it representative of
both Communities.

(4) The early introduction of responsible Govern-
ment and the formation of a Constituent Assembly
bv the end of the year.

Monckton has told Mountbatlen that he proposes to
advise the Nizam to confirm his acceptance of these points
by changing his Prime Minister: He appreciates that
Mir Laik Ali is thoroughly distrusted here, and that no
single move would create more confidence in the Nizam's
intentions than the appointment of a man of the calibre
of Zain Yar Jung, Hyderabad's urbane and able Agent-
General in Delhi. His loyalty to the Nizam is not in
doubt, but neither is his underlying realism. He has
made a considerable impression on the Government, and
in particular on V. P.

DEFINITION AND DETECTION

361

CiOVlRNMl N I HOUSI, Nl W DH HI,

Monday, 19th April, 1948
1 ast week a majority of the members of the Security
Council, having exhausted the possibilities of producing
any plan fully acceptable to both sides, tabled an agreed
resolution making various recommendations but nothing
moie— to the two Governments. Nehru's ieaction was at
tirst violently adverse He wrote to Mountbatten yester-
day calling the resolution something entirely different from
the original Chinese resolution of Dr Tsiang and arguing
that it rejected every contention put forward by the In-
dian delegate. The only course now open to the Indian
Government, he added ominously, was to oppose it com-
pletely. Mountbatten replied that in his opinion lew if
any of the amendments in the new resolution were funda-
mental. Vernon was instructed to write out the differ-
ences in the form of a table which was duly prepared in
time foi Mountbatten's meeting with Nehru to-day.

At the outset, it seems, Nehru was fully resolved to
issue instructions of general condemnation to Ayyengar at
Lake Success, but Mountbatten, with his overwhelming
persistence and flair for argument in detail, finally pre-
vailed on Nehru to break down and localise his objec-
tions under four specific headings, thiee of which on an-
alysis can be seen as expressions of the Government of
India's desire not to allow a whittling down of Sheikh
Abdullah's authority Mountbatten has also been instru-
mental in securing Nehiu's agreement that the proposed
plebiscite commission should be allowed to come to India.

1 saw Mountbatten immediately afterwards, and he was
deeply satisfied with the outcome of the talk, which has
clearly caused Nehiu to act upon second thoughts and to
avoid taking a dangerous decision from a preconceived
position.

C.OV1RNMFN1 HOUSr, NIWD1IHI,

Wednesday, 21st April, 1948
Under the new dispensation Delhi's social life is re-
verting from sherry — six to eight, to tea— four to six.

362

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Patel gave this new fashion a boost by holding court over
the tea-cups in the garden of his home at Aurangzeb
Road. It was his first social appearance since his serious
illness. The Diplomatic Corps, a galaxy of Princes, Cabi-
net Ministers, Congress leaders, business magnates and
editors were there standing around in groups or taking
their places at the small tea-tables. Many of them were
lining up to say a few words- of greeting to the Sardar,
who, bolstered and blanketed, reclined on a sofa. He
was looking very fragile, as indeed he still is, but the whole
occasion served as a gentle reminder that executive au-
thority still flows from him. The Mountbattens spent
about a quarter of an hour with him, and he was obvi-
ously highly gratified to see them.

To-day's lea-parly was at V. P.'s home to about a
dozen journalists, Indian and European, to introduce
them to His Highness of Kashmir, who looked very ill—
at-easc and said very little. Indeed, when questions were
asked about his departure from his capital, it was left to
the Jam Sahib to give us a homily on his brother- Prince's
courage and general devotion to duty. J came away feel-
ing that the whitewash had perhaps been laid on too thick-
ly. The Maharaja, who is a broken man and in a some-
what pathetic plight, has been complaining bitterly over
the treatment meted out to him. His home has been
commandeered, Cabinet action taken without his being
given any advance intimation. He wants to know where
the authority lies to protect him from these indignities.
Mountbatten has brought the matter up with Patel, who
in his turn has promised to discuss it with Nehru.

Mountbatten tells me he had a very interesting post-
mortem with the Maharaja yesterday, upbraiding him for
not taking the advice he had proffered to him in June to
accede one way or the other by the 15th August. At
first the Maharaja was inclined to defend his indecision
by saying, "Look at the trouble that boiled up when 1
did accede, and think what would have happened if I
had done so earlier.'" But Mountbatten pointed out that

STALEMATE

363

if he had acceded to India on time, Pakistan simply could
not have moved, and if to Pakistan, India would not have
done so. Patel's pledge on this had been categorical.

CHAPTl.R TWKNTY-SIX

STALEMATE

GOVIRN MFNT HOUSF, NEW DELHI,

Saturday, 24th April, 1948
Monckton left for London on the 19th, and wrote to
Mountbatten from Karachi reporting on the results of his
conversations with the Nizam. He warned that of the
four points agreed to in Delhi, the one most likely to
cause trouble in Hyderabad and to stand in the
way of a quick settlement was the problem of pro-
viding machinery for the introduction of responsible gov-
ernment. The formation of a Constituent Assembly on
a simple population basis giving the Hindus the over-
whelming majority within a week would simply not be
feasible for the Nizam. Monckton stressed, however, the
need for the Nizam to insist upon a reconstruction of his
Government to make it more genuinely representative of
all shades of communal opinion. The Nizam had wanted
Monckton to slay, but he refused to do so, on the grounds
that he was sure he could not remain on in the Stale
without compromising himself unless and until a new
Government had taken over.

The expectation has been that the Nizam would imple-
ment the four-point programme through one of his decrees
or firmans. The firman was duly issued yesterday, and
the expectation duly disappointed. Nearly all the psycho-
logical value of its practical concessions to the need for
implementing the four points has been wantonly thrown
away in a phrase.

364

MISSION WITH MOUNTHATTEN

After an expression of hope that "those political parties
which are not represented in the present Interim Govern-
ment in Hyderabad will join and take a proper share in
shouldering the responsibility of the Government", the
firman, with the dialectic of the death-wish, continues, "I
have felt apprehensive that mere imitation of a form of
Government elsewhere might poison the atmosphere of
our country in the same way as it is doing in other places".
The readiness to lose so much in order to score so little,
baffles the best mediating intentions.

(X)VLRNMFNT HOUSL, NLW DELHI,

Wednesday, 28th April, J94S
Fay and 1 dined to-night amid fairy-lights on the lawn
of the Delhi Gymkhana Club. Our host was Shri
Krishna,* who had collected an interesting party. The
principal guest was Dr. Ambedkar, the Minister of Law,
the leader of the Untouchables, and a colourful personality
in Indian politics over the past twenty years. He is now
one of the principal figures associated with the prepara-
tion of India's new Constitution, which finally removes
the stigma of untouchability from the Statute book. As
part of his emancipation, Ambedkar, himself an untouch-
able, has only recently married a lady doctor who is a
Brahmin. The custom of centuries cannot be uprooted
overnight, and the event has caused quite a stir. His wife
was with him this evening, but, as is the custom with so
many Indian ladies on social occasions, had little to say.

Ambedkar himselfwas in expensive vein, and gave us
a revealing analysis of some of the features of the new
Constitution. He pointed out, for instance, that the special
powers reserved to the judiciary under its provisions were
greater than those enjoyed by the United States Supreme
Court. As evidence of the enduring quality of the 1935
Act, he said that some two hundred and fifty of its clauses

* Shri Krishna, well-known Delhi political correspondent

STALEMATE

365

bad been embodied as they stood into the new
Constitution.

We had a discussion on Cabinet government. Ambedkar
referred to the complaint that the present system was
working too slowJy in India. He thought that where a
matter of policy affecting two departments was involved
the issue should at once be settled as between the Minis-
ters concerned. He commended the Geddes proposals
and the system of non-departmental Cabinet chiefs with
groups of departmental deputies under them. He said he
was very sorry Mountbatten was leaving before the Con-
stitution was finally passed. The Commonwealth issue,
he felt, was likely to be decided outside the Constituent
Assembly.

GOVLRNMF.NT HOUSh, NEW 1)1.1.111,

Tuesday. 4th May, 1948
The Hyderabad stalemate has been causing Mountbat-
ten much anxiety. He is anxious both on personal and
public grounds to bring the negotiations to a happy end-
ing. Properly exploited, he believes that the short time-
now little more than six weeks— before he hands over the
Governor-Generalship to C. R. should serve as an induce-
ment to both sides to iron out their differences. But it is
no mean problem to decide just when and how his in-
fluence can be brought to bear with the maximum effect,
particularly in Monckton's absence.

Mountbatten's proposal has been to send a last warn-
ing letter to the Nizam now, and a draft has been in active
preparation, but 1 have weighed in heavily, urging him not
to do this until all other remedies have been tried. My
case is that the letter as drafted in its present form is
psychologically the wrong approach.

As I put it in a note to Ronnie, "No doubt it will read
well on the record in ten years' lime, but the judgement
of history will be not only whether the advice was good
but also whether it was so presented to the Nizam that
in his present mood and situation he would be likely to

366

MISSION WITH M OUNTB ATTEN

accept it. A letter of this nature should only be released
in the last resoit after every other expedient has failed,
when it should be lodged as the final friendly plea. H.E/s
greatest gift is undoubtedly direct diplomacy by personal
contact. The objections to his visiting Hyderabad are
very weighty and will be pressed by the Government with-
out whose authority he cannot now go. My submission
therefore is that the primary aim should be to get the
Nizam to Delhi with no strings attached to the visit, but
simply for the purpose of providing Mountbatten with an
opportunity of talking to him as man to man.''

At a meeting at ten o'clock this morning at which
V. P., Ronnie, Vernon and myself were present. Mount-
batten agreed with my view. V. P. raised the point that
the Ni/am would probably reply by renewing the invita-
tion lor Mountbatten to go to Hyderabad, but he agreed
that this difficulty could be overcome on the grounds ot
Mountbatten's limited time here.

A general talk followed on the Princely situation. The
process of the States" integration, which began with the
group in Orissa and Bihar and which has been driven for-
ward on Palel's behalf with dynamic energy by V. P.
himself, has for the time being at least reached saturation
point.

The covenant for the largest union yet created was sign-
ed on the 22nd April. It is called the Malwa Union, and
comprises the Gwalior-Indore-Malwa group of States,
twenty in all, covering an area of forty-seven thousand
square miles and involving a population of more than
seven million. There^has been some delicacy in naming
the Rajpramukh or Constitutional head of the Union
nominally elected by a Council of Rulers. Gwalior, who
is a twenty-one-gun Prince, is to have the position. Even
more difficult was the choice of a capital city. Here the
compromise is Gwalior for the winter and Indorc for the
summer capital. Bhopal has reiterated his desire to re-
main out of the Malwa Union, but has gone quite a long
way to make his peace with the Government, and has

STALEMATE

367

announced his intention to introduce responsible govern-
ment in his State.

Only to-day another type of merger takes place. The
State of Kutch is to be merged diicct with the Govern-
ment of India. This, I understand, is being done pri-
marily because of Kutch's important strategic position.
There are other variations of the pattern. The Ruleis in
the Dcccan Slates and the Gujerat Rulers over one
hundred ol them in all — have both merged under separate
agreements with the Bombay piovince. \ ast Punjab and
Madras have entered into similar arrangements^ with ad-
joining States. One oi the most comprehensive self-sup-
porting mergers has been the formation of the Saurashtra
Union of the two hundicd and scvenleen Kathiawar
States. The Rajpramukh here is the Jam Sahib ol Nawa-
nagar, who has entered whole-heartedly into this new dis-
pensation and promises to play an increasingly important
part in Central politics These Unions are to be governed
through popular ministries.

To-monow yet another covenant will be signed, this
time for the union of the Sikh States. Negotiations hcie
have hinged round the attitude ol Paliala. He was en-
titled to remain out on his own, but without him the other
Sikh States could not achieve a viable union. V. P. told
us that he has now definitely decided I > tome in, on the
understanding that he and his Stale an* given a position
in it commensurate with their relative importance, so he
is to be Rajpramukh, and Kapuithala his dcpulv This
is certainly a great victorv lor V. P., and should un-
doubtedly turn the balance of power in Sikh affairs in
favour of the Central Government and againsi the am-
bitious exponents ol Sikhistan, a separate Sikh Stale carv-
ed out of the Last Punjab.

Another remarkable development has been the ioniza-
tion of a Union of Rajpulana Princes. It began as a mer-
ger of the smaller States, but then look nu«ie significant
shape as a result of Udaipur's decision to join in. When
Mountbatten visited Udaipur, His Highness told him that

368

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

he had decided of his own free will to take this step, as
being in the highest interests of his people. The Udaipur
dynasty is one of the most august in India, and the Ruler's
entry is likely to have a considerable eflect on the other
major Rajputana States, which, as viable units, have their
individual representation in the Constituent Assembly. Of
the nineteen Slates enjoying this initial right, seven have
uuw joined one or other of the Unions.

It is high statesmanship that can cover a revolutionary
act in the mantle of traditional form. V. P. was saying
this moining that the sins oi the father had indeed been
visited upon the sons. It wa^ the iailure of the old Patiala
and Bikaner to accept the 1^35 lederal Plan that nearly
broke up the whole structure of the Indian State. Only
Mount batten's last-minute sponsorship of accession saved
the day, thus enabling the present Patiala and Bikaner to
play a vital part in consolidating the new relationship.

Mounlbatten freely confessed that he did not foresee,
when he negotiated the Instrument ot Accession last year,
that the extension oi subjects would be demanded or grant-
ed so soon: but he mentioned an inleiesting opinion ex-
pressed by Nye that the seriousness of the States pioblem
had not been appreciated at all outside India, and was in
fact graver in its implications than the ptoblem of dealing
with the Congress, Moslem League or Sikh leaders. Nye
said that he had practically despaired of any friendly
settlement with the Princes, and had visualised trouble
ot incalculable dimensions after the 15th August. He
would not have been surprised if it had taken at least a
generation to reach the position achieved by May 1948,
and he felt that history would iccall this as a most re-
markable feat.

Just how much the climate has changed can be seen
with the entry of His Highness of Dholpur into the scheme
of things. Lasi August his mood was such that any con-
cept of merger beyond accession would have been wholly
unacceptable, but here he is to-day, his Princely status

S1ALEMA1E

369

luly acknowledged, Rajpramukh of the United State of
Vfatsya.

Mountbatlen also raised at this morning's Staff Meeting
ihe problem of the Defence Committee. Policy is still
unrelated to military capability. Mountbatten reminded
V. P. that he had agreed to the initial march into Kashmir
as an acceptable military risk, but now the situation was
different. As a commander with some experience in logis-
tical problems, he felt that Nehru and Palel were not
fully facing up to the military implications of the position.
Mkwntbattcn said he was very disappointed that the De-
fence Committee procedure was not being properly adopt-
ed. He only hoped that when he phased out it would
be kept up, and begged V. P. to back it.

Before the meeting broke up he recapitulated the revis-
ed approach to Hyderabad. He said that my proposal to
try first of all to get the Ni/am up to Delhi should be
regarded as firing the "right barrel". The "left barrcP
of a final appeal and remonstrance he would charge to
meet all eventualities*, but not fire.

In the afternoon I went round to Hyderabad House, an
impressive residence at the far end of Kingsway and the
vista, i was shown into a large drawing-room, where most
of the blinds were drawn. In the middle distance
I could just see large photographs of the two hand-
some daughters-in-law of the Ni/am, who are also the
daughter and cousin of the last Caliph, and thus in them-
selves the symbols of His Fxalted Highnesses religious and
dynastic aspirations. Zain Yar Jung duly appeared with
his son, to whom he introduced me, and we all took tea
together. He conveyed an impression of suavity and
polish without any trace of the fanatical streak. J find
it difficult to believe that he can have much in common
with the Ittehad clique. Their trust in him and his in-
fluence over the Nizam are factors that must no doubt
be assessed with some reserve at this time.

J broached the whole question of a possible visit from
the Nizam. He felt that His Lxaltcd Highness would only

370 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

come up if transport was made very easy for him. It was
a Jong journey, and a special air-cooled compartment
would be needed. He hated flying, and even the idea
of it was utterly repugnant to him. He still drives about
Hyderabad in his 1910 Rolls. Bombay suggested itself
to Zain as a possible compromise meeting-place. He also
felt that Monckton would have to approve and come out
again from England to hold the old man's hand. He said
finally that he was noi wholly unhopeful that the Nizam
might agree.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Sunday, 9th May, J948
After seeing a somewhat tiresome film at the Govern-
ment House cinema, called Copacabana, Vernon told me
of talks between Mountbatten, Zain and V. P., and sub-
sequently with Zain and V. P. alone. Zain only got back
this evening from Hyderabad. He had carried Mount-
batten's letter of invitation and has brought back the
Nizam's reply. It merely confirms the counter-invitation
which Mountbatten was not wholly surprised to receive
in the first instance by telegram on the 6th May. For the
purposes of the record, Mountbatten's letter and the
Nizam's telegram crossed. In the reply which Zain has
just handed in, the Ni/ani gives as one of the reasons for
saying "no" that any such move * k is certain to give rise to
grave misunderstanding both inside and outside Hydera-
bad which I am bound to avoid". Vernon tells me, how-
ever, that Mountbatten was bubbling over with optimism,
wholly unwilling to Sdmit defeat, and confident that if
he could meet the Nizam face to face he could yet pull
oil an accession agreement.

Zain warned that there is a marked deterioration in the
local situation. Some Government supporters have swung
over to the Razakars, indeed a "No confidence" vote in
Mir Laik Ali was only just averted, and Zain says there
are men about now who regard even Razvi as a moder-

STALEMATE

■is.

371

ate. V. P. was very calm and sensible, and ready to offer
economic concessions as well as access to a port.

Vernon reports, however, that we are getting danger-
ously near to the point where there will only be two alter-
natives left— force or the threat of force. 1 said f felt that
the crux of the matter now was to know where Ihe real
power lay. What was the exact status of the Nizam?
Much would depend on the appreciation he had formed
of his own position, both from within and from without.
The Nizam himself must not be under-estimated. I went
in to see Mountbatten, who thinks that the Nizam is at
last really frightened. Apparently when Mir Laik All's
position as Prime Minister was raised with him, he was
not indignant, but at once asked, "Who do they want?"

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Wednesday, 12th May, 1948
It is generally agreed that f should visit Hyderabad as
soon as possible, with the objects of meeting the Nizam
face to face on Mountbatten's behalf, of forming a per-
sonal up-to-date impression of the situation and if pos-
sible inducing a sufficient sense of urgency in the Nizam
and his advisers for them to reopen negotiations and in
general make the best use of Mountbatten's last few weeks
here. At a Staff Meeting this morning, V. P., who warmly
approved my proposed visit, said there was now definite
evidence that the Communists and the Razakars were ac-
tually combining together, and that this was not being
sufficiently stressed. Mountbatten found it difficult to be-
lieve that such an alignment could be taking place, but
V. P. was insistent, regarding it as indeed the central
factor in the situation.

Mountbatten began the meeting by asking after Paters
health. V. P. replied that he was a bit worried about the
irregularity of his pulse and lack of sleep. One of his en-
tourage, a doctor, was constantly talking to him about his
pulse, which only increased its irregularity.

372

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Thursday. Uth May, 1948
Before the Defence Committee (which as a result of
Mountbatten's. initiative has at last been called) Mount-
batten button-holed Nehru to get him to confirm in my
presence what he had said to Mountbatten yesterday-
namely, that he welcomed my going to Hyderabad, and
that if the Ni/am acceded, the Government of India would
do all in its power to accord him full physical protection.
In my briefing the possibility has not been overlooked that
he is no longer master in his own house, and that some
smooth and secret Palace revolution has been, or is about
to be, put into effect.

After the Defence Committee f saw Nehru again and
drove off with him to receive further guidance. He said
he wished only to make some general observations with
regard to my visit. His philosophy in the matter was that
to try to avoid trouble was often the best way of inviting
it. It was not possible to go on just watching shooting in-
cidents and other disorders that were taking place daily
on the Hyderabad border.

After leaving Nehru 1 returned at once to Government
House, to find V. P. still with Mountbatten. They seemed
quite pleased with the Defence Committee, which had
been discursive, but had enabled the military and political
leaders to form a more sympathetic understanding of each
other's viewpoint. Mountbatten professes himself to be
optimistic about my mission. Tt was agreed that I should
go completely under the auspices of the Hyderabad Go-
vernment. At five o'clock I went round to Hyderabad
House for a further tajjc with Zain and his son, Ali Khan.
Zain's plea was, "If only the Government of India would
not press too hard all would be well".

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DET.HI,

Friday. 14th May, 1948
\ have had a final run through with Zain. I am to be
the personal guest of Mir Laik Ali. No exact time-limit

STALEMATE

373

has been set for the trip. It is agreed that J should be free
to decide on the spot, but Zain himself hopes to reach
Hyderabad before I leave it.

The letter I am conveying to the Nizam expresses dis-
appointment at His Exalted Highness's refusal of the in-
vitation to visit Delhi, and doubt as to whether it will be
physically possible, apart from other considerations, for
Mountbattcn to come to Hyderabad in the limited time
now left to him. However, Mountbatten writes, "Before
1 leave I am most anxious to establish some form of con-
tact with you over and above the formal negotiations and
exchange of letters".

I am then duly introduced as one who has by now serv-
ed with Mountbatten longer than any other member of
his personal staff and who has been throughout intimately
acquainted with all the high level developments in his
Commands, particularly during this present appointment.
"He knows my mind completely and enjoys my fullest
confidence/' "1 may say'*, Mountbatten concludes, "that
1 have been extremely disturbed by reports which have
been reaching Delhi with regard both to the Communis!
and to the communal situation in Hyderabad, and in parti-
cular to the effect that these may be having on Your Hx-
alted Highnesses own position. J trust ihcrefore that you
will not hesitate to let Mr. Campbell-Johnson have your
frank estimate of the position from the general and' per-
sonal point of view. I would not wish him to convey my
personal message except to your Fxalted Highness alone,
for the presence of others would vitiate the personal con-
tact between you and me which I hope he may be able
to establish."

wSo there it is. To-morrow J leave on a mission of un-
known dimensions and opportunity. All that is certain
is that for the next forty-eight hours or so T shall be com-
pletely cut off from my base, as no contact with Mount-
batten in Delhi, or rather in Simla, or with the Govern-
ment of India, will be practicable. It is certainly by far
the most difficult and delicate task I have ever been called

374 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

upon to undertake during six years in Mountbatten's ser-
vice. However, I have lived long enough in the vicinity of
his influence to have caught something of his own buoyant
disposition.

CHAPTER TWFNlY-SrVLN

MISSION TO THE NIZAM

Hyderabad, Saturday, J 5th May, 1948
I n i i Wn xingdon airfield by a charter line Dakota short-
ly after breakfast, and after a brief pause at Bhopal arriv-
ed at Hyderabad just before lunch.

After lunch I was told that His Exalted Highness
would receive me in little over an hour's lime- i.e., at
5 p.m. 1 was duly driven to his official residence, "King
Kothi", as it is called. The Prime Minister had preceded
me by some ten minutes, and was there on my arrival.
I was shown at once into a modest reception-room clutter-
ed high with Victorian bric-a-brac. 1 could just discern
in the dim light, hanging on the wall, a large portrait of
King George V.

Mir I aik Ali stepped forward to introduce me to His
Exalted Highness, who was sitting almost invisible on a
large settee. 1 was staggered by his threadbare appearance,
and for the instant failed to realise I was in his presence,
but I pulled myself together in time to greet him with
fitting courtesy. He was dressed most shabbily in what
looked like a thin white cotton dressing-gown and white
trousers, with caramel-coloured slippers and light brown
cotton socks lying loosely about his ankles. He wore a
brown fez, which was perched on the back of his head.
He is a small man with a pronounced sloop; his mouth
is loose and his teeth are in a deplorable condition. His
hands shook, and while talking he fidgeted and knocked
his knees together in such a way as to give the observer

MISSION TO THE NIZAM

375

the impression of incipient palsy or St. Vitus* dance. But
his whole personality is held together by the intensity of
his expression and the vehemence of his high-pitched
voice.

I could not ascertain whether the Prime Minister pro-
posed to stay or leave for the interview, but on presenting
Mountbatten's letter to the Nizam, which he opened and
read slowly, an opportunity clearly presented itself for
him to see me alone if he wanted to, but he quite deliber-
ately refused to take it, and Mir Laik Ali stayed stolidly
on. Having read the letter, the Nizam turned on me quite
fiercely, and said that he was well aware of Lord Mount-
battens limited time and powers out here. "What could
he hope to do in a month?" he asked. He said that he
trusted that Lord Mountbatten had clearly understood that
it was quite impossible for him, the Nizam, to leave
Hyderabad, and if Lord Mountbatten was not free to
come and see him, well, then (and he gave a gesture of
farewell), he was sorry for it, and would say good-bye
and God-speed to him.

The Nizam said that as far as his relations with the
Government of India were concerned, they had his terms.
He acted through his Prime Minister and his Constitu-
tional Adviser, and he had nothing more he could say to
any other party, even on a private basis. I said that Lord
Mountbatten was naturally deeply concerned to do all in
his power to achieve a settlement before he left, but time
was short, and it was for His Exalted Highness to con-
sider whether there was any way in which the Governor-
General's good offices could be used. He was, I believed,
aware of Lord Mountbatten's general approach to the pro-
blem, and if there were any points of detail or emphasis
that I could fill in, I would be only too happy to do sp.

I referred to the special status, that Mountbatten had
had in effecting "the Standstill Agreement. "That is all
over, now," he replied. I tried tactfully to explain how
Mountbatten believed accession or its equivalent was in
the Nizam's best interests, but he dismissed the whole

m. m. — 13

376 MISSION WITH MOU NTB ATTEN

subject with a wave of the hand. Laik Ali intervened at
this point to say that he would be quite ready to take a
plebiscite on the issue if only it could be organised peace-
fully, but the law-and-order problem involved in carrying
it out had compelled him to turn it down, to which the
Nizam added, "Quite right, quite right."

I was unable to draw him out on the question of his
reaction to the Communist threat in Hyderabad. It was,
he said, "a matter of detail which you can discuss with
my Prime Minister".

He said that the fate and policy of the other Princes in
India were no concern of his, and that he regarded them
merely as noblemen to whom some courtesies were due.

The remainder of the interview was largely devoted to
the Nizam's giving me a lecture in forcible terms on the
Moslem philosophy of life, the basis of which was that
our ends are appointed. He remembered discussing this
matter with Lothian, the British Resident, who at the time
was an atheist, and who held some opinions to the effect
that there was "a measure of chance in our lives, as on
a race-course".

It was the Nizam's view that we either had a good or
a bad fate. He said that the situation might improve in
the next two or three days, or it might get better later on;
he could not say. But he was prepared for whatever was
appointed for him. He then asked me if I had heard of
Mohurram in the Moslem Calendar, and J replied politel)
that 1 had. "Ah," he said, "but you do not know what
it means. It is the commemoration of the death of the
Prophet's grandson. * And the acceptance of death and
loss is an inherent part of our faith." (In this respect it
should be noted that the Nizam visits and prays at the
grave of his mother every evening at six o'clock.)

On returning to the subject of Mountballen's interest in
the survival of the Nizam's dynasty, I explained thai
Mountbalten was a firm believer in constitutional monar-
chy, at which the Nizam took me up and said vehemently,
"That is where F join issue with him. Constitutional mon-

MISSION TO THE NIZAM

377

.irehy may be all very well in Europe and the west; it has
no meaning in the East."

The conversation was steered by Mir Laik Ali to the
Commonwealth issue. The Nizam was interested in know-
ing what chance there was of India's remaining within the
Commonwealth. 1 said that this matter was very much
under consideration at the moment, and that there were
influential forces who considered that India should stay
in. At this point T said I could perhaps make an observa-
tion which had no relation to my being a member of Lord
Mountbatten's staff, which was that whether India re-
mained within or went out, British opinion, as represented
by the present Government, would be most averse to one
part of the Indian sub-continent receiving more favour-
able treatment than another, simply as a result of Com-
monwealth membership. Any calculations made on this
basis would, f was sure, be illusory. This point, I think,
went home.

After a few general remarks on the troubled world
situation, and the Nizam's expression of concern over the
latest developments in Palestine, the conversation ended
with him conveying his most cordial compliments and
wishes to Mountbatten.

The interview, which lasted nearly an hour, was not
a particularly easy one to handle, in view of the Nizam's
somewhat disconcerting appearance and manner, but as
providing an opportunity to study his personality and
mind it was revealing. Although he may be physically
decrepit, he it; obviously menially alert and in full com-
mand of his faculties. I was, in fact, left with the impres-
sion that I had been spoken to by an eccentric elderly Pro-
fessor on his special subject. He is a Prince of the old
school- - arrogant and narrow, but on his home ground
formidable. His mood throughout was one of aggressive
fatalism.

I saw no evidence of the Ni/am being a prisoner. There
was quite a large number of police at the entrance and
by the road, but there is nothing abnormal in this, bearing

378

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

in mind the attempt on the Nizam's life in the autumn,
and the lack of any real frontage to "King Kothi", which
was not much farther off the main road than an ordinary
house in Delhi. Mir Laik Ali incidentally stayed on after
I left.

On my return to the Prime Minister's residence, Moin
came round to see me.

We discussed treaty or accession, and Moin indicated
lhat what they really feared was that accession might be
changed so that it meant in fact accession not on three
but thirty-three subjects involving uniformity of laws and
loss of internal autonomy which the Nizam would never
give up. Moin also gave me to understand that the free
movement of Indian Defence Forces through Hyderabad
territory would be unacceptable.

1 then left to dine with Munshi. 1 may say that travel-
ling in a fast car it took me forty minutes to reach MunshPs
house, which is at the far end of Secunderabad, fairly
near the airfield. Jn this place he is, of course, completely
out of touch with the life of the city, and can only see
those who have the time, petrol or political inclination to
visit him.

1 found him somewhat baffled and depressed. He said
that he had lost faith in Mir Laik AH as the result of what
he termed a completely bogus report the latter had given
of an interview he had had with him. He told me that
the position as between Moin and Laik Ali was somewhat
ambiguous. Although they were brothers-in-law, they did
not see eye to eye, but Laik was definitely on the crest
of the wave as far as influence with the Nizam was
concerned. *

Munshi said that he did not think that anybody meant
business either with regard to responsible government or
to accession, but he agreed with the preliminary' view I
had formed that the Nizam was politically master of the"
situation. I reassured him that my trip was personal and
informal and that I had come with the full knowledge and
approval of the Prime Minister and V. P. He seemed quite

MISSION TO THE NIZAM

379

happy to return to Bangalore to-morrow morning, saying
that his wife no longer liked living in this place and thai
his relations with the Government were so strained that
he had virtually lost all contact with them.

Hyderabad, Sunday, 16th May, 1948
T have completed a crowded day, talking and being talk-
ed to in unending flow. 1 told Mir Laik Ali that it would
certainly be interesting to meet Kasim Razvi privately,
if there was no publicity for the meeting, and it was under-
stood that 1 was only seeing people whom he himself
particularly wanted me to see. He replied that he would
definitely like me to meet Razvi and that the latter would
be calling on him this morning prior to a lour he was
making. I was advised to drop in.

J did so, and after a few minutes of small talk the Prime
Minister left me alone with Razvi. Jn my opening re-
marks I said something about feeling depressed at the
turn of events, to which he at once retorted that he was
not a bit depressed; he was just desperate. He wished me
to understand that his sole purpose was the defence of
the Moslems; to them only did he owe loyalty. I asked
him whether there was any truth in the report that the
Communists had been approaching the Razakars with a
view to common action. "When you say the Razakars",
Razvi replied very fiercely, "you mean me. 1 tell you
the condition of the Moslem here is such that they are
themselves rapidly becoming Communist. I have warned
them [he did not indicate exactly who 'them* referred to]
that this was likely to happen."

He then categorically asserted that he was quite pre-
pared to work with the Communists and had taken pre-
liminary action to that end. To make doubly sure {hat
I had not misunderstood him, I said that 1 presumed one
difficulty in his way would be the direct challenge thrown
down by the Communists to the Nizam himself — i.e., the
Communists* warning that there was to be "no truck with
the Nizam". Razvi paused for a moment and said yes,

380

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

that he appreciated that difficulty, but later, when T re-
turned to the subject, he made it quite clear that both the
dynasty and the Government were secondary considera-
tions to him if ihc Communists proved to be the only
allies he could use to save the Moslems from destruction.
"If only Jndia will leave us alone for two years, I promise
that J will create something they will envy. Hindus al-
ready are joining the Razakars." I asked whether with-
out a political settlement there might not be the same
crisis at the end of two years, and all he could say was
yes, but he added that, for one thing, he did not believe
that the Jndian Union would survive for more than two
years.

He said that he had absolutely no expectation of a
peaceable solution, and showed great intensity of racial
hatred in discussing the Hindus. He thought that Gandhi's
death was symbolic of Iheir behaviour. Hindus always
killed their Gods to make them into super-Gods, f asked
him whether he did not consider that the Communists,
as at present organised, were predominantly Hindu
He said that that was so, but that they were less com-
munally minded than other parties.

I said thai it was widely held that he was the real strong
man in the Slate, and asked him what his views were on
lh r M. He said, "Don't believe all the slanderous reports
about me as a wire-puller and maker of Governments. J
am the least person here. 1 am simply the champion and
servant of (he Moslems* cause, on behalf of which I will
stop at nothing. The Government call me in for my views
on occasion, which 1 give to them with complete frank-
ness/' He told me tnat to save Moslems from death and
Moslem women from being ravished he was ready to die.
The Congress representatives in Hyderabad were men of
straw. "Let me look after the Hindus," he said, smiling
for the first time.

Razvi is the complete fanatic. He stares with eyes that
bore holes into you and would strike terror into his friends
and enemies, were it not for a streak of absurdity and

MISSION TO THE NIZAM

381

charlatanism about him which even while he rants gives
him away, making it difficult to take him completely seri-
ously, and conveying the firm impression that his megalo-
mania has far out-run his real power. Jn appearance he
is slight and dapper, sporting a beard of Mack Sennett
proportions beneath a fez worn at a rakish angle. As he
walked briskly away he looked like a blend of Charlie
Chaplin and a minor Prophet.

Having disposed of Razvi, my next appointment was
with General El-Ed roos, the Commander-in-Chief of the
Hyderabad Army, a tall, handsome and, T can well believe,
very able officer of Hashcmitc Arab slock. He served
in the field in the Burma campaign under command of
Mountbatten, for whom, incidentally, he has the highest
respect. He said that there was some trouble in the
Sholapur area, that Indian troops had been helping ruf-
fians to make their way over the border, and that Indian
aircraft had been making reconnaissances. He was writ-
ing to Bucher and Elmhirst* privately on this subject.
He referred to the ordinance position. He said he had
made a frank ofTer to Himmatsinhjit (without, of course,
conceding him any right of inspection) to see things for
himself, which he had done, and he understood that he
had been satisfied. He said that the Communists were
very well armed and that the economic blockade v/as
virtually complete.

He stressed the intensity of the political suspicions of
both sides, and snid that although he was a soldier, he
could not help asking why the Central Government were
pressing so hard. 1 said that he must appreciate that
with the creation of Pakistan a strong Centre for the Indian
Union was essential. "Cannot they see", he said, "that
Pakistan was their own making, and that the pressure

* General Sir Roy Bucher and Air Marshal Sir Thomas
Elmhirst, Commanders-in-Chief of the Indian Army and Air
Force respectively.

t General Himmatsinhji, Indian Army, Adviser on States
Forces.

382 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

they are putting on here is causing a crisis and arousing
Moslem fanaticism?" "Without this pressure", he went
on (he clearly was referring to Munshi), "Hyderabad in
my view would have fallen like a ripe plum.** He said
that now a serious position was growing up which was
taking more and more the form of guerilla activity. I
said I had just seen Razvi, and that he was physically
smaller than I had expected. El-Ed roos who is some-
thing of a giant himself, replied with a laugh, "It's the
little ones that are dangerous.**

1 went straight from my talk with General El-Edroos
for a very long session with the Prime Minister. We
had lunch together alone, and talked for almost two hours.

Mir Laik Ali began by explaining that he was putting
forward proposals for representative government. He
could not just get rid of the Legislative Assembly, so he
had in mind to set in motion electoral procedure for a
Constituent Assembly to be elected in addition to it. (I
assume ultimately to supersede it.) He said that he had
discussed the matter with the leaders of all parties, and
he left to them the choice of the electoral procedure they
wished to adopt, which was either to use the existing
vocational roll (clearly heavily weighted in favour of the
Moslems) or to make a fresh electoral list, the prepara-
tion of which, together with the conduct of the election
itself, could not, in his view, take less than eighteen
months.

He said that his dilemma was that the Congress boy-
cott of the now two-year-old Legislative Assembly meant
that he had literally^ nothing but their own word to go
on for the political basis of their popular support. They
were not, he pointed out, like the Congress elsewhere,
which was genuinely elected before it carried out its boy-
cott policy. He said he was awaiting the reaction of the
parties and hopes to make an announcement by the end
of this month.

He then repeated Moin*s views on the accession issue
and said that his basic objection was that there were not

MISSION TO THE NIZAM

383

just three subjects, but that under those headings there
were ninety-one in all, as defined under the Indian Con-
stitution. He said that the internal identity of Hyderabad
would assuredly be blotted out. He therefore favoured
a special treaty which would be exclusive to India, and
which would include: a common Foreign policy; a de-
fence agreement, Hyderabad having an army of twenty-
five thousand, some ten thousand of which would be put
at the disposal of the Indian Union; and a communica-
tions agreement in which he foresaw no special difficulty.

I told him the form taken by my interview with Razvi,
and asked him for his reactions. He told me that he
thought Razvi must have meant that he would ally him-
self with the Communists only as a very last resort and
after the collapse of the Nizam and Government. I re-
plied that this was not clear from what Razvi had said
to me, and told him that if Razvi were to go unchecked
much longer, the Nizam and the Government might find
themselves literally as the nut in the nut-cracker.

This conversation did not represent any major advance,
so far as T know, on any of the previous views Laik Ali
has held either on responsible government or accession.

At 7.30 1 went round to General Fl-Edroos* house for
a second talk. He told me that one of the reasons why
the Nizam had refused to come to Delhi was the fear
that he would not be able to get back, and that I might
well be advised to check on this. He pointed out Hydera-
bad's strategic importance. While recognising their mili-
tary weakness, he said that should the worst happen, they
could and would cut off India from the South. He be-
lieved an agreement was possible if the politicians allow-
ed a Treaty giving India control in External Affairs, ad-
ministration over Defence and Communications. What
more could they want? he asked. If India pressed this
matter too far, he went on, resistance was certain. Scott
had said this as well.

M. m. — 14

384

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Hyderabad, Monday, 17th May, 1948
At 8 p.m. 1 had a last talk with the Prime Minister. I
told Laik Ali that I wanted to be sure that the Nizam's
refusal to visit Delhi was not based on any fears as to his
personal security. He said that there might have been
some such doubt in the Nizam's mind, but that the domi-
nating and compelling motive was that if he had come,
his move would have been seriously misunderstood in
the State. I told him that \ had been frankly worried
by the reliance that seemed to be placed on Opposition
support in England. I said that ! was sure that this was
a most dangerous illusion. Tor Hyderabad to become
a Parly issue in the British House of Commons could nol
serve the real interests of the State. Laik Ali told me that
he entirely agreed. He personally had the greatest ad-
miration for Mr. Attlee, and he did not want Hyderabad
to be bandied about in Party debate anywhere. He said
that he was most pleased that I had made the visit, which
he fell had been helpful in every way.

After f had had a quiet dinner with Zain's son and
beautiful daughter-in-law, Zain himself, who had arrived
that afternoon, asked to see me, and I went along to his
house at 1 1 p.m. He said that he had seen the Ni/am
alone. He had again been very vehement. "But", added
Zain, "he always is/' He was very firm on the issue of his
Legislative Sovereignty, but Zain had told him that it
was quite essential for him to form a new Government on
a much broader basis than the present one. He gave me
to understand that the Ni/am and Laik Ali had at last
agreed to do this. *The Nizam then apparently raised
the question of my interview, saying that he had spoken
exactly what was in his mind to me without any reser-
vations. The Nizam believed that there was a. ten per
cent chance that Mounlbalten would even now come him-
self, and asked Zain what he felt. Zain said that it
must to some extent depend on the kind of report I sent
in. The Nizam then began to ask questions about me.
Who exactly was 1, what were my politics, etc.

MISSION TO THE Nl/.AM

385

Zain thinks that solution is possible if the Legislative
reservation is made. He even went so far as to feel that
the word accession might be brought about. He is pro-
posing in his talks with the Nizam on Tuesday and Wed-
nesday (the Nizam had asked him to stay and have an
extra day for an extra talk) to see if this would be ac-
ceptable, provided it was strictly limited to three sub-
jects. He said that he was proposing to speak frankly
with El-Edroos, who was alleged to be giving military
assistance to the Razakars. This was causing consider-
able disquiet in Delhi. Finally, Zain hoped that 1 would
be able to postpone my visit to Simla until he got back
on Thursday evening, when I could give Mountbatlen the
latest information.

Hyderabad, nuw Di-LHF. Tuesday, I8th May, 1948
After an early breakfast and a final courtesy good-bye
lo Mir Laik Ali, ] was accompanied by Captain Baig on
the long drive to the airfield. Captain Baig's talents as
an A.D.C. have been fully tested, and he has been to
endless trouble in steering me from place to place on time
throughout my fantastic schedule. I leave in the knowl-
edge that everything possible has been done to throw
open the gales to me. From the Nizam downwards J
get the impression that everyone has spoken with trie maxi-
mum frankness of which he is capable, and there have
been surprisingly few evasions. If Deen Yar Jung was
reticent, he was at least receptive. As for my own con-
tribution, 1 hope and believe that I. may have been in-
strumental in tempering the general ''death-or-glory" at-
titude I found on my arrival.

The return flight in the aircraft was my first chance
to compose my thoughts. My main impressions, are:

The Niznm is the key man in the situation. As re-
gards the major issue of relations with the Indian Union,
nothing is being done without his approval or connivance.
Moreover, I consider that any agreement he finally en-
ters into will be honoured, in the sense that his regime

386

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

is strong enough to withstand internal opposition from
any quarter.

He is in a mood of aggressive fatalism, and in my
judgment is ready, and has the strength, to try to perform
a "Samson Act" on the Government of India; in other
words, if he goes under, full preparations have been made
to ensure that the political and social structure of the
State should go under with him. Razvi's role in this
scheme of things is to ensure that this process of disin-
tegration is completed, and that a mere military victory
will not suffice to solve the problem.

On the other hand, the Nizam is searching furtively
and anxiously for an honourable settlement. He is a
ruler of the old school; he has no liking for the trappings
of the Constitutional Monarch, and will put up the same
kind of resistance to that status as Queen Victoria did.
The tighter the corner, the more he will fall back on pre-
rogatives. I do not believe that he will voluntarily ac-
cept an accession solution which makes him anything
other than the official fountain-head of law and custom
inside his own State.

Any appreciation of the Nizam's attitude must take in-
to account that the prospects and policy of his fellow-
Princes do not interest him at all- -he regards them mere-
ly as impotent noblemen - -and that he is obviously a
deeply religious man. In times of trouble the Nizam is
liable to lean heavily on his traditional Islamic beliefs,
and I am sure he spoke to me with complete sincerity
on this. *

In this political bargaining no great advance has been
made since Laik Ali\s speech to the Hyderabad Legisla-
tive Assembly on 27th April. It seems likely, however,
that the Nizam will take a final stand both on the acces-
sion and the representative Government issues by the 1st
June.

With regard to Mountbatten's position, there is a very
widespread feeling that the only chance of a settlement
Will be through his good offices and influence. But the

FAREWELL PHASE

387

Nizam is clearly sceptical whether either can turn the
scales in time. A position, however, may conceivably
be reached in the course of the next fortnight in which
the differences of detail and interpretation are narrowed
down sufficiently for Mountbatten to provide the final
pressure. For the moment there is no more to be done
with the Nizam; the differences need to be ironed out be-
tween Zain and V. P.

CHAPTER TWENTY-EIGHT /

FAREWELL PHASE

- GOVERN ME NT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Thursday, 20th May. 1948
I spent all yesterday cut off from the world in a stern
effort to complete my report for Mountbatten to read a
day in advance of my own arrival in Simla.

This afternoon I had an hour's interview with Nehru,
and ran through my general conclusions with him. He
considers that the Nizam may have been deliberately "giv-
ing me the works", and in view of his refusal to enter into
any discussion with additional parties, he would naturally
rely on generalities. He agreed wilh me that Dcen Yar
Jung, who was the real founder of the Razakars, was
strong enough to face up to the implications of disband-
ing them.

The Prime Minister said that the history of Hyderabad
was not glorious and that they had nearly always given
way to pressure, eking their collapse before the Mahrattas.

He realised that the Nizam was genuinely concerned
about his treasures and personal prerogatives, and he was
ready to give assurances on these. He said he had no
intention of forcing accession in terms of the Tndian Con-
stitution on Hyderabad. Any further subjects would be

388

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

a matter of separate negotiation. Nor had he any in-
tention of swallowing up the Hyderabad Army.

He referred to the Nizam's religion, «and said that his
emphasis on Mohurram in his talk with me was signifi-
cant, as it commemorated the event which marks the
break between the Shia and Sunni Sects of the Moslem
faith. The Hyderabadis were Sunni Moslems, and it was
suspected that the Nizam himself was a crypto-Shia.

1 said J hoped he had not been unduly disturbed about
the publicity, and explained that it was primarily due to
the zeal of Munshi's stall. I had done my best to keep
it under control. (I understand there was some criticism
from one or two members of the Cabinet, but it did not
come from Nehru or Patel, who were not worried.) Nehru
said again this afternoon that it did not matter or alfect
the value of the visit.

Nehru says he finds the Nizam's attitude hard to un-
derstand, as he does not believe that he is at all cut out
for a heroic role.

After some initial uncertainty as to whether they were
going to meet, Zain went round to V. P.'s house at 9
p.m., and I joined them shortly afterwards.

With the background- of general border tension, V. P.
was strongly of the opinion that the present uncertainty
cannot be allowed to linger on, and after one or two ten-
tative programmes had been considered and rejected, a
complicated sequence of meetings was worked out in-
volving an invitation to Mir Laik Ali to arrive in Delhi
on the 22nd, a visit by Nehru and V. P. to Patel in
Mussoori, and Mountbatlen's participation at a decisive
point in the discussions, and in advance of any firm de-
cision

The conversation, although somewhat incoherent and
protracted, was frank and cordial. The gravity of the
situation was recognised in the light of border incidents
and the Sardar s views. Zain himself gave no indication
whatever of the Ni/anfs attitude on anv of the main sub-
jects under discussion, but V. P. reassured him on the

FAREWELL PHASE

389

limitation of accession to three subjects - anything more
to be negotiated; the identity and integrity of the Hydera-
bad Army; and the Nizam's legislative powers. (This
last is a most tricky constitutional and political issue on
which we will need to brief ourselves carefully.) Laik's
position and the reconslitutioti of the Government were
considered. Zain stressed the difficulty of Laik dismiss-
ing the whole Cabinet except himself and re-forming it,
but this matter will be frankly discussed at the forthcom-
ing meeting. The possibility of Zain himself taking part
in the new Government was considered. He said he
would prefer to serve as Deputy to someone else, but
was ready to co-operate provided his appointment came
from the Ni/am direct, and not as a result of pressure
from the Government of India.

Zain seemed to feel that V. P.'s proposals on all these
subjects were being made in a more palatable form than
before, but so far as I know there was no change of
ground on the Indian side. V. P., however, spoke in
the most fervent and emotional terms of his esteem for
Zain and of his wish for settlement, and the understand-
ing thai clearly exists between the two men is encourag-
ing. The situation now largely revolves round the Mus-
soori meeting with Palcl and the measure of discretion
V. P. can get from that meeting. V. P. anticipates that
it will be no easy encounter.

Both V. P. and Zain were good enough to say that
my visit to Hyderabad had been helpful.

GOVERNOR-GIN FRAl/S LODGE, SIMLA,

Saturday, 22nd May, 194ti
To complete this crowded week, Fay and I set on; on
our last trek to Simla. The Mountbattens and nearly all
the Staff have been here ever since the beginning of my
Hyderabad trip. So much has happened since 1 left, and
1 have been so absorbed in my own activities, that it
seems almost like a return from exile.

390

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

T have had two long talks with Mountbatten alone.
He says he only wishes now that he had sent me down
earlier, as the value of my report to him is in its objec-
tivity. He has found it very hard, in view of his own
friendship for Monckton and his personal desire to achi-
eve a settlement before he leaves, to avoid a subjective
approach to the problem. In this connexion I gave him
my frank opinion that the Nizam may well be placing
more reliance on C. R. — a Southern Indian and a Mad-
rassi — than on himself as Governor-General. Mount-
batten was not worried about the Nizam's negative atti-
tude. The vital objective of stirring up a sense of urgency
among the ruling group in Hyderabad and of causing a
renewal of negotiations has, he feels, been secured. For,
he says, until 1 went neither side seemed prepared to make
a new move.

GOVERN MI. NT HOUSE, Ni W DELHI,

Tuesday, 25th May, 194H
I left Simla on Sunday morning with Vernon after little
more than thirty-six hours there. 1 am surfeited with
travel. The logistics of my last week are a serious chal-
lenge to constructive or sustained thought. We returned
to the furnace in Delhi as advance guards to Mountbat-
ten, who has spent the last twenty-four hours in Patiala.
We were able to advise him on arrival that Mir Laik AH,
who reached here on Sunday, has apparently come in com-
pletely the wrong spirit and is so out of touch with reality
that he claims that the crisis is now past. Mountbatten
therefore got to work on him to-day in what f believe is
the longest interview lie has had with anybody on the
entire mission — five hours in all.

Mountbatten began by giving him with brutal frank-
ness a picture of what would probably happen if no settle-
ment was reached and Hindu blood began to flow in
Hyderabad. If after his departure in a few weeks India
were to decide upon armed intervention, what could be
done by the Hyderabad army? Laik Ali said he fully

FAREWELL PHASE

391

appreciated the military position, but that he considered
accession ten times worse than paramountcy. He explain-
ed that while he was personally in favour of democratic
institutions, he was opposed to the introduction of respon-
sible government in Hyderabad simply because it would
without doubt lead to accession. When V. P. entered
the room Laik Ali proposed a long-term agreement for
five or even ten years covering the three central subjects.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI,

Wednesday, 26th May, 1948
Discussion between V. P. and Laik Ali a deux went
on far into the night, and V. P., with hij; prodigious
powers of drafting and formula-finding, has produced
comprehensive "Heads of Agreement". They are divid-
ed into two parts, and cover eleven principal items, Part
I dealing with the basic relation between Hyderabad and
India, and Part II with the interim measures to implement
Part I. V. P.'s "Heads of Agreement" met Laik Ali's
request to be able to present to the Nizam a third alter-
native to accession, which is ruled out anyhow, and a
plebiscite.

Muuntbatten himself is strongly of the opinion that a
plebiscite would be the best solution, as the "Heads of
Agreement" open up another depressing vista of protract-
ed and niggling negotiation over detail. Laik All's per-
sonal view would seem to be in the same sense, for he said
that he thought a plebiscite would "save the face of both
sides". At the Indian end the plebiscite finds favour,
in particular with Patel, whose blessing is indispensable,
even though there is recognition that it would not auto-
matically lead to accession.

GOVERNMENT HOUSE, NEW DELHI.

Saturday, 29th May, 1948
This is a most critical moment in the tantalising Hy-
derabad negotiations'. V. P. has been to see Patel at
Mussoori, and has returned from him with a constructive

392 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

but strongly worded message. Patel comes down once
more in favour of the plebiscite. As for the "Heads of
Agreement", he accepts the basic relationship in Part I
without amendment, but would tighten up the interim
measures of Part II by shifting the balance of control
more in favour of the non-Moslems. The final paragraph
of Patel's message written in his own hand urges that if
Laik Ali means business he should come up with pleni-
potentiary powers from the Nizam. "It is no use", he
writes, "discussing with a person who has to go back
every time for instructions."

He wants a telegram with a twenty-four-hour time-limit
to be sent, saying that if Laik Ali cannot return with
authority and agreement on the fundamentals within that
deadline, the Government of India would draw the con-
clusion that Hyderabad do not want to continue the ne-
gotiations and are merely playing for lime. His last
words are "finalise within a week". Nehru has expressed
great distrust of Laik Ali. Intelligence about his acti-
vities confirms that we are dealing with a very sly pro-
crastinator, but his -or the Nizam's —response cannot be
delayed much longer.

On the credit side is Monckton's decision to come out
again. Mountbatten has expressed his delight at the news,
saying that lie will try to hold the position until his ar-
rival, but pointing out that powerful influences — growing
stronger every day — are at work militating against the
settlement which they both want.

Monckton, however, is not due in India until the 3rd
June, which happens to be the day when I and my family
are due to leave Bombay by sea for home. It is thus
possible for Monckton's and my paths to cross in Bom-
bay on the morning of the 3rd without undue administra-
tive inconvenience, or danger of breach of confidence. As
Monckton is arranging to fly straight on to Hyderabad
and has not been fully in the picture on the developments
during the period of my own visit onwards, Mountbatten
sees in my presence a providential opportunity to brief

FAREWELL PilASE

393

him before he is called upon to give what may be the
decisive advice to the Nizam. So there will be no fading
away for me until L am finally aboard the ship.

This evening there was a farewell Staff party to Fay
and myself in the Panelled Room. We do not actually
leave until Tuesday morning, but this was the only time
that the Mountbattens could come, and, characteristic-
ally, they wished to be there. It was a very pleasant
family affair. J am very sorry to be leaving before the
final curtain. 1 would have liked to have been present
for the denouement over Hyderabad, and to have wit-
nessed the series of ceremonies of formal farewell, which
I am sure will burst the bounds of formality. But there
it is. The phase-out programme was arranged some time
back, and it would be very difficult to amend our plans.
During the party there was much amusement at my alleg-
ed likeness to a large portrait on the wall of the renown-
ed Tippoo Sahib. The picture shows a man of dismal
and almost morose countenance, and the comparison did
little to raise my morale!

Afterwards Mountbatten presented me with a silver
cigarctte-box generously inscribed. We were much mov-
ed bv these tokens of confidence, appreciation and friend-
ship. For myself, my biggest reward has been the pri-
vilege of serving a great man on a great mission.

(JOVI RN Ml NT HOl'Sr. NI.W* DLLHI,

Sunday, 30th May, W48
We have this evening been to a large reception given
by V. P. at the Delhi Gymkhana Club, which attracted,
so far as I could see, nearly every celebrity in Delhi.
For the Mountbattens it is the first in a formidable se-
quence of farewell parties during the next three weeks.
Through the middle of this milling throng a messenger
brought in no fewer than three letters from the Nizam,
which immediately absorbed the attention of host, prin-
cipal guest and Prime Minister. Most of the Jndian
and Foreign Press were present, and it did not take these

394 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

intelligence experts long to recognise that important and
far from favourable information had come through, as
Mountbatten, Nefiru and V. P., moving into a corner,
put their heads together and talked in anxious under-
tones.

At first sight it would seem that hopes of settlement
under Mountbatlen's auspices have received a severe set-
back. In the first letter the Nizam's reaction to the
"Heads of Agreement" was simply that he could do no
more than await Monckton's arrival. In the second he
returned a brusque "no" to the discreet suggestion that
he might consider appointing a new and more acceptable
Prime Minister- -a suggestion which Laik Ali himself, with
what degree of candour it is difficult to say, had express-
ed himself as ready to sponsor if it would serve the cause
of good-will. The third is simply a renewed invitation
to Mountbatten to visit him in Hyderabad. Here again
the terms of the invitation are singularly lacking in warmth
or even courtesy of expression.

Mountbatten decided— wisely, ] think — to reply only to
the first letter, expressing regret at further delay and the
hope thai when Laik Ali comes to Delhi the next time
he would he allowed to bring with him plenipotentiary
powers to reach a settlement.

In addition to these deplorable notes of negation from
the Nizam, Laik Ali has weighed in denying the accuracy
of Vernon's notes on his meeting with Mountbatten,
Nehru and V. P. on the 26th and asserting that he had
never agreed to India's declaration of right to overriding
legislation in the three central subjects. Everyone in the
room at the time, however, is quite certain that he did
agree. This letter only seems to reinforce Nehru's warn-
ing that Laik Ali is not to be trusted, and that his sole
objective is to delay matters. Monckton's intervention
assumes hourly more decisive importance.

In spite of the current tension Zain Yar Jung creates
calmness and confidence with dinner-parties at Hydera-
bad House. Almost our last engagement before leaving

FAREWELL PHASE

395

was to dine with him and his, family and entourage. As
we sat out in the gardens after dinner, one of the Hydera-
badi ladies exchanging polite conversation put such small
items as Standstill Agreements, Instruments of Accession
and Paramountcy into their proper perspective. "Delhi",
she sighed, "is not what it was. There are no Moghul
Emperors now!"

M. v. cali:donia, Thursday, 3rd June, 1948
As my last official duty before boarding the ship, I re-
ported back to Mountbatten by telegram that Monckton
at the outset was clearly in a state of doubt and despond-
ency and unaware of the by now crucial importance of his
advice in swaying events favourably. He felt the chances
of the Nizam agreeing to anything were a hundred to seven
against, and if he was over-pushed, he himself was ready
to suggest that he should fight it out. 1 stressed the reality
of the political tension and the urgency of the time-factor,
and was able to say that f had left him in a much more
constructive and hopeful frame of mind than I had found
him.

Monckton urged that he must have time to handle the
Nizam in his own way, for he was hardly ever susceptible
to direct assault in one interview. However, if and when
a point of decision was really reached, he would come to
Delhi immediately. After advising him of Mountbatten's
and Patel's support for a plebiscite, 1 was relieved to hear
that he had already, of his own accord, arrived at a con-
clusion firmly in favour of this solution. He thinks that
the Nizam's sharp reply about Laik Ali's possible replace-
ment as touching his prerogatives might have been the
outcome of some mishandling in the original transmission
of the proposal. Monckton intends to tackle this problem
himself, and considers Zain to be the only feasible
alternative.

Apart from the customs interruption, I was well satis-
fied with this meeting. It helped to confirm my own be-
lief that in politics much turns on the art of being avail-

396

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

able in the right place al the right time. Monckton, for
his part, said he was most grateful for it, as he confessed
that while it would not have been desirable for him to
stop off at Delhi first on this visit, he would have been
at a disadvantage in going straight into the "Nizam wholly
unbriefed on the situation from the Indian end.

ionix)N, Wednesday, 23rd June, 1948
We reached Liverpool yesterday, after twenty days at
sea. The cyclone duly met us one hundred and fifty miles
out of Bombay, and remained to lash us all the way to
Aden. I was back just in time to watch the Mounlbattens
and all the rest of the party touch down at Northolt, the
same journey having taken them forty-eight hours by air.

Both the Duke of Edinburgh and Mr. Atllee were at
the airfield to invest this homecoming with unique distinc-
tion, for 1 doubt whether a Royal Duke and a Prime
Minister of I he day have been present together before
to greet a Viceroy or Governor-General on his return.
There were other Ministers, high officials and senior
officers, B.B.C., Newsreel and Press representatives, not
to mention photographers in large numbers, and last but
not least a Guard of Honour of a hundred Indian sailors
from their new cruiser, the /V////, which is still in
Portsmouth.

Attlee's presence, loo, was particularly appropriate, for
the transfer of power in India may well be regarded as
the most momentous policy decision of his Premiership.
In its conception and implementation he has throughout
carried a special responsibility, so that history will un-
doubtedly link Atlee and Mountbatlen in much the same
way as it has Morlfiy and Minto, Montagu and
Chelmsford.

While we were all in the ante-room having tea, Mount-
batten, who was discussing the Hyderabad situation with
the Prime Minister, called me over to say a few words
about the impressions I had formed of the Nizam on my
visit. Mr. Attlee listened carefully to the brief picture

FAREWELL PHASE

397

I drew; then said that he was quite satisfied that every-
thing humanly possible had been done to secure an
honourable settlement for the Nizam, and that we could
all go away with clear consciences in this matter. I do
not as yet know the details of the breakdown, having only
heard over the intermittent ship's radio that attempts to
reach an agreement had failed.

It is stange to think that the Mount battens and their
Staff party, who for the past fifteen months have worked
in such close unison, are now dispersing for the last time.
The more intensely you live in the vortex of great events,
the harder it is to break away and accept normalcy as
your lot. As we go off into this soft summer evening,
most of us will be taking a spell of leave, if only to learn
over again how to cope with the daily round at the
routine pace.

London, Monday, 28th June, 1948
In spile of the lures and distractions of Bradman's fare-
well Test Match at Lords, I have now had time to piece
together the drama of Mountbatten's last three weeks in
India. The ship's radio had reported only the briefest
statement of the Hyderabad breakdown, together with
short reports of Mountbattcn's final broadcast, and some
indication that the farewell scenes in Delhi had been no
less heart-warming than those of the 15th August, and in
many ways even more remarkable, in so far as they were
now simply expressions of personal gratitude to the
Mounlbattcns.

From long talks 1 have had with Ronnie and Vernon,
and one or two with Mountbatten himself since their re-
turn, and from notes which were maintained right up to
the day of their departure, it would seem that the course
of events after my meeting with Monckton was briefly
as follows.

Monckton stayed for three days in Hyderabad, return-
ing with Laik Ali to Delhi. At first the discussions were
stormy and the negotiations more than once on the verge

398

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

of complete collapse. Nehru refused to see Laik AH,
Monckton threatened to leave for home. Mountbatten
at one point saved the day by telephoning Nehru to say
he was quite sure he could find a satisfactory solution,
when in fact he had no idea how or where to seek it.
But somehow a life-line was maintained. Nehru made
a helpful speech on the 8th June, posing and answering
the question for his critics as to why the Indian Army
had not already marched in. He replied that whenever
force was employed it created more problems than it
solved. The storm subsided, and Mountbatten was left
with effective control over the negotiations.

Monckton, for his part, recognised that something more
than a long-term plebiscite was required to restore the
situation. Patel, from his sick-bed, still wanted unqualifi-
ed acceptance of accession. He now urged that no more
formulas should be provided from the Indian side. This
was acceptable to Monckton, who put up two documents
— a draft Firman to introduce responsible government,
establish a Constituent Assembly early in 1949 and re-
constitute immediately the existing Government. The
second document was the first part of V.P.'s "Heads of
Agreement"' in full. Laik Ali once again played for time,
saying he must return to the Ni/am. On the 9th June
rumours reached Delhi that a Pakistan representative was
in Hyderabad, but Laik Ali denied this on oath, and
agreement was reached that he should return to Hydera-
bad for consultation.

On the 12th June, Monckton reported getting the pro-
posals past the Nizam and through the I Executive Coun-
cil, except for two points — the issue of overriding legisla-
tion, and the composition of the Constituent Assembly.
This led to further difficult discussions, first between
Mountbatten, Monckton and Nehru in Delhi, and then
at a meetine with Patel and most of the Cabinet at which
Mountbatten was present in Mussoori. But the proposals
were agreed as modified by the Nizam subject to the dele-
tion of any direct reference to parity in the composition

FAREWELL PHASE

399

of the Assembly, and the substitution, instead, of the
words, kh in consultation with the leaders of the major
political parties" in Hyderabad.

On the 13th June, Monckton strongly urged Laik Ali
to come up, with plenipotentiary powers this time, but
once again he was limited in his discretion both by the
Council and the Nizam himsell. On the 14th June, Laik
Ali asked for four new amendments to the "Heads of
Agreement". These were, first, that the Government of
India would only request Hyderabad to pass legislation
similiar to that in force in India, and not peculiar to
Hyderabad; secondly, that Hyderabad should be allowed
to retain eight thousand irregulars: thirdly, that the Raza-
kars should be disbanded gradually, and not all at once,
and fourthly, that the state of emergency under which
India might station troops in Hyderabad should be de-
fined under the Government of India Act. Mountbatten
felt there was little hope of getting these additional points
past the Government of India, but, much to his pleasure
and surprise, Nehru was ready to agree.

On the 15th June, Mountbatten saw the Hyderabad de-
legation and reported this unexpected success. Laik Ali
at once raised two new points. He wanted declarations
of economic and fiscal freedom to be included. Once
again the Government of India agreed to give sympathe-
tic consideration, and suggested that these could be stress-
ed in a collateral letter. Mountbatten said that on this
point Nehru went so far as to propose the inclusion in
the collateral letter provision of facilities for joint collabo-
ration in the economic development of Hyderabad. Laik
Ali, apparently not realising what he meant, actually asked
for this to be deleted. Only on Monckton protesting that
it would be most unwise for Hyderabad to pass over this
offer, and Mountbatten explaining that it had hitherto
always been conditional upon full accession, and was thus
a further example of good-will, did Laik Ali withdraw
his request. But, as Mountbatten pointed out, the incid-
ent was typical of his exasperating obtuseness at this time.

400 MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Laik AH left for Hyderabad with the final document
and all the amendments, Monckton stressing upon him
the need now for total acceptance, or total refusal. An
answer was awaited at 7.30 that evening, but no message
came through until 9.40, when the Nizam regretted his
inability to give a final word without taking the opinion
of his Council. This was physically not possible until the
next day. The delay was accepted in Delhi.

On the 16th al noon, Mountbatten and Monckton were
informed that the Nizam had been recommended not to
accept the proposals on tour new grounds which Mount-
batten, and, I understood, even Monckton, considered so
unjustifiable and ridiculous that it was decided that
Monckton should fly down to Hyderabad during the night
to read out and underline Mount batten's reply.

His most serious objection was the deletion of the
words "on a basis which 1 shall consider later" in a sub-
paragraph of the firman referring to the setting up of
the Constituent Assembly. This deletion had already been
agreed to by his delegation, and could by no stretch of
the imagination be regarded as a major point of substance.
Another objection was his unwillingness to allow the eco-
nomic agreement (which in any case had only been offered
by India at the last minute) to be settled by a collateral
letter. He now wanted it in the body of the agreement.

By midday on the 17th there was a telephone message
from Monckton with the one word "lost". By the even-
ing a completely new point had been raised by the Nizam,
which he had never mentioned before, concerning India's
right to station troops in the event of emergency. He asked
for the negotiations to^ be continued. Nehru and V. P.
waited for Monckton, and then held a Press conference
releasing the terms that had been made available to the
Nizam.

Even now Nehru promised to leave this present offer
open for acceptance and impose no time-limit. Monckton
told Mountbatten that he had been particularly disappoint-
ed to find that Laik Ali had spent three hours with Razvi

FAREWELL PHASE

401

before even seeing the Nizam. He also gave his view at
an informal Press conference that the so-called blockade
of Hyderabad had not been imposed by the central Gov-
ernment, and probably not by the Provincial administra-
tions either, but rather by the individual action of low-
level officials.

Mountbatten now withdrew officially from the negotia-
tions, but made one last effort in a long, persuasive tele-
gram, a revised "left barrel", which was supplemented
by a message from Monckton. Both told him to have
the courage of his convictions and not allow himself to
sacrifice the interests of his State at the behest of the Ute-
had clique. The Jttehad extremists made it quite clear
that they were not prepared to enter into any concessions
which would limit their control over the State, and when
it came to the crisis, the Nizam lacked the will to assert
himself against this group.

Mountbatten feels that the main reason for failure is
that the principals on either side have never been able to
get together throughout the entire eleven months of nego-
tiation, and he is still confident that if the Nizam had come
to Delhi and he could have acted as mediator, agreement
could have been reached. Similarly, if the Hyderabad
delegation had had more negotiating powers and ability
to appreciate Moneklon's magnificent negotiating skill and
fundamental personal loyalty to his client, the Nizam, the
outcome might well have been favourable.

The prolonged Hyderabad negotiations, with their cres-
cendo in the last two weeks of his term of office, made
it impossible for Mountbatten to effect any last-minute
act of mediation over Kashmir. Tn March he had secured
the agreement of the two Prime Ministers to meel each
other at roughly monthly intervals. But two months frad
passed without any action on this, and Mountbatten sug-
gested that Nehru should write to Liaquat to propose a
meeting, preferably in Delhi, which would enable Liaquat
to say good-bye to Mountbatten before he left. But the

402

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

attempt had first to be postponed owing to Hyderabad,
and then abandoned owing to Liaquat's illness.

The ground had been prepared for detailed discussion
of various solutions. The Indian Cabinet, although very
bitter about reports of the participation of large regular
Pakistan Army units, were still in a comparatively recep-
tive mood for settlement. When Nehru sent detailed evid-
ence of the Pakistan Army's intervention, it was signi-
ficant that Liaquat in his reply did not specifically deny
the charge, but stressed realistically the danger to the se-
curity of Pakistan. "As the Indian Army approaches the
North-west Frontier", he declared, "the tribesmen feel
directly threatened." Jt is Mountbattcn's opinion that here
again the inability of the two principals to come together
at this particular moment was politically and psychologi-
cally most unfortunate.

But frustrations with the Nizam and over Kashmir are
but incidentals when set against the Mountbattens' de-
cisive victory over the hearts of the Indian people. The
Mountbattens' last day in India was, 1 hear from all sides,
a triumph beyond contrivance or imagination, ft was
borne in upon them with overwhelming emphasis that
India's people and Government had recognised the mean-
ing of their mission and the sincerity of their endeavours,
and were hailing them as liberators and friends.

There was first a farewell address by the Delhi Munici-
pality. To receive this they drove through densely packed
streets, along the Chandni Chowk, the great highway of
Old Delhi, down which no Viceroy had passed since the
assassination attempt on Hardinge in 1911. They were
mobbed, cheered and garlanded all the way to the Gandhi
grounds, where a crowd of a quarter of a million had
gathered, and where a further quarter of a million were
trying to gain entrance.

In the evening at the last of the great State banquets,*
given this time by the Cabinet, Nehru spoke in memorable

* It is interesting to note that the Monntbattens themselves
throughout their fifteen months in India carried through, on top

FAREWELL PHASE

40*

terms, paying heartfelt tributes to the Mountbattens, not
forgetting Pamela, "who, coming straight from school,
and possessing all the charm she does, did grown-up per-
son's work in this troubled scene of India". Of Mount-
batten himself he declared, "You came here, sir, with a
high reputation, but many a reputation has foundered in
India. You lived here through a period of great difficulty
and crisis, and yet your reputation has not foundered.
That is a remarkable feat."

He next spoke of Lady Mountbatten as possessing "the
healer's touch". "Wherever you have gone, you have
brought solace, you have brought hope and encourage-
ment. Is it surprising therefore that the people of India
should love you and look up to you as one of themselves
and should grieve that you are going?"

Referring to the wonderful demonstration of friendship
and affection by the common people of Delhi four hours
before, "J do not know", Nehru said, "how Lord and
Lady Mountbatten felt on that occasion, but used as I
am to these vast demonstrations here, 1 was much affected,
and I wondered how it was that an Englishman and
Englishwoman could become so popular in India during
this brief period of time. ... A period certainly of achieve-
ment and success in some measure, but also a period of
sorrow and disaster. . , . Obviously this was not connected
so much with what had happened, but rather with the
good faith, the friendship and the love of India that these
two possessed. . . . You may have many gifts and presents,
but there is nothing more real or precious than the love
and affection of the people. You have seen yourself, Sir
and Madam, how that love and affection work."

Mountbatten and Lady Mountbatten, visibly moved,
replied with the eloquence of the heart. At the end gifts
were exchanged, the Government presenting the Mount-

of all their other activities, a prodigious programme of enter-
tainment at Government House, which played no small part in
the promotion of good-will. Altogether they entertained 7,605
guests to luncheon, 8,313 to dinner and 25,287 to garden-parties,
at homes and tea-parties.

404

MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

battens with an inscribed tray bearing the signatures of
all the Governors of the Provinces, and Cabinet, and
Mount batten handing over on behalf of the King the gold
plate presented originally by the Worshipful Company of
Goldsmiths and Silversmiths to King George V for use
in the Slate dining-room of his Viceroy in New Delhi.
This he did at the King's express wish as "a symbol of
the friendship of all English men and women, and indeed
of all the people in the United Kingdom to the people of
India". After the dinner there was a glittering reception,
which was attended by no fewer than six thousand guests.

Among Lady Mountbatten's last public acts was to
visit the two great refugee camps of Kurukshetra and
Panipat, where some three hundred thousand refugees still
shelter. One of the Indian A.D.CVs with her reported
that he had never visited scenes like it in India. The re-
fugees gathered round her in their thousands, in tears at
saying good-bye to her. In many other camps refugees
collected their pice and annas to buy a railway ticket for
one of their members just to carry some small gift to her
as token of gratitude.

It was at another unique gathering- a dinner given to
the Mounlbattens by the entire Diplomatic Corps in Delhi
— that the Chinese Ambassador, doyen of the Corps, a
scholar and a man of fine sensibilities, came nearest per-
haps to catching the inner meaning and mood of this his-
toric leave-taking. By way of bidding farewell to the
Mountbattens he quoted the lines of a famous Chinese
poet; —

"Deep is the water in the Peuch-blossom spring,
Deeper still is our*hearts' feeling
When good friends are leaving."

PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES

In the course of this narrative more than two hundred
and fifty names of prominent personalities are mentioned.
Many of the references are only incidental and most of
them self-explanatory. Footnotes have been kept to a
minimum. With the coming of Independence the func-
tions and duties of many of the leaders and officials either
changed or were terminated. The following are some of
the principal dramatis persona', with (where applicable)
their official positions before and after 15th August, 1947
(Independence Day), within the period covered by this
book. Cross-references are provided wherever Christian
names or abbreviated titles have been used. It should be
noted that C.O.H.Q. and S.E.A.C. refer to Combined
Operations Headquarters and South-east Asia Command
(Lord Mounlbuttcn's two major War Commands).

Abdullah, Sheikh, Leader of the National Conference
Party in Kashmir Slate. After accession to India was
appointed Prime Minister by the Maharaja of Kashmir.
Member of Indian delegation to United Nations,
January 1948.

Abell, G. E. B. (later Sir George), Private Secretary to

the Viceroy (P.S.V.).
Ali, Mir Laik, President of the Nizam's Council from

November 1947.
Amrit Kaur, Rajkumari, Mahatma Gandhi's Secretary;

Minister for Health in the Government of the Dominion

of India.

Auchinleck, Field-Marshal Sir Claude, Commander-in-
Chief in India until 15th August; Supreme Commander
administering partition of Indian Army until 30th
November, 1947.

405

406

MISSION WITH MOUNT BATTEN

Ayyengar, Gopalaswami, Minister without Portfolio in the
Government of the Dominion of India; Leader of Indian
delegation to United Nations in January 1948.

Baldev Sinqh, Sardar, Sikh leader; Member for Defence
in the Interim Government; Minister for Defence in the
Government of the Dominion of India.

BItabha, C. H., Member for Works, Mines and Power
in the Interim Government; Minister for Commerce in
the Government of the Dominion of India.

Bhopal, The Nawab of, Ruler of Bhopal State; Chancellor
of the Chamber of Princes until May 1947.

Bikaner, The Maharaja of, Ruler of Bikaner State.

Brabourne, Lord and Lady, son-in-law and elder daughter
of Earl and Counter Mountbatten of Burma.

Brock man. Captain (S.) R. V., R. N., Personal Secretary
to the Viceroy; Private Secretary to the Governor-
General of India from 15th August, 1947.

Chhatari, The Nawab of. President of the Nizam's Coun-
cil from May 1947 to November 1947.

C. R. refers to C. Rajagopalachari.

Erskine Crum, Lieutenant-Colonel V. l\. Conference
Secretary to the Viceroy; and to the Governor-General
of India.

Gandhi, Mahatma, "father of the Nation".

Gandhi, Devadas, Managing hditor of the Hindustan

Times, and son of the Mahatma.
George refers to Sir George Abcll and to Commander

Nicholls, according to context.
Hyderabad, The Ni/am of. Ruler of Hyderabad State.
Ismay, Lord, Chief of the Viceroy's Staff; and of the

Governor-General of I«dia's Staff until December, 1947.
Jenkins, Sir Evan, Governor of the Punjab until 15th

August, 1947.

Jinnah, Mohammed Ali (Quaid-e-Azam), President of the
All India Moslem League; first Governor-General of the
Dominion of Pakistan.

Kashmir, The Maharaja of. Ruler of Jammu and Kash-
mir State.

PRINCIPAL PERSONALITIES

407

Kripalani, Acharya J. B., President of Congress.

Liaquat Alt Khan, General Secretary of the All India
Moslem League; Member for Finance in the Interim
Government; Prime Minister of the Government of the
Dominion of Pakistan.

Lockhart, Lieutenant-General Sir Rob, General Officer
Commanding-in-Chief, Southern Command, India; Go-
vernor of the North-west Frontier Province from June
to 15th August, 1947; Commander-in-Chief Indian
Army, Dominion of India, 15th August, 1947, to
January 1948.

Mat thai, Dr. John, Member for Transport and Railways
in the Interim Government' Minister for Transport and
Railways in the Government of the Dominion of India.

Menon, V. K. Krishna, High Commissioner for India in
the United Kingdom from August 1947.

Menon, V. P., Reforms Commissioner to the Viceroy; and
from July 1947 Secretary of the States Department,
Government of the Dominion of India.

Mievillc, Sir Fric, Principal Secretary to the Viceroy.

Mohammed AH, Financial Adviser in the Military Finance
Department of the Government of India; Member of
the Steering Committee of the Partition Council;
Secretary-General of the Dominion of Pakistan.

Monckton, Sir Walter, Constitutional Adviser to the
Nizam of Hyderabad.

Mounthatten oj Burma, Rear-Admiral the Viscount
(created Karl, August 1947), last Viceroy of India 22nd
March to 14th August, 1947. First Governor-General
of the Dominion of India, 15th August, 1947, to 21st
lune. 1^48.

Mounthatten of Burma, Countess, wife of the last Viceroy

and first Governor-General of India.
Mounthatten, the Lady Pamela, younger daughter of Earl

and Countess Mounlbatten of Burma.
Munshi, K. M., Agent-General for India in Hyderabad

from December 1947.

40H MISSION WITH MOUNTBATTEN

Nehru, Pandit Jawaharlal, Member for External Affairs
and Commonwealth Relations in the Interim Govern-
ment; Vice-President of the Interim Government; Prime
Minister of the Dominion of India.

Nicholls, Commander (S.) G. H., R. N., Deputy Personal
Secretary to the Viceroy; Deputy Private Secretary to
the Governor-General of India from 15th August, 1947.

Nishtar, Sardar Abdur Rab, Member for Communications
in the Interim Government; Minister for Communica-
tions and States in the Government of the Dominion
of Pakistan.

Patel, H. M., Secretary of the Indian Cabinet; Member
of the Steering Committee of the Partition Council.

Patel, Sardar Vallabhbhai. Member for Home Affairs and
for Information and Broadcasting, and from July 1947
for States in the Interim Government; Deputy Prime
Minister of the Dominion of India.

Patiala, Maharaja of. Ruler of Patiala State, and from
May to August 1947 last Chancellor of the Chamber
of Princes.

Prasad. Dr. Rajendra, Member for Food and Agriculture
in the Interim Government and President of the Con-
stituent Assembly.

Raiagopulacluiri, Chakravarti, Member for Industries and
Supplies in the Interim Government; Governor of Ben-
gal after 15th August, 1947, and first Indian Governor-
General of the Dominion of India, 21st June. 1948.

Ri'cs, Major-General T. W., Commander Punjab Bound-
ary Force July to September 1947; Head of Governor-
General's (India) Military Emergency Staff September
to December 1947.

Ronnie, refers to Captain (S.) R. V. Brockman, R.N.

Scott, I. D., Deputy Secretary to the Viceroy (D.P.S.V.).

Trivedi, Sir Chandulal, Governor of Orissa, Governor of
East Punjab from lMh August, 1947.

Vernon, refers to Lieutenant -Colonel V. F. Erskine Crum.

V . P. refers to V. P, Menon.